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***Pratibhā: The concept of intuition in the philosophy of
Abhinavagupta***

Kuanpoonpol, Priyawat, Ph.D.

Harvard University, 1991

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***Pratibhā* : The Concept of Intuition
in the Philosophy of Abhinavagupta**

A thesis presented
by
Priyawat Kuanpoonpol

to

The Department of Sanskrit and Indian Studies

in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
in the subject of
Sanskrit and Indian Studies

Harvard University
Cambridge, Massachusetts

October 1991

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in the Philosophy of Abhinavagupta.**

An Abstract

This dissertation is a study of Abhinavagupta's concept of intuition, with particular attention to its role in an aesthetic experience. In this study, the philosopher's synthesis of this concept is traced to three traditions of his intellectual heritage. The grammarian Bhartṛhari's treatment of intuition in the *Vākyapadīya* provides the groundwork for defining the creative role of language in cognition. The Śaiva religious philosophy uses the concept of intuition in forwarding the idea that a subject is free and independent in thought, and that the subject, like God, Śiva, is a unity of consciousness. A human forms mental images out of the spirit and will to know and act. Ānandavardhana in poetics also advances the theory of *rasadhvani* ("Suggestion of Sentiments") in which the poet, possessing intuition and using suggestion in poetic language, can devise original, mood-evoking poems. Abhinava combines these meanings in his concept of intuition which, in the largest sense, is consciousness's verbal immanence unfolding from a partless homogeneity into diverse, perceptible phenomena. In Abhinava's explanation of an aesthetic experience, the concept of intuition underlies the unity of the imaginative enterprise that is an aesthetic continuum comprising the whole of the theater--the poet, actor, and audience. This unity in turn gives the theater its peculiar aesthetic modality and coherence, beginning with a desire to enjoy oneself and ending in the relishing of a *rasa*, an aesthetic mood. Ramifications of intuition as a valid means of knowledge are discussed in the concluding remarks. Descriptions of different aspects of intuition are made with specific references to his intellectual sources: Bhartṛhari in language theory, Utpaladeva in the Śaiva theory of cognition, and Ānandavardhana in poetics.

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Abbreviations

<i>Abh</i>	<i>Abhinavabhāratī</i>
<i>AE</i>	<i>Aesthetic Experience According to Abhinavagupta</i>
<i>AR</i>	<i>Aesthetic Rapture: the Rasādhyāya of the Nāṭyaśāstra</i>
<i>ASS</i>	Ānandāśrama Sanskrit Series
<i>Bh</i>	<i>Bhartrhari : A Study of the Vākyapadīya in the Light of the Ancient Commentaries</i>
<i>Dhā</i>	<i>Dhvanyāloka</i>
<i>Dhāl</i>	<i>Dhvanyālokalocana</i>
<i>DCMS</i>	Deccan College Monograph Series
<i>HOS</i>	Harvard Oriental Series
<i>HSP</i>	<i>History of Sanskrit Poetics</i>
<i>IP</i>	<i>Indian Poetics</i>
<i>IPK</i>	<i>Īśvarapratyabhijñānakārikā</i>
<i>IPKv</i>	<i>Īśvarapratyabhijñānakārikāvṛtti</i>
<i>IPV</i>	<i>Īśvarapratyabhijñānavimarśnī</i>
<i>IPVV</i>	<i>Īśvarapratyabhijñānavivṛttivimarśnī</i>
<i>KA</i>	<i>Kāvyaḷamkāra</i>
<i>KĀ</i>	<i>Kāvyaḷadarsa</i>
<i>KASS</i>	<i>Kāvyaḷamkārasārasaṃgraha</i>
<i>KSS</i>	Kashmir Sanskrit Series
<i>KSTS</i>	Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies
<i>NS</i>	<i>Nāṭyaśāstra</i>
<i>RT</i>	<i>Rājatarāṅginī</i>
<i>TĀ</i>	<i>Tantrāloka</i>
<i>TS</i>	<i>Tantrasāra</i>
<i>SBE</i>	Sacred Books of the East
<i>SD</i>	<i>Śivadr̥ṣṭī</i>
<i>SK</i>	<i>Spandakārikā</i>
<i>SS</i>	<i>Śivasūtra</i>
<i>VP</i>	<i>Vākyapadīya</i>
<i>VSS</i>	Vidyābhavan Sanskrit Series (Chowkhamba)
<i>YS</i>	<i>Yogasūtra</i>

Chapter 1

Introduction

In the few centuries before Abhinavagupta's lifetime (late 10th to 11th century), a number of distinguished works were composed by the scholars and poets of Kashmir. Although Kalhana's history does not give us specific accounts of their achievements, it can be inferred from works in poetics and philosophy that partisans of various schools of thought were actively engaged in fruitful debates. A vital affluence of the kingdom also encouraged a high degree of intellectual intercourse, resulting in critical and theoretical innovations that come down to us in a wealth of treatises, notably in the areas of literature, poetics, Saiva philosophy, and grammar.¹ We observe that several authors were learned not only in the confines of their own fields, but that their interests in peripheral areas added syncretic insights to their proper endeavors.

Abhinava was an intellectual whose many interests, far from being fragmented, converged in a core of beliefs that formed a characteristic, philosophical outlook. One such central view is his concept of intuition, or

¹ Georg Böhler, "Detailed Report of a Tour in Search of Sanskrit Mss. Made in Kashmir, Rajputana, and Central India," *Journal of the Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society*, 1877: Extra number (vol. 34).

pratibhā. In the dissertation, I have mapped out a strategy of focusing on Abhinava's treatment of this concept in aesthetics, drawing on his knowledge in various disciplines to describe it in that context. By tracing the intellectual sources that contribute to his delineation of the notion of aesthetic intuition and by demonstrating how he shapes the structure of an aesthetic perception, I show that the model of the aesthetic structure depends on a general theory of cognition in Śaiva religious philosophy. Since, according to Śaivism, cognition is produced by the homogeneous consciousness in one basic way and in being produced implies a particular relationship of the subject, object, and experience, the structure of various kinds of experience is fundamentally the same, differing only as modalities of consciousness.

The idea of intuition (*pratibhā*) is traditionally treated in passing in Indian philosophy, with the exception of the Sāṃkhya and Śaṅkara's Advaitavedānta systems. Intuition, as a means of knowledge, unaided by the input of a sensory perception and occurring through a sense-contact with its object, is not considered valid. Intuitions of morally perfected individuals, however, are sources of saintly, revealed knowledge (*arṣajñāna*) that is the basis of scriptural authoritativeness.² The reasoning is that such extraordinary persons, seers (*ṛṣi*s), exist in reality itself and know it directly without an intermediary of the senses. Vedic seers and poets, for example, are said to have a special wisdom or insight (*dhī*) through which they receive direct knowledge from the divine. This insight gives them an immediate knowledge of reality which they sing out in

² Gopinath Kaviraj, "The Doctrine of *Pratibhā* in Indian Philosophy," *ABORI* 5 (1924): part I, 1-18, part II 113-132.

the verses of Vedic hymns.³ This connection between extraordinary cognitive and poetic powers as conceived by Vedic poets is maintained in the later literary tradition which attributes a poet's genius to his *pratibhā*. It is the insight and inspiration capable of immortalizing human deeds in an imperishable beauty of poetry.⁴

Abhinava was at a historically advantageous point where a few centuries before Utpaladeva had articulated a rigorous system of Śaiva philosophy and Ānandavardhana brought out his revolutionary theory of the suggestion of an aesthetic sentiment (*rasadhvani*) in poetics. Both predecessors of Abhinava relied substantially on Bhartṛhari's theory of language and consciousness in formulating and systematizing their theories.

In the Śaiva theory of cognition, knowledge is seen to be subjectively produced by an agent who is independent and sovereign in his mental construction. Each thought is a fresh and new creation on the part of

³ Jan Gonda, "Dhīṣ in the Ṛgveda," and "Pratibhā," chs. 2 and 15 in *The Vision of the Vedic Poets* (1st Indian edition, Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 1984), pp. 68-169, 318-348.

⁴ A clear example can be seen in Kalhana, the author of the history of Kashmir who thinks of himself as a poet because of his truth-telling capacity. See Stein, M. A., tr. *The Rājatarāṅginī: A Chronicle of the Kings of Kashmir*, (RTR) vol. 1 (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, Repr. 1979, 1st ed. 1900), verses 1.3-5, 7, pp. 1-2.

"I. 3. Worthy of praise is that power of true poets, whatever it may be, which surpasses even the stream of nectar, in as much as by it their own bodies of glory as well as those of others obtain immortality. 4. Who else but poets resembling Prajapatis [in creative powers] and able to bring forth lovely productions, can place the past times before the eyes of men? 5. If the poet did not see in his mind's eye the existences which he is to reveal to all men, what other indication would there be of his possessing divine intuition [*pratibhā*]? 7. The noble-minded [poet] is alone worthy of praise whose word, like that of a judge, keeps free from love or hatred in relating the facts of the past."

consciousness whose intuition, tinged by ideas of empirical things, verbally determines a cognition. In poetics, the theory of suggestion postulates that poetic language functions in revealing such meanings that, when perceived by a sympathetic reader, leads him/her to realize an aesthetic sentiment, i.e., a *rasa*. Ānanda encourages the poet, who is a god-like creator in the literary realm, to use the suggestive function of language and to exercise his *pratibhā* in order to compose novel and original works. Abhinava comments on the major works of these two predecessors. The *vimarsinī* and the *vivṛtivismarsinī* are commentaries to Utpala's *Pratyabhijñākārikā* and *Pratyabhijñāvṛtti* respectively, and the *Locana* to Ānandavardhana's *Dhvanyāloka*.

Abhinava's use of the term *pratibhā* combines cognitive and aesthetic aspects of creativity: the subjective freedom fundamental to every cognition is not different from imaginative and emotive powers in poetic language. Abhinava attributes a creative intuition to the sensitive audience as well as to the poet, and in that way he systematically defines a continuum of aesthetic experience, i.e., the theater, as an expanse of common imagination spun out of the intuitive power of the poet and responded to by the same in the audience. Their common bond is the language of poetry that spellbinds the spectators to a world brought forth in the poet's imaginings.

Combining literary criticism with religious philosophy, Abhinava conceives of the poet's intuition as the noumenous substance of the mind-made world. The poet is like God who plays at painting the universe on the screen that is Himself. The sympathetic spectators, exercising their intuitions in commonly experiencing the pleasures of drama, are akin to

creatures (*jīva* , *paśu*) who reflect God's universe in their everyday consciousnesses. Thus, in Abhinava's poetics, theatrical unity between the poet, actor and audience is structured analogously to unity between God and humans in Śaiva theology.

In this comprehensive view, the concept of intuition emerges as the innate power of consciousness that evolves from a first, noumenal moment through stages of increasingly formed language into self-conscious thoughts and communicable expressions. Language, in Abhinava's Śaiva Tantric view, is not merely the fabric of thought and communication, but subtle language in the highest sphere is the world-creative material itself. Supreme language, *parā vāk* or *pratibhā devī*, is the voice that is God's mind. This large meaning of a world-creative language is never entirely absent whenever Abhinava speaks of knowledge in other contexts. Language is the web of human society and the link between humans and the divine. Ordinary language binds humans to the world and makes them cattle (*paśu*) relative to the Lord; but the supreme language, being the essential identity between consciousness and Consciousness, leads a fettered beast back to the recognition of his true, sovereign nature.

Poetic language evokes meanings deeper and more moving than literal expressions of ordinary language. For Ānandavardhana the literary theorist, suggested meanings are the soul of poetry because they penetrate mere conventions to arouse the sensitive audience's sympathetic feelings. Abhinava devises a psychological theory to show how literary and dramatic stimuli turn emotional states (*bhāva*) into aesthetic sentiments (*rasa*), and how these sublime emotions repose in and are relished by the soul.

In this way, Abhinava views humans as god-like in nature and power. The human mind, even in a cattle-like state of bondage, has an independent and sovereign power of imagination. The human condition is underlaid by a spirited desire to know and to act. At bottom, a self-awareness of one's own agency in knowledge and action is the wonderment (*camatkāra*) that Abhinava ascribes commonly to ordinary cognitive and aesthetic perceptions. *Camatkāra* is the joy of perceiving the self by the self. It is a supreme wonder and delight in the knowledge that 'I' illuminate my thoughts; *camatkāra* is also the pleasure of relishing aesthetic sentiments by the self that savors its emotive creations. Abhinava transforms the deplorable transience of *samsāra* into a world renewed at every moment. Images in thought and action succeed one another, and everything that comes into existence, good or evil, is real. The ordinary world of transactions (*vyavahāra*) based on human conventions is real because of being constantly useful to people. So, too, the extraordinarily beguiling world of poetry and drama is a reality proven by the sheer experience of enjoyment.

Bringing together these facets of the concept of intuition while focusing on its development in the aesthetic context, I trace the conceptual sources to the notions of intuition in the first *kāṇḍa* of Bhartṛhari's *Vākyapadīya* and Utpaladeva's treatment of cognition in the *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvimarśinī*, in chapter two, "Bhartṛhari's Notion of Intuition in the *Vākyapadīya*." and chapter three, "Intuition in the Śaiva Theory of Cognition," respectively. Bhartṛhari's theory of language is critically important for the Śaiva theory of cognition, as well as for Ānanda's theory of suggestion in poetics. Specifically, the *VP* postulates that Brahman, the essence of language

(*śabdatattva*), is present in the world in two ways: it is embedded (*samniveśita*) in each individual consciousness (*pratyakcāitanya*); and it is revealed as the Veda in the intuitions of the seers. Brahman which is one is divided into many in the form of Speech (*vāc*). Similarly in a human, Speech, called "the reflecting one," (*pratyavamarśinī*) is the subjective form of language which renders the homogeneous consciousness perceptible to itself and others. Intuition is the juncture between consciousness and its form of diversity. As the noumenon that unfolds into three subsequent stages of Speech, intuition qualifies (or approximates) reality which is Brahman on one side and becomes revealed as concrete thought and apprehension in the diverse form of language on the other.

In chapter three, it is shown that the basic notions of consciousness and language found in the *VP* are borrowed by Utpaladeva in developing his Śaiva theory of full consciousness (*saṃvid*). Such a consciousness characterized by illuminating and reflecting aspects is capable of complex thought-formation. A mental image presented in mind as an object-cognition is consciousness's subjective creation by the cognizer (*pramāṭṛ*), who in being an agent, as the Śaivas emphasize repeatedly, is independent (*svatantra*) and sovereign (*aiśvara*). Cognition, determined by an intuition of what it is from what it is not, is basically verbal in nature. An object-cognition rests on a subjective awareness, and this apperception inherent in awarenesses is the condition of normal mental life in which the world appears as external objects of 'my' consciousness. Apperception (*anuvyavasāya*), which in the Śaiva philosophy denotes a mental function capable of arranging mental events into a coherent and meaningful order, is

used by Abhinava in the *Abhinavabhāratī* to account for the theater (*nāṭya*) as an expanse of imaginative re-creation. The theater is re-creation. It is like an apperception in that the spectator relishes his/her mental states that have been aroused and colored by poetic/dramatic propriety (*aucitya*) into a sublimely pleasurable object of contemplation.

Bharṭṛhari's concept of intuition, in a different way, is also a cornerstone of Ānandavardhana's innovations in poetics. It provides the ground for asserting that suggestive meanings are the essence of poetry, above and beyond literal meanings. In chapter four, it is shown that Ānanda's theory of suggestion (*rasadhvani*) reorients the aesthetic attitude toward elements that ought to be counted as causes of beauty. In contrast to his predecessors, Ānanda's new literary criticism states that the essential poetic beauty consists in suggested meanings that bring about an aesthetic sentiment: through poetry a poet communicates and imparts his feelings to the audience. Although the traditions of poetics and dramaturgy have indirectly presaged a notion that the poet's feelings (*bhāva*) control the poem and bring about similar feelings in the readers, Ānanda forcefully redefines the object of true poetry as states of mind (*cittavṛtti*) and poetic communication as a sympathy of hearts.

A vital question, which seems to elicit sage opinions from several quarters in the following centuries, revolves around the nature of the *rasa*. Exciting debates cited by Abhinava in devising his own explanation also illuminate his thought processes, as he refutes while, at the same time, extracting useful ideas from opponents' arguments. In the course of the argument he maintains by emphatic repetitions in the *Locana* and the

Abhinavabhāratī that intuition (*pratibhā*) is the cooperating cause of the audience's perception of a *rasa*; that a *rasa* is perceived, produced and revealed; that an aesthetic experience is an obstructionless consciousness (*avighnā samvit*) in its relishing (*rasanā, carvanā*) of the object which is a *rasa*; that the theater is a re-creation (*anukīrtana*), which is like an apperception (*anuvyavasāya*), rather than an imitation (*anukarapa*); that human thoughts and feelings are influenced by their trace impressions; that the *vibhāvādi* are emotional stimuli (*uparāñjaka*) and not emotional causes (*kāraṇa*), and so on. These assertions combined show a rigorously formed structure of aesthetic perception which is described in chapter five, "The Structure of Perception in Aesthetic Experience."

While seemingly an independent and original commentator, Abhinava is faithful to the traditions and the texts on which he comments. Even though Ānandavardhana has said nothing at all about the sensitive audience's intuition and imagination (*pratibhā*), Abhinava thinks that the great poetician implies that a poet's *rasa* is the root of poetry/drama, bearing its fruit in a like sentiment of the audience. How does one devise an epistemological scheme that can successfully treat such a flimsy and ephemeral, tie? So, too, there are many problems in describing perceptions from the perspectives of the poet, actor, character, and spectator who are engaged in the same drama/poetry from different angles. Like Hydra's head, several problems arise in the place of each one that has been freshly lopped off, for we see that theories proffered by Buddhists, Mīmāṃsaka ritualists, Sāṃkhya philosophers, poeticians and dramaturgists are thoughtfully considered and refuted for different reasons by our Śaiva

philosopher.

Abhinava clearly does not want an aesthetic experience to be completely transcendent--beyond the world--while he maintains that it is not anything found in the workaday world. More important, in view of the Saiva religious philosophy, nothing can be outside of the unity of consciousness which manifests ideas and images in only one way; and in this system to be is to be perceived. In structuring a scheme of aesthetic communication, therefore, Abhinava naturally employs the Saiva epistemology which fortunately lends itself well in this regard. Its explanation of cognition as an imaginative process already makes it adaptable to the treatment of aesthetic imagination in poetics. In a close analogy to the Saiva universe--a unity in which human minds reflect God's imaginings--unfolding from the noumenon of God's *pratibhā* into material phenomena, the theater is a re-creation in uniting the spectators' imagination with the poet's designs. The poet's intuitions are resounded by the audience's emotive experiences. The viewers contemplate and relish imaginings which flow with the actor's dramatic portrayal but which are shaped by beginningless trace impressions in their own psychic substrata.

A following point is made in the concluding chapter, "Discussion and Conclusion: the Creative Intuition": our medieval philosophers implicitly believe that innovative ideas arise out of conservative traditions. Such great minds that form a traditional background to Abhinava's thought are radically original; their credence in originality is expressed in the use of the idea of intuition. Yet these philosophers persistently argue for incalculable values of tradition that gives life to fresh visions. The creative process never

means a break with the past; it is a spontaneous presentation formed by unaccountable trace-impressions. Although Abhinava highly regards this world's reality, with its achievements in the arts and scholarship, his concept of intuition falls back ultimately in support of traditional ideals of morality and liberation. Thus, in his view, human intuitions realized outwardly as phenomena in the world inwardly illuminate the nature of self which, Indian philosophers say, ought to be seen and heard.

Chapter 2

Bhartr̥hari's notion of intuition in the *Vākyapadīya*

In different philosophical systems intuition (*pratibhā*) occupies a peculiar place among the valid means of knowledge. It is generally considered a perception which arises without the benefit of direct sensory experience and therefore not a reliable source of valid knowledge. Some, however, consider it the highest kind of revelatory knowledge that is the basis of scriptural and testimonial wisdom which cannot be gained from an ordinary, rational, experience. Abhinavagupta's use of the term indicates its presence in all human knowledges and experiences of ordinary cognitive, aesthetic, and religious nature.

That the concept of intuition occupies a central place in Abhinava's philosophy directly results from his interests in several branches of learning. Particularly in aesthetics, the notion of intuition is formulated by using the Śaiva theory of knowledge to furnish a more rigorous explanation for Ānandavardhana's seminal ideas concerning the communication between a poet and his audience. In this communication, a *rasa*, an aesthetic sentiment, is the primary object of communication. In order to fully appreciate Abhinava's ramifications of this term, we will examine the sources of his conception in the Śaiva theory of knowledge and in the language theory of Bhartr̥hari, both of which make profound contributions to

Abhinava's insights in the field of poetics and dramaturgy.

In Abhinavagupta's lifetime, the society of Kashmir hung in a balance between its splendid culture and political turmoil. The arts and scholarship flourished amidst the rapidly changing fortunes of rulers and ministers who were faced with factional wars within and the impending Muslim invasion without.⁵ For a populace that highly valued the pleasures of life, and a society in which *dharma* was challenged by the behavior of kings and commoners alike,⁶ Abhinava views poetry and drama as a means to accomplish the four aims of life. All sāstric texts are assumed to promote these aims, and poetry is inherently valuable in this regard.⁷ In the first chapter of the *Abhinavabhāratī* Abhinava argues that the *Nāṭyasāstra* is a

⁵ For Abhinava's historical background see K.C. Pandey, *Abhinavagupta: An Historical and Philosophical Study*, Chowkhamba Sanskrit Studies, vol. 1 (2d ed. rev. and enlarged, Varanasi: Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office, 1963). For a history of Kashmir see *Kaṭhapa's Rājatarāṅginī: A Chronicle of the Kings of Kaśmīr*, Vol. 1, M.A. Stein, tr. (Repr. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1979). Kaṭhapa mentions briefly the Muslim encroachment (RT 7.70), led by Mahmud of Ghazni. See also Stein's introduction, pp. 106-108.

⁶ If Somānanda's remark in *Śivadr̥ṣṭī* 1.37-8, and Utpala's comment could be taken as an oblique social comment, we have this passage: "nīvāsīni sarīrāṇi gr̥hṇāti paramesvaraḥ / yathā nr̥paḥ sārvaśhaumaḥ prabhāvāmodabhāvītaḥ // kṛdān karoti pādāladharmāms tad dharmadharmaḥ / tathā prabuh pramodātmā kṛdāty evaṁ tathā tathā" "The Supreme Lord takes on the bodies, which are inhabitants [in the depth of the ocean of hell]. Just as a sovereign king of the realm, overjoyed by his power, sports at making the dharmas of commoners his own dharmas, just so, the Lord, whose essence is joy, plays similarly thus." Utpala's comment says, "He illustrates this very idea by a worldly example." Radheshyam Caturvedi, ed, tr. *The Śivadr̥ṣṭī of Śrī Somānandanātha with the vṛtti of Śrī Utpaladeva*. (Benares: Varanaseya Sanskrit Sansthan, 1986.), p. 25. Kaṭhapa also reports with disapproval the behavior of kings who broke caste-rules and romped around with washermen and washerwomen. See RT, n. 1 above.

⁷ Gary A. Tubb, "Sāntarasa in Mahābhārata." *Journal of South Asian Literature*, XX.1 (Winter/Spring 1985), pp. 141-68. Reprinted in Arvind Sharma, ed., *Essays on the Mahābhārata*, (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1991), pp. 171-203.

sāstra, a technical and scholarly composition containing systematic knowledge, against those who view it as a *veda*, scripture in the sense of traditional knowledge.⁸ The *Nāṭyaśāstra*, often calling itself a *veda*, recounts its origin as a fifth *veda*: Brahman, beseeched by Indra to create an entertainment which can be seen and heard, drawing from four vedas their essential characteristics, creates the *Nāṭyaveda* in which all things human are represented, for the instruction of women and *sūdras* who are not eligible to study the four Vedas.⁹ For Abhinava, the theater, like a bitter medicine glazed with molasses, teaches *dharma* to a rude and uncivilized world of enmeshed in pleasure and pain.¹⁰ Poetry similarly instructs in the manner of a wife in contrast to scripture and history which are like a master and a friend respectively.¹¹ Moreover, an enjoyment of drama and poetry that culminates in the relishing of an aesthetic sentiment is not an ordinary experience such as occurs in a workaday situation. An

⁸ R.S. Nagar, ed., *Nāṭyaśāstra (NS') of Bharatamuni*, with the commentary *Abhinavabhāratī* by Abhinavaguptācāryā, 2nd ed., vol. 1 (New Delhi, Parimal publications, 1988), pp. 2-5.

⁹ *NS'*, 1.11-18, vol. 1, pp. 9-14.

¹⁰ *Abhinavabhāratī (Abb)*, p. 9-10 " *idam asmākam guḍapracchannakaṣṭhakaṣṭha-kalpam ciltavikṣepamāitraphalam.*" Bharata, *Nāṭyaśāstra*. With the *Abhinavabhāratī* commentary of Abhinavagupta. Nagar, ed. (2nd ed., New Delhi, Parimal publications, 1988). For a similar expression see Aśvaghōṣa's *Saundarananda* 17.63. I am indebted for this reference to J. Robert Phillips.

¹¹ Daniel H. H. Ingalls, Jeffrey Moussaieff Masson, and M. V. Patwardhan, trs., *The Dhvanyāloka of Ānandavardhana (Dhā)*, with the *Locana (Dhāl)* of Abhinavagupta (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1990), pp. 71, 533. "For everyone takes delight in the sidelong glance of his beloved and so the hearer, who is to be improved, being started by this delight, will be led on to understand the true nature of things in an indirect way, just as a child is led on to take medicine by one's putting sugar on his tongue, and so will end up in a state of disenchantment with worldly things."

aesthetic experience consists in a particular kind of imagination and contemplation that uniquely arise in the special context of the theater. Remarking on the difference between an aesthetic emotion, *rasa*, and an ordinary emotion, Masson writes,

Why? Because literature is not the real world. Nothing really takes place. The world of the past is transformed into art, and in watching this transformation... we somehow (for it is never explained precisely how this is achieved) touch the very core of our being. One distinction is that *rasa*s and *bhāva*s are magical. That is they exist for the duration of a play. Abhinava explains that they have no parallel in the real world... The opponent asks Abhinava: "But there is nothing in the whole world like this." "Ah", says Abhinava, "at last you have understood" *Rasa* is *alaukika*."¹²

Masson is quite right in saying that, in Abhinavagupta's view, aesthetic perception occurs only in a poetic and theatrical context. Although Abhinavagupta does not give an exposition of the transformation of a direct perception into art, a process in which "...we somehow touch the core of our being," in defining *rasa* as an extraordinary kind of knowledge he consistently and rigorously describes the nature of this experience. The theater is a special continuum that transforms ordinary cognitions into aesthetic perceptions. The theater is a place of the imagination. Its scintillating sights and sounds, the actors' costumes and actions, are not mere objects of cognition but rather of a special intuition and imagination, *pratibhā*. For this reason, as he comments on the *Dhvanyāloka*, Abhinava insists that both the poet and the audience possess *pratibhā*,¹³ and

¹² J.M. Masson and M.V. Patwardhan, *Aesthetic Rapture (AR)*, Vol. 1 (Poona: Deccan College Postgraduate and Research Institute, 1970), p. 32.

modifies Ānandavardhana's original verse and comment in saying that, like the audience in viewing a play, the poet in writing a verse is filled with *rasa* and therefore aesthetically removed from his own personal emotions.¹⁴

This modification, which does not escape the notice of the translators, is not incidental but central to the structure of communication and perception in the poetic/dramatic context.

Abhinavagupta's explanation of aesthetic perception relies on

¹³ Ānandavardhana, *Dhvanīyāloka* (*Dhā*). With the *Locana* (*Dhāl*) Commentary of Abhinavagupta. Pt. Mahadevasāstrī, ed. Kashi Sanskrit Series (KSS) 135 (Benares: Chowkhambā Sanskrit Series Office, 1940). *Dhāl* 1.4 " *pratīpatīpratībhāsahakāritvaṃ hy asmābhir dyotanasya prāptiḥ venoktam* (KSS 135, p. 68) and " *ata tadviśeṣo 'pi sahakārī kalpyate, tarhi vaktīpratīpatīpratībhāprāpīto dhvananavyāpārah kim na sahyate.*" (KSS 135, p. 69)

¹⁴ *Dhāl* 1.5 " *Soka iti krauñcasya dvandvavīryogena sa caribhānanodbhūtena sāhacaryadhvamśanenotthito yaḥ sokaḥ sthāyibhāvo nirapekṣabhāvatvād vipralambhaśrūṅrocitaratīsthāyibhātvād anyā eva, sa eva tatstābhūtavibhāva-tadutthākrandādyanubhāvacarvapayā hṛdayasamvādaśanmayibhāvanākramād ākrandāsvādyamānatām pratīpannāḥ karuparasarūpatām laukikasokavyatīrīktām svacītatadrūṣasamāsvādyasūratām pratīpanno rasaparipūrṇakumbhoccalanavac cītavṛttīnīḥ syandāsvabhāvāgviṭpādīvac ca samayānepekṣatve 'pi cītavṛttīvyāñjakatvād iti nayanākṛtakatayaivāveśavaśāt samucītasabdhacchandovṛttīdīnīyantrītaślokarūpatām prāptāḥ... na tu muneḥ soka iti mantavyam. evaṃ hi satī tadduḥkheṇa so 'pi duḥkhīta iti kṛtvā rasasyātmateṇī niravakāśam bhavet. na ca duḥkhasantāptasyaiśā dāsetī. evaṃ carvapocītasokasthāyibhāvātmakakaruparasam uccalanāsvabhāvatvāt sa eva kāvyasyātmā sārābhūtasvabhāvo 'perasābdavāilakṣapayakārakaḥ. (KSS 135, pp. 75-77). See Ingalls' tr. p. 115 and n. 5, p. 118, on the poet's *rasa*; and n. 9, p. 119, "See how subtly Abhinava alters the meaning of his text. We are not to think of the grief as belonging to Vālmiki. The grief is the bird's. It gives birth in Vālmiki not to grief but to a relishing of the bird's grief."; and Ingalls' introduction, p. 19 "The notion of Abhinava that Vālmiki ruminated on the determinants and consequents of the bird's bereavement and so developed his *rasa* in the scriptural way strikes me as an addition quite foreign to the view of Ānanda." D.H.H. Ingalls, et al. trans. *The Dhvanīyāloka of Ānandavardhana with the Locana of Abhinavagupta*, HOS 49, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990).*

philosophical Śaivism's general theory of cognition, specifically as put forward in Utpaladeva's *Īśvarapratyabhijñānārikā* (IPK). In the latter intuitions are innate verbal presentations that mediate between indeterminate (*nirvikalpaka*) and determinate (*svikalpaka*) cognitions, producing a verbal and determinate awareness that follows from an initial awareness of inchoate sensory perceptions. A particular of that generalized intuition is active in aesthetic experiences which arise through the extraordinary and delightful means of poetry, music, costume, singing, dancing, acting, and so on in the theatrical atmosphere.

Abhinava says of the aesthetic intuition, i.e., the imagination,

*pratipattiṛn prati sā pratibhā nānumīyamānā, api tu tadāveśena
bhāsamānety arthah. yad uktam asmadupādhyāyabhaṭṭatautena--
'nāyakasya kaveḥ śrotuḥ samāno 'nubhavas tataḥ' iti. 'pratibhā'
apūrvavastunirmānakṣamā prajñā;¹⁵ tasyā 'viśeṣo'
rasāveśavaiśadyasaundaryam kāvyanirmānakṣamatvam.¹⁶*

On the part of the perceivers, this intuition is not inferred but shines because one is filled with it (*tadāveśena*). This is the meaning. As my teacher Bhaṭṭatauta has said, "Therefore, the experience of the hero, the

¹⁵ Cf. IPKv 1.63, KSTS 34, p. 26. "apūrvārthanirmānakṣamānāmarthyāc ca vikalpa eva sarvasya sarvajñatvam ca sphuṭam." IPK 1.64 "yā caisā pratibhā tat-/ tatpadārthakramarūpitā/ akramānantacidrūpaḥ / pramāṇa sa mahatvarah."

¹⁶ Dhāl Ānandavardhana, *Dhvanyāloka* (Dhā) with the *Locana* (Dhāl) and *Bālāpriyā* (BP) commentaries, Kāśhi Sanskrit Series (KSS) 135 (Benares: Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office), p. 92. This passage will be discussed in detail in a following chapter.

My translation here follows from an explication of Professor Revāprasād Dwivedi, an eminent professor of *kāvya* at Benares Hindu University. According to him '*rasāveśa*' means that the poet is filled with *rasa*, just as when a person is very angry there is an '*āveśa*' of wrath. This usage is among those listed by Monier-Williams.

poet, and the audience, is the same." Intuition (*pratibhā*) is an insight that is capable of fashioning a new object. Its particular is the capacity for creating poetry, which is clarity and beauty because [the poet is] filled with *rasa*.

Of a phrase quoted above, "*asmadupādhyāyabhaṭṭatautena--'nāyakasya kaveḥ śrotuḥ samāno 'nubhavas tataḥ' iti*," Ingalls, struck by an apparent incongruity, says, "An extraordinary statement for Abhinava to quote with approval in view of the careful distinction which he makes elsewhere between the emotions of the hero and the aesthetic relish of the poet and the audience."¹⁷ It will be shown that Abhinava intends to say that by means of poetic imagination which is the cooperating cause in the aesthetic experience, the poet, the hero, and the audience who create and recreate the same drama are united in common imagination.¹⁸

Abhinava views the theater as a unity, that is, a continuum in which an aesthetic experience occurs. The word 'continuum' is used here in the sense of an expanse of consciousness, akin to the Buddhist word '*cittasamtāna*,' i.e., a mental continuum.¹⁹ In theory the unity of the theater comprises an

¹⁷ Ingalls, et al., trs., *Dhāt*, n. 5, p. 121.

¹⁸ A hero is one who leads the story and enjoys the fruits of the dramatic action. Ingalls, et al., trs., *Dhāt*, p. 413. It will be shown in the following chapters that in the logic of aesthetic perception, a hero (*nāyaka*) consists of the character and the actor in a common identity.

¹⁹ My use of this term is derived from *IPV* 1.5.1, vol. 1, pp. 238-239, "*tatrāpi kva cit ābhāse pramāṭṛaṇ ekīkaroti nīlambhinīrṛta iva prekṣakān. tāvati hi teṣāṃ ābhāse aikyam*," and *TA* 10.85-86, vol. 5, pp. 1950-1951, "*tathā hy ekāgrasakala-/sāmājīkajanah khalu/ nṛtīṃ gīṭam sudhāsārasāgaratvena manyate// tata evocyate malla-/nataprekṣopadeśane/ sarvapramāṭṛtādātmyam/ pūrṇarūpānubhāvakaṃ*," in which it is described that the spectators are united as one in respect of a dancer. See also Raniero Gnoli, *The Aesthetic Experience According to Abhinavagupta* (AE), Chowkhamba Sanskrit Studies (CSS), vol. 62

origin in the poet's imagination, conveyed by poetry as enacted by the

3rd Indian ed., (Banares: Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office, 1985), n. 3, pp. 56-57. In the situation the fact that spectators are combined as one cognizer reinforces the reality of their common perception. In 1.5.1, the argument for a unity of cognizers is that all cognizers are ultimately just consciousness in substance, projected from limited perspectives of embodied subjects; and sometimes the Lord unifies these various limited cognizers, joining them as one in relation to a dancer, i.e., they are in rapt attention with an absence of the perception of the 'self' and 'others,' which perception is the central issue in the problem of *svagataparagatīva* in aesthetics. As Abhinava and Nāyaka both say that poetry and drama remove this problem of the perception of one's mind and other's mind. In *NA* 10.85, Abhinava has said earlier (10.83-84) that when 'I' know something that is known by Caitra, or by two, or many people, just as this state of my knowing an object becomes perceptible through Śiva or through others' seeing, just so my knowing what others know becomes a variety of things such as a purposeful action, and so on. For, in the same way, the people in the audience, all focused on the song and dance, take it to be an ocean of nectar-substance. For that reason it is said that the identity of all cognizers with reference to spectating engenders an emotional effect which is full in form. (10.87) If singly the spectators' minds are satisfied by objects being just so (*tāvanmātrārtha*), what quality do they have in common, and how could they become a unity of cognizers? (10.88) But when an object is contained in an arrangement whose property is the state of being known by various people, then this object is other than its formerly dry form. The reasoning here is that in general the state of being known as something exists in a conventional condition (*vyavahāra*): an object which is stable in form upon being perceived generates ideas as to what it is, and the ideas, as meaningful things that promote actions, depend on a community of minds. Thus, an object as known is not 'dry', i.e. it is not confined merely to itself but is known in relation to other things by a consensus of cognizers. Thus, Abhinava also argues for the notion of inference--that inference does not depend on pervasion as a process existing in the objects, fire and smoke, as known by a single cognizer's mental continuum, but rather by a unity of cognizers who although distinct from one another are made one in respect of both an appearance of smoke and an appearance of fire. The epistemological unity of cognizers in respect the object of knowledge underlies the inferential process. Only in this way can we speak of inferential knowledge as new and unperceived before, and not as something known from a previous experience. (*IPV* 2.4.15, vol. 2, pp. 182-185) What I term 'continuum' is thus derived from such assertions about the unity of cognizers reinforcing the validity and reality of experience or knowledge. The well-structured 'continuum' of the theater will be discussed in the following chapters.

actor's imagination, and culminating in that of the audience. The framework of time and space which ordinarily conditions the workaday mind has been removed from the theatrical continuum: all participants are single-pointedly engaged in an uninterrupted awareness of the drama alone. In this expanse of an extraordinary state of consciousness, the poet, the actor, and the audience are one with the others through their unified and vivid imagination.

The idea of a unity has been suggested by Masson in observing that an experience of *rasa* includes identification and distance,

The spectators do not fall in love with Sītā. This *sthāyibhāva rati* is transformed (*paripata* into an extrawordly state (*alaukikāvasthā*), and this is what is called *rasa* . The *sahṛdaya* sympathises (*hrdayasaṃvāda*) with the original character, and to a large degree he even identifies (*tanmayibhāva*) with the situation depicted. But he does not identify completely; he retains a certain *aesthetic distance* , the name for which is *rasa* .²⁰

Masson also notices the similarity between the relation of the audience to the actor and that of *jīva* to *paramātman* ,

At another level, Abhinava compares the actor to the *Paramātman* . He retains his identity (just as the *Ātman* never gives up its self-luminosity) and yet manages to so engross people that they feel they are watching the original character. The spectator is thus like the *jīva* , liable to illusion.²¹

²⁰ Masson, *Aesthetic Rapture* , Vol. 1 (*AR*) (Poona: Deccan College Postgraduate and Research Institute, 1970), pp. 23-4

²¹ Masson, *AR* , Vol. 1, p. 36.

Another scholar, Gnoli, writes on the absorbing nature of an aesthetic experience and its similarity to that of a mystic:

In every way, whatever the difference between them may be, they spring from the same source. Both are characterized by the state of consciousness self-centered, implying the suppression of any practical desire, and hence the merging of the subject into his object, to the exclusion of everything else.²²

The aesthetic and the mystical state of consciousness are not only characterized by a particular bliss or repose. According to Abhinavagupta and his school, they are accompanied by a sense of wonder or surprise. The word expressing this wonder, i.e., *camatkāra* is frequently to be found,....²³

Such insights concerning relations of identity and distance and an affinity between aesthetic and mystical experiences are well-founded. They attest to an underlying structure of the aesthetic continuum which is implicit without having been directly explained by the author. The continuum of an aesthetic experience is a unity constituted by the reality of a common imagination.

In Abhinava's general theory of knowledge, *pratibhā*, as an intuition or an intuitive aspect of consciousness, exists not only in the poet or the actor. It is inherent in every consciousness which actively creates knowledge by manifesting a discrete and coherent cognitive object out of disparate sense percepts. The functioning of intuition arises with an intrinsic and innate verbalization to which consciousness, through its volitional impulse (*icchā*) and a basic store of trace impressions (*samskāra*) and memory (*smṛti*),

²² Gnoli, *AE* p. XLI.

²³ Gnoli, *AE* p. XLV.

gravitates. In a cognition formation, verbal concepts are imposed on bare percepts, and the awareness of the object graspable in mind in the form of language is a determinate cognition. Worldly communication and transactions (*vyavahāra*) depend on language which is the medium of private thought, public conventions, and social norms.²⁴ In an aesthetic experience, an extraordinary kind of 'cognition'--knowledge in the broad sense of the word--occurs through a mode of perception peculiar to means and end of poetry and drama.

The unity of an aesthetic continuum is structurally identical to that of the universe: its reality consists of a common sphere of imaginations bound together in re-creating the imaginations of the poet, just as the Śaiva universe consists of individual minds that reflect in their consciousnesses the imaginative plays of Śiva. Yet, the real world bounded by ordinary norms and transactions is different from the theater or a mystic experience. The ordinary world is unified in the ultimate Cognizer who manifests and is manifested by the multitude of individual consciousnesses, a hall of mirrors in which all mirrors are reflected in and by each other.²⁵ Individuals in

²⁴ Abhinavagupta, *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvimarsinī of Abhinavagupta: Doctrine of Divine Recognition (IPV)*, vol. 1, Subramania Iyer and K. C. Pandey, eds., (Repr. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1986), 1.5.18-19, pp. 282-294.

²⁵ According to Śaiva theology, *śarvasya sarvārūpatvam sarvātmavm*: everything consists of all things as its form and as its nature. (*SD* 6.125, p. 258). Since God is consciousness, all things produced by his consciousness must also be conscious in varying degrees. Thus, even inanimate objects are conscious: this is a cornerstone of the 'light' theory of cognition. There is cognition only because insentient objects are partly conscious and are of the same substance as the knowledge-substance of the cognizer, both being light which can mutually assimilate so that the object becomes represented in the subject. The purpose of the *Sivadr̥ṣṭi* is, in effect, to establish the nature of Śiva's transcendence and immanence as the Lord who creates the universe by manifesting it through his desire, and

the world act in accordance with the natural laws of Siva and with human-made conventions, all of which comprise *vyavahāra*, which may be generally described as a rational order or the ordinary norm through which people communicate and interact in an ordered way. The end and means of the theater which govern the modality of an aesthetic experience are distinguished from those in normal activity which seeks a purposeful accomplishment. In order to describe the notion of poetic intuition, therefore, we will show Abhinava's justification of the claim that it is a special kind of intuition.²⁶

Abhinava speaks of the aesthetic perception as an act of retelling, *anukīrtana*,²⁷ in opposition to other views that it is an imitation (*anukarṇa*)²⁸ or an intensification (*upacīta*).²⁹ A joy or bliss arising from an aesthetic contemplation reposes in the soul (*ātmaviśrānti*). An aesthetic experience is characterized by a predominantly subjective

through his powers of knowledge and action. Concluding the philosophical part of his work, Somānanda says, "*ekatvena tato jñeyā śivatā sarvagocarā*." (*SD*, 1.126, p. 258)

²⁶ Anandavardhana, *Dhvanyāloka* (*Dhā*) with the *Locana* (*Dhāl*) Sanskrit Commentary of Abhinavagupta and the Hindi translations text and commentary by Jagannath Pathak, Vidyābhavan Sanskrit Series (VSS 97) (4th ed., Varanasi: Chowkhamba Vidyābhavan, 1987) 1.6, pp. 93-94. "*pratibhā' apūrvavastunirmāpakṣamā prajñā; tasyā viśeṣo' rasāvedasavaiśadyasaundaryam kāvyanirmāpakṣamatvam*."

²⁷ *Abb* 1, Nagar ed., p. 35 "*idānīm upāyasaṃvedanālābhāt tad idam anukīrtanam anuvyavasāyaviśeṣo nātyāparaparyāyah. nānukāra iti bhramitsavyam*"; p. 36 "*tasmād anuvyavasāyātmakam kīrtanam rūpītevikālpasaṃvedanam nātyam. tad vedanevedyatvāt na tv anukarṇarūpam*"

²⁸ This view is attributed to Saṅkuka: "*anukarṇarūpatvād eva ca nāmāntarepe vyapadiśtoraseh*" (*Abb*, Nagar ed., p. 272)

²⁹ *Abb* 6, p. 271. This is the view of Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa: "*tena sthāyyevavibhāvānubhāvādibhir upacīto rasaḥ*."

awareness. The aesthetic perception is different from an ordinary one because its end and means, within the theatrical continuum, are unworldly, but the process of cognition itself is the same in all experiences. In order to understand Abhinava's notion of active and imaginative construction of ordinary and aesthetic experiences, we will describe the notion of intuition Bhartṛhari's philosophy of language which exerts powerful influences on both the Saiva theory of knowledge and Ānandavardhana's theory of poetics.

Bhartṛhari's notion of intuition

In the following section it will be shown that Bhartṛhari's essential contributions consist in establishing that an individual consciousness is inherently linguistic, and that a self-conscious knowledge is a reflection of the linguistic consciousness in the form of Speech (*vāc*), i.e., language which comprises personal experiences and expressions of the subject. Language is likened to the senses (*indriya*) through which one perceives and by which one acts upon the world.

Intuition is the juncture between the substance and the form, standing between the linguistically active consciousness and the form of diversity by which a cognition is manifested perceptibly and sequentially. Inasmuch as there is continuity between scriptural and ordinary languages, words (*śabda*) are the basis of all conscious awarenesses, thoughts, learnings and actions; and because the use of language intrinsically involves the elements of sense perceptions, memories, trace impressions, as well as familiarity with conventional norms, an intuition apprehends at once a linguistic proposition and its primary reality in the world. This notion of intuition is extended by

Saiva philosophers into the realms of psychology and theology in order to forward their theories of cognition and recognition.

***Sabda* and *vāc*: their continuity in scriptural and ordinary languages**

The first verse of the *Vākyapadīya* defines the all-encompassing Brahman as the Word-Essence, *Sabdatattva*.³⁰ The absolute unity of Brahman, *Sabdatattva*, is inviolable, being filled with different efficiencies

³⁰ Bhartṛhari, *The Vākyapadīya*, (VP) With the *Vṛtti* and the *Paddhati* of Vṛṣabhadeva, K. A. Subramania Iyer, ed., Deccan College Monograph Series (DCMS) 32 (Poona, Deccan College, 1966), 1.1., pp. 1-7. Translations and paraphrases of the VP are my own, in consultation with existing translations of Iyer and Biarreau. See also Iyer's and Biarreau's translations. K.A Subramania Iyer, tr., *The Vākyapadīya of Bhartṛhari with the Vṛtti*, chapter I, English translation, Deccan College Building Centenary and Silver Jubilee Series: 26. (Poona: Deccan College Postgraduate and Research Institute, 1965). Madeleine Biarreau, ed. and tr., *Bhartṛhari: Vākyapadīya Brahmakāṇḍa*, avec la *vṛtti* de Harivṛṣabha, texte reproduit de l'édition de Lahore, Publications de l'Institut de Civilisation Indienne, série in-8, fascicule 24 (Paris: Éditions E de Boccard, 1964).

Mindful that the controversy of the authorship of the *kārikā* and *vṛtti* has not been resolved, I should note here that I take the author of both to be one and the same Bhartṛhari. The reason is the same as the one given by Ingalls on the authorship of the *kārikā* and *vṛtti* of the *Ādvaitaśloka*: there are no significant disagreements between the verses and the comments, and the commentor does not mention a different author of the *kārikā* anywhere in the commentary. Furthermore, the comments of the *vṛtti* are always self-assured, without any hesitation or question. The *vṛtti* often takes a verse, which is a concise statement, and elaborates it by citing several opinions and raises questions. A real commentor usually questions his interpretation, often looking for substantiating remarks somewhere else in the *kārikā*, in trying to understand or accurately represent the text he comments on. The *vṛtti* of the VP often raises several contradicting opinions that make the *kārikā* seem more inconclusive than before. In order to do this, the *vṛtti*'s author must already have certain knowledge of the *kārikā*; being the author of the latter as well, his comments freely discuss the context of ideas and sources in which the verses arise.

(*śakti*) by which It manifests differentiated phenomena.³¹ Its primary efficiency is time which is the basis of all transformations,³² and out of this unity Brahman becomes manifest in the manifold state through the form of experiencer, the object of experience, and experience. These knots (*granthi*) of the triadic structure of experience, as they supersede one another in the unitary Brahman, become the manifold state of the world.³³

The unity of Word-Essence of Bhartṛhari is manifested in the world as Speech (*vāc*) in two ways: It is entered into an individual consciousness, and Its manifestation (*vyakti*) flows forth for the sake of knowing oneself and others, and that which flows forth is described as Speech, *vāc*.³⁴ It is also manifested in the world through the visions of the ṛṣi's as the Veda, which is Brahman's *anukāra*, an imitation, which is also described as *sūkṣmā vāk*, or subtle Speech.³⁵ The parallel ways that *Śabdātattva*, the Word-Essence or the Brahman-consciousness-- universe intertwined with the linguistic principle--becomes *vāc*. Speech or the subjective function of expression and communication in the world, underpin the full scope Bhartṛhari's assertion that language (*śabda*) is the basis of all knowledge and behavior in the world.³⁶ Scripture, as the Speech which is

³¹ VP 1.2, DCMS 32, pp. 14-17.

³² VP 1.3, DCMS 32, pp. 18-20.

³³ VP 1.4 and *vṛtti*, DCMS 32, pp. 21-22.

³⁴ VP 1.1 *vṛtti*, DCMS 32, pp. 7-8 " *pratyakcāitanye 'ntasamnivesitasya parasambodhanārthā vyaktiḥ abhiśyandate. evaṃ hy āha--sūkṣmām arthenāpravibhaktatattvām ekām vācam anabhiśyandamānām/ utānye vidur anyām iva ca enām nānārūpām ātmani sanniviṣṭām//*"

³⁵ VP 1.5, DCMS 32, p. 24. " *Vedābhyāśīt varam āntaram suklaṃ ajaram jyotiś tasmīnnevāpāre tamasi vīle vivartate*" *iti anukāraḥ iti. yām sūkṣmām nityām atīndriyām vācam ṛṣayah sākṣātkṛtadharmāno mantradṛśaḥ paśyanti... svapnavṛttam iva dṛṣṭasrutānubhūtam ācikyāsanta ity eṣa purākalpaḥ.*"

an imitation (*anukāra*) of Brahman *Sabdatattva* , is the basis of all learnings which have been developed in explicating and supporting the Vedas, while ordinary language whose principle is instilled in consciousness is used by humans in their cultural and social intercourses to further increase knowledges. The world thus based scriptural and ordinary languages continually evolves, and its expansion is rooted equally on tradition and on human insights through the medium of language by which transmission, communication and innovations are carried out.

It is said in *VP* 1.5 that Brahman's imitation (*anukāra*), the Veda, is rendered many in the form of Speech by the sages for the sake of transmission because that which is one and undivided cannot be transmitted in a divided way (i.e. by means of perceptible language transmitted by hearing rather than a subtle one of revelation which is seen in a vision).³⁷ In the course of transmission the branches of the Veda form the divisions of regional usages as well as of developments into the limbs and minor limbs that become various arts and sciences.³⁸ In the latter part of the *VP*, the theme of Speech as the subjective form of consciousness is elaborated. In verses 1.125-127, it is shown that every kind of awareness and knowledge that a human possesses, by which he/she is known to himself/herself and others as a conscious being, is accompanied by Speech. Speech as a

³⁶ *VP* 1.123, 125, DCMS 32, pp. 188-190, 192.

³⁷ *VP* 1.5 *vr̥ti*, DCMS 32, p. 25, "*tasya vedo maharṣibhiḥ, eko 'py... prāpita*" The *vr̥ti* states that the singular thing which is called the Veda existed in the seeing itself. The object, i.e., what was to be seen, was put into the form of Speech itself which had acquired a sequence for the sake of revealing [it] (*abhivṛtyakṛtimitā*), by the great *ṛṣi*s who could not make known an undifferentiated thing in a differentiated way.

³⁸ *VP* 1.5-10, DCMS 32, pp. 22-39.

subjective function verbalizes and apprehends one's own inward feelings, thoughts, and all cognitions of the external world.³⁹

This continuity and essential identity between revealed and ordinary languages-- *vāc* as language of the Veda intuited by the *ṛṣi*'s and as the subjective language of humans--support Bhartṛhari's notion that language is

³⁹ *VP* 1.125 states that language as form [of consciousness] is the basis of techniques in all learnings and of the arts. Through its power every object conceived is effected in an external form. Its *vyṭī* states that all learnings are bound in the intellective mind whose form is Speech. In respect of the conception of a pot and so on, every desire to instruct on the part of the person who initiates and the person who undertakes [an action], is done according to the form of Speech. (DCMS 32, pp. 192-193). *VP* 1.126 states that Speech, as form, is the conscious, inward and outward, perceptions of all creatures. Consciousness in all creatures does not go beyond the measure [of Speech]. The *vyṭī* states that in the world the designation of conscious and unconscious is made because Speech is the form that accompanies consciousness. Speech causes all creatures to desire to act purposefully, and anything incapable of Speech is known as insentient, like a log or a wall. People know their inner feelings through the accompaniment of Speech as the form, and all worldly activities based on it would come to a standstill in its absence. There is no creature possessing an awareness of itself and others which is not accompanied by Speech. Therefore, there is no mental activity without the use of the power of Speech. The very form of Speech-essence is the form of mental activities (DCMS 32, p. 193). *VP* 1.127 states that just as an actor (i.e. subject or doer) in wakefulness sets himself toward an action to be done by means of Speech, just so, in sleep Speech itself becomes the action to be done. The *vyṭī* illuminates the parallel between the manifestation of the *Sabdabrahman* and Speech as it is used by humans in effecting their purposes. The *vyṭī* states that the manifestation of *Sabdabrahman* is in the form of differentiated means and ends. [In humans] in wakeful activities, the knots of differentiation [of egoity] (See *VP* 1.4) into Speech having been transformed into actions of birth and so on, following the form of Speech, strive toward effects by reaching the changes that are fulfillments. But in sleep, Speech itself being the form of external objects has no [external] object; [Speech] effects the action toward changes that come to fulfillments (DCMS 32, p. 195). These verses clearly describe *vāc* as subjective language which is an effect (*kāryaḥ sabdah*) (*VP* 1.130, DCMS 32, p. 200), the reflecting one, *pratyavamarśinī* (*VP* *vyṭī* 1.124, DCMS 32, p. 192), and the form, *vāgrūpatā* of consciousness (*VP* 1.124, DCMS 32, p. 190) through which all cognitive experiences are determinately known.

an intrinsic component of reality even though it represents a secondary reality (*aupacārikī sattā*).⁴⁰ It is intertwined with a primary reality and derives its functionings from the latter because the substance of Brahman-consciousness is not different from that of an individual consciousness. Like light, consciousness illuminates itself and its object in a form which combines and reflects back the object in perception. That form, namely, Speech, is *vāc*.⁴¹ *Śabdabrahman*, evolving and manifesting the world of manifold appearances, is not unlike human consciousness which is accompanied by the form of Speech.⁴² Linguistic activities of the human mind culminating in Speech function constantly in sleep and wakefulness, and this functioning is said to be the same in the Great, the cause, which is the essence of Speech.⁴³ Verse 1.127 of the *VP* states the same thing in a different way: the manifestation of *Śabdabrahman* is in the form of end and means of wakeful moments (*pravibhaktasādhyasādhanarūpa*).⁴⁴ During its wakeful functioning, Speech as the form of mental activities is used by the subject in striving to achieve an [external] effect, but in sleep Speech itself becomes the

⁴⁰ On language as a representation of a secondary reality, see Subramania Iyer, *Bhārṭṛhari: The Study of the Vākyapadīya in the Light of the Ancient Commentaries* (Bb) (Poona: Deccan College, 1969), pp. 209-212. See also n. 52 below.

⁴¹ See above, nn. 34, 35 and text.

⁴² *VP* 1.126, DCMS 32, p. 193. "yo 'yam caitanya vāgrūpatānugamas..."

⁴³ *VP* 1.118, DCMS 32, p. 181 "sā ceyam svapnaprabodhavyūṭīḥ pravibhaktapurūṣānukārā mahatyapi vīkṛtīve kāraṇe nityam avasthītā..." The *paddhati* says, "mahaty api iti. yo 'sau maho deva ity ucyate."

⁴⁴ Although it literally means "divided," the translation of '*pravibhakte*' as "wakeful," here follows from the meanings of '*pravibhāge*' and '*avibhāge*' in the *kārikā* as 'differentiation' in the sense of wakefulness and 'non-differentiation' in the sense of sleep respectively. The *paddhati* glosses them, '*jāgradvasthāyām*' and '*svapne*.'

fullfillment which is the effect. The supporting verse states that the Lord of all, comprising all, after dividing himself by himself, and having created separate existents, becomes the experiencer in a dream.⁴⁵

In *Sabdabrahman* combining and dissociating (*bhedasamsarga*) efficiencies (*śakti*) create phenomena (*vivarta*) analogously to the verbal efficiencies of ordinary-language in human consciousness which orient determinate perceptions and understanding in normal experiences.⁴⁶ Just as the light of Brahman is reflected in the world as the Veda,⁴⁷ the light of

⁴⁵ *VP* 1.127, DCMS 32, p. 195.

⁴⁶ Compare in the *VP* verses 1.1-3 describing Brahman as the one and undivided who seems divided because of the efficiencies (*śakti*), at the same time that these efficiencies are Its power to create, with verses 1.117-120 (DCMS 32, pp. 177-184) describing the *śakti*s as the accomplisheers of differentiation. In the latter verses allusions to a similarity with 'cause,' unmistakably analogizes humans' conscious verbal functions with that of *Sabdabrahman*. Verse 1.117: "It is the efficiency of [the perpetually functioning Word (*VP* 1.116, DCMS 32, p. 177)] distributed on the breath and on the intellective mind, evolving on places of utterance that achieves differentiation." Its *vr̥tti* states "It [the breath] causes only a tinge of differentiation (*bhedānurāgamāstram*) to enter into the highest, undivided self which is the Word." Verse 1.118, *vr̥tti*, (DCMS 32, p. 179) states that the subtle verbalization constantly functions in humans as in the "Great," the cause which is the essence of Speech. See n. 43 above. Verse 1.120 (DCMS 32, p. 183) states that, "Knowers of scripture know that this [world] is the evolution of the Word; this world evolves at first out of the Vedas." The *vr̥tti* states that some who say that causality is postulated from the evidence of qualities that possess logical consequences from the cause in the effects, attribute the universal manifestation (*vivarta*) to an original matter, the array of efficiencies, the cause of unknowledge; and so, it is taught in scripture that Speech, possessing the contracted powers of enjoyer and enjoyed is the cause. An idea is prominent throughout these verses that *Sabdabrahman* which is filled with (*āviṣṭa*) the efficiencies is one by which the manifested universe (*vivarta*) comes into being, and *Sabdabrahman* takes up manifestation in the ego-form of the knots of experiencer, experienced, and experience (*VP* 1.1-5), and that it is the subjective language, *vāc*, i.e. language as used in the ego-form, that divides up the unity of *Sabdabrahman* (*VP* 1.116-131, pp. 177-203).

⁴⁷ *VP* 1.5 *vr̥tti*, DCMS 32, p. 24. "vedābhyāsāt varam āntaram suklaṁ ajaram jyotiḥ tasminnevāpāre tamasi vīle vivartate" iti anukāra iti."

human consciousness is reflected by means of ordinary Speech which he/she uses in subjective determinations to illumine knowledge in the world and to strive toward effective actions for himself/herself.⁴⁸

The essential unity of all empirical and subjective phenomena is the Word, Brahman *Sabdatattva*, which is also called the great god (*mahodevo*), the Bull of the Word (*śabdavṛṣabha*). In *VP* 1.130, it is stated: "They also call the self of the speaker, the Word that abides within, the Great Bull, with which one desires to be joined." The *vṛtti* elaborates in the following way:

In the world there are two essential [kinds of] language (*dvau śabdātmanau*), the eternal and the effect. Between these, the effect is ordinary language (*vyavahārika*) which causes to comprehend the reflection (*pratibimbopagrāhī*) of a person who consists of Speech (*puruṣasya vāgātmanaḥ*). But the eternal is the source of all worldly usage and transactions (*sarvavyavahārayoni*). Its sequence drawn up, it abides within all [people]. It is the birth, i.e., the substratum, of all transformations and the basis of all actions. Its power to effect objects in pleasure and pain is entirely unobstructed. It is light, seemingly opposed to (*viruddha*) [material objects such as] pots and so on, terminating in the field of consummated experiences; it is the boundless primordial matter of all formed things. Because it appears as all knowledge and because it appears as all differences, its eternally functioning manifestations are imitated in dream and sleep [of individuals]. It is provided with powers to create and destroy, like lightning and forest fire, through the realms of action and cessation. Indeed, knowers of Speech (*vāgyogavid*) who have cut the knots of egoity are joined in an absolute unity with Him, the Lord of all, possessing all powers, the great Bull of the Word.⁴⁹

⁴⁸ *VP* 1.116, DCMS 32, p. 193 "arthakriyāsu vāk sarvān samīhayati dehinaḥ/ tadutkrāntau vīsamjño yaṁ dṛśyate kāśṭhakuḍyavat." See *VP* 127, nn. 39, 44, 45 above.

⁴⁹ *VP* 1.130 and *vṛtti*, DCMS 32, pp. 199-200.

This verse, *VP* 1.130, and other passages discussed above, show the distinctions made in the *Vākyapadīya* between *Sabda*, i.e., Brahman the unity which is the linguistic principle intertwined with phenomena, and *vāc*, the effect or reflection of that linguistic principle in the form of the Veda and the subjective language in use. In the latter instance, Speech is the form of consciousness because it reflects back consciousness's light and renders cognitive objects consciously perceived with their determinate, verbal accompaniments. (Language as described by the metaphor of light will be discussed below.)

The distinction between *Sabdabrahman* and *vāc*, as the eternal and the effect, is that between language as an objective and universal principle in the former case, and Speech in the latter case as the subjective function, which accompanies a person and is used by him/her like the senses for apprehending inward and outward perceptions and for interacting with the world. From the fact that *Sabdabrahman* is established in the world as the Veda and as the linguistic principle entered into an individual consciousness, it follows, then, that *vāc* as the Veda is the communicable reflection, i.e., the *anukāra*, of Brahman, and *vāc* as ordinary language in use is analogously the communicable reflection, the *pratyavamarśinī* or *pratibimba*, of human consciousness.

The unitary source (*Sabdabrahman*) of scripture and Speech, both being *vāc*, is postulated because the author of the *VP* wants to establish that language which is intrinsic to consciousness is intertwined with the world and that language of this description is rooted in revealed scripture, because they--ordinary language and scripture--proceed from the same

cause. *Śabdabrahman*, the source of the Veda, is also the source of ordinary language with which a person perceives, thinks and communicates. Thus, Bhartṛhari supports his claim that the surest path to reach Brahman is grammar, (*VP* 1.5) because grammar assists in acquiring the correct knowledge of the Veda which contains the knowledge of Brahman, and because grammar elucidates the truth of relations between the mind and language as between things and language. Indeed, Brahman that is entered into human consciousness is undivided; and differentiation is *avidyā* resulting from the habitual use of language to reify mental categories of time and space, and so on (*VP* 1.1). Since these illusory manifestations begin with the knots of egoity, reaching Brahman is just the cutting of the knots, i.e., getting rid of differences and differentiation which the subjective language (*vāc*) imposes on the mind (*VP* 1.5). Through meditation on language (*śabdapūrvayoga*) and by cutting off the knots, one reaches the original unity, the Great Soul. On the other hand, grammar helps to purify the use of language, and purification leads to the attainment of the homogeneous and undivided source of all modifications in Speech. The source is intuition (*VP* 1.14).

Intuition: *pratibhā*

It is noted Bhartṛhari appears to postulate two sources of unity: the Word which is *Śabdabrahman*, *maho devo*, etc., and *pratibhā* which is the source of all Speech differentiations. In returning to the origin, one is united with the self which is characterized by being *sattālakṣaṇa*, which is the Great God, the Bull of the Word (*VP* 1.130-131); or, again, one reaches

the source of all speech modifications, namely, *pratibhā*, the ultimate matter (*parā prakṛti*) which is an approximation or qualification after being (*sattānugunya*) (*VP* 1.14, 1.123).

An ontological gap between *Śabda* and *vāc*, the homogeneity and its form of diversity, is filled by intuition which qualifies (or approximates) Being; it is the moment of apprehension between diverse efficiencies of words coalescing into a single object of cognition and the undifferentiated consciousness (*caitanya*) which is the real apprehender of experiences.

Intuition is postulated in this way because in Bhartṛhari's system language and reality, although moving on different planes, are intertwined. The notion of intuition, furthermore, gives scope to differences of subjective apprehensions and expressions which are fully materialized in three stages of Speech. An understanding of a linguistic proposition is intrinsically bound with reality, but as soon as one expresses a perception of reality in language, reality takes up the subject-object structure of the sentence. It is in intuition that consciousness, as the source of unstructured, inchoately verbalized thought, emerges and evolves in the structured form of Speech.

In the narrowest sense of the word, an apprehension of a sentence-meaning (*vākyārtha*) is intuition; it is an instantaneous flash of understanding. In the widest sense, it is the vision of the ṛṣi's who saw the Veda, revealed as an undifferentiated unity which the seers saw, heard, and experienced as if in a dream (" *svapnavṛttam iva dṛṣṭaśrutānubhūtam* , " *VP* 1.5, see n. 35). It is said that when one arrives at the unfragmented state of Speech, he comes upon the highest intuition, the origin (*prakṛti*) of

Speech modifications. And from this matter called intuition, which qualifies (or approximates) reality, through the practice of and meditation of the yoga of the Word, he attains the highest origin (*parā prakṛti*) in which all imaginings of transformations have become quiescent.⁵⁰ The *vr̥tti* of 1.26 describes it as an apprehension of a sentence-meaning.⁵¹ The *vr̥tti* of 1.123 gives a description similar to that found in 1.14: intuition is the source of reality, the origin of changes of states, being (*sattā*) which is provided with the powers to accomplish an end. The *vr̥tti* of 1.137 speaks of some ṛṣi's who evolve in intuition itself and who, in seeing the great soul, characterized by being, become enlightened.

In both senses of the word, intuition by itself is not an object, nor a state of mind, nor words. It is the point between word efficiencies' (*śakti*) functioning and cohering into a single perception and verbal accompaniments that follow, expressing that particular apprehension. In speaking of it as a qualification of being (*sattānugunya*) and the origin of Speech-modifications before an idea takes a definite verbal shape, Bhartṛhari indicates that an intuition which results from the functionings of words and their efficiencies contains the possibilities for further verbal ramifications that follow in the three stages of Speech, *paśyanti*, *madhyamā*, and *vaikhari*. And while the homogeneous consciousness, or being (*sattā*) which is Brahman, is not self-awareness, an intuition, falling ontologically between pure consciousness and its reflected form of Speech, is

⁵⁰ VP 1.14, DCMS 32, p. 48. "so 'vyatikṛpām vāgavasthām adbhigamya vāgvikṛpām prakṛtīm pratibhām anuparati. tasmāc ca sattānugunyaṁātrāṇi pratibhākyāc chaḥdapūrvayogabhāvanābhyaśāksēpāt pratyastamītasarva-vikṛoḍekhamātrām parām prakṛtīm pratipadyate."

⁵¹ VP 1.26 *vr̥tti*, DCMS 32, p. 67.

undifferentiated in substance; in form, as an apprehension, it is something distinguishable from consciousness itself.

Iyer, without alluding to *pratibhā*, explains how the mind connects with reality through language:

All these contradictions which result if word meanings are looked upon as having Primary Being disappear when it is understood that they move in the realm of Secondary Being. The basis of the Secondary Being is the fact that we determine things in our mind and use words to express what we have determined. Even what is present before our eyes does not become the object of verbal usage until we have determined its nature in our mind. Our mind enjoys a certain amount of freedom in determining things. The mind separates and analyses what is united in reality.... Therefore, the things denoted by the nouns and the verb have an existence only in the mind. This kind of Being which consists in something figuring in our mind is the basis of the use of all words.⁵²

On *pratibhā*, Iyer writes that when one has purified Speech, he attains happiness but not the ultimate reality:

Not yet.... He must fully realise the *pratibhā* which is derived from the ultimate Reality and which is identical with the ultimate Being (*satā*), the source of change and manifestation, endowed with the power of being the means of accomplishment and the thing to be accomplished (*sādhyaśādhanaśaktiyuktām*).⁵³

On intuition as the sentence meaning (*vākyārtha*), Iyer says:

...it is clear that, according to Bhartṛhari, the indivisible sentence is the

⁵² Subramania Iyer, *Bh*, p. 210-211.

⁵³ Subramania Iyer, *Bh*, p. 143.

unit of communication and that its meaning is understood in a flash (*pratibhā*). This meaning is also something indivisible, a complex cognition in which the central element is an action or process with its accessories closely associated with it.⁵⁴

On intuition in both aspects of an evolvent of *śabdabrahman* and the sentence meaning, Hattori writes:

According to him [Bhartṛhari], there is no essential distinction between the word and the meaning, both being two divisions of the *śabdabrahman*, the ultimate reality which is of the nature of the word. The *śabdabrahman* takes the form of *pratibhā* before it is manifested as the phenomenal words. As the primary evolvent of the *śabdabrahman*, *pratibhā* transcends the temporal sequence of sounds and the diversity of form that characterize the phenomenal words, and it is recognized as the original form of the phenomenal words (*vāgvikārānām prakṛtiḥ*). It resides in the mind of the speaker before he utters the sounds, and through the sounds that constitute the phenomenal words the listener is awakened to *pratibhā*.⁵⁵

David Carpenter, who sees *pratibhā* as the conjunction of "revelation and experience," writes:

Pratibhā is in fact the experience in which the two-fold manifestation of the Word-Principle--as language and world, knower and known--meet. This is clear from the fact that this intuition is neither a purely "subjective" event, nor an intuition into a thing-in-itself. It is rather the intrinsic luminosity of the world as a dynamic interrelated whole which is revealed by language.... It seems that it is in this sense, as conveying the dynamic interrelatedness of things, the fundamental 'Zugehörigkeit' of

⁵⁴ Subramania Iyer, *Bh*, p. 201.

⁵⁵ Masaaki Hattori, "Aśoka and *pratibhā*" in *Sanskrit and Indian Studies*, Nagatomi et al., eds., (Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1979) pp. 65-6.

self and world, indeed as instigating the enactment of this interrelatedness, that *pratibhā* is a manifestation of Śabdātattva.⁵⁶

While it may be, according to Carpenter, that every sentence-meaning is a revelation writ small, Raghunath Śarma who has a similar explanation puts it in a different way: intuition, which is an object of the intellective mind, is an apprehension in the form of "It is this" (*so 'yam*) which unites an apprehension of the expressor-expressed (i.e., linguistic) relation with that of something in the world (*padārtha*), like a cow, and so on.⁵⁷ As for Hattori's view that *pratibhā* is the first evolvent of *Śabdabrahman*, it is not completely evident that Bhartṛhari identifies intuition with an idea existing in the mind before the speaker expresses it in words, which idea is termed *vivakṣā* by the grammarian.⁵⁸

In Bhartṛhari's system, inasmuch as meaning is the principle element in language communication, language as the linguistic principle is inextricable

⁵⁶ David Carpenter, "Revelation and Experience in Bhartṛhari's *Vākyapadīya*," *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunst Südasiens* 29 (1985): 203.

⁵⁷ Raghunath Śarma, *Vākyapadīyam, Part I (Brahma-Kāṇḍam)*. With the *Svopajīdāvatī* of Harivṛṣabha and the *Ambākārī* of Raghunātha Śarmā, Sarasvatī Granthamālā 91, (Varanasi: Sampurnananda Sanskrit Vishvavidyalaya, 1976), pp. 170-171.

⁵⁸ Pūnyarāja's commentary to *VP* 2.407 (BSS 24, p. 254) says, "*vaktur antarakṣitā pratibhāivābhisandhūrūpā śabdamevī bhavati*," and equates intention (*abhidhā*) with intuition (*pratibhā*): the very intuition of the speaker blooming forth within in the form of an intention becomes composed of words. Bhartṛhari, *Vākyapadīya*, With the commentary by Pūnyarāja, Benares Sanskrit Series (BSS) 24 (Benares: Mssrs. Braj B. Das & Co., 1887). Iyer in his translation of the same verse numbered as *VP* 2.399 adds a note that "The following are the points in the *Ambākārī* on this verse. The power of a word to convey its meaning is called *abhidhā*. Some consider this *abhidhā* to be different from *pratibhā*, others not." Subramania Iyer, tr. *The Vākyapadīya of Bhartṛhari, Chapter II (VP II)* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1977), p. 171.

from language as expression: *śabda* and *vāc* meet in intuition in which the functions of word-efficiencies culminate in being the determinate perception of the subject, the meaning-apprehender. The intuition of the sages is the linkage between the Reality (*sattā*) and the subjective approximation or qualification (*sattānugūpya*), i.e., grasping Being from a subject's perspective and in the form of the subject's apprehending apparatus, *vāc* . Like lesser ones, the great Intuition perceived as if in a dream as a unity, is put into the diverse and sequential form, branching through stages of *vāc* ; intuitions are the basis of knowledge in the world of *vyavahāra* .

Sense-perceptions and language in cognition

Translations included in this section will show that Bhartṛhari conceives language as integrated with other functions of consciousness, and the subject is one whose sensory contacts and experiences are brought to bear on purely linguistic functions. Linguistic functions are constant and come to self-awareness as associated with sensory percepts which form a subjective background in which word-efficiencies coalesce into an apprehension. Although the Word-principle is fixed and the relation between a word and its meaning eternal,⁵⁹ there is scope for differences in subjective apprehensions and selections of words for expression. The speaker takes up an appropriate word with each [corresponding] meaning in regard the denoted meanings whose configurations are obtained by the desire to express, just as one who desires to perceive applies an appropriate sense.⁶⁰

⁵⁹ VP 1.23, DCMS 32, p. 51. " *nityāḥ śabdārthasambandhāḥ tatvānātā maharṣibhiḥ/ sūtrāṇāṃ śāstrānāṃ bhāṣyāṇāṃ ca prajñeṣṭhīḥ* . " "That the relations of words and meanings are eternal have been traditionally taught by great seers and authors of *sūtras* (such as Pāṇini and so on) along with the explanatory texts and commentaries."

The *kārikā* and *vṛtti* of *VP* 1.52 liken the use of words to drawing a picture: the figure consisting of parts is conceived as a single idea in the mind and then drawn out sequentially on a piece of cloth or a wall; in the same way heterogeneous words, their diverse parts drawn out and held in a single idea, are uttered by speech organs.⁶¹

Thus, when the problem of meaning conveyed and apprehended is considered, subjectivity necessarily enters into consideration. In understanding a meaning as well, the sentence is the complete unit of understanding from which word-meanings are derived. The reason is that although words and meanings as linguistic entities are in an eternal relation, word meanings in usage depend on subjective factors of a speaker and a hearer. Primary and secondary meanings arise because a word in use has associations with other words.⁶² A sentence also conveys meanings other than its literal meanings,⁶³ and the author of the *VP* lists factors that are the gray areas, indeterminacy, of word meanings.⁶⁴ That the determination

⁶⁰ *VP* 1.13, DCMS 32, p. 44 " *yogyam hi śabdāṃ prayuktā vivakṣāprāpitasaṃnidhāneṣv abhidheyeṣu pratyartham upādatte. tad yathopalīpsam ānab prativīṣayam yogyam evendriyam upalabdham prapīdhatte.*"

⁶¹ *VP* 1.52, DCMS 32, p. 111. " *yathāikabuddhivīṣayā mūrtir ākriyate paṭe/ mūrtyantarasya līlāyam evaṃ śabde 'pi drśyate.*"

⁶² *VP* 2.298-305, Iyer tr., *VP* II, pp. 129-131.

⁶³ *VP* 2.310-313, Iyer, tr., *VP* II, pp. 134-135.

⁶⁴ *VP* 2.314-6., Iyer, tr., *VP* II, pp. 135-137. (2.314) The meanings of words are determined according to the sentence, situation, meaning, propriety, place and time and not according to mere external form, (2.315) Connection, separation, association, opposition, meaning, context, indication, the presence of another word (2.316) Suitability, propriety, place, time, gender and accent etc. these are the causes of our determining the meaning of a word when there is no definiteness in it.

of word-meanings depends on the user is expressed in *VP* 2. 400, and the metaphor of the eye ("Just as, directed, the eye applies itself to seeing, just so a word intended is the expressor of the meaning.") recalls *VP* 1.13⁶⁵ and 1.118. Punyarāja equates intentionality with intuition, "It is the speaker's intuition, indeed, blooming forth within in the form of intention and consisting of words."⁶⁶

Bhartṛhari's implicit distinction between *śabda* and *vāc* distantly resonates with Saussure's distinction between language (*langue*) and speaking (*parole*):

Language is not a function of the speaker; it is a product that is passively assimilated by the individual. It never requires premeditation, and reflection enters in only for the purpose of classification...

Speaking, on the contrary, is an individual act. It is wilful and intellectual....⁶⁷

Similar to this view of language and speaking, Bhartṛhari's philosophy of language implicitly delineates the unity of language principle from the subjective use of language. In the former aspect, *Śabdatattva*, is a unity which comprises ideational and vocal linguistic elements existing in the mind and speech organs. In the latter aspect, Speech is an act of the subjective mind: it is that with which one thinks and which is the expression of one's ideas and thoughts. It is *vāc* which determines for the perceiver the

⁶⁵ See n. 60 and text, above.

⁶⁶ *VP* 2.400, *VP* II, Iyer, ed. (1983), p. 161 "yathā prāṇihitam cakṣur darsanāyopakalpate/ tathābhisaṃhītaḥ śabdo bhavatyarthasya vācakah." and *vṛtti*, p. 162 "...vaktur antarullasitā pratibhaivābhisaṃdhirūpā śabdamayī bhavati." See also n. 58 above.

⁶⁷ Ferdinand de Saussure, *A Course in General Linguistics*, (Rev., paperback ed., England: William Collins Sons and Co Ltd Glasgow, 1974), p. 14.

identity and character of a cognitive object, and which Bhartṛhari speaks of as the senses that apprehend the world. As soon as a person uses language he imposes a subjective perspective on it; Speech (*vāc*) in use, imposing a differentiated form on the linguistic principle (*Śabdabrahman*) also increases and binds the world through determinate and describable experience.

Intuition flashes forth between the efficiencies (*śakti*) of words in the objective language and their subjective meanings. It is the culmination of word-efficiencies in the eye, i.e., the intentional seeing, of the apprehender, just as it is the source of Speech unfolding into intended expressions. Verse 1.118 describes the role of intuition, mediating between word efficiencies and subjective perceptions:

The efficiency residing in words alone is the binder (or basis) of this world. With that efficiency as its eyes this intuition itself is perceived in different appearances.

Some [teachers] say that universals (*ākṛti*) are based on the support of subtle words. Indeed, being perceived through the modifications of the support, they resolve through an expressor-expressed relation in a revelation of themselves. According to others, just as the efficiencies in the matter of objects become dissolved into the senses, so, the efficiencies of senses [become dissolved] in the intellectual minds, and the efficiencies of the intellectual minds in the self of Speech, whose sequence is contracted. And this activity in sleep and wakefulness which imitates each person (*puruṣānukāra*) exists eternally even in the great one, the cause which is the substance of Speech.

Speech alone sees the meaning. Speech speaks. Speech alone extends the fixed meaning.

The universe of manifold appearances is bound in Speech.

Having divided the one, it enjoys.⁶⁸

It is apparent that the verse and its *vytti* explain how words become understood intuitively as meanings. The efficiency in words binds the whole, i.e., the expressor and its expressed meaning, and the efficiency is the eye through which understanding, perceived in different forms, arises. This is to say that the word efficiency is the means of meaning apprehension which is again differently perceived: within the boundary of word meanings, the arisen intuition is varied in appearance.

Intuition intervenes between the linguistic functions of *śabdātattva* in consciousness and its reflection in the self-conscious form of Speech. Intuition mediates the active consciousness on the one side and the reflection of its activities on the other. As the noumenon between being (*sattā*) and verbal manifestations, intuition qualifies or approximates (*sattānugupya*) reality but also holds a possibility for a variable qualification in the subjective character of Speech which manifests or reflects consciousness. The *vytti* cites two opinions. One is that the universals of words make themselves known in expressor-expressed relation through the manifesting substratum, i.e., the acoustic words. Another opinion has it that efficiencies in objects become dissolved in Speech by way of the intellective mind (*buddhi*). The latter opinion is cited in order to show connections of language function with sensory perceptions, i.e., that the activity of Speech which functions constantly in sleep and wakefulness is influenced by objects impinging on the senses and the intellective mind

⁶⁸ *VP* 1.118, DCMS 32, pp. 180-181. "Śabdesv evāśritē śaktir viśvasyāśya nibandhanī/ yanneirah pratibhālmāyam bhederUpah pratīyate."

through their respective efficiencies. This idea is echoed in the *virtu* of 1.123 below, where it is explained how determinate cognitions, ideas, are formed as accompanied by words:

There is not a notion in the world except that which is accompanied by words.

Every knowledge (cognition), as if penetrated by words, comes to light through words.

Since a person's innate disposition for language is in a contracted form, so, an indeterminate knowledge even when arising in respect of things that are to be known does not produce an effect. It is as follows: from his contact with grass and clods, etc., although a cognition (*jñāna*) occurs to a person who is moving hurriedly, etc., this state of knowledge is only indefinite (*kācideva*). In this state of knowledge whose seed of the linguistic disposition has come to attention, when the efficiencies of explainable and unexplainable words which cause to understand the meanings are fixed in relation to their respective meanings, the object itself is grasped up, shaped by cognition according to the efficiencies and pierced by words; it is said that the object itself (*vastu*), appearing in a distinct form accompanied by cognition (*jñānānugata*), is known. And it [the object thus cognized] becomes the cause of memory when seeds of sounds appear from other causes (*āvirbhavatsu śrutibhīṣu*). Similarly some teachers [say] that composition of cognitive activities in a person asleep is the same as that during wakeful moments, but only then [in sleep] the seeds of linguistic disposition function minutely (*tadā sūkṣmāṃ vṛttim pratilabhante*). Therefore they say this state is stuporous (*tāmasīm avasthām*). This is the ordinary consciousness (*saṃjñāna*) which constantly undergoes appearance and disappearance (*āvirbhāvatūrobhāvau*) in relation to words as its cause and effect.⁶⁹

⁶⁹ VP 1.123, DCMS 32, pp.188-90.

"na so 'sti pratyayo loka yathā śabdānugamād rīe
anuviddham iva jñānam sarvaṃ śabdena bhāṣate
yathāśya saṃhṛtaṃ śabdabhāvanā tathā jñeyasv artheṣūtpannāpy avikalpena
jñānena kāryam na kriyate. tad yathā tvaritam gacchates tṛṇaloṣṭādīsamsparsāt saty api
jñāne kācid eva sā jñāvesthā yasyām abhimukhībhiḥ śabdabhāvanābhijāyām āvirbhūtiḥ
arthopagrāhīṇām ākhyeyarūpāṇām anākhyeyarūpāṇām ca śabdānām pratyartīkṣanīyātāsu

Verse 1.123, and its *vṛtti*, clearly explains the continuity and differences between indeterminate and determinate cognitions through an accompaniment of words. An indeterminate cognition is purely a sense percept which occurs in passing without becoming consciously verbalized. A sense percept sows seed words which when they come to attention, and when their efficiencies are fully developed, the words which now are capable of expressing meanings are cognized together with the object itself. A determinate cognition, in the form of word-and-thing together can be stored away and can trigger seed words in memory, which seed words have been sown from other sense perceptions. The *vṛtti* describes a normal state of consciousness as consisting of a series of determinate and indeterminate cognitions, in which percepts and words are mutual causes and effects. The mind is constantly active with its sensory and verbal functions interacting to produce determinate cognitions.

In verse 1.124, Bhartṛhari uses the metaphor of light to describe the workings of the linguistic principle. Consciousness infused by the Word is like light, whose form of Speech achieves the reflecting function and completes the illuminating function. The grammarian often likens language to light: language is like light which illumines itself and its objects.⁷⁰ It is

*śaktiṣu śabdānurviddhena śakty anupātinaṁ jñānenākriyamāṇa upagṛhyamāṇo vastvātmā
jñānānugato vyaktīarūpapratyavabhāso jñāyata ity abhidhīyate. sa ca nimittāntarād
āvirbhavatsu śrutībījeṣu smṛtibhetur bhavati. tathaikeṣāṁ ācāryāṇāṁ supṭasyāpi
jāgradvṛtīyā sadṛśo jñānavṛtī prahandhah. kevalam tu śabdabhāvanābījāni tadā sūkṣmāṁ
vṛtīm pratilabdhante. tasmāt tāmasīm ceti tām avasthām ābuh. tad etat samjñānaṁ
śabdaprakṛtīvikārabhāvenāvirbhāvātirobhāvāv ajasram pratyannubhavaṭi."*

⁷⁰ VP1.50, DCMS 32, p.108. "ātmarūpaṁ yathā jñāne jñeyarūpaṁ ca dṛśyate/
arīharūpaṁ tathā śabde svarūpaṁ ca prakāśate." "Just as the form of the self and the form
of the object of cognition are seen in cognition, just so the form of a meaning and the form

also like light in a firestick (*arapistha*) giving its flame to other fires.⁷¹

The relation of a word with its meaning is that of an illuminator and illuminated.⁷² More important, language is like light because through its reflecting activity an object comes to view. Illumination consists of assimilating disparate objects and combining them into a single object of understanding returning to the perceiver. Indeed, its act of reflecting is the synthesis (*anusamdhāna*): the light of language "touches back" (*pratyavamṛśati*) with disparate percepts unified in the determinate cognition of a single entity. Verse 1.124 states:

**If the eternal Speech as the form of knowledge should vanish,
light would not illuminate, for Speech as the form [of
knowledge] is the reflecting one.**

Just as luminosity is the nature of fire and consciousness the nature of the inner controller, just so every cognition is also accompanied by just the form which is Speech (*vāgṛpamātrānugatam*). A subtle element of language exists even in a state of unconsciousness [i.e. a faint or a stupor]. Even the first fall of light on external objects, taking up the particular qualities, manifests the mere form of an object itself in an undefinable way as, "It is this (*idaṃ tad*)." At the time of memory as well, when such seeds of perception come to attention as verses, etc., that are to be remembered, the thought, "This is some hymn or verse that I can barely hear," turns about in mind like a bare form of light. And when language itself shine out in a word."

⁷¹ VP 1.43, DCMS 32, p. 103. " *arapistham yathā jyotiḥ prakāśāntarakāraṇam/ tadvacchabdo 'pi buddhisthah sruṣṭāṇāṃ kāraṇam prthak* ." "Just as the light in the firestick is the cause of another light, in the same way a word in the mind is individually the cause of word-sounds."

⁷² VP 1.23 *vṛtti*, DCMS 32, p. 60. " *indriyaviśayavad vā prakāśyaparakāśakabhāvena samayopādhir yogyatā śabdārthayoḥ sambandhah* ." "Or, like a sense and its object, the relation between a word and its meaning is a fitness as the illuminator and the illuminated, convention being an adventitious superimposition on this fitness."

is not the form [of cognition] (*vāgrūpatāyām asatyām*), even though light arises, without incorporating another form in itself it does not resolve in the form which achieves an illuminating action. When there appears a bare cognition of objects, i.e., things that are mutually distinct in nature and are mutually unfavorable, a subsequent synthesis is the reflecting back (*yad uttarakālam anusadhānam pratyavamarśa*) which entails the process of combining the efficiencies (*śakti*). This synthesis renders [disparate things] a single, whole object, and it is bound in language as the form. For, Speech (*vāc*), synthesizing and reflecting back in a notion which is qualified by all [of its] particulars and which effects a purposeful action, does not depart from the process of excluding and combining by supposing [that there are] separable elements of efficiencies.⁷³

To produce a determinate cognition, light must assimilate the object of illumination and reflect back itself and [its] object. Illumination and reflection complete the full functioning of light. Thus, the entire process consists in light's first falling on disparate things, and its synthesizing of mutually incompatible objects in itself, i.e., into the form of light; synthesis is

⁷³ VP1.124, DCMS 32, p. 190-192.

*vāgrūpatā ced utkrāmed avabodhasya śāśvatī
na prakāśaḥ prakāśeta sā hi pratyavamarśinī
yathā prakāśakatvam agneḥ svarūpam caitanyam vāntaryāmīṇas tathā jñānam api
sarvam vāgrūpamātrānugatam. yāpy asahcetutāvasthā tasyām api sūkṣmo
vāgdharmaṇugamo bhāvavartate. yo 'pi prathamopanipātī bhāyeṣv artheṣu prakāśaḥ sa
nimittjñānam aparigraheṇa vastusvarūpamātram idam tad ity avyapdeśyayā vṛttyā
pratyavabhāsayati. smṛtikāle 'pi tādṛśjñānam upalabdhibijñānam ābhimukhye smartavyeṣu
ślokaḥ dīṣu prakāśjñānamātram ārūpam iva buddhau viparivartate ko 'py asav anuvākaḥ
śloko vā yo 'yam mayā śruti-mātreṇa prakānta itī. vāgrūpatāyām cāsatyām utpanno 'pi
prakāśaḥ pararūpam anahgīkurvan prakāśanakriyāśādhana-rūpatāyām na vyavatiṣṭhate.
bhinnarūpāṇām cānupakāripāṇāmāntarānātmanām itaretarasya vastumātrājñāne
pratyavabhāsamāne yad uttarakālam anusamdhānam pratyavamarśa ekārthakāritvam
avibhāgena śaktisamsargayogopagrahaḥ tad vāgrūpatāyām baddham. sā hy
anusamdadhānā pratyavamarśanī ca sarvaviśeṣaṇaviśiṣṭe 'py arthakriyākāriṇī pratyaye
śakti-yapoddhārakalpanayā bheda-samsargamātrām na vijahāti.*

the "reflecting-back" of one idea provided with its particulars. It is a process in which the combination of efficiencies are combined as a whole and are productive of a single cognitive object. The cognitive object expressed by the words "*pararūpa*," "*bhinnarūpāṇām*," and "*ekārtha*" consists of a mixture of words and things, which is to say that the passage is not describing merely a linguistic function or a sensory perception, but a combination of both which comprises a determinate cognition under discussion.⁷⁴

When the *vṛtti* says that Speech, as form, synthesizing and reflecting, does not escape the matter of combining and dissociating through the supposition of separable elements, it is evident that a sentence-meaning (*vākyārtha*), which is understood as a whole in one intuition, is a product of combining and separating because an apprehender in recognizing the whole must also be able to distinguish the parts, i.e., the individual words.

A determinate cognition is real and inherent in indeterminate cognition. Language not a super-addition to perception, but perceptions cause and are caused by verbalization. All distinct knowledge, self-perceptions and mental activities are accompanied by language. Cognition is not passive, but it is a process by which consciousness lays hold of itself [its own illumination]

⁷⁴ Therefore, I did not translate the passage as does Iyer who takes the combination of *sakti*s to apply only to words. It follows from previous verses as well that a sense-perceptions and verbalizations are mutually impinging, and in a determinate cognition, the form of language and sensory object-cognition coincide as a single verbalized cognition. This is, after all, the essential idea that a meaning-apprehension, an intuition, grasps a linguistic proposition and reality, i.e., that an intuition is a *sattānugunya*. This interpretation follows as well from Raghunath Sarma's commentary who takes intuition in the form of "*so 'yam*" as an identification or coincidence of a linguistic proposition (*vācyaśāstra*) and things (*padārtha*). See Raghunath Sarma, *Vākyapadīyam, Part I (Brahma-kāṇḍam)*. With the *Svopajñāvṛtti* of Harivṛṣabha and the *Ambākartī* of Raghunātha Sarmā, Sarasvatī Granthamālā 91, (Varanasi: Sampurnananda Sanskrit Vishvavidyalaya, 1976), pp. 170-171.

through the form by which an external object becomes cognized. The metaphor of light is apt: it is the form which 'synthesizes' and 'reflects' back to consciousness an external object as an object of cognition. It illumines itself and its object: light must be perceived at the same time that it causes a perception of what it illumines.⁷⁵ For this reason, Bhartṛhari often says that the language-form is an object, *upagrāhya*, and the cause, *upagrāhi*, of perception.⁷⁶ Verse 1.125 is translated below:

This [Speech] is the conscious perception (*saṃjñā*) of worldly beings within and without.

Consciousness (*caitanya*) does not go beyond its [Speech's] measure in all creatures.

In the world, the designation 'sentient' (*śaṃjñā*) and 'insentient' (*viśaṃjñā*) exists in virtue of the fact that the form of language conforms to consciousness. Thus, he says,

"Speech causes bodily creatures to desire purposeful actions.

Whoever is without it is thought to be unconscious, like a log or a wall."

⁷⁵ The metaphor of light has been used to designate Speech and the soul in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*. Verse 4.3.5. states 'Speech, indeed, is his light,' said he, 'for with speech, indeed, as his light one sits, moves around, does his work, and returns. Therefore, verify, O king, where one does not discern even his own hands, when a voice is raised, then one goes straight towards it.' Verse 4.3.6 states, "The soul (*ātman*), indeed, is his light,' said he, 'for with the soul, indeed, as his light one sits, moves around, does his work, and returns.' Verse 4.3.7: 'The person here who among the senses is made of knowledge, who is the light in the heart [is the soul]." Robert Ernest Hume, tr., *The Thirteen Principal Upanishads*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1921) pp. 133-134.

⁷⁶ VP1.55 *grāhyatvam grāhakatvam ca dve śakti tejaso yathā/ tathāiva sarvasadbhānām ete prthagavasthite . VP1.1 tat tu bhinnarūpābhimatānām api vikārāpām prakṛtyanvayitvā chadbopgrāhyatayā sadbopagrāhitayā ca sadbdatattvam ity abhidhīyate .*

As for those who perceive inwardly, their measure of the consciousness of pleasure and pain comes about only insofar as it is accompanied by Speech as the form. As for those who are aware of external things, their worldly transaction based on [Speech] would come to a standstill in its absence. For there exists no creature possessed of consciousness in which the knowledge of itself and others is not accompanied by language. Therefore, there exists no form of mental activity which does not use the efficiencies of Speech. Others say that the form of mental activity is essentially the form of Speech. He says the following:

"Its form having been acquired through manifestation which takes up differences,

it is transmitted in all learnings; Speech alone is the ultimate matter.

Not transgressing unity, Speech being their eyes, Speech being their support,

divisions in language, such as 'cow' and so on, appear as individual [things].

They rise above death who attend to Speech, which has six gates, six supports, six awakenings, and six constants."⁷⁷

⁷⁷ VP 1. 125, (DCMS 32) p. 193-4.

*saigā samsārjñām samjñā bahir antaś ca vartate
tannmātrām avyatikrāntām caitanyam sarvajñāṇaṁ
yo 'yam caitanye vāgrūpatānugamas tena loka sasamjñā visamjñā iti vyapadesah
kriyate. evaṁ hy āha
arthakriyāsu vāk sarvān samīhaya dehinah
tadutkrāntau visamjñā 'yam dr̥syate kāṣṭhakudyavat
iti antasamjñānām api sukhaduḥkhasamvinmātrā yāvad vāgrūpatānurvṛttiś tāvad eva
bhavati. bahiḥsamjñāṇaṁ tannibandhanaṁ lokavyavahāras tadabhāvān niyatam utsīdet. na hi
sā caitanyenāviṣṭā jālir asti yasyām svaparasaṁbodho yo vācā nānugamyate. tasmecc
cūlikriyārūpam alabdhavākśaktiparigrahaṁ na vidyate. vāktattvarūpam eva
cūlikriyārūpam ity anye
bhedodgrāhaviṣṭena labdhākāraparigrahā
āmnātā sarvavidyāsu vāg eva prakṛtiḥ parā
ekatvam anatīkrāntā vānnetrā vānnibandhanāḥ
prthak pratyavabhāsanīte vāgvibhāgā gavādayah.
śaḍdvārām śaḍadhiṣṭhānām śaṭprabodhām śaḍavyayām
te mṛtyum atīvartante ye vai vācam upāśate."*

In this verse, Bhartṛhari emphasizes that Speech necessarily accompanies and conforms to consciousness; the presence and absence of Speech as form are the describable characteristics of 'conscious' or 'unconscious.' The use of language divides things in the world and binds them in a self-conscious experience. Thus, the statement, "*ekatvam anatīkrāntā vāñnetrā vāñnibandhanāḥ prthak pratyavabhāsante vāgvibhāgā gavādayaḥ*," recapitulates a previous verse (VP 1.118) "*śabdeṣv evāśritā śaktir viśvasyāsyā nibandhanī, yannetraḥ prabhātmāyaṁ bhedarūpaḥ pratīyate*."

These seminal ideas in Bhartṛhari are elaborated further by Utpala and Abhinava with modifications according to Śaiva theological doctrines. The idea of intuition, looming between quiescent consciousness and an active thought, is developed into a psychology of cognition: an intuition of what a thing is and what it is not precedes a determinate cognition. For Abhinava, intuition becomes the cooperating cause of an aesthetic perception. Bhartṛhari's profound contributions are seen especially in freeing a subjective aspect of language from its formal linguistic structure and thus preparing the basis for conceiving thought as an act of creation, or an imagination, by the cognizer.

Chapter Three

Intuition in the Śaiva Theory of Cognition

Bhartṛhari's language philosophy takes deep roots in Śaiva philosophy. Although its founder Somānanda rails against the grammarian, his commentator, Utpala who has already written his *Īśvarapratyabhijñā-kārikā* (*IPK*) inserts salient passages from the *VP* in his comment of the *Sivadr̥ṣṭi* (*SD*). Śaiva theory of cognition may be said to be at basis a conflation of ideas in Śaivism, Śāktism or popular (radical) Tantrism, and Bhartṛhari's theory of consciousness. The Tantric aspect becomes more pronounced in Abhinava's comment. It is on the basis of this theory of cognition, its philosophy and psychology, that Abhinava's aesthetic theory can be fully appreciated, and central to both aspects of his thought is the notion of *pratibhā*: a determinate cognition is fundamentally creative and free in its construction. This freedom is the background to the aesthetic imagination leading to the relishing of a particular *rasa*. The statements of the *Abhinavabhāratī*, asserting that there is knowledge of one's self in an aesthetic experience can be meaningful when we examine the foundations of thought and imagination.

Recognition

The principle ideas in Śaiva systematic philosophy of Utpala are related here in brief. Recognition, which is the subject of Utpala's treatise on

systematic Śaiva philosophy, is the liberating knowledge which is the realization, "I am Śiva." Śiva, the Universal Consciousness, is transcendent as pure consciousness and immanent in the world as the substance of all phenomena. Maheśvara, who creates the universe by manifestation, is immanent as consciousness in an individual's consciousness. Śaiva theology posits a chain of causality in which pure transcendence gradually becomes manifested as phenomena: *cit*, *ānanda*, *icchā*, *jñāna*, and *kriyā*.⁷⁸ In this scheme a preceding element causes and encompasses all the following. In the first place, God, pure consciousness withdrawn into sheer self-awareness, is the ground of *ānanda*, a vital joy of conscious existence which in turn begets a desire or impulse to create. *Ichchā* evolves into *jñāna*, a cognition which is an awareness of something external. From cognition proceeds the act of manifestation into phenomenal objects. This is *kriyā*, the manifestation of inner thought or imagination as external objects. In God an idea directly becomes phenomenal reality.

Maheśvara's immanence is manifest in the fact that an individual consciousness recapitulates the Universal Consciousness of Śiva. To recognize that 'I am Śiva' is no more than the realization of the unity of consciousness, that 'I' am the sole agent and creator of the universe of my consciousness. The universe exists to me as the projections of my consciousness, and this universe is traversed and intersected by all others' consciounesses that are represented in mine. The self which is to be known and recognized as Śiva, is the very self quiescent and transcendent amidst its web of images, just as

⁷⁸ *SD*. 1.2-3, pp. 3-5, " *ātmanīva sarvabhāveṣu sphurao nīrvṛtācid vibhuh / aniruddheccchāprasaraḥ prasaraḍḍṛkkriyāḥ śivāḥ // sa yadāste cidāhīdādmātrānubhāvatalayāḥ / tadicchā tāvatī tava jñānam tāvat kriyā hi sā //*"

God is at play at the vortex of Creation, delighting in the play of fashioning images called the universe.

Thus, theology finds a corollary in psychology. An individual consciousness is neither completely engaged in perceptible mental activities nor entirely withdrawn from perceptions, in the way that the Sāṅkhyas or Vedāntins would describe real consciousness as Puruṣa and Brahman who are disengaged and withdrawn from mental activities. In Śaivism, consciousness is the cause of joy and desire to know and create. A self-awareness of one's own independent and sovereign agency, inherent in all object-awarenesses, is a marvel and wonder (*camatkṛti*).

Utpala believes that the empirical world is created and arranged by God's will and imagination so that it invariably functions according to principle or natural law, *niyati*.⁷⁹ Human consciousness which is independent in respect of the subjective image manifestations participates in a real, external world. Utpala's arguments concerning the nature of cognition are often

⁷⁹ *SD* 4.47-52, pp. 98-101. (4.47-8) "*na svarūpavibhāgo 'tra svarūpe tatsvarūpatā / parāparādibhedo 'tra tadvyavahārāya kल्पitam // vyavahāro 'py avidyā no tatbhā- tvenesvarasthiteḥ / tenaiva vā tatbhā kṛtas tatbhā tadanuvarṭanam.*" (4.51) "*niyamānupra- veśāya śive collaṅghanena kim / evaṃ pravarttane tasya na nimittasamudgamah.*" Utpala's gloss on the last verse: "*yac ca ... coditam tatadātmakanīyatīśaktikṛtanīyamārōpa- dharmānupraveśaphalasamsāravyavahāra-sampādanāya.* See also *JPV* 2.4., vol. 2, p. 172. "*teṣāṃ nijam nijam prasiddham tṛpṣas tīlāso pi anyathābhāvanam asahamānam laukikam eva kāraṇam, iti ghaṭe mṛdāṇḍacakrādi... bhagavān bhūribhargo mahādevo niyatynuvartapollāṅghanaghanatarasvātantryaḥ ity atra pakṣe niyatynuvartīni laukike prasiddhe kāryakāraṇabhāve svātantryam*" and 2.4.11, vol. 2, pp. 179-80, "*yadi param vyavahārah sādhyate, tarur ayaṃ vṛkṣatvāi, iti nyāyena, vyavahāras ca jñānābhīdhānātmā kārya eva, tatra ca niyatīśaktīraṅgikṛtā bhavatīpi.*" Somānanda sets forth the idea that Śiva is a unity, the material and instrumental cause of the world; and the world created is not divided in itself for Śiva but divided for us in the conventional world. Utpala follows up this idea that the world created by Śiva is stable through the power of *niyati*, and through this stability such conventional rules of transaction, such as in inference, etc., can be effected.

directed toward certain Kashmirian Buddhists, and prominent in his mind are the debated problems of determinate and indeterminate perceptions.⁸⁰ In this respect he resembles Bhartṛhari who answers to Buddhists' critique of knowledge, particularly regarding language and its role in knowing reality.⁸¹ Utpala relies on Bhartṛhari's language theory to provide an intrinsic continuity between determinate and indeterminate cognitions: the subjective language, *vāc*, is consciousness's power of independence and autonomy. Speech which is the reflection of consciousness is the substance of mental activities by which consciousness constructs a synthetic idea of personhood in relation to the world manifested in the substratum of self-awareness. The stability of the external world, in turn, comprises a standard of rationality (*vyavahāra*) which are conventions of concepts that provide a coherence for subjectively produced thoughts.⁸²

⁸⁰ On Kashmirian Buddhists, see P. Th. Stcherbatsky, *Buddhist Logic*, vols. 1, 2. (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1962.); Jean Naudou, *Les Bouddhistes Kasmiriens au Moyen Age*, (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France), 1968; Ankul Chandra Banerjee, *Sarvāstivāda Literature*. (Calcutta: The World Press Private Limited), 1979.

⁸¹ David Carpenter, "Revelation and Experience in Bhartṛhari's *Vākyapadīya*" in *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Sud-Asien*, 29 (1985):185-206, p. 201. See also on connections between Bhartṛhari, Buddhism, Vedānta, and Saivism: David Seyfort Ruegg, *Contributions à l'histoire de la philosophie linguistique Indienne*, Publication de l'institut de civilisation Indienne, série 8, fascicule 7 (Paris: E. de Boccard), 1959, pp. 60-63, and ns. 1, 2, pp. 60-61.

⁸² Rājānaka Utpaladeva, *Pratyabhijñārikāvṛtti* (*IPKv*), Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies (KSTS) 34, Pandit Madhusudan Kaul Shastri, ed. (Srinagar: Jammu and Kashmir state), 1921. See verses 6, 7 in which he represents the Buddhist's view in which the problem of a personal identity is linked with determinate and indeterminate cognitions. See also the commentaries of Abhinavagupta on the notion of recognition of the true self in contrast to *aṣaṃpratyaya*, I-notion, an empirical self or personal identity, Chapters 1 and 2. Chapter 6 of *Jñānādhikāra* distinguishes between the non-dual self, and the 'I' whose

Utpala wishes to establish that Maheśvara, God or Śiva, is the Self, namely Cognizer who is the unitary substratum of the phenomenal world: His immanence consists in being an all-pervading and all-manifesting consciousness. The individual self is no different from the Lord, and cognition is the subject's activity of manifesting the object in his consciousness. In this process, he rejects the the Sāṃkhya notion that a crystalline *buddhi* reflects the object because either the intellective mind (*buddhi*) will be sentient or there must be another subject who animates it. Here the Śaivas ask, what is the use of positing another subject, the Puruṣa?⁸³ Utpala also rejects the Buddhists' notion that consciousness in illuminating an object of cognition assumes the form of the latter's reflection (*pratibimba*). Abhinava asks in this case, "Why does it assume the form of the object?" The reply is: "because of the already existing chain of causation."⁸⁴ Utpala's related concepts of consciousness and cognition are governed by unity: the animating principle is the same as that which thinks and acts; on the other side the unity of consciousness is not self-enclosed, but its power to create knowledge consists in making connections and relating disparate objects together in one coherent image (*ābhāsa*).

Śaiva philosophers give the cognizer complete reign over his cognition, and the status of an object is that whose existence depends on being

referents are the body and the psycho-physical complex. K. C. Pandey, tr., R.C. Dwivedi, ed., *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvimarśinī of Abhinavagupta*, (IPV) vols. 1-3. (Reprint. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass), 1986.

⁸³ IPV1.2.8, vol. 2, 104-110 "jādo 'py asau itīham arthasya prakāśo bhaviṣyati itī sāmkyamataṃ āśaṅkate...tataśca sā buddhir eva cinmayī syātī, kiṃ puruṣeṇa"

⁸⁴ Ibid. p. 112, "evam arthapratibimbakadvāreṇa arthamayī ity api āyāto vijñānavadaḥ. kuta etasyāḥ tad rūpatvam itī, pūrvakāraṇaparamparātaḥ itī uttaram."

manifested by the subject.⁸⁵ Since the homogeneous light of consciousness cannot illuminate an inert object of a different substance, which formerly unilluminated would remain as before, objects must also consist partly of light.⁸⁶ The agent is volitionally independent in his choice of cognition, and he is sovereign (*aiśvara*) in the manner of representation because his power for conceptual synthesis is autonomous.⁸⁷ Thus, knowledge is an assumption of the object by the manifesting subject. Cumulative knowledge and collective experiences of people are routinized in ordinary usage and transactions, *vyavahāra*. Since our world of rationality is thus rooted in conventions and conventional truths, personal and collective memories which are a basis of everyday behavior and rationality must be valid.

Eschewing external and objective criteria of validity, the Śaivas say truth is known by internal coherence: there is no absolute but only relative standards which depend on unity, be it a unity of an individual cognizer, the unity of a community of a common *vyavahāra*, or the ultimate unity of the grand Cognizer, Śiva. An error, is an incomplete knowledge,

apūrṇakhyāti.⁸⁸ A cognition which now disagrees with a previous

⁸⁵ IPV1.1.1 " *kartari jñātari svātmany ādisiddhe mahesvare / ajadātma nisedham vā siddhim vā vidadhūta kaḥ* "; 1.1.3 " *taṭhā hi jadabhūtānām pratiṣṭhā jīvadāśrayā / jñānam kriyā ca bhūtānām jīvatām jīvanam matam* ."

⁸⁶ IPV 1.5.2 " *prāgīvārtho 'prakāśaḥ syāt prakāśāimatayā vinā / na ca prakāśo bhinnas syād ātmārthasya prakāśatā* ,"

⁸⁷ IPV1.5.10 " *svāmināscātmasaṁsthāsya bhāvajāṭasya bhāsanam / asty eva na vinā tasmād icchāmarśaḥ pravartate* . " and 1.6.9-11 " *kin tu naisargiko jñāne bahir ābhāsanātmāni / pūrvānubhavarūpas tu sthitaḥ sa smaraṇādīṣu // sa naisargiko evāsti vikalpe svairacārīni / yathābhīmatasaṁsthānābhāsanād buddhigocare // ata eva yathābhīṣṭa samullekhāvabhāsanāt / jñānakriye sphuṭe eva siddhe sarvasya jīvataḥ //*

⁸⁸ See Navjivan Rastogi, "Theory of Error According to Abhinavagupta," *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 14 (1986): 1-34. See also IPV 2.3. The chapter is devoted to explaining

cognition does not prove the former wrong, but insofar as each present cognition is a synthesis relative to every other synthesis, a fixed truth does not exist in this system which recognizes Śiva as a substratum of infinite possibilities of his powers of manifestation.⁸⁹

Samvid

Samvid is proposed as the full or universal consciousness because it is the unity of the agent combining the five elements, from pure consciousness down to action. It is a concept of consciousness which allows formations of complex mental processes and activities to be unified in, i.e., caused by, consciousness which is the agent. *Samvid* is in essence *prakāśavimarsa*,

validity of knowledge and error.

⁸⁹ A theory of relative truths is set forth in chapter four of the *SD* in which Somānanda states essentially that all things in the phenomenal world are real as God's manifestations, in the same way that all notions in mind are real because they are perceived. As for the truth, *satyatvam*, he says, "*tathā yatra sad ity evaṃ pratītiś tad asaś katham / yat sat tat paramārtho hi paramārthas tatra Śivaḥ // sarvabhāveṣu cidvyakteḥ sthitaiva paramārthatā / mithyājñānavikalpyānāṃ sattvaṃ cidvyaktiśaktatā // vidyate tat tad atrāpi śivatvaṃ kena vāryate / iti ced eṣu satyatvaṃ sthūtam eva cidudgamāḥ // tathā śivodasyād eva bhedo mithyādikāḥ katham / vyavahārāya satyatvaṃ na ca vā vyavahāragam // tathā ca deśe kvacana rājājñā jāyate yathā / vyavahāro 'stu dīnārair etair vyavahāragaiḥ //* (*SD* 4.6-10, pp. 128-9). What is perceived as real is real, and what is real is ultimate because it is Śiva. Ultimateness is established through the fact that all conditions are manifestations of the mind, and thus it is possible to explain the truth of things that are imaginable by false cognitions (*mithyājñāna*). And since all things arise from Śiva, how can there be anything different which is false. Somānanda makes an interesting illustration here that truth, *satyatva*, is not inherent in custom and usage but is for the sake of usage and ordinary transaction, just as it happens sometimes that in a country the king commands that dinars be the ordinary convention in transactions. Utpala comments, "*sphuradrūpatā hi sattā. sphuradrūpatā ca prakāśamānatā. tatas ca jādātā tāvan nāstī... sarveṣāṃ ca ghaṭādīnāṃ prakāśarūpataya viśeṣābhāvād ekaparakāśātmatā; tata evaś kaśivatvaṃ*," (*SD* p. 128) This point, he says he takes up in detail in the *IPKv*.

light and its reflective aspect--pure illumination and its objectification. These two aspects of consciousness create self-awareness, since in consciousness an object-awareness presupposes a subject-awareness as well.⁹⁰ *Vimarsa* is analogous to an indeterminate cognition: it is an immediate awareness accompanied by a subtle verbalization.

Somānanda describes *vimarsa* in the following way: *pasyantī* is an action possessing a prior and posterior states, and *vimarsa* is this prior state, namely, an incipient idea that unfolds in stages into audible verbalization.

Vimarsa is in the form of desire, like the desire of a pot-maker thinking that he should make a pot, which is to say that it is the mental attitude of an agent toward the object of his action.⁹¹ For Utpala and Abhinava, *vimarsa* is subtly verbalized;⁹² immediate and instantaneous, it contains the synthetic thought in which the outcome, i.e., the goal to which a thought is directed, has been determined.⁹³ The initial presentation of *vimarsa*

⁹⁰ Dinnāga also has a similar idea about object-cognition and self-cognition. Cf. Masaaki Hattori, *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, HOS 47 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press), 1968, p. 28. "k. 9a. or [it can be maintained that] the self-cognition or the cognition cognizing itself (*svasamvitti*) is here the result [of the act of cognizing]-- Every cognition is produced with a twofold appearance, namely, that of itself [as subject] (*svābhāsa*) and that of the object (*viśayābhāsa*). The cognizing of itself as [possessing] these two appearances or the self-cognition (*svasamvitti*) is the result [of the cognitive act]."

⁹¹ See *SD* 2.84-5, p. 77, in which the idea of *vimarsa* is forwarded. 2.44 "etad drashtavyam ity etad vimarsah pūrvato bhāvet/ 2.45 yathā karttuh kulāīder ghaṭah kārya jīdrśah/ vimarsa icchārūpeṇa tadvad atīrpi samskṛtam."

⁹² *IPV* 1.5.20, vol. 1, pp. 294-5 "tau nāmarūpalakṣaṇau śabdārthau eka rūpatayā 'so 'yam' ity evamarūpatvena parāmrśatī adhyavasā sā paramesvarasakti vimarsarūpā ātmavad eva aham ity anavacchinnaatvena bhāti, na tu kadācit idantayā vicchinnaatvena bhāti." And 1.5.19, pp. 292-5.

⁹³ *IPV* 1.5.19, vol. 1, p. 284 "sāksātkāraśpe 'py asti vimarsah katham anyathā dhāvanādy utpadyeta pratisandhānavarjitam."

encompasses the whole consciousness, and when the presentation comes into bold relief in the conscious mind after it has been differentiated as an object "*idam*" from the subject "*aḥam*" and from every other possible objects, the cognition thus delimited is a determinate cognition called *vikalpa*.

Utpaladeva agrees with his Buddhist opponents that what is perceived as an external object is a mental event, i.e., a determinate knowledge following an indeterminate cognition inheres (*samaveta*) in the perceiver and is inseparable from him.⁹⁴ His differs with them as to the nature of representation. Whereas the opponents are represented as saying that the cause of a variety of representation consists of trace impressions (*vāsanā*) which awaken various mental images of objects,⁹⁵ Utpala holds that there is a material connection between consciousness and things, through which connection the subject and object are able to be combined in cognition. Combination (*anusaṃdhāna*) is a function of the light of consciousness, the

⁹⁴ *IPV* 1.4.7, vol. 1, pp. 173-177. *'yā ca paśyāmy aḥam imam ghaṭo 'yam itī vāvasā/ manyate samavetaṃ sāpy avasāntari darsanam.*" "The determination which is conceived as "I see this pot," "this is a pot," is also a "seeing" that inheres in the determiner." The idea is that a determinate cognition, in the form of a perception ("This is a pot") or an apperception ("I see a pot"), following closely on an indeterminate perception is inherent in subjectivity. Abhinava glosses key-words, "*avasāyah avasā, samavetaṃ itī aprthagbhāvam āha. avasāntari, svatantrā nīlarmukhe bodhātamanī abhātāspade ity arthah. darsanam itī nirvikalpakam anubhavanam.*" (p. 176)

⁹⁵ (See the chain of reasoning from *IPV* 1.5.1 onward, and especially, *IPV* 1.5.4-5, vol. 1, p. 210.. If (you say) various adventitious manifestations should cause to infer an external world, since homogeneous understanding (*bodha*) cannot be the cause of a variety of manifestations; in that case, varied awakening of trace impressions would not be the cause (of perceptions). What basis is there of a trace impression as well for [causing] a variety of its awakening? The argument is that if the opponents say that the trace impressions are responsible for creating a variety of perceptions in understanding (*bodha*) which is homogeneous, why should a trace impression be responsible for a variety of its awakening?

activity of the agent (*kartr*) whose nature is *samvid*. The following verses illustrate his notion of consciousness as light which is the agent of cognition:

1.5.11 They know *vimarsa* to be the nature of a manifestation; otherwise, light in being colored by an object would be insentient, like crystal and so on.

1.5.12 Therefore, the self alone is consciousness (*caitanya*), the agency of [ordinary] consciousness (*citi*) which is the conscious activity (*citkriyā*).⁹⁶ Denoted by synonyms, [the self], therefore, is different from an insentient.

1.5.13 [Ordinary] consciousness is the ultimate Speech (*parā vāk*), arisen from itself and consists of reflection. It is the primary independence; it is the sovereignty of the ultimate self.

1.5.14 [Ultimate Speech] is vibrancy, the great being which has no distinctions of space and time. This is said to be the heart, because it is the substance, of the Supreme Lord.⁹⁷

Utpala's interpretation of Bhartṛhari's concept of Speech as form is clearly shown in the former's commentary of the *SD* 2.2 where he cites *VP* 1.124 [116] and *vṛtti*.⁹⁸ In *SD* 2.2 Somānanda raises an objection to Bhartṛhari's identifying Brahman with *parā vāk*:

⁹⁶ *IPVV* 1.5.112, vol. 2, p. 183 "citkriyārūpācitikarṣeti."

⁹⁷ *IPV* verses 1.5.11-14, vol. 1, p. 241, 245, 250, 255. 11. "svabhāvam avabhāsasya vimarsam vidur anyathā/ prakāśo 'rūtoparakto 'pi sphaṭikādijaḍopamaḥ" 12. "ātmāta eva caitanyam citkriyācitikarṣitā/ tātparyepoditas tena jādāt sa hi vilakṣaṇaḥ/" 13. "citih pratyavamarśālmā parā vāk svarasoditā/ svātantryam etan mukhyaṁ tad aiśvaryaṁ paramātmānaḥ." 14. "sā sphurattā mahāsattā deśakālāviśeṣiṇī/saiṣā sārāyaṁ proktā hrdayam parameṣṭhinaḥ."

⁹⁸ DCMS 32, pp 190-91. "vākrūpatā ced utkrāmed avabodhasya sāsvalī/ na prakāśaḥ prakāśeta sā hi pratyavamarśinī."

Thus, they say that the supreme Brahman, the beginningless and thus imperishable which is the alphabet (*akṣara*) in the form of the Word, is *paśyantī*, because it is the highest Speech.⁹⁹

Utpala comments:

The beginningless and endless supreme Brahman in the form of consciousness is the alphabet, changeless and in the form of the Word. And what is called *paśyantī* is the supreme Speech. Without Speech as form, what is called supreme Brahman even being the light of consciousness would not shine because [supreme Speech] is the reflecting one. Thus, they say that reflection itself is said to be illumination.¹⁰⁰

Utpala who borrows the idea of Speech as the form of knowledge from Bhartṛhari says in the *vṛtti* of the *IPK* 1.5.11:

The primary essence of light is reflection. Without it, light, whose configuration is differentiated by its object, would be merely clarity [as of a crystal], and not sentience, because of an absence of aesthetic wonder (*camatkṛti*).¹⁰¹

In rejecting the Sāṃkhya model of consciousness as a crystal and the Buddhists' idea of consciousness as a mental continuum, *cittasamtāna*, Śaiva philosophers propose their model of full consciousness, *saṃvid*, because they

⁹⁹ *SD* 2.2, p. 34. " *ity āhus te param brahme yad anādi tathā akṣayam / tad akṣaram śabdārūpam sā paśyantī parā hi vāk.* "

¹⁰⁰ *SD* 2.2., *vṛtti*, 34 " *yad anady anantam ca param brahma cidrūpam tad akṣaram nirvikāram śabdārūpam. saiva ca paśyantī samjñā parā vāk. vākrūpatām vinā parabrahmākhyaś cūprakāśo 'pi na prakāśeta sā hi pratyavamarśinī. pratyavamarśanam eva ca prakāśanam ucyata ity āhus te.* "

¹⁰¹ *IPK* 1.5.1, *vṛtti*, *KSS* 34, p. 18 " *prakāśasya mukhya ātmā pratyavamarśas tam vinārtahabheditākāśasyāśya svacchatāmātram na tv ajādyam camatkṛter abhāvāt* "

want to say that a self-awareness underlies every object-awareness: every cognition (*jñāna*) is preceded by a desire (*icchā*) and joy (*ānanda*) in the self-dependent power of manifestation. What distinguishes an insentient from a sentient is the latter's imaginative power and the knowledge of its agency in the exercise of that power. Desire underlies the act of becoming aware of an object through the imagination: a self will toward an objective precedes and conditions the imaged object. Abhinava says that in consciousness itself the world shines with an appropriate form only as "I", in the first realm whose objectification is desire. In God, *parāmarśa* is characterized by desire; [in humans] it is a mental construct.¹⁰² *Parāmarśa* is objectification, i.e., a stage of a determinate cognition governed by a desire [to do something]; this stage may be intermediate and relative to another. Thus, in cognition, an object-objectification (*idamparāmarśa*) is made in the light of the subject-objectification (*ahamparāmarśa*), producing the awareness that "I know this object," or "I illuminate this object":

An insentient such as a crystal, etc., cannot be aware of itself as it is and as possessing a pot, and so on. [So, there must be] precisely objectification. In this way, objectification (*parāmarśana*) is the life of insentience: it is self-dependence in respect of internal and external causal activities, innate to itself. It is an unexpectancy on the part of a manifestation in regard to anything else, which unexpectancy is characterized by a repose in itself. When a presentation (*vimarśa*) arises that, "So, I, being light, illuminate,"¹⁰³ *saṃvid* is taken [by the cognizer] to be complete

¹⁰² IPVV, vol. 2, p. 173. " *cidātmāni viśvaṃ prathamecchāparāmarśabhūmau aham ity eva uctena rūpeṇa bhāti*" " *nanu bhagavati parāmarśa icchālakṣaṇa itī kim etat. parāmarśo hi vikalpah.*"

¹⁰³ " *aham evaṃ prakāśātmā prakāśe*" The IPVV 1.5.11, p. 175 has " *so'pi aham evaṃ prakāśātmā prakāśe.*" Bhāṣakara's gloss: " *prakāśakartā 'smi.*" There are two

consisting of the cognizer, the cognized and cognition, and it wants nothing beside. Because, although a crystal grasps a reflection as 'what it is,' it expects for completion another cognizer; and so, lacking *vimarsa*, it is insentient. By all means, in reality because there is a repose of an objectification of the 'I' through ['my'] self-same identity with the nature of the cognizer who consists of *vimarsa*, there is sentience at both times [during the desire to cognize and during cognition]. It has been said that,

"A discrete *vimarsa* is complete as a 'this'.

The repose in one's own nature is the *vimarsa*, 'I am that.'"¹⁰⁴

As the passage above shows, the Śaiva concept of cognition (in the initial stage of *vimarsa*) contains a structure in which self-awareness is inherent in object-awareness, inasmuch as an object-awareness is preceded by a volition (*icchā*) and arises on the substratum of self-awareness. The discovery of self-awareness is perhaps much more important to the Śaiva philosophers than that of an object-awareness. Granted, a knower knows the object in cognition, but that the knower knows himself as the creator, i.e., the

presentations--of the 'this' and the 'I'--and between the two the I-presentation is identifiable with the light that is the cognizer, whereas the this-presentation cannot be so identified. The sense of identification is recapitulated in the supporting verse mentioning the "*vimarsa*, 'I am that.' The Śaiva schema seeks to explain the intuitive self-consciousness that accompanies all thoughts which appear as "my thought," and to support the argument that thoughts are imaginatively constructed and that the subject is aware of his/her role as the creator. So, there are *parāmarśas*, objectifications, of subjectivity and objectivity.

104 *JPV* 1.5.11, vol. 1, p. 242. " *atha tatābhūtam api ātmānam tam ca ghaṭādikam sphatikādīḥ na parāmarśatū samartha itī jadam. tatā parāmarśanam eva ajādyjīvitam antarbahiṣkaraṇasvāntīryarūpam svābhāvikam avabhāśasya svātmaviśrantīkaṣapam ananyamukhaprekṣitvam nāma. 'aham evam prakāśātmā prakāśe' itī hi vimarsodaye svasamvid eva pramāṭrprameyapramāṇādī kṛtārtham abhimanyate no tu atīrīkṣtam kṣāṇkaṣati. sphatikādī hi grhītapratibimbam api tatābhāveṇa siddhau pramāṭrantaram aprekṣate itī nīrvimarśatvāt jadam. sarvatra vastuto vimarsātmakapramāṭrsvabhāvatād-ātmāhamparāmarśa viśrāntēḥ ajadatvam eva pūrvāparakoṭyoh. yad uktam "idam" ity asya vicchinnavimarśasya kṛtārthatā/ yā svasvarūpe viśrāntīr vimarsaḥ so 'ham ity ayam."*

manifestor, of the object is a great joy called *camatkāra*. Utpala says in the commentary of *SD* 1.7: "*Camatkāra* is rejoicing in the form of being aware of one's own nature as such, its expansion is the blossoming forth as the self of the world [i.e., one's own immanence in it]."¹⁰⁵ In aesthetics Abhinava calls it the bliss of relishing a *rasa*, and it will be shown that in an inwardly directed aesthetic experience, the enjoyer, being aware that he creates images, relishes them as objects of contemplation.

IPV 1.5.12, directly recalling the *vṛtti* of *VP* 1.126, states that there is not a creature whose knowledge of itself and others is not accompanied by Speech, and that the essence of *vāc* is the the form of mental activities.¹⁰⁶ Ordinary consciousness is created. The agency of this creation is *vimarsa*, which is said to be *parā vāk*, the reflecting one. *IPV* 1.5.13 states that the conscious mind of which we are ordinarily aware is effected by a mental activity that is *vimarsa*, namely, the reflective aspect of *saṃvid* (or *caitanya* in the *Sīvasūtra*¹⁰⁷): the conscious mind is of the nature of reflection (*citih pratyavamarśāt mā*). What we perceive self-consciously is consciousness reflected on itself, through the form of the ultimate Speech, arisen from its own essence (*rasa*). Precisely because reflection, which is ultimate Speech, is *vimarsa*, the agent is free in his power of cognition: a knower knows a thought-object through a verbal designation that occurs

¹⁰⁵ *SD*, p. 7. "āmodaḥ camatkāraḥ tathāśvarūpaparāmarśarūpaḥ, tasya jṛmbhā viśvātmataḥ vikāśanam."

¹⁰⁶ *VP* 1.124, *vṛtti*, "na hi sā caitanyenānāvīṣṭā jātur asti yasyāṃ svaparasambodho yo vācā nānugamyate. tasmāc citukriyārūpam alabdhavākśaktiparigrahaṃ na vidyate. vāktattvarūpam eva citukriyārūpam ity anye."

¹⁰⁷ *IPV* 1.4.12, vol. 2, p. 245. "caitanyam iti... kathitaḥ bhagavatā sīvasūtreṣu 'caitanyam ātmā' 1.1."

spontaneously. The Śaivas say that, in an indeterminate awareness, an immediate presentation is subject to an intuitive apprehension as to what it is and what it is not; and through such an intuition, an inchoate idea is put into a concrete verbal form, becoming cognizable as something. This determining is free inasmuch as intuitions arise in unknown ways out of the "essence," i.e., the store of trace-impressions in the psyche. *Vimarsā*, the immediate presentation or the original mental activity that "blossoms" into a determinate cognition, is a reflection of consciousness enformed by subtle Speech. The first stage of Speech (the intuitive), still indeterminate, emerges out of pure consciousness, and from this essence a verbal designation that arises develops into a determinate cognition.

At the ultimate level, Abhinava calls Speech (*vāc*) the agency of Śiva; Speech is an immediate presentation (*vimarsana*) in character and consists of a volitional objectification (*parāmarśa*).

Speech (*vāc*) is the agency which consists of objectification (*parāmarśa*) and characterised by immediate presentation (*vimarsana*). It is proper to Vedic and magical texts (*māntṛī*) because it is the place of production, duration and dissolution of mantras and because it causes the expansion, increase, and so on, of mantras. In the form of verbalization, it is united with the Lord whose body is the great mantra; but it is not in the form of particulars of the motor-senses (*karmendriya*) falling under the category of a fetter,¹⁰⁸ or of words that are an effect.¹⁰⁹ Just this is the agency of the great soul.¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁸ i.e., *vāc* as ordinary language is the bondage to *samsāra*.

¹⁰⁹ See VP 1.122, DCMS 32, p. 200. " *iha dvau śabdātmānau nityaḥ kāryaś ca.* "

¹¹⁰ JPVV, Vol. 2, p. 187. " *parāmarśamayī vimarsalakṣaṇaiva yā kartṛtā, saiva mantrāṇāṃ utpattisthitiḥ śāsthanātvena samāpyāyanopabṛmhanādikāritvena ca māntṛī mahāmantratannoś ca bhagavataḥ sambhūdhinī śabdānārūpā, na tu pāsavargamadhyapatitā karmendriyaviśeṣarūpā tatkāryaśabdārūpā vā vāk. paramātmānaś ca eśaiva kartṛtā* "

This agency, the capacity for self-awareness and object-awareness in image-presentations through illuminative and reflective aspects of *saṃvid*, is associated specifically with *camatkāra*, which Abhinava calls the joy and wonder of the aesthetic experience. Utpala's uses *camatkāra* in a general sense. He forwards the basic ideas that in cognition self-awareness and object-awareness must occur together, and a cognition is not due to the instigation of the object but, rather, to the desire and the illumination of the subject as the cause. The joy of (*ānanda*) and desire for (*icchā*) creation are properties of sentience.

Although the philosophical and sectarian (*āgama*) Śaivas believe that finally the *nirvikalpakajñāna* which the seeker (*mumukṣu*) attains through practice and meditation is liberating because it is pure and unstructured consciousness (*asaṃkucita*), language which constructs determinate thoughts is fundamentally inherent in all states of consciousness. Speech, *parā devī*, which in Bhartṛhari's description is the binding one, *nibandhanī*, in sectarian Śaivism is the noose (*pāśa*) that provides the continuity between Bhairava, the master (*patī*) and the unliberated person, the cattle (*paśu*).¹¹¹ The world is an emanation in the essential form of

aiśvaryaṃ."

¹¹¹ See *Sivasūtra* 1.2-4, pp. 16-28, especially p. 28, " *tadadhiṣṭhānād eva hi antarabhedānusaṃdhiṃ vāndhyatvāt kṣaṇam apī alabdha viśrāntīni bahir mukhāny eva jñānāni, iti yuktaiva eṣāṃ bandhakarmoktīḥ.* " "Precisely because they are based on that (Mātrkā [i.e. phonemes in ordinary language]) is the basis (of all limited knowledge), and because they lack an inner synthesis into a unity, these knowledges being turned outward do not find rest even moment; so it is right to say that they are as the cause of bondage." (my translation) Jaideva Singh, tr. *Śiva Sūtras: The Yoga of Supreme Identity (SS)*. With the text of the *Sūtras* and the Commentary *Vimarśinī* of Kṣemarāja. Repr. Delhi: Motilal

mantra s issuing from the heart (*hrdaya*). Abhinava writes:

It has been stated, "The great Goddess, the great Being, is said to be the life of the universe." **Substance** is the significant (*atuccha*) form which is the power of an immediate presentation (*vimarsasakti*).¹¹² [Substance is] the form of illumination of the subject and object also possesses just this which implies its [light's] difference from non-light. Thus it has also be described in the *Sārasāstra*:

"The highest garland [of letters] is the power which is the substance of this world."

So, the recognition of the power is shown as, "This [Goddess] (*saiṣā*)."
The heart is said to be the foundation, and in the said theory it is the consciousness of insentient beings. It is also the illuminator. It also has the power of presentation (*vimarsa*). For, in various texts it is said that the very heart of Him who is reposed in the ultimate place of the universe is in the form of presentation and consists of the highest mantra. For mantra alone is the heart of all things; mantra is in the form of presentation, and presentation consists in the power of the supreme Speech. Therefore this has been said:

"Without them [i.e., phonemes] there would be no word, no meaning, nor even a movement of consciousness"...

The revered Bhartṛhari also says as well:

"There is no notion in the world except what is accompanied by words.

Banarsidass, 1982 (1st ed., 1979). See also *Spandakārikā* 3.13-16, pp. 152-166, especially 3.13, p. 152. "*sabdarāśisamutthasya śaktivargasya bhogyatām/ kalāviluptavibhavo gataḥ saṁ sa paśuḥ smṛtaḥ*." "He is known as cattle who in being robbed of his power of *kalā* becomes the object of enjoyment of the group of powers rising up from the multitude of words." (my translation) Jaideva Singh, tr., *Spanda-kārikās: The Divine Creative Pulsation (SK)*. With the *Spandanīrṇaya* commentary of Kṣemarāja. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1980.

¹¹² I translate '*vimarsa*' as 'presentation,' 'reflective presentation,' or 'representation,' depending on the context. The word contains, I believe, notions of light's reflection and an immediate presentation. Alexis Sanderson generally takes it to mean 'representation,' and I agree with him to the extent that it represents in the form of Speech consciousness's illumination (*parakāśa*). At the same time, however, a *vimarsa* is immediate and not distinctly verbal at first. The immediate presentation in the first stage is ramified fully into a verbalization (*abhilāpa*) which is a component of a determinate cognition.

All knowledge seemingly pierced by words is understood." (*VP* 1.123)

"Should eternal Speech, the form of knowledge, should vanish, light would not light. For [Speech] is the reflecting one." (*VP* 1.124)

"This [Speech] becomes the consciousness within and without of all worldly beings. Without it he is seen to be unconscious like a log or a wall." ¹¹³ (*VP* 1.126) ¹¹⁴

In this passage, Abhinava cites three important verses from the *VP*: 1.123, 124, and 126. These citations show not merely that he and his grand-teacher Utpala conceptually depend on Bhartṛhari, but also that they use these verses to undergird theological and psychological tenets of Śaiva sectarian beliefs. From Bhartṛhari's language theory, the feminine Speech, *vāc*, readily takes up the garb of the Goddess, *devī*. Speech as an indispensable accompaniment of consciousness becomes the power (*śakti*) inseparable from Maheśvara. The fabric of communication and binder of the world (*visvanibandhanī*), indeed, becomes the substance of ontological realms and the binder or fetter of humans to *samsāra*.

In the context of Śaivism, this passage expresses the belief that the consciousness possesses movements (*spandana*) that become manifested perceptibly in Speech. Consciousness is the Lord and the self of each individual, unchanging and unreconstructed behind all phenomena, and consciousness is reflected by Speech. Levels or modalities of consciousness in different contexts of experience are explained by the theory that language is the basic substance that expresses and conveys ideas in the mind.

Abhinava also speaks of *vāc* and aesthetic experience with reference to

¹¹³ *JPV* 1.5.13, vol. 1, pp. 250-251.

¹¹⁴ In this quotation, Abhinava combines the first half of the *kārikā* of *VP* 1.126 with the last half of the supporting verse.

Bhartrhari: "what has been accomplished by those beginning with the revered Bhartrhari is to be observed here, namely, that scripture (and word sounds, *śruti*) is the appearance of the Word's manifestation, as in the passage, "All the worlds are Speech alone." Since Speech is the source of all things, it is well known as the plot, i.e., the body of drama."¹¹⁵ Thus, it is not an overstatement to say that Abhinava's general theory of cognition applies equally to all modes of perception--ordinary, aesthetic, and ultimate. The root of this theory lies in Bhartrhari's fundamental notion that language is the form of diversity of a homogeneous and active consciousness. In Śaiva theology Speech (*vāc*) is the binder of absolute and ordinary worlds, and the link between them, because it shares the essence and nature of both. Speech is bondage and liberation, from the ordinary to the absolute reality, because it is the form of mental activity (*citīkriyā*). *Vāc* is the power of reflective presentations (*vimarsa*) giving diversity of thoughts and mental images to the homogeneous consciousness.¹¹⁶

Another influence of Bhartrhari can be seen in the concept of synthesis: the light of consciousness in reflecting back synthesizes disparate elements into a single object. *Anusamdhāna* , synthesis, generally applies to the combination that results in single determinate cognition, in contrast to an

¹¹⁵ *Abh* 14. 2-3, Nagar ed., vol. 2, p. 169. " *tad āha vāg gñi sarvasyeti. vāg eva viśvā bhuvanānīti śruteḥ śabdavivartādirūpatvaṃ ca prasādhitaṃ tatra bhavadbhīr bhartrhariprabhūtiḥ itī tad ihānusarapiyaṃ. sarvākaraṭve ca vācaḥ itivṛttaṃ tu nātyasya śarīraṃ parikūrītaṃ itī* "

¹¹⁶ *IPV* 1.5.13-14, vol. 2, pp. 252-266. See especially, " *nūnam idam caītro haṃ ityādīpratyavamarśāntarabhittibhūtatvāt, pūrṇatvāt parā, vakti viśvam abhilāpati pratyavamarśena itī ca vāk, ata eva sā svarasena cidrūpatayā svātmaviśrāntīvapuşā uditā sadānastamitā nityā ahaṃ ityeva.* " pp. 254-5.

anuvyavasāya, an apperception that combines several notions into one manifestation (*ābhāsa*). In theory, a synthesis is present even in the immediate presentation of *vīmarśa*, because the latter contains in it the precognitive desire to arrive at an object or objective which provides the impetus for conceiving a series of continuous action as a unified whole.

Abhinava explains it in the following way:

Or, let an immediate perception be momentary. Even in that case, there is also presentation (*vīmarśa*) This is inevitable (*avaśyam*). So, he says, "Otherwise, how." If it were not so, then, by means of a single intention (*ekābhisamdhāna*) a person who runs quickly, who reads syllable in haste, and who intones a book of mantras, would not arrive, pronounce and intone the object desired.

For it is as follows: there is a knowledge regarding that place, the desire to advance, the advancing, the knowledge of having advanced, the synthesis (*anusamdhī*) with another benefit, the synthesis (*anusamdhāna*) with the desire to leave another place. Even in this instance, how could one reach the desired place without a reflection (*pratyavamarśa*) in the form of joining and disjoining, which is the desire to advance, and so on. So it must be thought for speaking or describing, etc., quickly. In these cases in particular one undertakes to advance vocal actions on places of utterance (*sthānakarapākramanādi-yoga*). And here for the very reason that the formation of a concrete mental construct which will come about later is not perceived, there is haste. So, there must be a subtle reflection consisting of a concealed (or rolled up) power of words. For a concrete mental construct is the power of words being manifested by amplification (*prasāraṇa*). Just as a white pot is an amplification of a 'this', ['this'] also has the form of a wide-bottomed belly in which a quality provided with the genus 'whiteness' inheres, and so on, because of the passage ' *dhāvu gatisuddhau* ' ('The root *dhāv* ' in the sense of 'gait' and 'pure'), is taken in the sense of going quickly which is running, from the force of its own efficiency.¹¹⁷

¹¹⁷ *JPVV* vol. 1, 1.15.19, p. 291-3. " *bhavatu vā kṣaṇamētrasvabhāvaḥ sākṣātkāra, tatrāpi asti vīmarśaḥ. avaśyam ca itaḥ. 'katham anyathā' iti. yadi sa na syāt tai ekābhisamdhānena jadvāi gacchan, tvaṛitam ca varṇān paṭhan, drutam ca mantrapustakam vācayan, na*

We recall a similar description from *VP* 1.123 and 124. In 1.123, Bhartṛhari describes an indeterminate cognition from going in haste and perceiving in passing grass, clods, and so on, which indeterminate cognition becomes determined a. In 1.124, he says:

And when language is not the form [of cognition] (*vāgrūpatāyām asatyām*), even though light arises, without incorporating another form in itself it does not resolve in the form which achieves an illuminating action. When there appears a bare cognition of objects, i.e., things that are mutually distinct in nature and are mutually unfavorable, a subsequent synthesis is the reflecting back (*yad uttarakālam anusadhānam pratyavamarśa*) which entails the process of combining the efficiencies (*śakti*). This synthesis renders [disparate things] a single, whole object, and it is bound in language as the form. For, Speech (*vāc*), synthesizing and reflecting back in a notion which is qualified by all [of its] particulars and which effects a purposeful action, does not depart from the process of excluding and combining by supposing [that there are] separable elements of efficiencies.¹¹⁸

abhimatam eva gacchet, uccārayet, vācayet vā. tathā hi tasmīn deśe jñānam ācikramiṣa ākramanam ākrāntatājñānam prayojanāntarānusamdhānam lityakṣadesāntarānusamdhīh tatrāpi ācikramiṣa ityādinā yojanaviyojanarūpeṇa pratyavamarśena vinā abhimata-desāvāptih katham bhavet. evam tvaṇitodgrahanavācanādaṁ mantavyam. tatra viśeṣataḥ sthānakaraṇākramanādiyogaḥ. atra ca yataḥ paścād bhāviṣṭhūlavikalpakalpanā na samvedyate, tata eva tvaṇitattvam iti sūksmeṇa pratyavamarśena samvartitāśabda-bhāvanāmayena bhāvyam eva. samvartitā hi śabdabhāvanā prasāraṇena vivartyamānā sthūlo vikalpaḥ, yathā idam ity asya prasāraṇā gaṇaḥ sukla ity ādih, tasyāpi prthubudhnodarākāraḥ sukle tvajētiyuktiguna- samavāyī ityādiḥ"

118 *VP* 1.124, DCMS 32, p. 192 *vāgrūpatāyām cāsatyām utpanno 'pi prakāśaḥ pararūpam anāhṅikurvan prakāśanakriyāśādhanaṇrūpatāyām na vyatīṣṭhate. bhinnarūpānām cānupakāriṇām āntarānātmanām itaretarasya vastumātrājñāne pratyavabhāsamāne yad uttarakālam anusamdhānam pratyavamarśa ekārthakāritvamavibhāgena śaktisamsargayogopagrahaḥ tad vāgrūpatāyām baddham. sā hy anusamdhānā pratyavamarśanū ca sarvaviśeṣaṇaviśiṣṭe 'py arthakriyākāriṇi pratyaye*

The ideas of synthesis in these two passages are very similar. They differ only in that Abhinavagupta uses the desideratives of the verbs 'to go', 'to read' and 'to intone' according to his Śaiva notion that a cognition is preceded by a precognitive desire, *parāmarśa* or *icchā*, which directs one's attention an object of thought. Otherwise these passages contain the same idea that after a vague, indeterminate cognition, percepts are combined and reflected in language as a unified object of a determinate cognition. Language as a form of thought carries out its synthetic function by means of association and dissociation ('*śaktyapoddhārakalpanayā bhedasamsargām na vijahāti*' in Bhartṛhari and '*yojanaviyojanarūpeṇa pratyavamarśena*' in Abhinavagupta). An object when unified in a determinate cognition possesses all of its qualifications and can cause a purposeful action, i.e. an action that culminates in an object, *artha*. ('*sarvaviśeṣaṇaviśiṣṭe 'py' arthakriyākāriṇi*' in Bhartṛhari and '*prṭhubudhnodarākārah śuklatvajātiyuktaguṇasamavāyī*' in Abhinavagupta).

Intuition and determinate cognition

In the passage translated above, Abhinava in speaking of synthesis also elucidates the transition between the subtle presentation of *vimarśa* and its determinate form in concrete language which comes about later.

A mental object thought in ordinary language is a *vikalpa*. It is a cognition which has been chiseled and defined, out of a universal and encompassing state into a limited and determined cognition of 'what it is.' A distinction

śaktyapoddhārakalpanayā bhedasamsargamātrām na vijahāti.

between *vimarsa* and *vikalpa* is made in *IPV* 1.6.1-3 in the following manner: between a *vimarsa* and a *vikalpa* there intervenes a judgemental process as regards two alternatives (*dvayāpekṣin*). The encompassing presentation, "this," is made determinate by means of exclusion (*vyapohana*) and positive judgement (*niscaya*), through intuitions of what it is and what it is not.¹¹⁹ These intuitions arise between stages of pure awareness and verbally determined awareness, and Abhinava says,

A mental construct is that which is delimited from everything around it, as if by chiselling; and because *vikalpa* is such (i.e., dependent on exclusion and identification), therefore, pure 'I' is a *vimarsa* and not a *vikalpa*.¹²⁰

The basic elements of this theory of cognition furnish the groundwork Abhinava's explanation of aesthetic perceptions. First, Abhinava makes elaborate and carefully reasoned arguments in the *Abhinavabhāratī* and the *Locana* to show how an aesthetic perception differs from an ordinary cognition: an *alaukika* experience one gets from relishing the tastes of a poem does not transcend perception, but rather it is a mode of cognition which is extraordinary because of its unique means and goal. We cannot use an aesthetic cognition in the real world since it does not lead to successful performances of everyday activities. Aesthetic perceptions, moreover, arise from suggestiveness of poetic language and theatrical artifice. Thus, they entail a dialectic of true and false, correct and erroneous, cognitions.

¹¹⁹ *IPV* 1.6.3. " tadatatpratibhābhājā mātraivātsadvyapohanāt / tanniscayam ukto hi vikalpo ghata ity aham." See full passage in n. 121 below.

¹²⁰ *IPV* 1.6.3, vol. 1, pp. 310-11. " eṣa eva paritāśchedāt lakṣaṇakalpāt paricchedah... yasmād evaṃ vikalpaḥ tato 'ham iti suddho vimarsaḥ na vikalpaḥ."

Perceived in the aesthetic mode, such cognitions are real and valid, for they lead to delight--the successful goal of relishing a *rasa*.

The Śaiva theory of error is pertinent in accounting for a discrepancy between audience's actual perception of an actor and its consent to believe that he is Rāma without a feeling of having made a cognitive error. This dialectic of true and false cognitions underlies the aesthetic mode of experience: although we have a good judgement of truths and errors, we are persuaded to go along with the reality of what is ordinarily untrue. We slacken the rein on our imagination because truths and reality of poetry/drama are judged by criteria other than accomplishing an aim in the external world.

Vikalpa is a mental construction consisting of concrete words. It has an external reference when it is an ascertainment, and no external reference in the case of memory or imagination. Mental construction occurs in the realm of duality (*māyā*), through the process of synthesis which combines spatially contiguous parts into a whole, or temporally related events into a single entity. A synthesis combines trace impressions from memories of things experienced with present percepts. In contrast to a purely immediate presentation of *vimarsā*, a "this," in which the mind immediately grasps its object, a mental construct (*vikalpa*) arises after an intuition which excludes the counter-positive (*pratiyogin*) of what the object is not and identifies it as what it is. For example, a *vimarsā* of the 'I' is an immediate presentation of being, a continuous self-identity which has no counterpositive and does not involve alternatives of 'what it is' (*tat*), and 'what it is not' (*atat*). When the 'I' is combined with qualities, such as, "I am thin," or with events in time,

such as, "I who was young and am now old," this composite and verbally conceived person "I" is a product of mental construction. An immediate presentation, *vimarsa*, may be closely compared to Buddhists' description of *svalakṣaṇa*, a real thing directly and intuitively grasped. The Śaivas believe, however, that the mind can be conscious of mental events only when these are reflected by language, however subtle. The essence of language exists even in the most immediate mental image. This amounts to saying, then, that language is consciousness. In the course of becoming more concretely pronounced, an immediate presentation is mediated by an intuition which seizes the thought-object and determines it distinctly in a word as 'what it is not' and 'what it is.'

Verse 1.6.3 of the *IPV* defines the cognizer in relation to intuition and mental construction, and *IPV* 1.7. 1. identifies him with Maheśvara. The significance of these two verses for our purpose is that through intuition, and the capacity to represent by manifesting, the cognizer is a creator like God. *Kartṛ*, now synonymous with *jñātṛ*, is later explicated as *nirmātṛ*: the knower is the doer in the sense of a creator, a maker of objects. The *IPV* 1.6.3 describes an intuition of the cognizer as follows:

For, a mental construct which is this[notion], "pot," is said to be the judgement of what it is from an exclusion of what it is not, by the cognizer who experiences intuitions of what it is and what it is not.

Here, the cognizer is different from the cognition. He is shown to be the agent who is independent in respect to the content of cognition (*pramā*) because of [his] power to effect conjunctions and disjunctions, and so on. The cognizer possesses an inward manifestation of all objects. This manifestation, inasmuch as it has pure consciousness as its body (*cinmātraśarīro 'pi*), exists in a common substratum with it [pure

consciousness] by the principle of a city in a mirror. This has also been stated. And thus, the cognizer experiences, which is to say that he enjoys, a manifestation of a pot, i.e., an intuition of what it is, and a manifestation of 'non-pot', i.e., an intuition of what it is not. Now, when it is in the realm of indeterminate cognition, this pot is of the nature of consciousness. Its body being the whole, it is full like consciousness itself; and there is no worldly usage through it. The cognizer, in causing a dualistic operation (*māyāvyāpāra*) to come forth, fragments even the full state of being; and he makes an exclusion in the form of negation of 'non-pot,' i.e., himself and cloth and so on. On the basis of this very exclusion, a judgement of a pot is pronounced as, "Just pot." Precisely because an object is in the form of a negation of other possible objects that it is delimitation (*pariccheda*), because it cuts off on all sides, like a chisel.¹²¹

Abhinava's commentary explains: a cognizer is distinct from the contents of cognition because he is empowered to associate and dissociate them. Being thus independent in regard to the contents of his cognition, he is shown to be the actor (*kartr*). To know, i.e., to actively shape one's own thoughts, is to act. And inasmuch as a manifestation is consciousness, it appears in consciousness as a city in a mirror. A mental image never becomes truly determinate without a verbal accompaniment. An intuition of

¹²¹ *IPV* 1.6.3, vol. 1, pp. 310-11. " *tadatāpratibhābhāṣā matraivātadvyapohānāt/ tannīścayanam ukto hi vikalpo ghaṭa ity ayaṃ. iha pramāṇa nāma pramāṇād atiriktaḥ pramāṇsu svatantraḥ samyojanaviyojanādyādhānavasāt kartā darsitaḥ, tasya ca pramāṇur antaḥ sarvārthābhāṣaḥ, cīnāmātraśarīro 'pi tatsāmānādhikaranyavṛttir api darpaṇa-nagarānyāyenāsti--ity api uktam. evaṃ ca tatpratibhāṇ ghaṭābhāṣam, atāpratibhāṇ ca aghaṭābhāṣam pramāṇa bhajate--sevate tāvat, tadavikalpadasāyām citsvabhāvo 'sau ghaṭaḥ cidvad eva viśvaśarīraḥ pūrṇaḥ, na ca tena kaś cid vyavahāraḥ, tat māyāvyāpāram ullāsayan pūrṇam api khaṇḍayati bhāvam, tenāghaṭasyātmanah patādes cāpohanam kriyate nīśedhanarūpam, tad eva vyapohanam āśrītya tasya ghaṭasya nīścayanam ucyate 'ghaṭa eva' iti, evārthasya sambhāvyamānāparavastu-nīśedharūpatvāt, eṣa eva paritas chedūt takṣaṇa kalpāt paricchedaḥ. "*

'not-pot,' 'a pot' excludes and identifies the perceived object, rendering determinate an indeterminate cognition.

In indeterminate cognition, a pot is just consciousness. Its body is universal. It is full, like consciousness, and by this [indeterminate cognition] there is no communication and transaction (*vyavahāra*) whatsoever. Then, bringing into view an operation in [the mode of] duality, it fragments that universal state. It effects an exclusion, which is negation of possible things. After exclusion, it ascertains that the object is 'a pot.' Because an object's identity follows from a negation of other possible (*sambhāvyamāna*) objects (*vastu*), an intuition becomes a determinate knowledge through a process of delimitation (*pariccheda*): it cuts out a definable idea from its previous, vague and encompassing state.

Thus, an intuition mediates indeterminate and determinate cognitions. The Śaivas seem to mean by this that a *vimarśa* is an immediate reflection of pure consciousness's awareness of an object, i.e., a *parāmarśa* . This initial awareness is just consciousness itself. In order for a subjective awareness of an object to occur of the kind expressible as, "this is a pot," "I know this pot," the idea of the object must be set in an awareness of the subject as the knower. *IPV* 1.7.1 equates intuition with the cognizer who is ultimately God or Maheśvara. The knower and intuition are two aspects of consciousness that becomes self-aware through object-representation. Intuition is two-faced: the inward-facing side is homogeneous consciousness, namely, the Cognizer, and its objective side takes up sequences of things that are objects of knowledge. The cognizer is a boundless and sequenceless consciousness; intuition is tinged by a succession of *padārtha* s--categories of

things, or meanings of words. To be more precise, like a reflection on the surface of water, intuition is tinged by series of things without itself being sequential. Abhinava's commentary glosses the phrase, "*pratibhāti ghaṭaḥ*" so as to say that intuition rests in the cognizer rather than in the cognized object.

The Śaiva philosophers use the concept of intuition how a homogeneous consciousness can be aware of or produce a variety of thoughts. It also explains how the cognizing mind may be active and willful, which is to say that neither the choice nor the identity of an object in awareness is governed by an empirical thing. In cognition, a volitional impulse brings certain sense-experiences to attention, and an intuition of possible categories of things determines how and what an initial presentation is to be known as. An intuition mediates the subjective and objective, the pure cognizer and pure object, by bringing subjective components of cognition to fulfilling the production of a cognizable object in the mind. Consciousness, with its intuition of possibilities for a determinate cognition, actively creates mental images rather than passively perceives impressions of objects through the senses.

Imagination and valid knowledge

Abhinava's concept of intuition has thus far been described in connection with the Śaiva philosophical explanation of how a cognition arises. Relevant links between Bhartṛhari's philosophy and Śaivism have illuminated their respective theories of cognition. For both schools, consciousness is

metaphorically termed 'light' (*prakāśa*) because it apprehends and reflects back, determinately grasping an object as a definite, speakable, thing; and the form of this reflection is language. In this way, homogeneous and indivisible consciousness can represent to us a world of multiplicity whose appearances are arranged and structured by 'efficiencies' primarily in the forms of time and space.

Abhinava speaks of a mental construct as a willful synthesis out of memory, trace impressions and sense percepts.¹²² Such a construct is new and vivid, being an inward image projected so as to appear external. This external manifestation is innate (*naisargika* or *svātmīya*). The mind is capable of projecting any image at will; the term 'innate' signifies an immediacy which distinguishes a mental construct from other mental

¹²² *JPV* 1.6.6, vol. 1, pp. 325-326. "sā yojanā sarvā vikalpanā vilāpa eva, na tu suddhaḥ pratyavamarśaḥ....bhinne'pi katham anusamdhānam iti ced āha 'saṃskārāḥ' prāktanānubhavaakṛtāvāsanāprabodhajasmṛtīvasāḥ, iti yāvat, prāṇe balābalaavasād anusamdhīb, buddhau jñānasukhādītārāmyāt, sūnye vaitatyāvaitatyayogāt, ayam api vikalpa eva, evaṃ 'sa evāyam ghaṭaḥ' iti 'pi vikalparvaṃ mantavyam." "Thus joining is always an imaginative process (*kalpanā*) which is a mental construct, but it is not a pure reflection. [An objection follows.] Regarding [an imaginative process], since it is implied that a qualification, and so on, is the cause of the body, because the body has been manifested before differentiatedly, so even now its manifestation is continuous. For if the body is entirely full, one who sees synthesis as the lack of interruption should make it an, "I-this" [continuity]. Then who would say that this realm of *Sadāśiva* is the realm of *vikalpa*, inasmuch as there is continuity precisely when there is synthesis? [*Sadāśiva* is the realm of *vimarśa* where the presentation is predominantly in the form of "This-I."] And since it is differentiated, how is there synthesis? If [there is this objection], he says from trace impressions, because of the power of memory born from the awakening of the trace impressions made by former experiences. This is the meaning. From the power of strength and weakness there is synthesis in [life's] breath; from a gradation of knowledge and feelings such as happy, and so on, [there is synthesis] in the mind; from the presence of extension and non-extension, in the void. This is also *vikalpa*. The synthesis of a pot and so on in this manner, "This is really this pot," must be considered a mental construct as well."

processes such as a memory. The latter mental event arises from trace impressions of former experiences and therefore appears to have taken place in another time. A mental construct, which is a projection as external of an internal appearance (i.e., mental image or an idea), is vivid, present and without any intervention by trace impressions.¹²³ In *JPV* 1.6.10, Abhinava states that a mental construction can be purely imaginative, i.e., a mental projection corresponding to no object of direct perception. This imagination roams about, arises, and changes independently through its own impulse, without any dependence on others' urging. Such a projection of imagined appearances is innate (*naisargika*): Although no one has ever seen an elephant with tens and hundreds of pairs of trunks, a mental construct can make it appear to stand here and now (*tātkālikam*) in the realm of the mind, which is a clear mirror of thought (*antaḥkaraṇabhūmau svacchadhīdarpaṇāyām*).¹²⁴ Since creatures vividly imagine things without having empirically perceived them and because thoughts are freely constructed by the subject, Abhinava concludes that,

any creature from a worm to Brahman, being filled with the activities of life, innately possesses the power of knowledge which is image-projection and the power of action which is imagination (*ullekhana*). Therefore, on this plane it is impossible even to suppose a dependence on a ready-made creation fashioned by a different god. In this sense, one's own sovereignty exactly should be recognized clearly, which sovereignty is characterized by one's independence of knowledge and action as in the phrases, "he knows," "he acts."¹²⁵

¹²³ *JPV* 1.6.9, vol. 1, pp 335-337. " *anubhavaśūnasya 'idam nīlam' iti antaravabhāsam bahirābhāsayataḥ svāntarbhāvābhāso naisargikaḥ* "

¹²⁴ *JPV* 1.6.10, vol. 1, PP. 338-339.

¹²⁵ *JPV* 1.6.11, vol. 1, p. 341-343.

But if the synthesizing mind can fashion any image it wills, what truth or basis for rational activity is there in the world? To this Abhinava says that there are no fixed, empirical criteria of truths. Inference is a provisional rather than ultimate means of valid knowledge: an inferred knowledge must depend on two perceptions occurring at once, a present perception of smoke on the mountain and previous perceptions of seeing a smoke and fire together. Likewise is the sublation of a previous mistaken knowledge by a subsequent correct one. In making an inference or in sublating an error, we rely on past experiences and conventions, which in turn depend on individual and collective memories having correspondence with a stable world of nature as ordained by Śiva. Inference is provisionally useful but is far from being a standard of correctness superior to direct perception.¹²⁶

Here, Abhinava does not mean that there is no rationality or discourse in the world. On the contrary, it is only because there is rational discourse (*vyavahāra*) that there are criteria of truth and means of knowledge by which judgements of true and false are made. Inference does not depend only on an intrinsically true nature of an object, but operates in a framework of conventions of mutual understanding and transaction. When inferring fire from smoke, the subject must unify a present perception of smoke with ideas about fire from memories of his previous experiences.

The measure of truth, therefore, exists in the unity of the self who knows and acts. Consciousness is constantly and ceaselessly active at synthetic

¹²⁶ See arguments in *JPV* 2.4, that validity of an inference is not based on empirical objects but rather on the knower's past knowledge and experiences, conventions and a stability of natural world (*nityatā*).

thoughts replacing one another in turn. A knowledge is deemed valid relative to another knowledge; and only because there is one holder of all perceptions and cognitions, who joins and disjoins, them that there is a notion of valid knowledge. Even though there are no external criteria of truth, there is an internal coherence and connection between kindred things. Internal coherence is the defining characteristic of sentience.¹²⁷ On the cosmic level as on the level of individual consciousness, there are no outside absolute criteria of truth, no ready-made world apart from a unity of consciousness in which kindred things are united by their conceptual affinity. It is this notion of knowledge as imagination, valid because of an internal coherence rather than empirical correspondence, that Abhinava brings to bear on his theory of aesthetic perception.

Perception and Apperception

Abhinavagupta likens apperception (*anuvyavasāya*) to the theater (*anuvyavasāyavat viśayikāryam nāṭyam*). His meaning of apperception is different from that in the Naiyāyika usage, i.e., that percepts received through the senses are gathered in the mind and cognized in the soul; the cognition is then known in a subsequent moment of self-awareness. The process is expressed thus, "This is a pot," "I know the pot." For the Mīmāṃsakas, the object, knowledge, and the cognizer are known together as one; thus, there can be no apperception because the knower and knowledge are inseparable. The Śaivas take a different approach to knowledge. It is stated in the *Śivadr̥ṣṭi* that knowing in itself is an activity.¹²⁸ In the later

¹²⁷ *IPV*1.7.2, vol. 1 pp. 356.

systematic philosophy of the *Īśvarapratyabhijñā*, knowing is an active manifestation on the part of the consciousness, and action is the bringing about of this inner design consisting of knowledge in the external world.¹²⁹

Abhinava's use of *anuvyavasāya*¹³⁰ is furnished in connection with an explanation of a synthesis of cognitions into a complex idea and an action. In this regard, it is linked with *pramāṇa*, the means which produces a single, new cognition. *Pramāṇa* is teleologically defined as the knowledge that persists uninterrupted until it serves its desired purpose.¹³¹ A desired purpose is the limiting definition of a *pramāṇa* because Abhinava wants to say, first, that an action consisting of a series of manifestations in the external world and comprising parameters of time and space, is unified in the subject; and, second, because an action of complex manifestations (*ābhāsa*s) must be unified, the unifier must be one *samvid* which is continuous in indeterminate stages through determinate cognition and

¹²⁸ *SD* 1.23-24, p. 16.

¹²⁹ *IPV* 2.4.4, vol. 2, p. 159. "evam ekā kriyā saisā sakramāntarabāhīḥ sthitiḥ/ ekasyaivobhayākārasaḥśnor upapādītā." "Thus action is one. It is a sequential state, internal and external, accomplished by a single [subject] who can take both forms."

¹³⁰ *IPV* 2.2.3, vol. 2, p. 43. "pascād bhāvinam vyavasāyam niscayātmakam vikalpakam anuvyavasāyasadbhāvācyam vidadhad antahkaranam etān kriyāsambandhādi-vikalpān sampādayati." "A determination in the nature of an ascertainment and a mental construct, occurring afterward, expressible by the word 'apperception,' and orienting the mind causes mental constructs to acquire relations with actions and so on."

¹³¹ *IPVV* 2.3.1-2, vol. 2, p. 68. 2.3.1 "idametādrg ity evam yadvasād vyavalīṣṭhate/ vastu pramāṇam tat so 'pi svābhāso bhīnavodaya." 2.3.2 "so 'ntas tatthāvimarsātmā desakālādyabhedini/ ekābhīdhānaviṣaye mitir vastunyo abādhitā." "An object that is resolved from the force of [perceiving] thus, "this is such," is a valid knowledge. Since it is a one's own manifestation, it rises ever anew." "Being inward, consisting of a presentation as such in an object of a single intention, which object has no division in time and space, it is [substantive] knowledge (*miti*) which is not sublated in respect of the object."

culminates in the agent's carrying out of the action. The *saṃvid* manifests knowledge as a series of *ābhāsa*s connected by various relations, and action as what is desired to be achieved by the agent, who accordingly uses appropriate instruments to bring about externally his desired purpose. Validity is not fixed but relative to a prior and less perfect, or later and more perfect, knowledge. A particular knowledge is relative to all manifestations of the full consciousness which unifies and makes experiences coherent in respect of a particular purpose. *Anuvyavasāya*, in this connection, is a function of the mind (*manas*) that creates coherence by unifying percepts with abstract relations into a positive determination.¹³² It is a function analogous to an *anusamdhāna* in *vikalpa*, differing only in that an *anuvyavasāya* arranges relations (*kāraka*) while *anusamdhāna* arranges the whole in a determinate cognition. Apperception (*anuvyavasāya*) is necessary in valid knowledge, inasmuch as serving a purpose defines valid knowledge and the latter requires ideas of relation. Abhinava concludes that an action which attains its object must proceed from a cognizer's power to relate distinct and discrete cognitions into a web of coherence.¹³³

¹³² IPV 2.2.3, vol. 2, p. 41. "taddvayālambanā etā mano 'nuyavasāyī sat/ karoti mātṛvyāpāramayīḥ karmādīkalpanāḥ." "The [sensuous] mind, [as opposed to the intellectual *buddhi*] being the apperceiver, creates these thoughts (*kalpanā*) of action and so on, which are operations of the cognizer [indeterminate cognitions] [and] which depend on these two [unity and diversity]."

¹³³ IPV 2.3.7, vol. 3, pp. 136-138. "prthag dīpaprakāśānām srotasām sāgare yathā/ aviruddhāvabhāśānām eva tathāikadhī." "Like separate lights in a lamp [or] streams in a river, so is the insight of a unity, possessing a single thing as its object of action, of uncontradicted manifestations." Abhinava's comment, "prthag ye dīpaprakāśāḥ teṣām sambandhi yad ekam sāgare srotasām ca yad ekam vastu tena kāryā yathā aikyadhīḥ tathā aviruddhā ye avabhāśā ghaṭalohitakūṭcanādayaḥ teṣām sambandhi yad ekam svalakṣaṇam tatkāryā aikyadyīr iti sambandhaḥ aikyadhīyā--pratibhāso vimarso arthakriyā ca iti

In the theatrical context, apperception, in addition to being an after-cognition, is also the coherence-creating function: the mind arranges present

svikṛtam." "Just as a single thing possessing relations of [i.e. illuminated by] lamp-lights, and a single substance of streams in a river, creates an effect which is an insight of unity, just so an insight of unity has as its effect a single bare particular (*svaśakṣaṇa*) possessing the relations of appearances of 'pot,' 'metal,' 'gold,' and so on. This is the meaning. Thus, it is accepted that through an insight of unity there is a representation, which is an appearance, and a purposeful action." Cf. *Abhinavabhāratī*. The same reasoning is attributed to Saṅkuka in order to explain how a spectator perceives actors and actions on stage. Abhinava represents Śrī Saṅkuka as saying that an aesthetic perception is an insight (*dhī*) consisting of a stream of contradictory awarenesses (*viruddhabuddhisambhedaḥ avivecitasaṃplava*). Abhinava quotes a verse from the *Pramāṇavarttika* to the effect that even a false knowledge can lead to a purposeful action (*arthakriyāpi mithyājñānadṛṣṭā*). No doubt, Abhinava describes an opponent's viewpoint on the basis of Abhinava's own critical perspective, which is that the mind arranges bare percepts into a unified idea according to some aim or purpose and that even a false cognition can lead to a purposeful action. R. S. Nagar, ed., *Nāṭyaśāstra of Bharatamuni*, with the commentary *Abhinavabhāratī* by Abhinavaguptācārya, vol. 1 (2d ed. Delhi: Parimal Publications), 1988, p. 272.

On *samanvaya*, Abhinava says in *IPV* 1.7.2, vol. 1, p. 356-357. "yadi aṃśā bhāṇā nīlasukhādaya uhyamāṇā ekasmin 'aḥam' itī pramāṇrūpe mahāsaṃvitsamudre pratītiṣṭhanti ābhimukhyena viśrāntīm bhajante, tata eṣu parasparam samanvayarūpam yat jñāteyam tat upapattiyā ghaṭate, jñātūnām bhāṇaḥ. tacchabodhpravṛttinimittam parasparam jñānīyuh itī, karma ca anyonyayogakṣemodvahanāmakam jñāteyam, tac ca samanvayābhīprāyena iha darsitam, na jādānām svataḥ samanvayaḥ kadācid api itī pratīpādayitum."

"If these states, blue, happy, and so on, as they are being borne settle in one great ocean of *saṃvid*, i.e., the one cognizer, "I," they come to rest presently. Thus, an affinity (*jñāteya*) in the form of coherence [i.e., a mutual logical connection] among them (*eṣu parasparam samanvayarūpam*) arises as the state [of being] kindred things. The reason for using the word [affinity (*jñāteya*)], is [to indicate] that they should know one another. And an object of action is an affinity consisting of a stream which allows the joining of one with another, and this has been shown here through the meaning of 'coherence' (*samanvaya*, lit. logical connection), in order to establish that there is never a logical connection in itself between inert things." This is to say that making sense out of bare percepts is a function of the mind of a single cognizer, rather than a function inherent in empirical objects.

percepts into imaginative constructs conducive to the dramatic goal. When going to the theater, one has a desire or intention not do something real (" *na me kiñcid pāramāṛthikam kartavyam...* " ¹³⁴), but, rather, to enjoy oneself in communion with all others in the audience in seeing the wonderful sights and sounds of the theater. The purpose achieved by the theater is bliss, i.e., the relishing of the *rasa*. This uninterrupted continuity between an idea and its culmination in action, made coherent by relations in apperception, governing a series of separate perceptions and experiences in *saṃvid*, makes the knowledge gained in the theater valid. Its validity rests on the fact that the theater, from the perspective of an individual viewer or of the audience as a whole, is an unobstructed continuum of one-pointed (*ekāgra*) and coherent (*samyagsambaddha*) imagination; one knowledge persists from the beginning to the end and accomplishes its purpose. That knowledge is an aesthetic experience achieved by a valid means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*). ¹³⁵

The unifier as a cognizer and agent of action, whose unification terminates in accomplishing of an effect, is the *saṃvid* consisting of *prakāśa* and *vimarsa*. In the concept of *saṃvid*, Abhinava provides the logic of the manner in which consciousness moves from one mental event to another, above the substrata of subconscious memories and indeterminate cognitions that constantly arise into the composition of conscious mental images, while the mind (*manas*) unifies these various events and images into a single coherent stream of thought terminating in achieving a purposeful activity.

¹³⁴ *Abh* 1.1, Nagar ed., p. 35

¹³⁵ *JPV* 2.3.7, pp. 137-138.

The distinction of consciousness and self-consciousness is evident in this regard: while percepts from the senses and memories raised out of the subconsciousness (trace impressions) are synthesized into a determinate cognition which comprises a stage of representation (*parāmarśa*) governed by a precognitive impulse (*icchā*), determinate cognitions as distinct and separate representations in themselves now consciously perceived have no coherence. Coherence is a combination in which distinct mental events (*ābhāsa*) are in relation (*sambandha*) or logical connection (*samanvaya*) to one another, and there are such relations and connections because the whole stream of events tend towards one single purpose.¹³⁶ In this situation, each mental construct (*vikalpa*) does not stand alone but is perceived in another organizing level of consciousness that puts them in relation to one another;

¹³⁶ *IPV* 1.7.2, vol. 1, p. 356, and 2.2.1-7, vol. 2, p. 33-63. See especially 2.2.7, p. 58 "evam evārthasiddhiḥ syān mātur arthakriyārthinaḥ bhedaḥbhedaavatārthena tena na bhrāntir īdrśī." "Thus, indeed, the agent seeking a successful action may accomplish his goal through a purpose which is divided and unified. Therefore, there is no such error." This 'error' means the world of *vyavahāra* which notably in Vedānta and Buddhist systems is construed as an epistemological error. Utpala says the phenomenal world is real, *satya*, and not an error, *bhrānti*. Chapter 2 of *IPV* 2 is devoted to showing that mentally constructed concepts of relations are real and not erroneous because they are conventions that support the functioning of the world. They are real because they are stable and useful "satyāḥ sthāiryopayogābhyām." *IPV* 2.2.1., vol. 2, p. 33. The world is real because it is stable and useful. Thus, using the notion that conceptual relations and logical relations are real because they are formed by and for convention, *vyavahāra*, which is real, "evam ca ābhāsāḥ smṛtāḥ asmīn asṁvedyam apī ābhāsāntaram sāmānyasambandharūpatayā anupraviṣṭam, anyathā na katham cid vyavahārah iti sakaladesakāladasāpuruṣopayogī yadī ayam vyavahāro na satyāḥ tarchī na anyasya satyatvam vidmah iti na atra bhrāntīḥ iti bhramitavyam. *IPV* 2.2.7, p. 63. "And thus even in the manifestation itself, another manifestation is agreed upon as logical connections and relations, although it is not perceptible. Otherwise, in no way can there be an ordinary world. And if this world, being of benefit to humans in all places, time and circumstances, are not real, then, we know of nothing else real. So it is not to be mistaken as an error."

and at this level consciousness is aware of mental constructs as elements in its cognition, i.e., as *ābhāsa*s that are possibilities in a combination.

Perhaps mindful of a difference between his own notion of apperception and that of the logicians, Abhinava says " *anuvyavasāyavad viśayīkāryam nātyam* " ¹³⁷ Logic defines an apperception, *anuvyavasāya*, as a direct perception possessing as its scope a determination: " *yathā ghaṭajñān-āntaram ghaṭam aham jñāmi iti mānasam jñānam. 2 jñātātāvabhāsakam brahmacaitanyam iti māyāvādinah.* " ¹³⁸ "as the mental perception, "I know the pot," immediately after the knowledge of a pot; and 2. according to the school of illusion, it is Brahma-consciousness manifesting the state of being known." The *Nyāyakosa* also gives a definition of *vyavasāya* as a knowledge which is made an object of knowledge, which is to say a knowledge of something [perceived] before (*pūrvajñāna*). In the statement that a direct perception consists in ascertainment (*Gautamanyāyasūtra* 1.1.4), for example: here, the immediate perception of a pot, understood by an ascertainment, "I perceive a pot," occurring immediately after the direct, visual, sensory perception of a pot, is an ascertainment in the form of a determinate cognition. The commentary by Vātsyāyana says that everywhere the knower by means of his senses has an ascertainment in regard to a sense-object. An apperception (*anuvyavasāya* or literally after-ascertainment) occurs by means of the mind. ¹³⁹

¹³⁷ This appears in the Nagar edition. The Baroda edition, GOS 37, has " *anuvyavasāyaviśayīkāryam nātyam* "

¹³⁸ Bhīmācārya Jhalakīkar, *Nyāyakosa*, Bombay Sanskrit and Prakrit Series 49 (Rev. and re-ed. by Vāsudev Shāstrī Abhyankar, Poona: The Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1978), p. 35.

¹³⁹ *JPV* 2.2.3, vol. 2, p. 41-2. " *taddvylambanā eti mano 'nuvyavasāyī sat/ karoti*

Abhinava's definition is similar; but in the scheme of his conception of *saṃvid* as the whole of consciousness that encompasses complex mental phenomena, *anuvyavasāya* implies in one sense that the state of knowledge is [as if] perceived by another state of consciousness which is its substratum. Abhinava treats this sort of apperception as a level of *parāmarśa*, a state of mental representation which rests (*viśrānta*) on another. He says in *IPV* 1.5.10 that

parāmarśa is the place of rest (*viśrāntisthāna*). The final one is the ultimate, and that in a form of such as "I". But what contradiction is there [in there being] an intermediate state of rest, as one says of the roots of a tree in the going to a village, because the former is created in dependence of the latter. Also, since the intermediate *parāmarśa*, "because this blue [arises] by that [cause], there is this blue," rests on a basic *parāmarśa* "I," it is established precisely that repose consists in the self. To say that "I know this blue" amounts in essence to saying that "I illuminate [the blue]."¹⁴⁰

Samvid is postulated as a consciousness identical to the Lord in possessing the powers of knowledge and action resting on the will of the agent. If consciousness is one homogeneous entity, Śaiva philosophers seek

mātrvyāpāramayīḥ karmādikaḥ pañcāḥ."

¹⁴⁰ *IPV* 1.5.17, pp. 278-9. The term *parāmarśa*, an object-awareness governed by a particular precognitive impulse (*icchā*), represents the possibility of intermediate representations, which is based on a more basic representation in which it is manifested. An example is that the ideas 'pot' and 'cloth' are *parāmarśas* which are represented in the "I" *parāmarśa*. The latter which consists of the a personal identity, such as being a potter who desires to make a pot, and so on, is a representation in the pure "I" or " *suddhāhambhāva* ." Other passages in the *IPV* explicating this term are 1.5.10, vol. 1., pp. 236ff.; 2.3.9, vol. 2, p. 113; 2.4.2, vol. 2, pp. 203-4, and others.

to explain how diverse things such as experiences and actions are formed by a single agent who is *saṃvid*. Such a consciousness is independent as to what it wants to manifest and sovereign as to how it manifests, in subjecting thought-formations to parameters of time and form (*mūrtikriyā*).¹⁴¹ It has the freedom and power to shape mental objects. Abhinava says of *vimarsa*, *saṃvid*'s reflective aspect, that it is capable of being all things: it makes another oneself, and it makes oneself another; it unifies both into one, and

¹⁴¹ *IPV* 2.1.5-7, vol. 2, pp. 16, 20. "*mūrtivaicitryato deśakramam ābhāsayaty asau/ kriyāvaicitryanirbhāsāt kālakramam apīśvaraḥ*" "That Lord manifests a sequence of space as varieties of forms, and a sequence of time as well through an appearance of varieties of actions." The theory is that the Lord as the ultimate *saṃvid* is not differentiated but projects differences in the form of time and space through his power of reflection or representation, i.e., *vimarsa*. *IPV* 3.1.1, vol. 2, pp. 214-216, "*evam antarbahir vṛttih kriyā kālakramānugā/ mātur eva tadanyonyāvīryukte jñānakarmaṇī*" "Thus the knower alone possesses the activity of inward and outward modes conforming (corresponding) to time and space; therefore knowledge and action are not unconnected with one another." Abhinava's comments (p. 215), "*asya pramātur eva jñānasaktivapuṣo dharmaḥ. tat iti tasmād avīryuktaṃ jñānaṃ kriyā ca. jñānaṃ vimarsānuprāṇitam, vimarsa eva ca kriyete*." "The knower alone has the property consisting the power of knowledge. Therefore : therefore knowledge and action are not unconnected. Knowledge is brought to life by *vimarsa*, and *vimarsa* itself is action." The idea is that all perceptions of external things and subjectively originated thoughts, which occur in the sequences of time and space (as action and form), would be scattered and unconnected without a single unifying subject who appears as one in all discontinuous mental events; although the subject, *saṃvid*, is not differentiated, *vimarsa*, the reflection is put to parameters of time and space in the course of blooming forth into concretely verbalized mental constructs. *IPV* 2.1.6-7, pp. 20. "*sarvatrābhāsabhedo 'pi bhavet kālakramākarah/ vicchinna bhāsaḥ sūnyāder mātur bhātasya no sakṛt.// deśakramo 'pi bhāveṣu bhāti mātur mātātmanah/ svātmeva svātmanā pūrṇā bhāvā bhānti amītasya tu*." "Everywhere, discrete appearances, having time-sequence as their origin, would be discontinuous, if the cognizer, consisting of the void, and so on, is not illuminated as one.// Although things appear to be in a spatial sequence to a limited knower, they appear full to the unlimited knower as the self by means of the self." This is to say that because appearances are formed by subjective forms of time and space, they require a single cognizer to give them a sense of unity and coherence.

having unified into one, it cancels both.¹⁴² He means, very probably, that representations (*vimarśa*) consisting in synthesis project externality as the world of objects in my consciousness, and internality as the 'I' who perceive the world; a representation combines the object and subject in a single cognition, and cancels both notions of objectivity and subjectivity. Or, it cancels a particular representation and synthesizes another mental event. These stages of representation are evident in Śaiva epistemeological schema, beginning with *Śiva*, *Śakti*, *Īśvara*, *Sadāśiva*, *Sadvidyā*, and so on, in which the ultimate level of complete and undifferentiated awareness is split off into an incipient self-awareness in the *Śakti* stage, followed by an awakening (*unmeṣa*) to objectivity in the *Īśvara* "That-I" awareness; this is in turn followed by a "I-that" of the *Sadāśiva* stage in which subjectivity predominates, and the *Sadvidyā* level in which the subjectivity and objectivity are in equal balance.¹⁴³ Inasmuch as it is subtly verbal and governed by a desire, *vimarśa* contains in it the object of a purposeful action for which it is conceived, and develops into a *vikalpa*; the mind relates distinct manifestations into a coherent whole.

¹⁴² *JPV* 1.5.13, vol. 2, p. 252. " *vimarśo hi sarvaṃsahaj... ityevamsvabhāvaḥ.* "

¹⁴³ *JPV* 3.1, see n. 141, and vol. 3 (tr.), pp.190-200. This chapter devoted to the nature of the subject describes gradations of experiences, differentiated by the *vimarśa* power of reflective presentation of pure consciousness which is Śiva. These stages are also quickly outlined in 1.5.14, vol. 2, pp. 254-5, where the *Sadāśiva* stage corresponds with *pasyantī* level of Speech. See also 3.1 for a scheme of corresponding epistemological and ontological realms and their presiding deities. A practical illustration of levels of presentations may be made as follows: in cognizing a pot, a person must first be attentive. "Ah, a pot," " *ayam ghaṭaḥ*," he says. The tacit subjectivity in this cognition may be expressed as an apperception when he reflects, "I am seeing a pot." Or, if he is totally absorbed in a fascinating pot, the sense of I-this and this-I disappears, and he is intensely aware of just 'pot.' The latter is a single-focused, *ekāgra*, perception.

Verse 2.2.3 of the *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvimarsinī* describes how the mind (*manas*) is an apperceiver through its function of creating coherence:

The mind, being the apperceiver, creates these ideas of actions and so on in dependence on these two [unity and diversity], which constructions are the operations of the cognizer.

It has been established previously that, in the world, a living being is the cognizer, who in being self-conscious is like an inward string of a garland of knowledge. It has been ascertained also that he is independent. Being of a pure nature, he is Śiva; but in the realm of duality, being of a limited nature he is cattle. Thus, when his mind (*manas*) blooms forth, the blooming is vivid in the realm of mental constructs (*vikalpabhūmikā*). Because the arising [of an awareness] in the realm of *Sadāśiva* and *Īśvara* pertains to a sensuous indeterminate [cognition], the operation of *vimarsa* is of that which is not external to an indeterminate cognition. The determination that comes about afterward, consisting of an ascertainment, is determinate. It is expressed by the term " *anuvyavasāya* ," and the mind in effecting [apperception] brings about the mental constructs of action, relation, and so on. And these mental constructs depend on two things in the forms of unity and diversity...¹⁴⁴

The aesthetic experience is a particularly good illustration of the process described above: in it, determinate images are constructed from trace impressions and percepts. The modality of this experience, i.e., that it is an aesthetic experience and not a mundane one (*laukika, vyavahārika*), is governed and made coherent by a more inclusive awareness of the theatrical context. The aim of the theatrical context, in turn, makes possible the contemplative attitude of savoring.

In this aesthetic experience, with *samvid* as the whole, there are levels

¹⁴⁴ *JPV* 2.2.3, vol. 2, pp. 42-43. See also Pandey's translation, *JPV*, vol. 3 p. 131.

of perceptions, of which *anuvyavasāya* is the coherence-creating function. We see in Abhinava's analysis an integral picture of the mental life in which particulars are united by means of mental categories such as action, relation, universal, substance, place and time, within a governing objective.¹⁴⁵ A coherence of a series of mental events implies diversity, i.e., particulars within the series, combined in unity through ideas of relations that humans have conventionally instituted so that practical purposes in everyday life are able to be accomplished. The cognizer must unite levels of mental functions in order to carry out actions in practical life.¹⁴⁶ Indeed, the world consists of knowledge and action in *vyavahāra*, which is based on the routinization of abstract concepts that persist because they are useful for the continuity of interpersonal communication in society. This unification of distinct ideas presupposes the unity of an individual consciousness as well as a unity of the world, through which unities invariable occurrences are verbally described in routinized and conventional terms.¹⁴⁷ Therefore, according to Śaiva systematic philosophy, one must posit the cognizer of the nature of *saṃvid*, whose action consists in making external his inward thoughts and designs.¹⁴⁸

¹⁴⁵ *IPV* 2.2.3, vol. 2, pp. 46-47. " *Itatra ca ayaṃ saṃvidavataraṇakramo yat kriyāśakter eva ayaṃ sarvo viśphāraḥ.* " "And in this (talk of provisional reality-- Bhāskara), this world is a succession of a descent of *saṃvid* in that everything is an expansion of just the power of action."

¹⁴⁶ *IPV* 2.2.1, vol. 2, pp. 33-36; vol. 3, (tr.), pp. 128-9.

¹⁴⁷ *IPV* 2.3.8, vol. 2, p. 108-109. " *avisīṣṭo yady api vahnnyābhāso deśakālābhāsapramukhaḥ ābhāsaḥ... Itatra kim pramāṇāntareṇa.* "

¹⁴⁸ *IPV*, vol. 1, p. 422, " *saṃvidāṃ jñānānām aikyena vinā lokaprasiddhiḥ lokamārgaḥ sarvo vyavahāro na sambhaviḥ. sambhaviḥ ca ayaṃ tasmāi aikyam āsām... sa eva ca pramātā ucyate itī sthītam* "

Chapter 4

Intuition in Poetics

Throughout the tradition of literary criticism, texts on poetics regularly cite *pratibhā* as the source of the poet's extraordinary ability to create beautiful poetry. It is conceived as an inborn genius, a divine gift or inspiration, without which no poem of worth will come forth even if a poet has the requisite skill and practice. Such treatises, searching for causes of beauty and obstacles to poetic excellence, provide an education for a would-be poet as well as for readers. To that extent, they reflect overarching conceptions of "poetness" (*kavitva*) and changing trends in literary works.

Gerow describes the historical process that culminates in Ānandavardhana's theory of poetics¹⁴⁹ as a rapprochement between the two art forms--poetry and drama. Having lost court patronage, Sanskrit drama withered into a written art form while Sanskrit poetry became increasingly vernacularized in devotional religious movements. Consequently, the famed critic, in redefining the subject matter of poetry and poetics, brought drama into the proper realm of poetry. In this process,

¹⁴⁹ According to Gerow, an articulation of the *Nāṭyaśāstra*'s notions of *rasa* in poetry and the linkage of the notions of *rasa* and *alamkāra* are two out of three ways of understanding the importance of Ānandavardhana's *Dhvanyāloka*. Edwin Gerow, *Indian Poetics (IP)*, in *History of Indian Literature*, vol. 5, fasc. 3, Jan Gonda, ed. (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1977) pp. 252-253.

the language of poetry is made to realize its multivalence and full capacity of expressiveness, as well as the "integrative quality" of drama.¹⁵⁰

Ānanda lived in an epoch that was kind to its poets and other intellectuals. The scholar-loving court of Kashmir, from the reign of Jayāpīḍa onward, provided necessary patronage for the great surge of literary activities recorded by Kalhaṇa. We find mentioned in the *Rājatarāṅginī*, great poets and poeticians of this historical period,¹⁵¹ many of whom Abhinava often cites by name. At the height of its political and cultural glory, the literary tradition of Kashmir made a great impact on Indian poetics. With the *Dhvanyāloka*, Ānandavardhana revolutionized the conception of poetry and of the poetic mode of communication. Devoting the last *uddyota* to *pratibhā*, Ānanda describes the endlessness of the 'modern' poet who keeps a *rasa* in his heart as the goal of the creative process, while employing the suggestive function, *dhvani*, of poetic language to achieve this aim. Poetry no longer appeals to the aesthetics of the intellect alone, but rather the poet can devise fresh and original literary works culminating in joy, *prīti*, of an emotional nature in the sympathetic and sensitive reader.

Ānanda's treatment of the poet's *pratibhā*, following a long tradition of its usage in a general way as the poet's genius, is significantly integrated with a structural re-orientation of hierarchical poetic elements and of poetic communication. Although Ānanda's conception of poetry as a 'soul' and the suggestive function of poetic language had been foreshadowed by Vāmana

¹⁵⁰ Gerow, *JP*, p. 252.

¹⁵¹ *RT*, vol. 1: 4.495-497, p. 166, Vāmana and Udbhaṭa; 5.34 Mukṭākāṇa, Sivasvāmin, Ānandavardhana, Ratnākara; 5.66, p. 195, Bhaṭṭa Kallāṭa; 4.704, p. 184, Saṅkuka. M. Aurel Stein, tr., *Kalhaṇa's Rājatarāṅginī: A Chronicle of the Kings of Kashmir* (*RT*), vol. 1, (Repr., Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1979).

and Udbhaṭa, the two great court literati before him, it was his work that effectively determined later views on Indian aesthetics. To that extent, a modern critic such as De finds it impossible that the idea of the soul of poetry has not always been implied, and few critics of Sanskrit literature today would wholeheartedly support the notion that aesthetic emotions are inferred by the audience upon hearing a poem or seeing a play. Ānanda's revolution is a historical process, which entails a new definition of the relation of the poet with his work, and the poet with his reader. This linkage is provided in part by Ānanda's concept of a poet's imagination and the poet's creative control over a literary piece. The development of *pratibhā*, therefore, is to be examined in the light of Ānanda's language theory and his thesis that *rasadhvani* is the 'soul' of poetry. The bond between the poet and his *sahṛdaya* suggested by Ānanda is strengthened by the logic of aesthetic perception that Abhinava furnishes in the *Locana* and the *Abhinavabhāratī*.

Problematics of the 'soul' of poetry

The style of Sanskrit poetics does not lend itself to lengthy expositions on the subjective aesthetic experiences of a poet and his reader such as one may find in Western literary criticism of certain periods. Short verses in the form of *sūtra*s or *kārikā*s concisely define genres and constitutive elements of good poetry. In spite of this mnemonic brevity and by comparing analytical categories appearing in different texts, it is possible to detect "schools" and innovations within the tradition.

Early poetics texts, up to Vāmana and Udbhaṭa, speak metaphorically of

the entity, "poetry," as a body, and the few lines devoted to the description of this body evince an attitude of poets in their self-consciousness as brethren whose common immortal glory consists in the "body" of their verses.¹⁵²

Vāmana at the court of king Jayāpīḍa was the first to mention the soul of poetry as a distinct cause of beauty, "*Rīṭir ātmā kāvyasya*."¹⁵³ Ānanda turns the soul into the suggested meanings in poetry, the function and goal of poetic language which distinguishes literature from scripture, *sāstra*, and so on.

S. K. De finds it virtually impossible that the idea of the soul of poetry has not been implied even in the poetry of the *Rg Veda*, and he writes a lengthy footnote to support this point,

152 For example, see verse 23 of Bhartṛhari's *Vairāgyasatakā*. "*tvam rājā vayam apy upāsita guruprajñābhīmānonnatāḥ/ khyātas tvam vibhavair yasāmsi kavayo dikṣu pratānvanti naḥ/ itthaṃ mānada nātidūram ubhayaḥ apy āvayaḥ antaram/ yady asmāsu parāṇmukho 'si vayam apy ekāntato nihpṛhāḥ*." "You are a king, we also are elevated by the pride of wisdom from the teachers we have served. You are known by your powers, we poets extend our fame in all directions. Thus, the gap between us two is not so great, O pride-destroyer. If you turn away from us, we are also absolutely indifferent." (my translation) Bhartṛhari, *Vairāgyasatakam*, in *Satakatrāyaṃ*, with the gloss of Mahābalopāhvakṛṣṇasāstri (2d ed., Bombay: Nirṇayasagar Press, 1891), p. 11.

See also Stein, tr., *RT* 1.3-5, p. 2; 1.46-7, p. 10. 1.46 "We pay reverence to that naturally sublime craft of poets without whose favour even mighty kings are not remembered, though the earth, encircled by the oceans, was sheltered under the shadow of their arms as in the shade of forest trees." 1.47. "Without thee, O brother composer of true poetry, this world does not even in its dream know of the existence of those ornaments of the earth who once rested their feet on the temples of elephants, who possessed wealth, and in whose palaces maidens dwelt, moons of the day,--without thee the universe is blind, why [praise thee] with a hundred hymns?"

153 Vāmana, *The Kāvyaśāstrakārasūtras of Vāmana (KA)*, with his own *Vṛtti*, Kāśināth Pāṇḍurang Parab, ed., *Kāvyaśāstrakārasūtras* 15 (Bombay: Nirṇaya Sāgara Press, 1889) 1.2.6, p. 3.

The metaphorical expression *kāvyaśarīra* with its implied *kāvyaātman* plays an important part in Sanskrit Poetics throughout its history.... Whatever may be the value of this metaphor as an index to the conception of poetry gradually evolved by Indian theorists, one point is clear, viz., that they all take, from Bhāmaha to Jagannātha, the *śabda* and *artha* as constituting what they call the 'body' of poetry; and with this idea the theories start, ultimately ending in a search for its 'soul'.¹⁵⁴

De again writes,

The older writers on Poetics, therefore, before the advent of the Dhvani-theorists, content themselves with the working out of the outward form of expression, the 'body' of poetry, and hardly trouble themselves with the question of an ulterior aesthetic principle, the 'soul' of poetry; nor do they identify, as some later writers do, this 'soul' with the psychological factor known as Rasa.¹⁵⁵

The perception of this modern literary critic is precisely that the talk of 'soul' and 'body' implies an 'ulterior aesthetic principle' which animates the outward form of expression. Gerow, on the other hand, minimizes this distinction as a metaphorical usage that can easily be overloaded, proposing that the force of '*śarīra*' is that of a 'corpus' of literature. He further alludes to the imagination, which is "the quality of the poetic product corresponding to the faculty of imagination and [which] is considered to be the proof of genius,"¹⁵⁶ as the prime characteristic in the Western stereotype of a poet; and this quality, in Gerow's opinion, has been supplanted by its opposites in

¹⁵⁴ De, *HSP*, vol. 2, p. 35-6.

¹⁵⁵ De, *HSP*, vol. 2, pp. 116-7. See also De, *HSP*, p. 90.

¹⁵⁶ Edwin Gerow, *A Glossary of Indian Figures of Speech (Glossary)* (The Hague: Mouton, 1971), p. 68.

classical India.¹⁵⁷

Ānandavardhana in his treatment of *pratibhā* in the fourth *uddya* of the *Dhvanyāloka*, in fact directly addresses the problem of imitation and creative distinctiveness: the *rasika* poet who possesses *pratibhā* and exploits the suggestive function of poetic language will be able to create fresh and original poetry even on age-old themes. Gerow, however, takes imagination to be the figure of speech *bhāvikā* which is "the ability to make the several images of the individual poetic statement coherent in terms demanded by the work as a larger whole."¹⁵⁸ In sum, he writes on the absence of a universal aesthetic in Indian thoughts on the arts:

The notion of such a universal or analogical aesthetic did not suggest itself to Indian thinkers, as it has to our own since the Renaissance, because the creative act had always been considered a matter of technique and style embodied in a tradition, evolving from its own material, and not a manifestation of the freely intuiting intellect, the genius.¹⁵⁹

This statement is an accurate description even of Ānanda who thinks of the poet's imagination, endless when combined with the suggestive function of language, as a gift of the goddess Sarasvatī and an extension of the

¹⁵⁷ Gerow, *Glossary*, p. 60.

¹⁵⁸ Gerow, *Glossary*, p. 68.

¹⁵⁹ Gerow, *Glossary*, p. 81. The image of the "poet" or the "artist," as Gerow rightly observes, influences the manner of appreciating poetry. In the postmodern phase of Western literary criticism, after critics have pronounced the death of the author, the critics and readers take equal shares in controlling the meanings of poetry. Nevertheless, critics and readers still take an interest in biographical notes of poets and how these personal experiences influence their dominant themes and images.

capacity of language, rather than a unique possession of individual poets. But given that individual geniuses proceed from material and technique rather than manipulate them, Indian poetics constantly take *pratibhā* as a quality that excites and thrills the poet for its inspirational and inexplicable resource to produce the cutting edge of poetry.

The absence of a stereotype of individualism does not prohibit the striving toward particularly unique excellences within well-defined rules of tradition. The cultivation of various tropes and regional styles, and even of emotional and psychological nuances of *rasa*s and *bhāva*s, is a gift of the Indian poetic imagination, whose stereotype is inevitably different from that of the West. The notion that poetic excellences are an extension of the poet as an individual, rather than of his technique and material, can also be found in Kuntaka's treatment of *pratibhā*: the poet's unique talents are differentiated into particulars of imagination expressed as distinct types of poetic excellences.¹⁶⁰

When modern Indian critics seek to explain the causal connection between the poet and his creation through the imagination, they look to the notion of *pratibhā* rather than *bhāvikā* as the poet's imagination. The uses of these two allied terms surely intimate that Indian poetics conceive of literary works in terms of their distinctiveness, a unique and created coherence which can be controlled by nothing else but an imagination purely of a poetic kind. The reason that *bhāvikā* should be an *arthālamkāra* is not

¹⁶⁰ Kuntaka, *Vakroktijīvita*, Critically edited with variants, introduction and English translation by K. Krishnamoorthy (Dharwad: Karnatak University), 1977, 1.24-29, pp. 40-48. See translation, pp. 326-334. According to Kuntaka, styles, *mārga*, are extensions of the individual poets' *pratibhās* which in turn arise from his nature and temperament.

readily obvious, unless figures of speech are thought of as poetic devices that can operate not only in words and phrases, but throughout an entire piece.

If the notion of *pratibhā* or *bhāvikā* brings into play the poet's individual creative talent which accounts for particular beauty and excellences of literary works, then this notion necessarily involves the kind of beauty that poetry is thought to possess. The question of 'soul' and 'body' must then be reconsidered as the aesthetician's attempt to categorize the elements that are possibly beautiful, and whose beauty is produced by the poet and appreciated by the reader. Thus, between De's position that Indian poetry and poetics must have always been alive to an emotive quality of poetry as an 'ulterior aesthetic principle,' implied in the term *kāvyaśarīra*, and Gerow's attitude of neutrality to these categories, there is a third position, namely, that such a categorization is heuristically and thus metaphorically useful for orienting the aesthetic attitude, of the poet and the reader to literary works. There is no reason against taking the texts at their face values: when Daṇḍin and Bhāmaha speak of the body of poetry, the metaphor can be taken straightforwardly as described for the sake of depicting a whole whose analytical parts can be individually investigated. Similarly, Ānanda speaks of the 'soul' of poetry exactly to distinguish the whole from its parts, as well as to reorient the aesthetic attitude of literary-minded readers toward perceiving through the relations of the whole and parts the beauty of poetry.

Indian aestheticians today take the concept of *pratibhā* to be the factor that relates the poet's imagination to literature. T. N. Sreekantaiya, with reference to Coleridge's and John Dewey's descriptions of imagination, says

on imagination,

There is a whole gamut of allied senses in which the word is used, from the simplest which is little more than the power of vivid visualization to the highest, the activity of the whole mind of a poet in which conceptions swarm into the stream of consciousness and are integrated into a beautiful whole.¹⁶¹

K. Kunjunni Raja traces the Indian meaning of poetic imagination to the great artists of the *Rg Veda* :

... the Rgveda itself contains clear statements about the process of the creation and appreciation of poetry; about the importance of the poetic vision, the great care needed in communicating the art experience and the role of the responsive listener in the aesthetic experience.¹⁶²

The eminent Indian grammarian and aesthetician continues,

... as the primary source of poetic inspiration and as the cause of poetry... This *pratibhā* or poetic vision is an instantaneous or time-less flash of insight integral, indivisible and immediate, and accompanied by a sense of happiness and joy,....¹⁶³

According to his view, Indian aesthetics contributes the notion that poetry comprises a 'circuit of the artist's experience,' involving

(1) the artist's experience, (2) the communication through the artistic

¹⁶¹ T. N. Sreekanthaiya, " 'Imagination' in Indian Poetics," *Indian Historical Quarterly*, vol. 13, no. 1 (March, 1937): 59-84, p. 60.

¹⁶² K. Kunjunni Raja, *The Language of Poetry*, Extension Lectures Publication Series: 29, Dharwad: Karnatak University, 1978, p. 2.

¹⁶³ K. Kunjunni Raja, *The Language of Poetry*, p. 8.

medium, and (3) the reception and recreation of the artist's experience by the receptive art connoisseur." A communication of an aesthetic experience is successful when what is felt by the artist is similarly felt in the audience with equal intensity, clarity, and delight.¹⁶⁴

Although Ānandavardhana is the first critic to articulate the role of the *sahṛdaya*, the sensitive reader, which fulfills the above-described circuit of aesthetic experience, poets and critics before him are mindful in varying degrees of the reader. The nature of poetic communication of which poetic texts explicitly speak or hint at is to be described below.

Poetic Communication

While Vedic poets are conscious of themselves as 'seers' whose visions bring about an interaction between the gods and humans,¹⁶⁵ and are subsequently thought of as the seers of reality,¹⁶⁶ the role of poets in the classical and medieval period has become secular. The reward of writing poetry, poetics texts tell us, is untold wealth and undying fame. Poets thrive

¹⁶⁴ K. Kunjunni Rāja, *The Language of Poetry*, p. 2.

¹⁶⁵ See ch. 2, "Dhī in the R̥gveda," in Jan Gonda, *The Vision of the Vedic Poets* (1st Indian edition Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers Pvt. Ltd, 1984 [1st published as vol. 8 in *Disputationes Rheno-Trajectinae*, 1963]), pp. 68-169.

¹⁶⁶ See Yāska, *Nirukta*, 1.18-20. On the intuitive insight of the seers, describes seeing as understanding the real meanings of words. To see truly means to understanding the real purport and to be able to use it for successful communications with humans and the gods. Bhartṛhari cites the same passage when speaking of how Brahman, the One, becomes its *anukāra*, the *Veda*, when seen by the seers who describe it to others in language, the form of diversity. Yāska, *The Nighaṇṭu and the Nirukta: The Oldest Indian Treatise on Etymology, Philology, and Semantics*, Laksman Sarup., ed. and tr., (Repr. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1967, 1984 [1st ed. 1920-1927]), pp. 18-20. The *vṛtti* of VP 1.5 especially draws extensively on these verses of the *Nirukta* which have been copiously referred to in the *Mahābhāṣya* 1.1.

in cities and find their audience in the courtly circles and wealthy upper classes.

Siegfried Lienhard describes a typical literary milieu in which the art and craft of the poet is assiduously cultivated in his education and through competitions in courtly assemblies or societies (*goṣṭhī*) where literary minds meet to sharpen their wits. The audience, also highly cultured and similarly educated, do not look for a personal expression of the poet's own experiences but rather for his skillful presentation of well-known themes. A poem is likened to a miniature painting whose motifs and imageries need to be deciphered by the viewer.¹⁶⁷ The sensitive reader is familiar with its theme and ornamentations, and he is emotionally primed to be receptive to such familiar conventions. He expects novelty in an individual poet's presentation rather than in sentiments:

Just as the poet's inspiration is shown mainly in the presentation, often in the details and refinements of a few lines, so the connoisseur's attitude to the poem is characterized by the fact that it is not the subject matter or the theme as such that primarily arouses his interest and gives him the pleasure of discovering something new, but the manner of presentation--the "how" rather than the "what". For the reader, the individuality and unique quality of any work resides in the way in which the poet has handled the traditional, predetermined elements which belong to *kāvya*.¹⁶⁸

This seems to represent closely a reader response that leads to the

¹⁶⁷ Siegfried Lienhard, *A History of Classical Poetry: Sanskrit-Pali-Prakrit (HCP)* in *A History of Indian Literature (HIL)*, Vol. 2, Fasc. 1, Jan Gonda, general ed. (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz) 1984, p. 37

¹⁶⁸ Lienhard, *HCP*, p.32.

popularity of *citrakāvya*, 'portrait' poetry. Ānanda, considering it an inferior product or even a non-poetry, cautions his readers against such 'miniature' poems in which *rasa* or any other kind of emotion figures but little,

That which is different from these, namely poetry which lacks *rasa* or an emotion (*bhāva*) as its final meaning, which lacks the power to reveal any particular suggested meaning, which is composed only by relying on novelties of literal sense and expression, and which gives the appearance of a picture, is *citra*. It is not real poetry [just as a picture is not the real thing] for it is an imitation of poetry. ... But where there is no reference to the *rasas*, etc., there cannot be any type of poetry at all. Because poetry cannot be about nothing.¹⁶⁹

Lienhard further describes such conventional novelty: it does not suffer the intrusion of a poet's feelings. Rather, the reader or listener discovers the special qualities that a poem (and its author) wishes to emphasize by paying close attention to the handling of details. Such a reader is described by Lienhard:

He recognizes them, as already stated, by the fine variations from the norm, by new combinations of the fixed poetic material specified for certain descriptions, themes and attributes. He also recognizes them by the way in which figures (*ālamkāra*) are constructed, the manner in which information is presented in each sentence or stanza and by the suitability (*aucitya*) of both sound and sense-bearing elements.¹⁷⁰

Conceptions of "body" and "soul"

Early conceptions of poetry as a body express the pride of poets: the

¹⁶⁹ Ingalls et al, tr., *Dhā, vṛtti*, 3.41-2, p. 636.

¹⁷⁰ Lienhard, *HCP*, p.35

kāvya vapuḥ or *kāvyaśarīra* is the immortal body that lives as fresh and beautifully as ever after the poet himself has perished,¹⁷¹ and which immortalizes the deeds of kings.¹⁷² That which holds this body together and gives coherence to a literary piece is the poet's intention, *bhāva*, which is analysed as a quality or a figure of speech called *bhāvika* variously described by critics.

Broadly speaking, Daṇḍin considers the body of poetry, an arrangement of words with a poet's intended meanings, to be adorned by ornaments which are figures of speech.¹⁷³ He seeks for the cause of beauty (*cārutvāhetu*) in the body distinguished by natural regional styles, primarily the *gaudīya* and *vaidarbha*,¹⁷⁴ and by the poet's own distinctive style, which together are called *mārga*. Figures of speech are ornamentation which adorns the body and increases its beauty; such ornamentation consists in artful manipulation of meanings within the arrangement of style (*mārga*). The life of this well-adorned body is given and sustained by the poet's *bhāva*. On the body of poetry, Daṇḍin writes,

1.10 Wise men have shown that poems have a body and ornaments,

171 Bhāmaha, *KA* 1.6-7 " *upeyusām api divam san nibandhavidhāyīnām / āsta eva nirātaṅka kāntam kāvyamayam vapuḥ // ruṇaddhi rodasi cāsya yāvat kīrtiḥ anasvarī / tāvat kilāyam adhyāste sukṛto vaihuḍḍham padam //* "

172 Daṇḍin, *KA* 1.3-5 " *iha śiṣṭānuśiṣṭānām śiṣṭānām api sarvathā/ vācām eva prasādena lokayātrā pravartate // idam andham tamah kṛtsnam jāyeta bhuvanātrayam/ yadi śabdābhavayam jyotiḥ āsamśaram na dīpyate // ādirājayasobimbam ādarsam prāpya vādmayam/ teṣām asaṃnidhāne 'pi na svayam pasya nasyati // "*

173 Daṇḍin, *KA* 1.10-18, 2.1-3ff.

174 The *rīti*s are subsequently said by Vāmana to be the soul of poetry. See, on *mārga*, *rīti* in Daṇḍin and later critics, particularly Vāmana, D. K. Gupta, *A Critical Study of Daṇḍin and His Works* (Delhi: Meharchand Lachhmandas, 1970) pp. 121-145.

The body, to begin with, is an arrangement of words distinguished by a desired meaning.

2.364 They call *bhāvika* the quality that governs a large composition, The poet's emotion (*bhāva*) is the intention that figures in poems up to their completion.

2.365 Mutual compatibility of all parts of the subject matter, a lack of meaningless particulars, description of places,

2.366 a clarity even of obscure (*gambhīra*) themes : since all these things are controlled by *bhāva*, they call it *bhāvika*.¹⁷⁵

Bhāmaha rejects the basic divisions of Daṇḍin, namely, the concrete distinctions between regional styles (*KĀ* 1.31-36) and the notion that an arrangement of words can be analysed separately from their meanings in figurative usages (*KĀ* 1.13-16). He states that sound and sense of words together are the body and ornaments of poetry,

Poetry consists of word and meaning together. It is twofold, namely,

¹⁷⁵ Otto Bohtlingk, tr., *Daṇḍin Poetik* Leipzig: Verlag von H. Haessel, 1890) p.2, p.84. (My translations)

1.10 *śairi (śūribhīḥ) śarīram ca kāvyānām alamkāraś ca darsitāḥ*
śarīram tāvad iṣṭārthavyavacchinna padāvalī

2.364 *tadbhāvikam iti prāhuḥ prabandhaviśayam guṇam*
bhāvaḥ kaver abhiprāyaḥ kāvyesv āsiddhi samsthitaḥ

2.365 *parasparopakāritvaṃ sarveṣāṃ vastu-parvāṇāṃ*
viśeṣaṇāṇāṃ vyarthāṇāṃ akriyā sthānavarṇanā

2.366 *vyaktīr ukṭikramabalād gambhīrasyāpi vastuṇaḥ*
bhāvāyattam idam sarvam iti tad bhāvikam viduḥ

prose and verse. Otherwise, it is threefold, namely Sanskrit, Prākṛit, and apabhraṃśa. ¹⁷⁶

but accepts the distinction of *śabdālaṃkāra* and *arthālaṃkāra*. ¹⁷⁷ The body of poetry is described by the verses,

1.6 Truly, the faultless and lovely body made of poetry remains of those who create literary works, though they have gone to heaven.

1.7 So long as his imperishable fame obstructs the earth and sky, indeed, he stands above blessed in the realm of the gods.

1.8 Thus he who desires glory whose boundaries are the expanse of the earth, who knows what ought to be known, should strive toward the beauty of poetry, ¹⁷⁸

as that which is faultless and lovely. It is the imperishable body of poetry that gives the poet his eternal fame and a place among the gods. The idea that poetry is the light of the ages, glorifying the deeds of kings and the poets, and this body of beauty ought to be faultless, is similarly expressed by

¹⁷⁶ P. V. Naganatha Sastry, *Kāvyaśāstra of Bhāmaha (KA)*, (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 2nd ed., 1970), 1.16, p. 6, "śabdārthau sahītau kāvyam gadyam padyam ca tad dvidhā saṃskṛtam prākṛtam cānyad apabhraṃśa itī tridhā."

¹⁷⁷ Bhāmaha, *KA* 1.15, p. 6.

¹⁷⁸ Bhāmaha, *KA* 1.6-8, pp. 2-3.

*upeyusām api divam sannibandhavidhāyinaṃ
āsta eva nirātaḥkam kāntam kāvyamayam vapuḥ*

*ruṇaddhi rodasī cāsya yāvat kīrtir anasvarī
tāvat kilāyam adhyāste sukrīṭ vaibudham padam.*

*ato bhīṣṇachalā kīrtim śibheyasīmā bhuvah śhiteḥ
yatno viditavedyena vidheyah kāvyalakṣmaṇi.*

Daṇḍin,

1.4 All these three worlds would become blind darkness
if the light called "words" does not illuminate all through *saṃsāra*.

1.5 The reflection of the first kings' glory, after it reaches the mirror of
eloquence [and] sees itself, does not perish, although the [kings] are no
longer present.

1.7 Therefore, even a small fault in a poem should in no way be
overlooked; even a beautiful body is unsightly because of a single
leprous spot.¹⁷⁹

For both early poetics, once the 'body' of poetry has been
circumscribed, categorizations can be made in respect of genres, kinds of
ornamentation that increase and defects that mar the beauty of that body.
Elements of aesthetic criteria at this stage of development entail the sounds
and sense, but emotive aspects of poetry are confined to the types of figures
known as *rasavad*, etc. The *rasa*s themselves are stated by Bhāmaha
(*KA* 1.21) and Daṇḍin (*KA* 1.18) to be requisite in *mahākāvya*s because
such lengthy works necessarily describe the vicissitudes of human lives.

Although both critics ascribe the source of the poet's creative genius to

¹⁷⁹ Dandin, *KA* 1.4, 5, 7, pp. 1-2.

idam andham tamah kṛtsnam jāyeta bhuvanaśrayam
yadi śabdāhvayam jyotir āsaṃsāram na dīpyate.

ādirājayasobimbam ādarsam prāpya vāṭmayam
teṣāṃ asaṃnidhāne 'pi na svayam pasya nasyati.

tad alpam api nopekṣyam kāvye duṣṭam katham cana
syād vapuḥ sundaram api svīreṇaikena durbhagam.

pratibhā, as Lienhard observes, the poet's feelings are not deemed essential to the beauty of the poems. Their active agency is alluded to as *bhāvika*, a quality (*guṇa*) which is the poet's *bhāva* in the sense of intention, *abhiprāya*. For Daṇḍin, this quality governs an overall coherence, particularly of a larger piece such as a *prabandha*, through a proper composition and juxtaposition of the parts in the whole work.¹⁸⁰

Bhāmaha tersely mentions the poet's role in a similar manner, through the quality of *bhāvikatva*, using the same phrase as Daṇḍin's: *bhāvikatvam itī prāhuḥ prabandhaviṣayaṃ guṇam*. The cause of this quality is the coherence the story and orderliness of language that makes poetic themes vivid as if directly perceived.¹⁸¹ Gerow rightly calls this figure of speech 'imagination,' since it acknowledges that the cause of the excellence of poetry, apart from objectively analysable literary devices, is the compositional and subjective arrangement on the part of the poet, not included in the 'body' of poetry.¹⁸² The prescription of a poet's own emotions, such as a *bhāva* or *rasa*, as a vital element in a composition does not yet occur to poetics of this period because the poet's role is not to communicate feelings, but rather to create a beautiful body of such descriptions. Although the notion of *rasa* exists in the works of the earliest critics--Bharata, Daṇḍin and Bhāmaha--it is clearly and elaborately described only by Bharata in connection with drama and the theater. For in this context, a *rasa* is the very end-product that dramatists wish to produce in the audience by means of poetic language, the theatrical accoutrements of

¹⁸⁰ Daṇḍin, *KA* 2.363-6, p. 84. See p. 108 above, and n. 175.

¹⁸¹ Bhāmaha, *KA* 3.53-4, p. 71.

¹⁸² See also D. K. Gupta, "Concept of Bhāvika in Sanskrit Poetics," *ABORI* : 54-60, and V. Raghavan, "The History of Bhāvika in Sanskrit Poetics," *JHQ* 14, (1938): 787-798.

costumes and music, the actors' acting, singing, dancing, and so on. For early literary critics, concerned chiefly or solely with poetry, consider the *rasa* s as emotions that are required only in larger works.

The progress in Indian aesthetics from Daṇḍin and Bhāmaha to Ānandavardhana is great, but the latter's achievement must be seen to follow from earlier concepts in general and his predecessors in Kashmir in particular. Udbhaṭa and Vāmana, who are known to be attached to the court of Jayāpīḍa,¹⁸³ appear to represent the 'schools' of Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin respectively.

Vāmana, the first to speak of the soul of poetry, describes the body as word and meanings together, refined by qualities and ornaments.¹⁸⁴ *Rīti*, the three-fold style --*vaidarbhi*, *gauḍīyā* and *pāñcālī*-- is the soul because it is that which gives a poem its distinctive quality or character.¹⁸⁵ This distinctiveness is the substance of qualities *guṇa* s,¹⁸⁶ which are strength, clarity, and so on.¹⁸⁷ Ornaments are causes of superexcellence of poetry.¹⁸⁸ Relations between the body and ornaments are metaphorically described in this verse:

A poem, indeed, is sweet (*svadate*) like the form of a young woman,
exceedingly purified even by qualities,

¹⁸³ See n. 151 above.

¹⁸⁴ Vāmana, *KA* 3.1.2 (See ns. 40,41 below), and 1.1.1 *vṛtti*, p. 1. " *kāvyaṃ khalu grāhyam... śabdārathayor vartate.* "

¹⁸⁵ Vāmana, *KA* 1.2.6-9 and *vṛtti*, p. 6.

¹⁸⁶ Vāmana, *KA* 3.1.1, p. 25.

¹⁸⁷ Vāmana, *KA* 3.1-4., p. 26. See a listing of the *guṇa* s in De, *HSP*, vol. 2, pp. 80, 94-95, and pp. 75-107 on "Daṇḍin and Vāmana."

¹⁸⁸ Vāmana, *KA* 3.1.2, p. 25.

in which pleasure is created by dense creations of artifices that are true ornaments.

But if it happens that, like the body that fails in vigor because of its qualities, a woman is bereft of youth,
Even those ornaments people love surely rest on unwholesomeness.¹⁸⁹

Structurally conceived, the body and soul are considered together apart from the character and ornamentation. The body is simply the word-and-meaning of poetry, and the soul is its distinctive arrangement according to established regional styles. Qualities and ornaments are imposed on the body, and the verse above tells us that the body must first have a wholesome and youthful character; otherwise, ornaments, far from adorning it, would lose their own beauty, like ornaments on an old woman.

We recall Ānandavardhana's important metaphor comparing the body and soul of a beautiful woman to those of poetry in *Dhā* 1.4:

**The substance (*vastu*) is something else still which is felt in the poems of great poets,
that which appears different from the well-known parts, like charm in beautiful women.**

Still something else, being perceived from the literal meaning, is the substance in the poems of great poets. Well-known to the sensitive audience, it is that which shines out apart from obvious, ornamented or

¹⁸⁹ Vāmana, *KĀ* 3.1.2, p. 25.

yuvater iva rūpam adga kāvyam svadate suddhaguṇam tad apy

alūva

vihita-praṇayam niraṇtarābhīḥ sadalamkāravikalpakakalpanābhīḥ.

yadī bhavati vacas cyutam guṇebhyo vapur iva yauvanavandhyam

śhṛṅganāyāḥ

api janadevīṭāni durbhagatvam nityatam alamkāraṇāni samśrayante.

perceived, limbs, like charm in beautiful women. For just as in women, charm is other than each and every part being individually described but rather something else, another essence which is nectar in the eyes of the sensitive audience, just so is this [suggested] meaning.¹⁹⁰

For Vāmana, the soul and body are an indistinguishable entity, and character and ornaments are extrinsic. Ānanda uses the same imagery in quite an opposite way: the soul is likened to the charm of a beautiful woman shining out as nectar to the eyes of a *sahṛdaya* above the beauty of her limbs. Although the parts are each well known and well described separately, the whole is felt to be something altogether beyond them. This soul is the suggested meaning, other than the literal meaning which is the well-known and adorned parts of the body.

Udbhaṭa's contributions to the theory of *rasadhvani* and the soul of poetry are many, in spite of the paucity of his extant works and the unreliability of their commentaries. Gnoli credits him with the introduction of a third potency of poetic language, the *vyañjanāvṛtti*.¹⁹¹ Ingalls describes

¹⁹⁰ Ānandavardhana, *Dhvanyāloka*, with the *Locana* commentary of Abhinavagupta and the *Prakāśa* Hindi translation of both texts by Jagannath Paṭhak, Vidyābhavan Sanskrit Granthamala (VSS) 97 (Benares Chowkhamba Vidyabhawan, 1965), 1.4, p. 47.

¹⁹¹ Raniero Gnoli, *Udbhaṭa's Commentary on the Kāvyaśālikā of Bhāmaha*. Serie Orientale Roma, vol. 27 (Roma: Istituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente, 1962), "Udbhaṭa by introducing into poetry the secondary function of words... let open the door to the conception of a third potency of language--the *vyañjanāvṛtti*--, different both from the primary and the transferred sense of words, which characterises true poetry." (p. xxiii-iv). "The source of poetry must be then another sense or value that words assume, altogether different from the primary and the secondary one. This new sense--the poetical sense--irreducible, as it is, to the literary one, cannot however do without it, but is, as it were, supported by it. A truly poetical word or expression is that which

Udbhaṭa's influence on the *Dhvanyāloka* as his awareness of explicit and implicit meanings, as those which are conveyed *śrutyā* and *arthena* respectively. Thus, according to Ingalls, Indurāja's concluding remark that Udbhaṭa has nothing to say on *dhvani* because Udbhaṭa has included that in his treatment of the figures of speech, is justified because

Udbhaṭa was fully aware of that type of semantic operation that Ānanda was later to call suggestiveness (*vyañjakatva*, *dhvani*) and of the importance to poetry of the suggestions which it could bring about. One might fairly say that in Udbhaṭa's mind the two main building blocks of Ānanda's critique, *rasa* and *dhvani*, were present, the first consciously, the second perhaps only subconsciously. But the blocks had not yet been built into a system.¹⁹²

Udbhaṭa's *Kāvyaśāstrakārasārasaṃgraha* displays more than a casual acquaintance with Bharata's definitions of and relations between the *bhāva*s and *rasa*s.¹⁹³ To Ingalls' remark that Udbhaṭa's treatment of the figures *preyasvī*, *urjasvī*, *rasavatī*, etc., makes some sensible order out of them, it

cannot be replaced by other words without losing its value. Poetry knows no synonyms. The father of this new conception, Ānandavardhana, was fully aware of his indebtedness to Udbhaṭa." (p. xxv-vi.)

¹⁹² Daniel H. H. Ingalls, Jeffrey Moussaieff Masson, and M. V. Patwardhan, trs., *The Dhvanyāloka of Ānandavardhana with the Locana of Abhinavagupta* (*Dhā*, Ingalls et. al., tr.), edited with introduction by Daniel H. H. Ingalls, Harvard Oriental Series 49. (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press), 1990, introduction, p. 9.

¹⁹³ Udbhaṭa, *Kāvyaśāstrakārasārasaṃgraha of Udbhaṭa* (*KASS*, Banhatti, ed.), with the *Laghuvṛtti* Commentary of Indurāja, edited, introduced and annotated by Narayana Daso Banhatti, (Bombay Sanskrit and Prakrit Series 79. Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1925), 4.1-7, pp. 40-53. See also, Udbhaṭa, *Kāvyaśāstrakārasārasaṃgraha of Udbhaṭa* (*KASS*), with the ' *Vivṛti*.' Critically edited with introduction and indexes by K.S. Ramaswami Sastri Siromani. Gaekwad Oriental Series 55 (Baroda: Oriental Instituted), 1931, 4.1-7, pp. 32-34.

may be added that perhaps these very verses which intimate the suggestions of *rasa* first provoked Ānanda's thoughts to the theory of *rasadhvani*. Finally, if the commentators, Pratīhārendurāja and Tilaka, are faithful to the true teachings of the text, Udbhaṭa can be credited with the idea that *rasa* is the soul of poetry,¹⁹⁴ and that *rasa* is suggested or

¹⁹⁴ Udbhaṭa, *KASS* with the *laghuvṛtti*, 6.7 (74), Banhatti, ed., p. 81-84. In this verse Pratīhārendurāja seems to have combined Vāmana's idea of the soul of poetry with the notion that poetry is *sarasa*, and expounds at great length to this effect, "ucyate. na khalu kāvyasya rasānām cālaṃkāryālaṃkārabhāvaḥ kiṃ tv ātmasarīrabhāvaḥ. rasāḥ hi kāvyasyātmātenāvasthitāḥ sabdārthau ca sarīrarūpatayā yathā hy ātmādhīṣṭhitam sarīram jīvātū vyapadyate tathā rasādhīṣṭhitasya kāvyasya jīvarūpatayā vyapadesaḥ kriyate tasmād rasānām kāvyasarīrabhūtasabdārtha-viśayatayātmātenāvasthānam na tv alaṃkāratayā " (p. 63) But the commentator explicates the meaning of the verse without saying the comments are indeed Udbhaṭa's intended ideas on the matter. Banhatti, the editor, and De do not think the comment highly representative of the text, but Pratīhārendurāja seems to be in an era which the literary circles have accepted '*rasa ātmā kāvyasya*' but not *dhvani*. The former proposition, whose terms are already well known in poetics and dramaturgy and are readily associable, is much easier to accept than *dhvani*, which is brought in from the grammarians' point of view and describes an entity that no one up to then has thought to exist in poetic language. Pratīhārendurāja's commentary cited above substantiates my point that the conceptions of 'soul' and 'body' are structural and not neutral categories. Pratīhārendurāja does not accept Ānanda's theory of *dhvani* since it is seen that the former tries to show that a figure of speech rather than a meaning is suggested, i.e., revealed (*vyaśyate*), and, therefore, suggestion is not a function of language but a figure of speech. He seems to follow the basic divisions of body, quality, and ornament of poetry as prescribed by Vāmana, and ends by saying, "evam etad vyaśjakatvaṃ paryāyoktādiśvādiśv antarbhāvitam. " "Thus this suggestiveness is included in the figures of speech, *paryāyokta*, and so on." (p. 92) His arguments against *dhvani* can be found in *Laghuvṛtti* 6.9, p. 85ff (Banhatti, ed.) Banhatti also notes on that, "His principal object in the foregoing discussion was to prove that *vyaśjakatva* is completely included in the alaṃkāras. He seems to have a great aversion to the theory that *dhvani* is quite separate and can never be included in alaṃkāras. Further he seems also to have an abhorrence even for the word *dhvani*.... " (p. 175)

revealed, *vyāṅgya*.¹⁹⁵ His thought, obscured by time, is obfuscated rather than elucidated by the commentaries. Both Pratīhārendurāja and Tilaka, if indeed they are the authors of these commentaries, seem to have little direct knowledge of and traditional connection with the author, and their comments appear to be a conglomeration of several ideas that originated between the late 10th and 11th centuries. The commentaries, whose explications include those meanings that arose subsequent to Udbhaṭa, and are valuable for understanding, if not the author of the text, the evolution of poetics during the next few centuries. Yet it is more than tempting to see in Pratīhārendurāja's and Tilaka's commentaries on Udbhaṭa's *bhāvikā* the pronouncement of a relation between the poet and the reader that culminates in Ānandavardhana's *sahṛdayatvam*. A verse of Udbhaṭa's (*KASS* 6.6) fairly recapitulates Bhāmaha's (*KA* 3.53), to which Pratīhārendurāja comments:

This has been said: "Through a coherence of utterances, [there are] extreme marvels." In this case, a coherence of utterances causes an instantaneous perception of the meaning because a composition of words are well-known to people and are devoid of incoherence (*vyastasaṃbandha*). For, when there is [coherence], the feeling (*bhāva*) that is linked to the poet--his heart (*āśaya*)--devises particular

¹⁹⁵ Udbhaṭa, *KASS* 4.2, Siromani ed., GOS 55, p. 32. The verse: "ratyādīkānām bhāvānām anubhāvādisūcanē/ yat kāvyam badhyate sadbhis tatpreyasvad udāhṛtam." Tilaka's commentary interprets 'sūcanē' to mean *vyaktāu*: "sīhāyibhāvatvāt rates tu vyabhicāribhīr api sūcanē vyaktāu yat kāvyabandhanam (tat) preyasvat. ratyā priyatarayā upalakṣitam bhāvabr̥ndam atrāstīti. ata eva vyāṅgyā rasabhāvatadābhāsa-tatprasamāḥ kāvyatattvavidbhir abhidhīyate." Tilaka's commentary is not a reliable report of Udbhaṭa's text because Tilaka seems to have incorporated some ideas of Abhinavagupta and Bhaṭṭanāyaka, such as the phrases "vāgneḥ sītanivṛtīr anumīyate iti kārāṇasyāpi kvacit gamaktvāt vibhāvair bhavaty eva sūcanam" and "api tu sādharanyena pratīpanno rasānāvvyāpāragocarah."

meanings that are means to the four aims of humans and are possessed of the *rasa* of love and so on. This [design] is made immediately perceptible to the sympathetic hearers as if [they were] the poet, as an image reflected by various poems because [the poet's feeling] is not different from [the hearers'] own design. In this situation, the counter impression (*pratimudrā*) of the sympathetic hearers' own design goes along, because their innerself is caused to melt by experiencing clear words of this sort. Thus, the design of the poet, consisting of present and past things he has experienced, is perceived as if right before the eyes by the sympathetic hearer to be the same as his own design.... So, therefore, *bhāvika* should be seen to consist in the meeting of the two designs of the poet and the hearer on the basis of this kind of cause. And for this very reason, a *bhāva*, linked with the poet [and] ending in an identity, etc., with the hearer's *bhāva* is termed *bhāvika*, because it exists in a form that is vibrant before [one's eyes].¹⁹⁶

Tilaka's commentary alludes to a similar poet-reader relation but denies that the reader, under the effect of this figure of speech, is a *sahṛdaya*:

Events (*bhāva*), even in violation of destructive and prior absences [i.e.

¹⁹⁶ Udbhata, *KASS* 6.6 (73), Banhatti ed., p. 79-80. "tad uktam vācām anākulyeneti atyadbhūtā ity ca. tatra vācām anākulata vyastasambandharahita-lokaprasiddhasabdopanibandhāt jhagity arthapratīlikāritā. tasyām hi satyām kaveḥ sambandhī yo bhāva āsayah sṛṅgārādirasasamvalīlacaturvargopāyabhūtaviśiṣṭārtho-llēkhī sa kavineva saḥṛdayaḥ srotṛbhīḥ svābhīprāyābhedena tat tat kāvya pratibimbīta-rūpatayā sākṣātkriyate. srotṛnām api hi tat tadvīdhasvacchasabdānubhavadrāvītāntar-āṣṭmanā saḥṛdayānām svābhīprāyāpratimudrā tatra samkrāmati. ataḥ kaver yo 'sau abhīprāyas tadgocarīkṛtā bhūtā bhāvīno 'pi padārthās tatra saḥṛdayaḥ srotṛbhīḥ svābhīprāyābhedena pratyakṣā iva dṛśyante...tad evam evam vīdha hetunibandhanam kavīsrotṛbhāvadvītayasaṃmīlanātmakam bhāvikam draṣṭavyam. ata eva cātra kavīsambandhīno bhāvasya srotṛbhāvābhedādyavasītasya puraḥsphura drūpasya vīdyamānatvād bhāvikavyapadesah...." Compare Bhāmaha's *KA* 3.53, "bhāvikatvam itī prāhuḥ prabandhaviśayam guṇam/ pratyakṣā iva dṛśyante yatrārthā bhūtābhāvinah," with Udbhata's *KASS* 6.6, "pratyakṣā iva yatrārthā dṛśyante bhūtābhāvinah/ atyadbhūtāḥ syāt tad vācām anākulyena bhāvikam."

events in the past and future], when by their own importance and the power of the clarity of Speech, are composed so to appear as a flashing series, that will be *bhāvika*. The heart (*āsaya*) of the speaker is in the hearer in this situation.... In the explanation that it is the ability to enter into the [sympathetic] heart, it will be a figure of speech, such as *rasavat* and so on.¹⁹⁷

These passages from Udbhata's verses, and their commentaries, indicate that the role of *rasa* has already begun to be considered and examined in the light of dramaturgical theory and its constituent elements, rather than simply as a figure of speech, *rasavadalamkāra*, that possesses or furthers an emotion. The relation of 'soul' and 'body' of poetry has been established by Vāmana. Ānanda's structural rearrangement pivots on changing *rasavat* as a figure of speech to *rasa*, the *aṅgin* and *ātman* which cannot be directly denoted, only suggested and revealed. In the province of language analysis, the soul is more than the sum of its parts; it is illuminated by a cognition of its parts.

As a poet and critic, Ānanda's principal interest is directed to the nature of poetic words and their conveyance of meanings. In contradistinction to a suggested (*vyāṅgya*) poetry stands the opposite extreme of *citrakāvya* a painting-poetry in which poetic devices and their niceties are the sole source of aesthetic pleasure.¹⁹⁸ In between are poems whose suggested meanings

¹⁹⁷ Tilaka's commentary to Udbhata, *KASS* 6.12, GOS 55, p. 51. " *pradhvams-
ābhāvaprāgabhāvākṛāntā api bhāvāḥ svamahimnā vacaḥprasādasāc ca yat
sphurattantava iva dṛśyamānā badhyante tadbhāvikam. vaktur āsayah srotary
'aurāsūti...[sa]hrdayapravesakṣamatvam iti vyākhyāyām rasavadādyalamkāratāpatih.* "

¹⁹⁸ In his insistence that a 'portrait' poetry is not poetry, Ānanda may have directly opposed Vāmana's notion of beauty, Vāmana being an enthusiastic appreciator of the *rīti* as the soul of poetry in the same way that the lines of drawing are of a

are subordinated (*guṇibhūtavyaṅgya*), but the best and true poetry, says Ānanda, is that whose principal aim and success lie in conveying an emotion, one of the nine types. Ānanda's critical analysis hinges on the nature of language and *dhvani* almost to the exclusion of other possible kinds of poetic beauty.¹⁹⁹ Abhinava's task remains to construct a logical and psychological substantiation for Ānanda's basic theory.²⁰⁰

Suggestion and its mode of communication

To examine Ānandavardhana's structure of argumentation, we find that he introduces *dhvani* in the first *uddṛyōta* by way of its detractors. Thus, Ānanda begins with the opponents' misconceptions and explains what a *dhvani* is not--a *lakṣaṇā*, *bhakti*, *guṇavṛtti*, *tālparya*, nor is it included among earlier enumerations of figures of speech. Having stated its definition in *Dhā* 1.4-5, he devotes *uddṛyōta* s 2 and 3 to demonstrating what it is by examples. In 3.33 he returns again to arguments of what it is not--an inference or an inferred knowledge of the speaker's intention.²⁰¹

picture. For discussion of Vāmana and *cīrakāvya* see: D. N. Shukla, "Dhvanyabhāva-vādins and the Dhvanivādins," in *Principles of Literary Criticism in Sanskrit*, R.C. Dwivedi, ed. (Delhi: Motilal Bnarsidass, 1969) pp. 79ff.

¹⁹⁹ Jeffrey M. Masson, *Theory of Suggestion in Sanskrit Poetics, (TSSP)* Ph. D Thesis. Cambridge, MA: 1971, p. 22. "It is not only that one must not directly name the emotion the poet seeks to create, but the poet must also not give away his intention through too direct use of words in general."

²⁰⁰ Masson, *TSSP*, p. 107 ff. Masson observes that Ānanda has provided no theory--definition, and philosophical explanation--of *rasa*, which becomes the focal point of a large part of Abhinava's theories on literature. Masson thinks Ānanda's intention is turned toward establishing *rasadhvani*, his audience being the older *ālaṃkārikas* and their followers, namely those who analyse poetry mechanically and conceive of poetry, after Daṇḍin and Bhāmana, as a body.

²⁰¹ See Ingalls et al, 3.330, p. 587.

Ānanda's concern is to provide not a logical proof, but rather an argument that *rasadhvani* exists because it has existed since the beginning of poetry, been known and taught traditionally,²⁰² and continues to exist so long as it is perceived and produced. That his language theory is based on the grammarians and particularly on Bhartṛhari is known from *Dhā* 1.13:

When [*kārikā* 1.13] says 'Which the wise call *dhvani*,' this means that the term was invented by men of knowledge and that it has not been put into use inadvisedly. The preeminent men of knowledge are the grammarians, for all the sciences rest upon grammar; and they gave the name *dhvani* to the sounds of speech that are heard. In the same manner other wise men, who knew the true essence of poetry, have followed the example of the grammarians by giving the title *dhvani* to that verbal entity which contains a mixture of denotative and denoted elements and which is designated as 'a poem.' They did so because of the similarity [to acoustical *dhvani*] in its being a manifestor [of suggested meanings just as the heard sounds manifest words].²⁰³

Again in *Dhā* 3.33, Ānanda says:

As for those scholars who have exactly determined the nature of brahma as it appears in speech [sc. the Grammarians], we adopted the term *dhvani* from their philosophy, so the question whether or not we are in conflict with them does not arise.²⁰⁴

By this last statement one is reminded immediately of *Vākyapadīya* 1.1, stating that the one and indivisible Brahman from whom the world proceeds is *Sabdatattva* because that Brahman is the substance of all modifications

²⁰² *Dhā* 1.2.

²⁰³ Ingalls et al, tr., 1.131, p. 169.

²⁰⁴ Ingalls et al, tr., 3.33m, p. 582.

which are apprehended by words and penetrated by words. All divisions of duration, creation, and cessation are shaped by the Word. The *vr̥tti* goes on to say:

And from being the cause of the alphabet (*akṣara*), it is called *akṣara* . The revelation of that [Brahma] who is entered within an individual consciousness flows forth for the sake of causing others to know [i.e., communicating with others]. Thus, indeed, he says,

"Subtle Speech (*vācam*), whose essence is undivided from the meaning, not flowing forth, is one (*anabhiśyandamānām*); others, indeed, know it to be otherwise--many in form and abiding in the soul."²⁰⁵

According to Bhartṛhari, *dhvani* is a subtle component of acoustic language, as opposed to the ideal and psychic aspects of language. *Dhvani*, a subtle vibration reveals the *spṛṣṭa*, the ideal meaning-bearing symbol.²⁰⁶

²⁰⁵ VP 1.1 *vr̥tti*, DCMS 32, p. 7. " *taś cākṣaraṇīmītatvād akṣaram ity ucyate. pratyakṣātanye 'ntaḥsaṃniveśitasya parasambodhanārthā vyaktir abhiśyandate. evaṃ hy āha sūkṣmām arthenāpravibhaktatativām ekām vācam anabhiśyandamānām. utānye vidur anyām iva ca enām nānārūpām ātmani sannivīṣṭām.*

The *padddhati* of Vṛṣabhadeva sums up, " *etad uktam bhavati. pratipuruṣaṃ sarve varṇā buddhau kramasamhāreṇa bhedaūrodhānena vāvatīṣṭhante, na tu tena rūpeṇa parasambhodo bhavatiū buddhis tāvat prāṇe 'rpayati, te prāṇavṛtīyanugrhitāḥ sthānakaraṇebhyo vyaktiāḥ parasambodhāya syandante sravanūti yāvat. pūrvam rūpādīṣu sūkṣmasabdānugamena brahmaṇī sabdatativābhīdhānam. iha tu sthūlavarnākāratvenākṣaravyapadesa itī viśeṣaḥ.*"

²⁰⁶ On *spṛṣṭa* see John Brough, "Theories of General Linguistics in the Sanskrit Grammarians (1951), in *A Reader on the Sanskrit Grammarians*, J. F. Staal, ed., (2nd ed. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1985, 1st ed. 1972) pp. 402-414. See also the same author's discussion of Ānandavardhana's use of *dhvani* with reference to Bhartṛhari in "Some Indian Theories of Meaning," in the same volume; K. Kunjunni Raja, *Indian theories of meaning*, pp. 109-119; and K. A. Subramania Iyer, *Bhartṛhari: A Study of the Vākya-pādiya in the Light of the Ancient Commentaries*, Building Centenary and Silver

The vibration is effected through a desire to express (*vivakṣā*) which occurs in the mind (*buddhi*) of the speaker, moving the air to rise up in the chest and strike against places of utterance in the mouth and throat. This subtle vibration in turn is embodied and enlarged by [a body of] air (*nāda*) which reaches the hearer.²⁰⁷

Jubilee Series 68, (Poona: Deccan College Postgraduate and Research Institute 1969) pp.147-180.

²⁰⁷ On *vivakṣā* see VP 1.13, DCMS 32, p. 44, " *arthasya pravṛtītattvam vivakṣā, na tu vasturūpatayā sattvam asattvam vā. vivakṣā hi yogyasabdanibandhanā. yogyam hi sabdam prayoktā vivakṣāprāpitāsamnidhāneṣv abhidheyeṣu pratyartham upādatte. tad yathopalipsamānaḥ prativīṣayam yogyam evendriyam upalabdham prapīdhatte.*" Verses 41-117 describe the manner in which the subtle word *spṛṣṭa*, which in itself is partless and sequenceless is transformed into physical words which are heard, by means of *dhvani*, the subtle vibration, and *nāda*, a body of air which enforms the vibration and reveals it. Bhartṛhari uses the metaphor of light to describe a word which illuminates itself and its meaning (1.44, 58-60). The hearer must first cognize what the word is through sounds heard, and subsequently grasps the meaning: 1.44 " *dvāṁ upādānaśabdeṣu śabdau śabdavidō viduḥ/ eko nimittam śabdānām aparō rthe prayujyate*". The imagery of light occurs in 1.46-48 *aragīṣṭha yathā jyotiḥ prakāśāntarakāraṇam/ tad vac chabdo 'pi buddhiṣṭhaḥ śrutiṇām kāraṇam pṛthak. 1.47 vitarkitāḥ purā buddhyā kvacid arthe nivesitāḥ/ karāṇebhyo vivṛttena dhvaninā so 'nugrhyate. 1.48 nādasya kramajanyatvān na pūrvo na paraś ca saḥ/ akramāḥ kramarūpeṇa bhedaṁ iva jāyate.*" Clearly, in these verses the grammarian shows that since communication (conveyance of meaning, *arthasya pravṛtītattvam vivakṣā*) consists in the speaker's employing a word appropriate to his intention (desire to express, *vivakṣā*), the imagery of light applies in as much as the word which is an idea in the mind of the speaker is the cause of sounds heard (*śruti*), just as the light in a fire-stick is the cause of other lights. This word, whose meaning is intended to be expressed, thought out first in the mind caused at sometime to be entered into a meaning, is assisted (favored, *anugrhyate*) by *dhvani* which evolves upon the places of utterance; and the word which is in itself not sequential becomes differentiated because *nāda*, the air which manifests it, is produced in a sequence. Communication by means of language requires an objective ideality of a word possessing an eternal relation with its meaning, and the subjective aspect, namely, the meaning in the mind of the speaker is desired to be put across. This subjective aspect is postulated through a connection

The meaning, says Bhartṛhari, is a unified and indivisible whole, and it is the *vākyārtha*, a sentence-meaning. This is to say that although language understanding necessitates ideal parts which are phonemes, words, and so on, in the mind, what we understand through language is not merely a designation by reference to a bare thing as "that," (*tyad*).²⁰⁸ A sentence-meaning even if expressed by a single word orients understanding in respect of time and place, provided with a subject and action. If we hear and understand one word, "tree," even there, the notion includes an elliptical verb 'to be' meaning that "there is a tree."

between the mind and breath: the speaker impels the air through his chest cavity, and it then strikes upon places of utterance, producing *dhvani* of the *śabda* in his mind. The relation between a *dhvani* and a *śabda* is expressed in 1.106, "*anavasthitakampe 'pi karane dhvanayo 'pi te/ sphoṭād evopajāyante jvālā jvālāntarād iva*." Even when the vocal action ceases to vibrate, the *dhvani*s are still produced from a *sphoṭa*, like a flame from another flame. Bhartṛhari sums up the relation between the ideal word, the light which illuminates itself and the meaning, in 1.113-7. In transition to his exposition of the subjective language, he begins with verse 1.118 "The efficiency residing in words is the binder (basis) of the world; with that [efficiency] as its eyes, intuition itself is perceived in different appearances." Bhartṛhari compares the process of conveying the idea in the mind of the speaker to a three-fold process of painting in 1.52: "*yathaikabuddhiviśayā mūrtir ākriyate pale/ mūrtiyantarasya tritayam evaṃ śabde 'pi drśyate*." Just as a person who is to be painted is first perceived with all his limbs, is composed in mind as one idea, and is then drawn out again with parts on a piece of cloth; just so, words that are heard become a single idea, and when the idea is made into *dhvani* through utterance, the words again become sequential. The *paddhati* explains that this process is a chain extending between the speaker and hearer in a relation of perceived and causing to be perceived, "*āvantamānab* iti *śrotṛvaktṛparamparayā grāhya itī grāhyatvam svarūpaparakāśnād, arthaparakāśanād grāhakatvam*."

208 VP 1.13 *vṛtti*, DCMS 32, p. 45 "*aparo 'rthab. kevalam vastu tyadādīnām vastuopalakṣaṇām viśayamātram. tasyapravṛtītatvam saṃsargaḥ. saṃsrṣṭo hi kriyāsu guṇabhāvena pradhānabhāvena copādīyate*."

Language is embedded in consciousness (*antaḥsamnivesitaḥ*), which is to say that language as an entity somehow "entered" into consciousness is *śabdatattva*. The use of language, the exercise of vocal organs and a natural ability to understand meanings, etc., is innate.²⁰⁹ Bhartṛhari supports the notion of the intrinsicity of language by *āgama*: it is through beginningless and endless transmission of revealed words and subsidiary branches of learning that the world subsisting on knowledge knows of its origin. Knowledge in its earliest form is attributed to the seers who directly see reality. They see Brahman and, not being able to express this Unity, they tell of Brahman through the form of diversity, which is its *anukāra*, imitation; this form is subjective language (*vāc*).²¹⁰ The *vṛtti* of a later verse in the *VP* quotes Ṛg Vedic verses: "the bull with which one desires union, roars. The great god enters into mortals."²¹¹ In the same way, *Śabdatattva* enters into and assumes the nature of human consciousness.

Thus, language as the fabric of communication possesses a structure which is both objective and subjective. From the perspective of subjective language, the use of language, as a linguistic entity, proceeds from the desire to express. A desire to express occurs on the mundane level of human communication, and underlies meaningfulness of a denotation. Iyer writes,

²⁰⁹ *VP* 1.122, DCMS 32, p. 187-9. " *tathā hy anupadesasādhyāḥ pratibhāgamyāḥ eva karṇavinyāsādayaḥ. ko hy etān puruṣadharmān anyatra śabdātmikāyāḥ kartum pratipādayitum vā samartha itī.* " "For it is as follows: the projections of vocal action and so on are unlearned and are to be understood through intuition. For who can teach or establish these human qualities beside a disposition for language (*śabdabhāvanā*) which is of the nature of the Word."

²¹⁰ See ch. 2 of this dissertation and ns. 31, 33.

²¹¹ *VP* 1.38, DCMS 32, pp. 199-201.

The word has the power to convey the meaning, the power called *abhidhā*, but this power will work only when the speaker intends to apply it in a particular case. (*VP* 2.399) The actual application of the word by the speaker for conveying one of its meanings must be distinguished from his intention to do so. Thus, there are three things: (1) the power of the word to convey one or more meanings, which is natural and eternal (*abhidhā*) (2) the intention of the speaker to apply the word for conveying one of its meanings (*abhisamdhāna*) (3) the actual application (*ukti, viniyoga*).... Of the three things, the power of the word to convey its meaning is eternal. In actual speech, however, one begins with something which is in the speaker's mind, his desire or intention to say something particular. This is referred to by the word *abhisamdhāna* by Bhartṛhari. While explaining it, Puṇyarāja uses the word *pratibhā*. In this context, both mean the same thing. As the natural power of the word, namely, *abhidhā*, works only when the speaker intends that it should do so, the intention (*abhisamdhāna, pratibhā*) and the *abhidhā* are sometimes identified.²¹²

In regard to suggestion (*dhvani*) as a function of language, Ānanda avers that he does not disagree with any existing notions, except that suggestion, *dhvani*, is not any of those things proposed by other schools as the poetic meaning. It is something that has been known and passed down traditionally but not formally defined.²¹³ Suggestion is a meaning which is perceived when the literal meaning has been perceived. In contradistinction to the claims of other theories of poetic meanings, it is not secondary or associated. Perceived on the basis of the literal meaning, it is primary and independent from the latter. It is not inferred, which is to say that it does not convey the intention but rather the object of the speaker's intention.²¹⁴

²¹² K. A. Subramania Iyer, "Bhartṛhari on the Primary & Secondary Meanings of Words," in *Indian Linguistics*, vol. 29 (1968): 97-112 (Poona: Deccan College, Linguistics Society of India), p. 101.

²¹³ *Dhā* 1.1., VSS 97, p. 8.

Given that the essence language is a communication of a speaker's desire to express something to the hearer who perceives the meaning, just as the grammarian's *dhvani* illuminates the word and the meaning, so in Ānanda's poetics *dhvani*, the suggestive function inherent in language illuminates the poetic meaning after the literal meaning is perceived. Ordinary language is used to communicate directly what the speaker wants to express. In the language of poetry, what is spoken is not the author's personal direct expression, i.e., he is not causing a knowledge about himself personally. The second meaning is possible because the object of communication, the *vivakṣita* of the poet,²¹⁵ is a *rasa*, which is the soul of poetry and the aim of poetic communication.

It is in this sense that Ānanda says that poetic language does not communicate the poet's *vivakṣā*, i.e., the desire on the part of the poet to directly express something for and about himself personally. But the object desired to be expressed is a *rasa*, which is made the aim of poetic language by means of suggestive function.

A suggested meaning is not inferrable (*anumeya*), nor is it a the

²¹⁴ *Dhā* 3.33, see Ingalls et al, trs., pp. 582-594. "Therefore, to sum up: words operate like inferential marks only when the suggested element is in the form of the speaker's intention; but when the suggested element is turned into object of the speaker's intention, they operate as things to be communicated." (p. 588)

²¹⁵ Ibid. "But the suggestiveness that comes from the revealing an intention on the part of the speaker is common to all human sentences without distinction. It is not apart from the denotative power, for that which is suggested in this case is inseparably present with it. This, however, is not true of a suggestion which the speaker wishes to convey (*vivakṣita*). It is where what is suggested stands as intended to be conveyed that the suggestiveness [of the sentence] can prompt us to call it *dhvani* (suggestive poetry). (p. 582) See also n. 1, p. 583.

speaker's intention (*tālparya*). Ānanda resorts to explaining that the relation of a suggested meaning to a word is an *upādhi*-- its adventitious character depends precisely on the understander, the *sahṛdaya* or sympathetic reader in whom such a meaning is evoked by poetic language.

The suggested meaning is illuminated by the literal meaning, as a pot by a lamp and stands in a *prakāśyaparakāśana* relation to the literal meaning.

Dhā 3.33 gives a rather roundabout explanation of the adventitious, *aupādhika*: since the relation of a word and its meaning is eternal, in order to distinguish the falsity of human sentences from the truth of Vedic sentences, one must posit an adventitious character of the deviations in human sentences. If poetic suggestiveness which illuminates the speaker's intention is adventitious, it would then result that all personal statements are suggestive. Ānanda says this is true, except that in ordinary communication a suggested meaning is inherent in the literal meaning, but not as what is desired to be expressed. An utterance whose object is revealed as what is desired to be expressed is the suggestiveness that instigates the operation of *dhvani*. This adventitious character of a suggested meaning depends on a subjective and contextual interpretation: the moon which is cool to all other people causes pains to those who are desolate in love. Or again, what is desired to be expressed may be something quite different from the literal meaning which is the *vivakṣā* or the speaker's intention (*vaktrabhiprāya*).²¹⁶ For example, when the amorous

²¹⁶ *Dhā* 3.33, VSS 97, p. 479-480. "nanu anena nyāyena sarveṣāṃ eva laukikāṇāṃ vākyaṇāṃ dhvanivyāpāraḥ prasaktaḥ. sarveṣāṃ apy anena nyāyena vyañjakatvāt. satyam etat; kiṃ tu vaktrabhiprāyaparakāśanena yad vyañjakatvam tat sarveṣāṃ eva laukikāṇāṃ vākyaṇāṃ avīṣṭam. tat tu vācakatvān na bhidyate vyaṅgyam hi tatra nāntarīyakatayā vyavasthitam. na tu vivakṣitatvena. yasya tu

woman says to the monk, "Wander freely, O gentle monk....," if the desire to express is also the object of the expression, then the literal meaning (*vācya*) coincides with the suggested meaning (*vyāṅgya*); and it is understood that the monk should wander freely. But when the fierce lion is brought into the picture, it is understood that the woman's real desire, which is the object of her expression, is to prohibit the monk from wandering and thus to save her trysting place. The understanding of the prohibition is adventitious because it depends on contextual factors--a woman in love and a monk in fear--which are not known to all and are not inherent in the word-meaning relation itself.

Ānanda differs from the Mīmāṃsaka's theories of language, which provide for secondary and extended meanings through functions of *guṇavṛtti* and *tātparyasakti*, particularly on the point that the suggested meaning is independent of the first, literal meaning. Bhartṛhari's theory of language makes perceptible the difference between linguistic and objective language and the subjective desire to express underlying the use of language. Thus it gives scope to a difference between understanding what a word means, which is a linguistic function, and understanding what the speaker intends to say which is a subjective understanding.

Furthermore, the sentence is a unit of understanding because of an indeterminacy of a word (through homonymy and polysemy, etc.), whose determinate meaning is figured through its relations with other words in the sentence, in the mind of the speaker and the hearer. Associations of a word with other words and contextual nuances characteristic of subjective

vivakṣitaivena vyāṅgyasya sūtrīḥ tadvyāṅjakaivaṃ dhvanivyavahārasya prayojakam."

understanding are the basis of a figurative usage of words and their meanings.²¹⁷ Thus, according to Bhartṛhari, in real communication, one understands not the literal word-meanings but rather the sense conveyed by the whole sentence consisting of words that are mutually determining.²¹⁸ Such explanations of meanings and senses in figurative usages no doubt had a great deal of influence on Ānanda.

Vivakṣā is fundamentally different from *tātparyasakti* of the Mīmāṃsakas. Although the ritualists agree with grammarians that the word-meaning relation is eternal, that a word is defined by its pragmatic use, i.e., what is understood by it, and that language communication presupposes an appropriate mental apparatus, Mīmāṃsakas admit only the material word-sounds (*śabda*) occurring in a sequence, as the cause of understanding.²¹⁹ Therefore, the ritualists can account for figurative usages only as variants of the first meaning, because of the presumption of a *tātparyasakti* inherent in the words.²²⁰ The Prābhākara's theory that the

²¹⁷ VP 2. 250-256, Iyer, tr., VP II, pp.108-112.

²¹⁸ VP 2.310-326, Iyer, tr., VP II, pp. 134-140.

²¹⁹ See *Ślokavārttika*, sūtra 5, section 12 (on *spṛṣṭa*): "123. The Ablative in 'Śabdāt' (in the sentence 'Śabdāt arthapratītiḥ') signifies causal agency. In your theory too, there would be an intervening factor between the cognition of meaning (and the cognition of the Word,--the manifestation of *Spṛṣṭa* being the intervening factor). 124. That is said to be subsidiary, which, being known in one shape, is used in another. And (in the case of the Word) we are not cognisant of any other form of causality (than the one we lay down) 125. The intervention of the operation of the cause itself is common to all causes; and in the case of the Word, it is only this operation of itself (which is found to intervene between the Word and its signification); therefore there is no real intervention at all." Ganganath Jha, tr., *Ślokavārttika*, (Repr. Calcutta: The Asiatic Society, 1985 (1st published 1908)), pp. 279-280.

²²⁰ Abhinava interprets *guṇavṛtti*, a secondary function, through presumption whenever the denotation has a *skhaladgati*, and *lakṣaṇā* as the power to manifest a

word of denotation extends as far as the meaning is taken to task by Abhinava who shows that a multivalent meaning, its nuances coming immediately to mind, cannot be caused sequentially by individual words. Such a meaning does not stop and start again, but rather suggestion is a single field of perception in which several evoked images come to mind at once, without a sequential arrangement. Since a verbal operation occurs at once without pausing, a multivalent meaning cannot be, as the Mīmāṃsakas say, an operation in which the same words give rise to several, literal and figurative, meanings.²²¹

meaning in dependence of the sublation of the primary meaning, etc., as the cooperating cause. The primary meaning is simply the power of conveying a meaning in dependence on convention. Abhinava first concedes that *dhvani* operates after the previous three functions, and then denies that secondary usage exists at all in the type of suggestion based on the power of meaning. The argument here is an interesting one: the difference in cooperating cause results in the difference of power, *śaktibheda*. What kind of power? The examples he gives show that it is the power of the operation of different means of knowledge. The same word, assisted by pervasion, memory, and so on, gives to infer the speaker's intention, but assisted by the senses results in the operation of a determinate perception. Abhinava's theory of knowledge is clearly at work here: the kind of knowledge and perception we gain depends on words and the cooperating causes--which are subjective factors--such as the memory of pervasion in inference and the senses in a *vikalpa*, a determinate perception. It is a short step from here to Abhinava's use of *pratibhā* as the cooperating cause of poetic appreciation, which is a kind of perception. See *Dhāt* 1.4, VSS 97, pp. 58-62.

Cf. *VP* 1.46 *vṛtti*, DCMS 32, pp. 74-75, "*na hi śabdasya kramavatī viramya viramya svārthādiṣu vṛtīḥ sambhavati. sakṛd uccāraṇāt*." "For, it is not possible that a word pause again and again in the sequential conveying of its own meanings. Because [its] utterance is once."

²²¹ In the argument against the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas, whose position comes very close to that of the grammarians in saying that the verbal operation extends as far as the meaning and that this extended meaning arises instantaneously, Abhinava points to a fundamental difference with the grammarians, the *sphoṭavādins*. The Mīmāṃsaka's sense of *jhaṭ īti* comprises a series of understandings that occur so quickly they seem

The foregoing discussion has shown that the ideas of the soul of poetry and of *rasa* as an independent entity (not a figure of speech) have been presaged by Vāmana and Udbhaṭa. Ānanda makes the strategic shift of *rasa* from the position of a *rasavat* figure of speech to that of the soul of poetry: it occupies the position of *aṅgin*, the whole to which the parts, *aṅga*s, are subordinated. In this structure, within the realm of poetic propriety, *aucitya*--which includes appropriateness of the subject matter, believability of actions, and suitability of subsidiary motifs as well as poetic devices--every element of a poem should be created with the aim of producing a *rasa*. This *aṅgāṅgin* relation in poetry between a *rasa* and its subsidiary parts also allows the treatment of the literal along with its figurative and secondary meanings as causes of poetic beauty, subsidiary to the whole and the highest aim, namely, a *rasa*. Suggestion, *dhvani*, is thus primarily divided into the *avivakṣitavācya* and *vivakṣitānyaparavācya* types.²²² In the former, the literal meaning is entirely suppressed or transferred to another meaning. In the latter type, traditional poetic elements are admitted as causes of beauty if they are subordinated to suggesting a *rasa*. Ānanda likens the relation of expressed to suggested meaning to that of a lamp and a pot;²²³ and it follows that since both upon

instantaneous, but the *sphoṭavādins* say that the meaning which is a *sphoṭa* is partless, *avibhaktā*. The metaphysical corollary indicates a parallel between language and cosmology: the relation of the manifold world to Brahman, *Śabdātītva*, is that of *dhvani* in language to *sphoṭa*, which is *avibhaktā*, and a *vākya*. *DhāL* 1.4, VSS 97, pp. 62-67.

²²² According to *Dhā* 3.33i A, Ingalls et al, tr., p. 565, this division is made according to the dependence of suggestion on the literal meaning in *vivakṣitānyaparavācya*, or on secondary usage in *avivakṣitavācya*. "And it was in order to show this double dependence that the very first analysis of *dhvani* was into these two divisions."

being cognized do not disappear, they are distributed as principal and subordinate.²²⁴ Thus, the defining characteristic of poetry is essentially the suggestion of a *rasa*, (*rasadhvani*), and poetry is in the sphere of *rasadhvani* if the poet has *rasa* as his intention, i.e., the ultimately conveyed object of his composition, while striving to convey it by means of suggestive words. With *rasa* as the whole, Ānanda shows that every part of speech,²²⁵ including a preposition (*pra*)²²⁶ and a conjunction (*ca*),²²⁷ can suggest an emotion.

That true poetry is characterised by *rasadhvani* is illustrated by the negative concomitance of *rasa* in *citra* poetry, in *Dhā* 3.41-2. In this instance, the critic is unequivocal about what is real poetry, and why:

That which is different from these, namely poetry which lacks *rasa* or an emotion (*bhāva*) as its final meaning, which lacks the power to reveal any particular suggested meaning, which is composed only by relying on

²²³ *Dhā* 3.33f, Ingalls et al., tr., p 557-8, and below, n. 75,

²²⁴ *Dhā* 3.33g, Ingalls et al., tr., p. 560. "We reply that there is no such fault here, because the two [meanings] are distributed as principal and subordinate. Sometimes the suggested sense is predominant and the expressed sense subordinate. Sometimes the expressed sense is predominant and the suggested sense subordinate. Of these [alternatives], where the suggested sense is predominant we have what is called suggestive poetry (*dhvani*). Where the expressed sense is predominant we have a different type of poetry] that will be described in what follows." Abhinava calls the second type *guṇibhūtavyaṅgya*." (p. 561).

²²⁵ *Dhā* 3.1ff, Ingalls et al., tr., p. 369ff. It may be said that Ānanda includes among "factors which act as suggestors," which Abhinava enumerates as "words, sentences, phonemes, word-components, texture (*saṅghatanā*), and long sections of poetry," and which he says can never be suggested (p. 370), the traditional elements, the "body," in earlier literary criticism.

²²⁶ Ingalls et al., trs., 3.16h, pp 464-465.

²²⁷ Ingalls et al., tr., 3.16f, p. 453.

novelties of literal sense and expression, and which gives the appearance of a picture, is *citra*. It is not real poetry [just as a picture is not the real thing], for it is an imitation of poetry.... But what is this thing called *citra*, where there is no touch of a suggested meaning? For suggested meaning has already been shown to be of three sorts. Now we may let the word *citra* apply to that case where there is no suggestion of a thing (or situation) or of a figure of speech. But where there is no reference to the *rasa*s, etc., there cannot be any type of poetry at all. Because poetry cannot be about nothing; and everything in the world necessarily becomes a constituent of a *rasa* or a *bhāva*, if only by its ultimately being a determinant (*vibhāva*) thereof. This is because the *rasa*s are particular states of mind and there is nothing that does not produce some state of mind. If there were, it would not be in the area of poetry.²²⁸

It is said, in effect, that the substance (*vastu*)²²⁹ of poetry consists in its being productive of some state of mind, and poetry is that which renders everything in the world a constituent of one or another emotion, which is a state of mind. In comparison to an aesthetic communication and appreciation described by Lienhard, Ānanda's explanation of what poetry is and how it should be appreciated is a radical innovation.

Ānanda's conception of unity created by a *rasa* as the *arḍgin* is very clearly shown in *Dhā* 4.5, "While this relation of suggestor and suggested may be various, a poet who possesses *rasa*, and so on, should be attentive to one."²³⁰ And,

²²⁸ Ingalls et al, tr., *Dhā*, p. 636. " *cittavṛttivīśeṣā hi rasādayaḥ, na ca tad asti vastu kiñcid yao na cittavṛttivīśeṣam upajanayati tadutpādane vā kavivīṣayataiva tasya na syāt* "

²²⁹ *vastu* which is the *tattva* See *Dhā* 1.6 and *vṛtti* where Ānanda glosses ' *arthavastu* ' with ' *vastutattva* ' .

²³⁰ *Dhā* 4.5, VSS 97, p. 539. " *vyāḍgyavyāñjakabhāve 'smin vividhe sambhavaty api/ rasādīmaya ekasmin kavīḥ syād avadhānavān* ."

In the *Rāmāyaṇa* the *karuṇarasa* (the flavor of compassion or tragic mood) is prepared by the first of poets himself, where he says that his "grief became verse." He carries out the same *rasa* throughout his composition up to Rāma's final, irreversible separation from Sītā.²³¹

The *Mahābhārata*, with its complicated structure of stories within stories, is astoundingly conceived by Ānanda as a unity bound by its single *rasa* of the peaceful (*sānta*). Daṇḍin's and Bhāmaha's definitions of a *bhāvikā* make it a quality that proceeds from the *bhāva* or *abhiprāya* of the poet. A *bhāvikā* contains a coherence in the arrangement of poetic parts, making them appear vividly as if they were before the eyes. In regard to a compositional coherence being a function of the poet's imagination (in Gerow's sense of the word), Ānanda seems to have the support of tradition for his views concerning the unity of a composition, with the difference that in the place of *bhāva*, there is the poet's *rasa*. And in the place of *bhāvikā* there is the poet's *pratibhā*.

Suggested meaning and the poet's intuition

Ānanda states that the *ślāghyaḥ* meaning, which is the soul and substance of poetry and which is not known by a literal expression, is *dhvani*. This meaning which is to be praised by a sensitive audience as the substance, being soul of the body which is beautiful because of lovely and appropriate configurations, is of two kinds: the literal and the "felt."²³² The

²³¹ Ingalls et al., tr., *Dhā* 4.5, p. 690.

²³² *Dhā* 1.2, *vṛtti*, VSS 97, p. 45. "kāvyasya hi lalitocītasannīvesacārūṇaḥ sarīrasyevātma sārārūpatayā śhītaḥ sahrdayaślāghyo yo 'rīhas tasya vācyah praiyamāṇas ce ti dvau bhedaḥ." I have translated '*praiyamāṇa*' as 'felt' here

latter is the meaning which when perceived leads to a *rasa*. The critic says that still something else is felt (*pratiyamāna*) which is very well known (*suprasiddha*) to the sympathetic audience apart from the well known (*prasiddha*) ornamented limbs. Verses 1.4-6 form a single context:

*pratiyamānam punar anyad eva vastv asti vāṇiṣu mahākavīnām
yat tat prasiddhāvayavātiriktaṁ vibhāti lāvṇyam ivāṅganāsu.*

*kāvyaśyātmā sa evārthas tathā cādikaveḥ purā
krauñcadvandvaviyogotthaḥ śokaḥ ślokatvam āgataḥ.*

*sarasvatī svādu tad arthavastu niḥśyandamānā mahatām kavīnām
alokasāmānyam abhivyanakti parisphurantaṁ pratibhāviśeṣam.*

Ānanda tells us what "something else" there is that the sensitive audience feels. "It is just this meaning that is the soul of poetry. And so it was that, long ago, grief, arising in the first poet from the separation of the pair of curlews, became verse."²³³ And this "meaning substance" (*arthavastu*) flown out from Sarasvatī to the poets reveal [their] extraordinary, vibrant and special *pratibhā*. In these verses it is shown that the real meaning, (i.e., suggestion) which is the soul of poetry, arises in the poet.²³⁴ And it is

because I think that 'felt' carries a stronger flavor of being a real perception of greater aesthetic value than the directly expressed meaning. And because it is the meaning that leads eventually to *rasa*, I use "felt," in order to contrast its emotional potentials with the intellectual nature of literal and implied meanings in ordinary usage.

²³³ Ingalls et al., tr., *Dhā* 1.5, p. 113. The wording of these two verses merits some pondering: the poet's bursting into poetic language is an instance of the soul of poetry. It is not the reverse, i.e., that the sorrow of the poet has been rendered into a verse, and consequently a significant meaning derived from that becomes the soul of poetry.

²³⁴ Ingalls, n. 1, p. 113, "It was this element arising in Vālmīki, whether one regard it with Ānanda as the *bhāva, śoka*, or with Abhinava as the *karuṇarasa*, that produced

Sarasvatī or *bhārati* (*vāc*) who reveals the *alokasāmānyam* *parisphurantam pratibhāviśeṣam* in him.²³⁵ Gerow rightly observes that Indian poetics does not equate creativity with individuality: the poet's greatest gift is a gift from the goddess.

Suggested meanings are understood after the literal meanings have been understood, but they are independent and primary.²³⁶ The literal meaning is discarded in the first category of suggested meaning, *avivakṣitavācya* , and subordinated to another meaning in *vivakṣitānyaparavācya* . The best kind of poetry is that in which the suggested meaning alone is most prominent. Suggested meaning, Ānanda argues, is revealed, *vyajyate*, and it cannot be a *lakṣaṇā* or *bhakti* , or *guṇavṛtti* , since the meanings of these three types of secondary meanings depend on their literal meanings.

Once again we defer to the wisdom of Bhartṛhari in that while the Mīmāṃsaka theory of meaning states that acoustical phonemes, sequentially apprehended and combined in a syntactical combination, directly evoke meanings, Bhartṛhari's theory of meaning posits a *sphoṭa* between word-sounds and their meanings. Words illuminate themselves and their meanings. In this sense, the speaker's intention is inherent in the linguistic symbol (*sphoṭa*) in the minds of the speaker and the hearer. The speaker's intention takes up a word (*śabda*), and the mind, linked with breath through the efficiency distributed in both, moves the breath to produce the

the first poem, for it is *rasa*, etc., that gives life to poetry as the soul gives life to the body. Note that Ānanda's concept of *bhāva* and *rasa* is much simpler than Abhinava's. To Ānanda *rasa* is no more than the sharpening of Vālmīki's emotion of grief."

²³⁵ *Dhā* 1.5-6, KSS 135, pp. 84-93.

²³⁶ See *Dhā* 1.9ff.

dhvani of a word's *sphoṭa*. In apprehension, the phonetic sounds heard are resolved in a combination (*anusamdhāna*) into a partless *vākyārtha* or *vākyasphoṭa* (the sentence-meaning), apprehended as a whole.²³⁷

Language sounds are different from random sounds because they are governed by ideal words in the mind.²³⁸ Between words and meanings, there intervenes a mental synthesis--a combination of word-efficiencies into a single and meaningful whole--from which a sudden flash of understanding arises. This sudden understanding is an intuition, *pratibhā*. It is said in *VP* 2.143 that *pratibhā* is the sentence-meaning (*vākyārtha*), a partless and instantaneous understanding which cannot be repeated even by the perceiver. On the subjective side of language, intuition mediates heterogeneous facets of words and a homogeneous understanding, just as the *sphoṭa* mediates diverse and unified aspects of words on the objective, linguistic side.

This theory stands between the Buddhists' view of language as conventionally instituted and mentally produced, and the realist Naiyāyika and Mīmāṃsaka positions in which language consists of real word-sounds corresponding to real things in the world. In the first position, in literary critical usage, since words are unreal their meanings are also ineffable, and all the more so suggested meaning in poetic language. In the second position, since meanings are directly evoked by word-sounds, there can logically be no other material cause for a suggested meaning. The ritualists furnish *tālparya*, the speaker's intention, as the cause for explaining

²³⁷ See chapter 2 and nn. 206, 207 above.

²³⁸ See for discussion on *sphoṭa* in K. Kunjunni Rāja, *Indian Theories of Meaning*, pp. 116-136.

extended or non-literal meanings such as in the phrases, 'a village on the Ganges,' or 'the boy is a lion.' When a literal sense cannot be made out of such phrases from an *abhidhā śakti*, they say that it must be a product of *tātparyasakti*, the speaker's intention to qualify a village or a boy contextually.

In Bhartṛhari's theory, language as a linguistic entity presupposes an eternal connection between words and meanings. As a subjective entity, making sense out of words and their meanings is a subconscious process that comes to mind as a sudden intuition. Kumārila's objection against *sphoṭavāda* is precisely that the *sphoṭa* and *saṃskāra*s intervene, as subconscious processes, between a cognition of a word and the cognition of its meaning. These processes, says the Mīmāṃsaka, are inherent in the causal activities of words.²³⁹ The *VP* attempts to explain the complexity of verbal understanding: the partless and sequenceless understanding is always intertwined with linguistic possibilities, which is to say that a meaning as an idea is an idea only to the extent that it can be put into words and communicated by means of words. Understanding, which is intuitive, is impalpable; it becomes expressed and embodied by sounds of words. The intuitive works in the hearer and the speaker: it is the sentence-meaning apprehended by the hearer, and the origin of ideas that become the three stages of Speech, *paśyanti*, *madhyam*, and *vaikhari*, in increasing degrees of perceptible manifestation.

The poetic function of *dhvani* does not cancel out its linguistic function, naturally. Here, there is a question whether a suggested meaning stands to a

²³⁹ See above, n. 219.

literal meaning as a literal meaning to a sentence-meaning. Ānanda says no, because the knowledge of the literal meaning, which illuminates the suggested meaning, does not disappear when the latter is known. Both meanings are intended to be understood, but only the suggested meaning is intended significantly.²⁴⁰ The particular property of a *dhvani* which characterizes it as linguistic is that it consists of air vibrations, conveying the *sphoṭa* which signifies a mental content, a desire to communicate something. A poetic *dhvani* does not depart from this character: it carries further the desire to express in a manner proper to poetry something further, which can be a fact, a figure of speech, or a *rasa*.

Ānandavardhana's concept of intuition

The new *rasika* poet is exhorted to cultivate his feelings in observations not of words-and-meanings and their artful arrangements alone but also in such things that are immediate to his feelings; he should recollect the significant *slāghya*, i.e., suggested, meaning, and he should look to the beauty of the world of nature in its glorious variety, in order to enrich the age-old themes of poetry.²⁴¹ *Pratibhā* in this sense is not merely a genius for his craft, for which Ānanda uses the term *śakti* to denote a power which can make a poem effective in spite of spoiling effects of impropriety.²⁴²

²⁴⁰ *Dhā* 3.33f, Ingalls et al., trs., p. 557.

²⁴¹ *Dhā* 4. 7, Ingalls et al., p. 704-708.

²⁴² *Dhā* 3.6.e, Ingalls et al., trs., p. 409. "If you ask how it is that sensitive readers nonetheless find beauty in such instances, our reply is: because the aberration is concealed by the poet's skill (*śakti*).... And so it is that the impropriety of a great poet, such as his well-known writing of the sexual enjoyment of the highest gods, does not appear as vulgarity because it is concealed by his skill."

Neither is it simply imagination and inspiration, but rather it is a combination of intuition that is productive of originality as well as an insight into human nature from which arise emotional conditions now brought within the legitimate province of poetry. By a poet's *pratibhā* there is freshness and originality because the poet evokes a special kind of perception of words that suggest something real.

We may look to Pratiḥārendurāja's commentary on Udbhata, emphasizing the emotional content of poetry: "Because poetry is emotional (or flavorful), a poem, truly, must be emotional, not unemotional, because its body is of words and meanings refined by qualities."²⁴³ Ānanda conceives of an emotive aesthetic perception because it begins as a *rasa* in the poet and ends as the *rasa* in a *sahṛdaya*. It is this real thing (*vastu*) that suggestions and suggestiveness of language are empowered to cause to be understood. Ānanda's own feelings on this matter appear throughout and particularly in his own verse in *Dhvanyāloka* 3.43:

I am weary from much painting of the world,
for though I used the new and wondrous sight of poets
which busies itself in giving taste to feeling
and used the insight of philosophers
which shows us objects as they really are,
I never found, O God recumbent on the Ocean.
a joy like that which comes from the love of thee."²⁴⁴

²⁴³ Pratiḥārendurāja, *Laghuvṛtti*, Banhatti ed., p. 81. *kāvyaśya sarasatvāt. kāvyam khalu guṇasaṃskṛtasaḍdārthaśarīratvāt sarasam eva bhavati na tu nīrasam.*

²⁴⁴ Ingalls et al., tr., *Dhā* 3.43b, p. 653. "yā vyāpāravatī rasān rasayitum kāci kavīnām navā/ dṛṣṭīr yā pariniṣṭhatīrthaviśayonmeṣā ca vaipascīto/ te dve apy avalambya vīśvam anīśanīrvaṇayanto vayam/ śrāntā naiva ca labdham abdhīśayana tvadbhaktitulyam sukham."

If Ānanda thinks of himself as a typical modern poet, it may be said that poetness (*kavitva*) consists in seeing the new and wondrous things that give taste to feeling, and in seeing things in their true nature. Abhinava glosses 'sight' (*dr̥ṣṭi*) as *pratibhāna* , i.e., intuition.

Ānanda has much to say, in the fourth *uddyota* , concerning the soul of poetry and the poet's *pratibhā* . With the help of *dhvani* , the poet's *pratibhā* is endless.²⁴⁵ Here, he means the imagination is endless. The critic also speaks of a 'modern' poet like the great ones, the first poet or Kālidāsa, whose language flows from an abundance of feelings. Freshness and originality of imagination require an attention to the real world and to one's own feelings evoked by images in the world. It is this kind of creation, not entirely devoted to literal meanings and intricacies of poetic devices but drawing the audience into the poem's dramatic reality, that Ānanda extols. The poetician paints this picture of the poet in his world:

In poetry's endless worlds
the poet alone is God;
the universe revolves
according to his nod.

If the poet writes of love,
the world assumes its flavor;
if he becomes dispassionate,
all things lose their savor.

A true poet may treat unliving things
as living, and living as unliving;
his wish sole master of all properties

²⁴⁵ *Dhā* 4.1, Ingalls et al., trs., p. 678.

by his withdrawal or his giving.²⁴⁶

The poet is god: he imparts his own *rasa* or its lack to the world of his imagination. If one argues that a make-belief world lacks immediacy, on the contrary, says Ānanda. If one speaks of tradition and general types of poetic matters, poetry has always been composed with immediacy of feelings. The first, great poet composed verses out of an overflow emotion. If even one poet after Vālmīki is admitted to be great, then it is proven that novelty and originality are possible within the generalities of poetic matters.²⁴⁷ And there are such poets as Kālidāsa and others. Ānanda writes,

For just as the nature of the universe, although it has manifested this marvellous proliferation of matter through the succession of past ages, cannot be said now to be worn out and unable to create anything new, just so is the situation in poetry, which, although it has been worked over by the minds of countless poets, is not thereby weakened, but increases with ever new artistic abilities.²⁴⁸

Ānanda's conception of a *rasa* as the 'soul' can be summed up thus: the soul of poetry, as a dimension ungoverned by literal denotations, is delight to a *sahṛdaya*. It is perceptible through suggestive language by which the feelings of a poet and his audience are in tune. Such implied meanings over

²⁴⁶ *Dhā*, 3.43 *vr̥ṇi*, VSS 97, 530. See Ingalls et al., tr., p. 653; and Ingalls' n1, "The literal meaning of the word *dr̥ṣṭi* is shifted by metonymy to the meaning "poetic imagination." See also Abhinavagupta's gloss : "Sight: that is, in the form of poetic imagination (*pratibhā*). The *dhvani* in the word 'sight' is assisted by this figure.... [The word "sight"] is shifted to another sense, to the sense of imagination which blossoms forth from the constant practice of ocular perception." (Ingalls et al, tr., p. 654).

²⁴⁷ *Dhā* 4.7, Ingalls et al. p. 710.

²⁴⁸ Ingalls et al., trs., *Dhā* 4.10, p. 715.

and above literal meanings have been in the thoughts of Udbhata, although it is by no means clear by what mechanism they are implied.²⁴⁹ What other meanings could there be besides those that words literally or figuratively express? Ānandavardhana's creation of a new category of meaning is not only daring, but as Ingalls says, "The suggestion opens up a new world." This world is consummated in the audience's sympathetic perception. Poetic meanings are felt, so to speak, in the heart of a *sahṛdaya*.

Ānanda takes this 'soul' dimension further than questions of the nature of language in grammar and literary criticism: poetry does not immortalize deeds because of its extraordinary beauty. Poetry is a universe of its own, and great poets are *Prajāpati*'s, creator-gods. In this sense, a literary work does not record some objective facts by representing them. It is immortal because poetic language does not denote or stand for another real thing. If true poetry is appreciated by means of suggestive language, its existence can be only in the present. It is the endless world created ever anew on the filaments of the poet's and the reader's *rasa*. Poetry is a state of mind (which Ānanda says what it is all about), and its endlessness rests in the hearts of people in whom a poem holds sway rather than in the 'body' of material, poetic elements.

Ānanda speaks of the *rasa*s in the *Rāmāyaṇa* and the *Mahābhārata* as quintessential, transcendent sentiments. These epic poems are testimonies in subjective experiences of things more real than individual persons and their doings. Inasmuch as humans are capable of feelings of *adbhuta*,

²⁴⁹ Ingalls et al., trs., introduction, p. 8 on Udbhata's distinction between meanings given *śruti* and *artha*.

karuṇa, *sānta*, for example, and are capable of turning them into and culling them from poetry, we are intertwined with the divine beyond the minimal world of meaningless actions. Poetry speaks of things that in time become godly, and of ultimate goals reached by insights into the agency of forcefully driving emotions as they impel humans headlong toward different ends, holy and unholy.

Whether in Vedic conception of poets as truth-seers, or in earlier poeticians' descriptions of the poet's *bhāva* as the sustainer of internal reality, or in Udbhata's notion of coherence (*ānukūlyam*), the poet's intuition is the instinctive design behind a great sprawling panorama. It is this design which lends truth and coherence to poetry. For Ānanda, a literary work is a unity because a *rasa* exists in the poet and forces him to conclusions that are consonant with it: he knows in his heart where the piece is leading up to even before beginning to compose.²⁵⁰

After Ānanda, discussions revolve around the nature of *rasa*-- what it is and how it is conveyed. Ingalls is of the opinion that Ānanda views it after the old school, i.e., that it is an intensification of *bhāva*.²⁵¹ It is possible

²⁵⁰ *Dhā* 4.5, Ingalls et al., trs., p. 690. "In the *Rāmāyaṇa* the *karuṇarasa* (flavor of compassion or tragic mood) is prepared by the first of poets himself, where he says that his "grief became verse." He carries out the same *rasa* throughout his composition up to Rāma's final, irreversible separation from Sītā."

²⁵¹ Ingalls et al., trs., *Dhā*, introduction, p. 18. "Ānanda uses the word *rasa* of a basic emotion that has been heightened, sometimes from whatever reason, but most specifically from the combination prescribed by *BhNS*.... Here *rasa* is simply a heightened form of peaceful happiness (*sukha*).... Ānanda conceives this *rasa* to abide in the character invented by the poet or in the poet himself, as well as in the audience. As for the first: "The speaker may be the poet or a character invented by the poet. If the latter, he may be devoid of *rasa* and *bhāva*, or he may be possessed of *rasa* and *bhāva*" (3.6.g A). As for the poet himself, it is when he is under such a heightened state

that the question never occurs because to him the essential thing is that *rasa* exists as that which is conveyed in poetic language. In the realm of poetry, it is a given that personal emotions are quite different from aesthetic emotions, as poetry is different from a real situation in life. Personal feelings may underlie poetic utterances, but an aesthetic action in regard to literary and dramatic works is relatively limited in comparison to real actions, or philosophical attitudes, which a person takes toward moral and spiritual goals. In the fourth *uddyota*, it is said that great poems such as the *Rāmāyaṇa* and the *Mahābhārata* lead to the *rasa*s of compassion and peace, and in that sense they link us with some ultimate truth--the presence of the divine on earth and the ultimate futility of worldly glories.

Even so, sentiments are suggested: the sensitive reader is immersed in such aesthetic emotions, but he does not become liberated. Aesthetic feelings are confined to the world of art, and aesthetic actions do not go beyond the realm of *rasa*. Or, having brought together in his thought the grammarians' theory of language and Bharata's theory of drama, Ānanda is satisfied to say that poetic language has a primary emotional content which it conveys by means of the linguistic function called suggestion. He implicitly accepts Bharata's definitions and explanations of *rasa*s and *bhāva*s. Thus, the *rasādi*s would occur as Bharata describes wherever poetic language functions suggestively, in the poet who uses it, in the poetry which contains it, and in the audience which is sensitive to poetry's true meanings. Ānanda mentions in a general way (as does Udbhaṭa in the fourth *varga* of *KASS*) that *rasa*s are engendered by the *vibhāva*s and so of emotion as *rasa* that he becomes capable of writing the suggestive poetry that will transfer this *rasa* to his hearers."

on; there is no evidence that he is interested in the psychology of different emotional states or in other explanations of such emotional factors besides their conventionally prescribed relevance to *rasa* s in poetic language. What is dramatically portrayed by an actor's *abhinaya* --such as an *anubhāva* of horripilation, stereotyped mannerisms such as plucking flower petals or scratching the ground with one's foot--can equally be described in poetry and thereby contextually suggest an emotion.

It may be concluded that Ānanda's theory of *rasadhvani* joins the dramatic *rasa* s, as the objects of a poet's desire to express (*vivakṣā*), with a poet's *pratibhā* , as the source of his creative originality. This linkage forges an intrinsic connection between the poet's emotional state, a *bhāva* or a *rasa* , with a *rasa* -filled poem and with the sensitive audience in whom the aesthetic sentiment arises. Although Ānanda thoroughly clarifies and classifies *dhvani*--that it is not a secondary meaning, that it is a meaning occurring after the literal meaning but different from it, that it may be primary or subordinate to the literal meaning--he does not explicitly treat relations between the poet and his work and with his readers. Such relations, implied by his theory of poetic communication, necessarily come into question. In Ānanda's example of Vālmīki's grief turning to poetry, what is the status of this emotion in relation to the *rasa* in the reader? How do *vibhāva* s, and so on, become a *rasa* ? These questions are left to Abhinava to work out in the *Locana* and the *Abhinavabhāratī*.

Chapter 5

The structure of Perception in Aesthetic Experience

Abhinavagupta's argumentation with a view to formulate a logical and rigorous structure of perception in aesthetic experience is directed to the Mīmāṃsaka Bhaṭṭanāyaka. The latter wrote a text, *Hṛdayadarpaṇa*, in which he forwarded his own aesthetic theory and refuted the concept of *rasadhvani* as the soul of poetry. This work is now lost, and what we know of it is through Abhinava's representation, who incorporates much of Bhaṭṭanāyaka's ideas in his own theory. It will be shown in this chapter that although Abhinava profits much from his opponent's explanation of the occurrence of *rasa* in one's mind or another's mind, his formulation of the perceptual structure, in dependence of the theory of suggestion in poetic language, is fundamentally different. Consequently, Abhinava's concept of *rasa*, the mode of its perception and the nature of aesthetic experience, differs from Bhaṭṭanāyaka's. For the Mīmāṃsaka, the aesthetic perception which is likened to *Brahmāsvādāna* attains to a sublimity beyond any ordinary mode of perception. For Abhinava, however, although the *rasa* experience which is sublime and reposes in the soul is *alaukika*, it occurs through an ordinary mode of perception whose cooperating cause is intuition, *pratibhā*, but whose end, *rasa*, is *alaukika* because of its particular means, namely, the suggestive function of poetry and the theatrical accoutrements--costumes, makeup and headgear, and so on.

Bhaṭṭanāyaka's view considered

Bhaṭṭanāyaka, the Mīmāṃsaka, appears to have been a good Śaiva as well. We find Abhinava attributing a verse to him, describing the Lord as an artist who creates the world on the screen of his soul.²⁵² His descriptions of the *rasa*-filled poets and the proper reader, *adhikārin* of poetry, whose heart like a spotless mirror is receptive to its beauty, do not characterize a typical ritualist of whom it is said that the heart has dried up from the severity of textual hermeneutics. Of such Mīmāṃsakas, one may look for explanation in Sanderson's "Purity and power among the Brahmins of Kashmir," depicting a Tantric movement that was sweeping through the orthodox householders of Kashmir, a process which Abhinavagupta promoted in overcoding rituals with his Tantric deities and thereby internalizing Tantric metaphysics in practitioners.²⁵³

Because of the affinity in their theories, Abhinava argues at length and with much admiration against Nāyaka. The Mīmāṃsaka theory of language is closest to that of the Grammarians: both schools hold that words are eternal, and that their relation to their meanings is eternal. Both accept the supreme authority of the Vedas as a self-subsistent entity, a timeless archetype and absolute standard. For both the semantic capacity of words is

²⁵² *Abh* 1, Nagar ed., vol. 1, p. 5. Abhinava makes this citation from Nāyaka's *hṛdayadarpaṇa*, " *namas tralokyanirmāṇakavaye sambhava yataḥ/ pratikṣaṇam jagannātyaprayogarasiko janaḥ*." This appears to be, perhaps, a benedictory verse dedicated to Śiva, the poet of the creation of the three worlds because at every moment people are sentimental (*rasika*) with the performance of the theater of the world."

²⁵³ Alexis Sanderson, "Purity and power among the Brahmins of Kashmir," in *The Category of the Person*, Carrithers et al., eds., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).

defined through their practical effects: the Mīmāṃsaka holds that a word is that by which the apprehender grasps the meaning.²⁵⁴ Verbal cognition presupposes an existing language structure in the mind and arises when there are auxiliary causes, i.e., a person who in uttering words manifests them phonologically.²⁵⁵ Language understanding consists of a two-fold operation: an acoustic apprehension of sounds by the ear, and a meaningful understanding effected by contact of the mind with the soul.²⁵⁶ The tradition of the *Vākyapadīya* is in the main in agreement on these points. Differences occur, however, over elements in transmission: the *Vākyapadīya* posits an ideal entity, the *sphoṭa* meaning-bearer, which in apprehension is a unity relative to which individual phonemes, once uttered and heard, are non-entities. This is not to say that phonemes relative to words and words relative to sentences are not material entities, but the theory stresses the distinction between the sequential and differentiated nature of sound-apprehension and the instantaneous, non-sequential and undifferentiated nature of semantic apprehension, which is an idea. The ontological gap is filled by the function of *pratibhā*, uniting the heterogeneous efficiencies and bridging the gap between manifold sounds and a unity of understanding.

Mīmāṃsakas, of both the Bhāṭṭa and Prābhākara schools, hold that the

²⁵⁴ A. B. Gajendragadkar and R. D. Karmarkar, trs., *The Arthasaṃgraha of Laugākṣī bhāṣkara* (Repr., Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1984), p. 4. "yad yasmāc chabdhēn niyamataḥ pratiyate tat tasya vācyam." "What is invariably understood from a certain (*yasmāt*) word is what is expressed by that [word]."

²⁵⁵ Mahāmahopādhyāya Gangānātha Jhā, *The Prābhākara School of Pūrva Mīmāṃsā* (Repr. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass), 1978 (1st ed., 1911), pp. 52-68.

²⁵⁶ *Ibid*, p. 52.

sequence of sounds in a word, and words in syntactical relation in a sentence, are direct causes of understanding. Kumāṛila Bhaṭṭa objects to *spḥoṭa* on the ground of its being superfluous: if language engenders understanding through *sābdībhāvanā* and *ārthībhāvanā*, why posit an ideal entity between acoustic sounds and understanding?²⁵⁷ The more sophisticated Prābhākara school holds that each word in a sentence is not semantically efficacious, and the meaning arising after words have been syntactically related in a sentence extends as far as the word leads.²⁵⁸ But their theory would thus be *anyonyāśraya*, which is to say that the meaning of words will be derived from the sentence and the meaning of the sentence will be derived from words. Abhinava points out with a cutting wit: "Why, this Mīmāṃsaka might claim to be the descendant of his own great-grandson."²⁵⁹

These seemingly small differences widen in the application of language theories to poetics. When the Mīmāṃsakas argue that the function of poetic suggestion is merely *bhakti*, *lakṣaṇā*, and *guṇavṛtti*, they are adhering to the basic tenet that words are efficacious through the *sābdī*- and *ārthībhāvanā*, and that any other meanings cannot be derived directly from the words themselves but only through presumptive measures (*arthāpatti*) taken to prevent incomprehension or miscomprehension. If by the statement "*gaṅgāyāṃ ghoṣaḥ*" we understand a meaning at variance with the literal meaning, the basic functions of words are not to be changed;

²⁵⁷ Kumāṛila Bhaṭṭa, *Ślokaṭīkā*. See n. 219, chapter 4.

²⁵⁸ This amounts to the practical definition that a word is whatever is meant (conventionally) by it. See also n. 221, chapter 4.

²⁵⁹ Ingalls et al, trs., *Dhāt* 1.4b, p. 89.

it should rather be presumed that the understanding is derived from extrinsic and circumstantial factors, such as the speaker's intention (*tātparyasakti*), or qualitative and relational types of transference from the literal to the understood meaning.

Perhaps due to this conservatism, Bhaṭṭanāyaka, in spite of his appreciation of aesthetic communication, accepts the existence of *rasa* but maintains that either *dhvani* does not exist, or even if it exists it is not the soul of poetry. His theory is that poetic language consists of three functions: *abhidhā*, *bhāvanā*, and *bhoga*. Nāyaka links his language theory to aesthetic perception in poetry and the theater, having posited a sentimental relation between the poet and the audience: the poet on the one hand is filled with *rasa*, and the audience partakes of this *rasa*, drinking it as a calf from the mother cow, *Sarasavatī*, unlike an ascetic who must cull his Brahma-bliss from subjecting himself to austerities.²⁶⁰ Nāyaka's primary critique of former theories of *rasa* is that if according to Lollaṭa, *rasa* is *sthāyin* intensified by *vibhāva*s, and so on, or if *rasa* is an imitation of the actor's *sthāyin* which has been inferred through *vibhāva*s by the audience, there is the problem of one's mind and another's mind, i.e., the direct knowledge of one's own mental content and feelings in contrast to the indirect or inferred knowledge of other's feelings. How does one feel what another feels? The stance one takes toward one's own pains and pleasures is different from that toward others'.

Because in drama, a person in the audience is emotionally moved without being personally angered or saddened--in the same way perhaps that Vālmīki is moved by the sorrow of the curlew without suffering from the

²⁶⁰ Ingalls et al., trs., *Dhāt* 1.6, p. 120.

grief--Nāyaka postulates a second stage of poetic language, *bhāvanā* or *bhāvakatvam*, which conjures up and universalizes aesthetic emotions. And in the third stage of poetic language, *bhoga*, a reader or spectator relishes within himself the bliss of *rasa*, transported beyond the world of ordinary experiences. According to Abhinava, Nāyaka has said that "*raso na pratiyate nodpadyate nābhivyaajyate*."²⁶¹ "*Rasa* is neither perceived, produced, or revealed (i.e. manifested)." This statement seems to rule out any attempt to describe *rasa* as a mental event occurring in a person, and it is meant perhaps to stress the notion that *rasa* is an innate state of mind of a *sahṛdaya*. Since it is not *abhivyaajyate*, i.e., it does not exist latently and become actually manifested, and it does not arise from causal factors (*utpadyate*), and since it is not perceived from external objects through the senses, this innate *rasa* is ever present and is realized (*bhāvyate*) purely in the soul when all stuporous obstructions have been cleared away by the proper dramatic stimuli, *vibhāva*s, and so on. To compare it to *brahmāsvādāna* likens it to Saṅkara's ultimate realization "I am the tenth," a bliss realized by the removal of *avidyā*. Bharata has originally stated in the *Nāṭyasāstra* that *rasa* is the primary object of the theater:

In this connection, we will explain the *rasa*s now to begin with,

Because but for a *rasa*, there is no purpose whatsoever.

In this regard, *rasa* arises from a conjunction of *vibhāva*,

anubhāva, and *vyabhicāribhāva*.²⁶²

²⁶¹ *Abh*, Nagar ed., vol. 1, p. 275

²⁶² *NS* 6. 32, Nagar ed., vol. 1, 271. "*tatra rasān eva tāvad ādau abhivyaākya mahā na hi rasād rīe kaś cid arthaḥ pravartate/ tatra vibhāvānubhāvavyabhicārisamyogād rasaniṣpattih.*"

He describes the *bhāva* s later on in chapter seven:

Now we will explain *bhāva* s. Here, one asks why they are called *bhāva* s: Is it because the *bhāva* s become, or is it because the *bhāva* s cause to be? It is answered that they are *bhāva* s in that, assumed (*upeta*) by speech, the body, and the mind, the *bhāva* s cause objects of poetry (*kāvyaṛtha*) to become.²⁶³

The Muni describes an *artha* in relation to *bhāva* s:

That object (*yo ṛtho hi*) which is carried out by a *vibhāva*, but is known (*gamyate*) by *anubhāva* s which are verbal, bodily, and mental actings, that is called *bhāva*. And by mental acting (*sāttvikābhīnaya*), whose means of stimuli are the speech, the body and color, in realizing (*bhāvayan*) the *bhāva* in the mind of the poet (*kaver antargatam*), [that object] is called *bhāva*. Because they bring into existence these *rasa* s which are composed by various [kinds of] acting, Therefore, these are to be known as *bhāva* s by practitioners of drama.²⁶⁴

Bharata is speaking of three separate things: a *bhāva* is so called through its relation with *vibhāva* and *anubhāva*, being carried out (or transported, *āhṛta*) by the former and known by the latter. This may be an emotional

²⁶³ NS ch. 7, introduction, Nagar ed., vol. 1, p. 337. "bhāvān idānīm vyākhyāmaḥ. ātrāḥ--bhāvā itī kasmāi. kim bhāvanūti bhāvāḥ kim vā bhāvayanūti bhāvāḥ. ucyate--vāgāṅgasattvopetān kāvyaṛthān bhāvayanūti bhāvā itī."

²⁶⁴ NS. 7.1-3, Nagar ed., vol. 1, p. 340. "vibhāvenāhṛto yo ṛtho hy anubhāvais tu gamyate/ vāgāṅgasattvābhīnayaiḥ sa bhāva itī samjñātaḥ// vāgāṅgamukharāgeṇa sattvenābhīnayena ca/ kaver antargatam bhāvaṃ bhāvayan bhāva ucyate// nānābhīnayasaṃbadhān bhāvayanti rasān imān/ yasmāi tasmād aṃi bhāvā vijñeyā nātyayokīrbhīḥ."

state in general of a poet, actor, or an audience, or even the character. The second *bhāva* is so called because it realizes the poet's *bhāva*-- emotion or intention -- which sustains the whole piece, as discussed by Daṇḍin and Bhāmaha.²⁶⁵ And in the third verse, it is so called because it realizes *rasa* s. According to Bharata, then, *bhāva* s exist in the poet, the actor, the audience, and probably in the character portrayed as well.

Nāyaka has termed the second stage of verbal operation in poetry *bhāvanā* or *bhāvakatvam* , with due regard for Bharata's sense of *bhāvayanti rasān iti bhāvāḥ* . But Nāyaka says that the *rasa* s are "not perceived, produced, or manifested." If the *rasa* which must exist in the audience is brought into being by *bhāva* without being effected by external factors, then *bhāvanā* , the second function of language which causes the realization of *rasa* , can be equated with *bhāva* .²⁶⁶ Nāyaka makes *bhāvanā* synonymous with his invented *bhāvakatvam* . So, according to him, after literally denoting meanings, poetic language is poetic because it is *bhāvaka* ; through its universalizing function it possesses or engenders *bhāva* s which realize *rasa* . And within the category of poetic language Nāyaka incorporates and permits contextual and gestural factors--such as facial expressions, intonation, etc.--as a part of a verbal operation, to a much greater extent than Ānanda, who limits expressiveness of language to only two factors, literal and suggestive.²⁶⁷ Although Ānanda does say that music

²⁶⁵ See chapter 4, p. 107ff.

²⁶⁶ *Bhāvanā* interpreted in conventional meanings as mental conjuration (as in meditation, particularly Tantric meditation) or as the inherent power of words to cause understanding (literal and moral according to Mīmāṃsā theory of language, and aesthetic in this instance), is nothing new .

and gestures can suggest *rasa*.²⁶⁸

The operation of *bhāvanā*, possessing or engendering *bhāva*, consists in universalization (*sādhāraṇīkaraṇa*)--precisely to solve the problem of one's mind and another's mind (*svaparagatatatva*): if the *bhāva*s are solely in any one agent, they would have to be perceived, produced, or manifested in any of the other (among the poet, actor, audience, and perhaps the character). Poetic language de-objectifies: it removes the character of being an object of personal emotional perception from poetic objects,

*kāvyaārtha*s. It universalizes them: *Sītā* in poetry and drama is not a real individual or historical person, but poetically described. The poetic language modulates the reader's feelings away from normal emotional objectification. The poetic object, a *vibhāva* whose feelings are known by *anubhāva* (emotional affects), is realized in the reader not as a person, i.e., an object of direct perception or inference, but as and through the *bhāva* of the reader.

The argument is that if the audience views drama as a direct perception, the emotions engendered, love, anger, and so on, would interrupt the aesthetic enjoyment; but if he is indifferent (*taṭastha*), he would be completely unemotional.²⁶⁹ The function of *bhāvanā* modulates these

²⁶⁷ This can be seen in Abhinava's discussion of Nāyaka's critique of Ānanda's first two examples of suggestion *Dhāt* 1.4b, p. 831.4c, p. 98 (Ingalls et al., trs.): the housewives to the monk, and to the traveller. There, Nāyaka argues *dhvani* is not the soul of poetry because a *rasa* is realized in the audience not through suggestion but through (1) gesture and intonation, manipulation of the word 'I', (2) through the contextual knowledge of the monk's timidity and the lion's fierceness that there is an understanding of prohibition. Abhinava asks, if you are so keen on admitting these contextual cooperating factors, why are you so resistant to admitting suggestion with *pratibhā* as its cooperating cause?

²⁶⁸ *Dhāt*, Ingalls et al., trs., 3.33e, 3.33i, 3.33n, pp. 555, 565-6, 585.

poles. Poetic language renders a specific cause (*asādhāraṇahetu* in logic) into a general or universal cause (*sādhāraṇahetu*), so that aesthetic emotions are neither personal nor impersonal. In this sense, the audience's emotional state is a kind of *bhāva*, like that of the poet's when he composes or the actor's when he acts. When Nāyaka says that *rasa* is neither perceived, produced or manifested, he views and solves the problem in the logical structure of perception: because the sensory objects that are *vibhāva* s, known through their *anubhāva* s, are such, it is impossible that the kind of aesthetic emotion we have could be the result of a direct perception. Nāyaka is delineating different ways that an ordinary and a poetic object are perceived. The language function of *bhāvakatvam* puts the audience in the *bhāva* of the play which in turn removes obstacles from each viewer's personal, emotional objectification, after which consciousness attains to the state of *rasa*, becoming a solid mass of aesthetic bliss.

Other Critics' views on the nature of *rasa*

Abhinava has given a short history of conceptions of *rasa*.

Lollaṭa and others have explained Bharatamuni's statement, " *vibhāvādibhiḥ samyogo 'rthāt sthāyinas tato rasanīṣpattiḥ* " ²⁷⁰ in the following way: *vibhāva* is the cause in the rise (*utpatti*) of a mental state in the nature of a *sthāyin*, and in this [rise] they do not want to say that *anubhāva* s are produced by *rasa*. Because [*anubhāva* s] ought not to be counted as the cause of *rasa*, but rather, among the very *bhāva* s, *anubhāva* s and *vyabhicārin* s are mental states, and even if they do not

²⁶⁹ *Dhāt* 2.4, Ingalls et al., trs., p. 221; *Abh* 6, Nagar ed., p. 275. " *Bhāṭīanāyakaś* *iv āha--raso na pratīyate, notpadyate nābhivajyate...svagata!vaparaḡata!tvādi ca pūrvavad vikalpyam.* "

²⁷⁰ *NS* 3.32, Nagar ed., vol. 1, p. 271.

occur together with a *sthāyīn*, he (Lollaṭa) wants to say they are in this instance of the nature of *vāsanā*. Even in the example, among the manifestors (*vyāñjana*) and so on, the state of being one person's *vāsanā*, like the *sthāyīn*, is another's state of amazement, like a *vyabhicārin*. Therefore, *rasa* is accumulated (intensified) by *vibhāva*, *anubhāva*, and so on, in the *sthāyīn* alone. Let the *sthāyīn* be unintensified: it belongs to both alike, in the object of imitation (Rāma, etc., in a primary way) and in the imitator, from the force of *anusamdhāna*.²⁷¹

Abhinava adds that this is an old view found in Daṇḍin who has said that love becomes the Erotic (*rasa*), and anger in the ultimate stage becomes Fury. Lollaṭa, according to Abhinava, views the problem from the standpoint of psychology and understands that 'conjunction' (*saṃyoga*) means the conjunction of the *bhāva*s with the *sthāyīn*, from which conjunction a *rasa* arises. Among these, all *bhāva*s except *vibhāva*s are mental states; although the *sthāyīn* mental state is caused by the *vibhāva*s, emotional effects are not produced by *rasa*: the actor does not reach *rasa* in exhibiting emotional effects. But Lollaṭa also does not want to say that *anubhāva*s are causes of *rasa* (in the audience), and whether *anubhāva*s and *vyabhicārin*s occur together with *sthāyīn* or not, they are mental states and, therefore, are trace impressions. The difference between *sthāyīn*, and *vyabhicārin* is a matter of degree and locus, occurring in the character (Rāma) and the actor. *Sthāyīn* is just the basic emotion which when intensified becomes *rasa*, from the force of *anusamdhāna*, an arrangement or artifice.²⁷² Lollaṭa assumes that the psychological processes occur in

²⁷¹ *Abh* 6, Nagar ed., vol. 1, p. 271. "atra bhāṭalollaṭaprabhṛtayas tāvad evaṃ vyācakhyuḥ... cānusandhānabalāt. --itī."

²⁷² or it possibly means an intuitive synthesis in Abhinava's epistemology.

everyone: *bhāva* s (except the *vibhāva* s) are mental states, and *anubhāva* s and *vyabhicārin* s are *sthāyin* s under different circumstances. *Rasa* is the heightened form of a *sthāyin*, which is directly cognized by the spectator who thus possesses it through direct cognition.

Śaṅkuka²⁷³ says that this is not so, as reported by Abhinava:

Because without the use of *vibhāva* s and so on, it is impossible to perceive (*avagati*) a *sthāyin* because the middle term is absent. Because it would result that the *bhāva* s have already been defined since another definition would be pointless when one already exists. Because it would result in an endless, increasingly weak intermediate state. Because the Comic *rasa* will not have six parts, and there will be innumerable *rasa* s and *bhāva* s in the ten stages of love. Because we see the opposite [is true], namely that we know grief is severe at first and lessens in time, and we see that anger, zeal, and love diminish into its opposite, namely, nonenmity, fortitude, and habitual enjoyment (*sevā*). Therefore, the *sthāyin* is a *bhāva* in the form of an imitation of the *sthāyin* in the original [character] such as Rāma, etc. It is perceived through the force of a middle term to exist in the imitator (i.e. the actor) through its causes called *vibhāva*, its effects *anubhāva* s, and its cooperating [causes] called *vyabhicārin* s, which being produced with effort, although artificial are not thought to be so. *Rasa* is designated by another name exactly because it is an imitation.

Indeed, the *vibhāva*, *anubhāva*, and *vyabhicāribhāva* are synthesized (*anusam̐dheya*) according to the poem, learning, and one's own simulation; a *sthāyin* is not synthesized even from the force of poetry. The words, as denotations, "love", "grief," etc., turn love and grief, etc., into denoted objects. But they do not cause understanding as a verbal acting. Indeed, language is not verbal acting although verbal acting is carried out by it, in the same way that bodily acting is carried out by the limbs. . Therefore,

"Ripened of itself, even deep and wide and great,
the ocean of grief is drunk up by the fire of the submarine fire."

²⁷³ A celebrated poet in his time, mentioned by Kalhana in M. A. Stein, tr., *RT*, vol. 1, 4.704, p. 184. See ch. 4, n. 151.

Likewise,

"Struck dumb by grief he remains so, who is beseeched to move
by friends whose cries are unsteady, struck by a vivid fear in
their hearts."

In these verses, grief is not an object of acting but rather of denotation.

"The droplets from the mist of her tears, falling as she writes, show up
like sweat that breaks out now on my body, from a touch of the palm
of her hand."

But by such a statement as this denoting its own meaning, love in the
form of happiness, in Udayana, a *sthāyībhāva*, is acted out but not
spoken. Truly, the power to cause understanding which is acting is other
than denotative. For this very reason the word *sthāyīn*, being of a
different category, was not mentioned in the *sūtra*. Therefore, the
Erotic is love being imitated, and thus it is correct to say that the Erotic
consists of it and arises from it.

"Of one running toward the lights of a gem and of a lamp,
thinking they are gem,
Even though the particular is a false knowledge, the particular
results in an effective action." (*Pramāṇavārttika* 2.57)²⁷⁴

And in this connection the perception in regard the actor is not that he
is happy, nor that this is really Rāma, nor even that he is not happy, nor
yet whether he is Rāma or not. It is not that this is someone like Rāma.
But rather, this perception is different from perceptions that are correct,
false, doubtful, or similar; but through the principle of a horse in a
painting, the perception is that this is that Rāma who is happy. He
[*Saṅkuka*] says this:

"What one perceives in a flash is not a doubt, nor a truth, nor a
contradiction.

The insight (*dhī*), that he is this person and that he is not this one,
is an undiscriminated flood from a mixture of contradictory
awarenesses.

By what logic may a vivid burst of experience be questioned?"²⁷⁵

²⁷⁴ *The Pramāṇavārttikam of Ācārya Dharmakīrti*, with the *Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti*
of Manorathanandin, ed. Dr. Ram Chandra Pandeya (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1989) p.
76.

Saṅkuka's theory is that the audience infers the *sthāyīn* in the actor and in perceiving imitates it. It is called *rasa* because it is an imitation of the *sthāyīn* in the actor. The audience directly cognizes the *vibhāva* and so on, and logically infers that the actor, as character, is in a certain emotional state. While the *vibhāva*s, etc., are created artificially, the permanent emotion is not created but rather it is the emotion of the original character that the actor is reproducing. What we perceive on stage, words and actions, are not real words and real actions; but they are acting, i.e., imitation carried out through words and actions. Saṅkuka points out the inherent artifice of dramatic performances: acting is a make-belief that leads to an *arthakriyā*, namely, the insight (*dhī*) on the part of the audience that the actor is and is not the hero. This perception is a *pratibhā*, or a *dhī*, a sudden flash of insight, an indiscriminate flood of contradictory feelings, which cannot be analyzed by logic.²⁷⁶

275 *Abh.* Nagar ed., vol. 1, p. 271-272. "etann eti Śrīsaṅkukāḥ. *Vibhāvādyayoge sthāyīno... yuktīyā paryanuyūjyeta sphurannanubhavaḥ kayā// itī*"

276 Abhinava does not mention any specific texts of Lollaṭa and Saṅkuka as sources of these opinions. The rather sketchy report he gives of their views seems to be his own paraphrase, couched in his own philosophical language with terms such as *anusandhāna* when he represents Lollaṭa as saying that the *sthāyīn* belongs to both the original character who is imitated, and the actor who is the imitator, "*sthāyī bhavātṭv anupacitaḥ. sa cobhayor api. / mukhyayā vṛttīyā rāmādaḥ/ anukārye 'nukartary api cānusandhānabalāt-- itī.*" (Nagar ed., p. 271) It is difficult to know exactly what this means, but it seems that *sthāyīn* exists in everyone through the force of close inspection or suitable connection, or from the force of a mental synthesis by which the *sthāyīn* in a person changes according to stimuli, the *vibhāva*s, etc. This seems to be the preferred explanation in view of Abhinava's following description of the relations between the *bhāva*s, with the *sthāyīn* as the main one. (Nagar ed., vol. 1, p. 281).

Abhinava's report of Saṅkuka's position, likewise, is set in such a way that preludes what Abhinava will say later on about differences between a normal cognition and an aesthetic perception, by setting up the notion attributed to Saṅkuka that an *arthakriyā* can be gained from a false perception. Abhinava is perhaps not fair to Saṅkuka who in fact says, above, that a *dhī* is a flood of contradictory awareness that the actor is and is not Rāma, but Saṅkuka is mainly treated by Abhinava as saying that the audience in fact actually believes that Rāma is the actor and can therefore infer the *sthāyīn* from the actor's acting. But Abhinava is right in seeing that if Saṅkuka thinks that the audience

Śaṅkuka's theory recalls the theory of *mimesis* the Greek dramatic tradition, where the artist is thought to imitate and reproduce ideal forms or reality of the gods' handiwork. The basis of an artistic reality consists in the reality of the original, which is reproduced and taken as a replication of a real thing by its perceiver. In the Indian case, the theory of imitation is taken to task and nipped in the bud by Abhinava and his drama teacher Tauta, who point out the logical and practical impossibilities of "imitation" in dramatic performance, either by the artist creating the character or by the audience perceiving the drama. If the actor's mental state is an imitation or reproduction, and his mental state is perceived as such, no *rasa* will arise. If the audience's knowledge of the actor's mental state is an inference, one cannot make a valid inference from a false middle term. Even if the audience could infer from an invalid middle term, i.e., the actor's appearance of being angry, acting, says Abhinava, is not a matter of taking up external characteristics of another person. As Abhinava says elsewhere,²⁷⁷ emotional identification in an aesthetic context is not like an imitation of a beloved, i.e., as a person in love takes up the clothings or gestures of his/her idol. What Śaṅkuka describes as the audience's conviction of an identity between the imitated and imitator, is in fact not a cognition which can be judged true or false about a particular individual since the audience

has a flood of contradictory awarenesses, then it cannot make a valid inference on that basis. Abhinava, however, likes the concept of *dhī* and appropriates by using it as he gives instances of what an aesthetic perception is not. *Abh* 1, Nagar ed., vol. 1, p. 34, "teṣu na tattvena dhīḥ. na sādrśyena yamalakaval... hastalāghavādīmāyāvat."

²⁷⁷ *Abh* 6, Nagar, ed., vol. 1, p. 275. "kāntaveśānukāravaddhī na rāmaceṣṭitasyānukārah etac ca prathamādhyāye 'pi darsitam asmābhiḥ" "The imitation of Rāma is not like an imitation of a lover's garments. And I have shown this already in the first chapter."

entertains the belief in this identity about any other portrayer of the same character.

Śaṅkuka might say that Rāma is a universal form, but according to Abhinava this is not true because Rāma is an individual (because he has to have particular characteristics to be subject of poetry).²⁷⁸ An audience does not personally become emotional toward the characters as portrayed by the actors; and if acting is a convincing imitation, and an aesthetic perception is direct or inferred, then it should be the *sthāyin* of the actor that is rendered an object of aesthetic perception, rather than the *vibhāva*. In that case, the audience would perceive the actor as a real person and infer his emotional state from its affects, rather than being emotionally stimulated by the actor as a *vibhāva* as described by Bharatamuni.

If Śaṅkuka hopes to establish the theory of "imitation" by logic, Abhinava points out these logical flaws. If the actor imitates a mental state, love, of Rāma, the spectator perceiving it as an imitation will not have a *rasa*. If acting is arranged (*anusamdhīyate*) in a manner entirely artificial and extrinsic to the actor and is so perceived, no *rasa* will arise. Moreover, a valid inference cannot be gained from false middle terms; and if this

²⁷⁸ *Abh* 1, Nagar ed., vol. 1, p. 34. This is to say that we can identify with a character only as a particular person, with qualities, human feelings, and so on, even if we emotionally identify with him without having the emotions that he has. "*trailokyasya... tēvadviśeṣabuddhiḥ*," "Of the three worlds. This has been said, Rāma, and so on, of this sort never descend to the path of knowledge. When they are described by scripture, then even if a knowledge of his particular [qualities] shines forth from a great statement, like the *Rāmāyaṇa*, even so because [particulars], by being in the present, culminate in an individuality (*svālakṣaṇya*) consisting in the capacity for a possible purposeful action, and this sort of knowledge of Rāma's particulars [from scripture] does not lead [to thinking] that they are in the present."

inference is a valid knowledge, then there would be a subsequent judgement whether the actor is really Rāma or not, but an audience, in fact, accepts equally any actor as Rāma. Finally, if acting renders *vibhāva*s, and so on fit to be directly perceived, then what the audience should really perceive is that the *sthāyin* is in the actor.²⁷⁹

These arguments amount to the question of believability in dramatic portrayal, from the perspective of the actor who portrays and the audience who ought to be convinced, or at least who is willing to be convinced. Śaṅkuka's theory of imitation is credible enough--that the actor's reproduction of Rāma is taken as real--until Abhinava points out that believability actually depends as much on the spectator's knowing that the actor is not Rāma as that he is. The spectator's perception cannot take up imitation simply as a direct cognition. Otherwise, he would either be too convinced and think this is really Rāma, or he would perceive the actor's gestures as artificial, which are therefore unable to convey a feeling.²⁸⁰ Not

²⁷⁹ *Abh* 6, Nagar ed., vol. 1, p. 274. "yac coktam rāmo yam ity asti pratipattiḥ... sāmājikānām pratipattiḥ."

²⁸⁰ *Abh* 6, Nagar ed., vol. 1, p. 273. "atha naṭagatā cittavṛttir eva prapannaṁ satī ratyanukāraḥ śṛṅgāra ity ucyate... kṛtimāḥ santah kim kṛtimatvena sāmājikāḥ grhyante na vā. yadi grhyante tadā taiḥ katham rater avagatiḥ." "As to the statement that just the mental state of the actor having been perceived [by the audience] is an imitation of love, which is the Erotic [*rasa*]. There, too, it must be pondered, "What is it perceived as?" If love, etc., are the cause, an amorous glance, etc., the effect, fortitude, etc., the concomitant, and this mundane mental state being fit for perception in the form of a cause, an effect, and a concomitant, is understood as the actor's mental state by being of the same nature; well, then, the logic of the [of the audience's perception] being imitation of love, in the saying that it is perceived as love, is far off. [A rebuttal from Śaṅkuka's camp follows.] These *vibhāva*s, and so on, are real in the imitated [i.e., original character], but being a cause is not so in the imitator [i.e., the actor]. This is the remainder. Let it be so. However, inasmuch as these *vibhāva*, and so on, are really not

so, says Abhinava: the audience is willing to take any actor to be Rāma, on the one hand, and, on the other, it does not really believe that the actor is Rāma.²⁸¹ As Śaṅkuka himself says the audience's perception is a *dhī*, an indiscriminating flood of contradicting awarenesses, but a *dhī* is convincing enough to produce an imitative state of mind of *rasa* in the spectator.

Abhinava differs in holding that the audience's conviction in the reality of the theater is never complete: they retain a detachment which is disbelief:

"*teṣu na tattvena dhī*." ²⁸² "[No one] takes them to be real." And "*kin tu*

its [love's] cause, effect, and concomitant; simulated (*upakalpita*) by the force of poetry, learning, and so on, and being artificial, are they perceived by the audience as artificial, or not? If they are perceived [as artificial], then how do they convey [the feeling of] love?" Abhinava shows in this passage that if the audience merely perceives by direct cognition and inference the actor's mental state then (1) there is no difference between a dramatic and an ordinary state of mind, then there is no imitation on the part of the audience which would not be able to distinguish between a real emotion and a dramatic emotion; and (2) on the other hand, if the spectator perceives by direct cognition the *vibhāvas*, etc., which do not affect him/her emotionally, the perception would appear to him only that the actor is 'pretending,' or 'simulating.' Then, again, a dramatic action would seem fake and convey no feeling of love. In this case, the spectator would feel neither love nor the erotic sentiment.

²⁸¹ *Abh* 6, Nagar ed., vol. 1, p. 274, "*yaś cōktam rāmo yaś... nariakāntare 'pi ca rāmo yaś itī prapattir asti*." "As for [Śaṅkuka's] statement that the perception is, 'This is Rāma,' that, too, if it is so determined at that time, in an absence of its negation by a sublator subsequently, why should it not be a true knowledge? Or, when there is a sublator, why is it not a false knowledge? In fact, even when a sublator does not arise, it should be just a false knowledge. Therefore, to say that [the perception, 'This is Rāma'] arises from a mixture of contradictory cognitions (*viruddhabuddhisambhedād*) is incorrect. There is the perception, 'This is Rāma,' even in regard to other actors as well."

²⁸² *Abh*, Nagar ed, vol. 1, p. 34. *NS* 1.107 of Bharata, "*naikāntato 'tra bhavatām devānām cānubhāvanam/ trailokayasyāsya sarvasya nātyam bhāvānukīrtanam*."

Abhinava interprets the verse to make the distinction between *anubhāvanam*, in the sense of imitation, and *anukīrtanam* in the sense of re-creation. The context of the verse is that the demons are angry and concerned with their portrayal as the idea of the

*sarvasya pratyakṣasākṣātkāra kalpā tatra na dhīr udeti.*²⁸³ "But, rather, in this situation, an insight, like an immediate experience which is a direct perception, does not arise in everyone." This is to say that nobody in the audience thinks or believes that he is witnessing a scene in real life, like a direct cognition. Without this disbelief, the audience would think that a real event is happening. On the other hand, if the audience takes the play to be an imitation only, then no one will be emotional. The point being made here is that a direct cognition and inference alone cannot account for the aesthetic mode of perception, not even if the cognition is an insight that combines in it contradictory reports of true and false perceptions. The mind arranges and makes coherent percepts, not as true or false cognitions, but according to the goal toward which an experience is directed. Abhinava shows that an aesthetic experience cannot be a direct cognition that simply overlooks true and false judgements, but it must be an experience in which direct cognitions are arranged or apperceived differently from an ordinary experience in real life.

In this sense and from this deliberation, Abhinava comes to the conclusion that the cognition in the theater is always underlaid by a dialectic of belief and disbelief, which makes the *vibhāvādi* an extraordinary means

first play was conceived, and Brahmā is telling them that the theater portrays not only the gods and demons, but conditions of all in the three worlds. Abhinava comments, "*na devāsuraṇām ekāntenā 'nubhāvanam. naī 'va te 'nubhāvyante keṇa cit prakāreṇa. tathā hi teṣu na tatitvena dhīḥ*" "Not only the gods and demons will be imitated. Indeed, they won't be imitated at all, because there is no conviction (*dhī*) that they are real. Abhinava then goes on to enumerate the ways in which an aesthetic perception is not a propositional judgement, or any other kind of cognition produced by ordinary means.

²⁸³ *Abh.*, Nagar ed., vol. 1, p. 35.

of knowledge. One cannot arrive at any propositional, true-or-false, judgemental cognition from seeing a dramatic performance. One does not perceive the *vibhāva*s in the way described by traditional logic and epistemology. And Abhinava therefore calls it *uparāḍjaka*, because it does not lead to a propositional or factual cognition, but it stimulates and influences the perceivers' emotional states. Because the aesthetic causes or stimuli are extraordinary, strange and unusual, the resulting perception consists in identification and distance--an absorption and a detachment. An aesthetic perception requires a that a spectator become emotionally entangled and at the same time perceive his emotions as objects to be savored.

While working out the problem of 'imitation,' Abhinava also comes upon fundamental differences between 'imitation' and 'imagination.' Imitations can be made of physical things and characteristics, but not of mental states. One can reproduce someone's mental state in one's own mind only by using one's own experiences. The psychology of the actor, probably taught to Abhinava by his drama teacher Tauta, is clearly described, with the conclusion that the actor who thinks he is reproducing Rāma actually has no idea of a real Rāma. The actor must "put himself in between" in order to recreate the character.²⁸⁴

Abhinava sets up this series of arguments which culminate in his own demolishing of Nāyaka's theory, as he says, "*taddūṣapam anuṭhānopahatam eva*."²⁸⁵ The conclusion is by now foregone because we see that Abhinava

²⁸⁴ *Abb*, Nagar ed, vol. 1, p. 274. "*na cā 'pi...iti galīto 'nukāryānukartṛbhāvah*."

²⁸⁵ *Abb*, Nagar, ed. p. 276.

has set down the definition of *rasa* not only in the first chapter of the *Abhinavabhāratī*, but also in the *Dhvanyālokalocana* as well. Śaṅkuka's theory of *rasa* as an *anukāra* of the *sthāyin* in the actor replaces Lollaṭa's intensification theory, namely that *rasa* is an intensified *sthāyin* which exists uniformly in everyone. Abhinava then proceeds to dismantle the 'imitation' theory and brings up Nāyaka's problem of *svagataparagataiva*, which has partly contributed to the refutation of Śaṅkuka's "imitation" theory. In the end, Abhinava also dismantles Nāyaka's version of *sādhāranīkaraṇa*. He produces his own 'corrected' view that *rasa* is a real perception, physically produced, and revealed, and that the process of universalization by which the audience has an emotional identification and distance is accomplished by active imagination. In this regard, not only the function of poetic language is at work, but also the entire psychic structure of the audience is brought into action.

The process of universalization, in Abhinava's version, encompasses the whole theater, which now, owing to a common imaginative enterprise of the poet, actor, and audience, is a single continuum of consciousness, like a *saṃvid*. The world of the theater is an independent reality, i.e., *alaukika*, not so much by its transcending the world of normal experiences as simply by being unlike any other mode of knowledge found in the ordinary world. Abhinava is at pains to show repeatedly what an aesthetic perception is not. He is able to cite numerous cases.²⁸⁶ As to what it is, Abhinava is not

²⁸⁶ See *Abh*, Nagar ed., p. 3. " *tatra nāṭyam nāma laukikapadārthavyatiriktaṃ tadānukārapratibimbālekhyasādrśyāropādhyavasāye... vastu rasasvabhāvam iti vaksyāmaḥ* "; p. 34 " *na sādrśyena yamalakaval. na bhṛṅgalatvena rūpyasmṛtīpūrvaka-sukṭikarūpyavat... na yuktīr acītatadābhāsatayāhastalāghavādīmāyāvat.* "

always so precise, perhaps because Indian philosophy has not given much room for the validity of imaginative thought. The language and vocabulary for describing the imaginative process are for the most part those of Kashmir Śaiva philosophy, a fledgling among the established systems which have provided little means for philosophical treatment of the imagination as a cognitive process.

It seems that Abhinava borrows from his opponents a great deal and ends an argument by taking over the opponent's position. This habit can be seen from another perspective: the formulations of his problems as well as the answers depend on critical analysis of preceding opinions, and such opinions that he cites have been crucial to his thoughts. One might say that he 'learns' from his opponents, but his final opinions furnish new and critical insights that provide a more acute perception of the topic under discussion.

Is *rasa* "perceived, produced, and revealed"?

Abhinava presents Nāyaka's theory last because it resolves earlier theoretical problems and also poses the most crucial question: what kind of perception is *rasa*? Abhinava joins a psychological theory (after Lollāta and the old-fashioned views) with *dhvani*, to refute Nāyaka's statement that "*rasa* is not perceived, produced, and revealed." Abhinava's concept of *sādhārāṇīkaraṇa* is in harmony with the theory of *dhvani*, and brings *rasa* into the realm of cognition. This cognition of an aesthetic nature is extraordinary because it is conditioned by a goal beyond the workaday purposefulness and because its means belong to the world of drama alone.

Bhaṭṭanāyaka has progressed beyond an aesthetic "naive realism" to

recognizing defects in the view that an aesthetic perception is a simple direct perception of purely poetic and dramatic elements. He also recognizes, in contradistinction to Lollāṭa's intensification theory, that *rasa* is a leap in experience: there is no gradual build-up to a high pitch of fervor, and thus *rasa* is not an ordinary or personal emotion. He has solved the problem of one's mind and another's mind with the second function of poetic language, whose *bhāvakatva* renders the *sādhārāṇīkarāṇa* of aesthetic perceptions.

Bhaṭṭanāyaka's version of *sādhārāṇīkarāṇa* does not make characters universal types as much as it modifies a spectator's emotional attitude: through its clear perfection and ornamentation, poetry generalizes feelings into *bhāva*s, poetic rather than personal emotions. Personal feelings which ordinarily exist in one or another person individually in the aesthetic mode become *bhāva*s. In traditional Indian theater today, after the dancer/actor reaches a technical perfection, he/she must seek equally to project the *bhāva*-- not his/her own personal feelings but the feelings required by plot, suitable to the harmony of the mood which governs every aspect--music, dancing, costume, intonation--of the piece, in the same way that an opera singer would seek to dramatize his/her arias after mastering the techniques.

Sādhārāṇīkarāṇa also solves the problem of the actor's imitation of the character: the emotions portrayed belong to neither. Abhinava says, "of a universal form, what is the meaning of similarity and with what?"²⁸⁷ Bhaṭṭanāyaka, then, takes *bhoga* to be just pure enjoyment of emotions stripped of the constraints of being personal or directed to a specific object. He raises *rasa* to an entity neither perceived, produced, or manifested, excluding the possibility of its being a cognition, intensification, and

²⁸⁷ *Abh* 1, Nagar ed., p. 36. "*sādhārāṇarūpasya kaḥ kena sādrśyārthah*"

reproduction.

Likening the savoring of a *rasa*, *rasāsvādāna*, to the mystical joy in Brahman, *brahmāsvādāna* which is a solid mass of bliss, Nāyaka elevates aesthetic emotions to a transcendence beyond any means of perception. Nāyaka proposes, in effect, that the third function of language, *bhāvanā*, raises the relisher out of the ordinary world into transcendence, an experience of the pure *ātman* which is *Brahman*.

Having accepted many of Nāyaka's critical solutions to the problem of aesthetic perception, Abhinava's argument with Nāyaka over the phrase, "*rasa na pratīyate, nopadyate, na vyajyate.*" "*Rasa* is not perceived, produced or revealed." Abhinava says, "*tatra pūrvapakṣo yaṁ bhaṭṭalollāṭapakṣānabyugamād eva nābhyupagata iti laddūṣaṇam anuthānopahataṁ eva. pratīyādivyaktīriktaś ca saṁsāre ko bhoga iti na vidmaḥ.*"²⁸⁸ "In that connection, the opponent's view is not accepted simply because of non-acceptance of Bhaṭṭalollāṭa's view. So its fault is struck down without arising. We do not know what in the transient world is an enjoyment different from a perception?"²⁸⁹

²⁸⁸ *Abb* 6, Nagar, ed., p. 276.

²⁸⁹ This is a puzzling passage, particularly concerning the phrase "non-acceptance of Bhaṭṭalollāṭa's view." Who does not accept that view, Abhinava or Nāyaka? In any case, why does Abhinava bring in Lollāṭa's position at this point, of which we know through Abhinava's brief comment that he is the author of the 'intensification theory.' As reported, Lollāṭa's salient opinion is only that the *sthāyin*, permanent emotion, is intensified into a *rasa*; and that this condition is universal. Lollāṭa's mistake is to think that an aesthetic cognition is like any ordinary cognition. But he does make a valuable point that the *sthāyins* basically exist in all people and become modified and intensified by various causes, a point that Abhinava incorporates while characteristically striking down the opponent's main view, i.e., that a *rasa* is an intensified *sthāyin*, and that a viewer's own *sthāyin* is heightened simply by watching a play.

In the *Locana*, of the *Dhvanyāloka* 2.4, we find Abhinava giving the same arguments against Bhaṭṭanāyaka, in much the same sequence, without mentioning Lollāṭa and Śaṅkuka. It is noteworthy that Abhinava attempts to establish that the scheme or structure of aesthetic experience is essentially the same in drama and poetry.²⁹⁰ In the *Abhinavabhāratī*, he simply states that poetry and drama are the same, *kāvyaṇ ca nāṭyam*.²⁹¹ His arguments in the *Locana* seem not to have been concretized as yet, and he cites the opponents' points of argument without the striking and decisive refutation that one finds in the *Abhinavabhāratī*. But it is clear that Abhinava means to argue that *rasa* is perceived, produced, and manifested (or revealed by suggestion). He appropriates the notion of *vāsanā* from Sāṃkhya psychology and uses it as the basis of sympathetic responses to characters portrayed because, says he, all people have *vāsanā*'s as the basis of their memory and experience.²⁹² At the same time, the audience must

²⁹⁰ "upāyavallakṣaṇyam eva lāvad atra śaraṇi." *Dhāt.*, VSS 97, p. 197.

291 Abh 6., Nagar ed., p. 288-289. " *etad upasamharaṭi--rasmāḍ iti. nāṭyāi samudāyarūpād rasāḥ. yadī vā nāṭyam eva rasāḥ. rasasamudāyo hi nāṭyam nāṭya eva ca rasāḥ, kāvye 'pi nāṭyāyamāna eva rasāḥ. kāvyārṭhaviṣaye hi pratyakṣakālpasamvedanodaye rasodaya.... tena nāṭya eva rasā na loka ityartibah. kāvyaṁ ca nāṭyam eva.* " He sums this up. From it: from drama in the form of a collocation are the *rasas*. Or, if the *rasas* are drama itself, [then] drama is a collocation of the *rasas*. And the *rasas* are in drama alone. A *rasa* is also in the poem being dramatically portrayed, for a *rasa* arises when an experience like a direct perception arises, whose scope is a poetic object... Therefore, the *rasas* are in the theater alone, not in the world. This is the meaning. And poetry is just drama." Abhinava makes this point in a rather insistent manner.

292 "rāṁāḍīcarīṣam u na sarvasya hrdayasamvāḍīpī mahāśaḍīhasam. cīraṁśaḍī-
viśīṣṭatīvāc cetasah. yad āha śāśam anāḍīvaṁ śīśo nityatīvā. jāmdeśakāśavya-
vabīṣaṁāṁ apy ānāṁlaryam smṛīśamskāśayor ekaṁpātīvā' īi. tona pramīś īśvad
rasasya śiddhā. Śā ca rasānāṁpā pramīś upadyate." DhāḶ, 2.4, VSS 97, p. 198-9. For

simultaneously entertain a belief and disbelief that the actor is the hero.²⁹³ Having refuted Lollaṭa's theory that a *sthāyin* when in conjunction with the *vibhāva*, *anubhāva*, and *vyabhicāribhāva* is intensified into a *rasa* in the original hero and the actor, Abhinava nevertheless takes up the position that a permanent emotion is caused and intensified by these *bhāva*s in a

Abhinava's references to the *Yogasūtra*, see Ingalls et al, trs., n. 41, p. 231.

293 " *tasmād aniyatāvasthāitmakam sthāyīnam uddiṣṭya vibhāvānubhāvavyabhicāribhāv samyujyamānair ayaṃ rāmaḥ sukhī smṛtivilakṣaṇā sthāyīni pratīgocaratayāsvādarūpā pratipattir anukartṛālambanā nāṭyāikagāminī rasaḥ. sa ca na vyatiriktaṃ ādhāraṃ apekṣate. kiṃ tv anukāryābhinnābhimate nartake āsvādayitē sāmājika ity etāvanmātram adah. tena nāṭya eva rasaḥ, nānukāryaḥ itī ke cit. Dhāt. 2.4, VSS 97, p. 195. The attribution of this passage seems intentionally ambiguous. Abhinava seems to begin the passage as his own opinion, and adds at the end *ke cid ābuh*. I think the reason for this is that Abhinava has been doing research and has collected various opinions on *rasa*, but has not quite made up his mind, which he did in the *Abhinavabhāratī*. The question whether the audience perceives the actor, as imitator, as the character, the imitator, or not, comes up in Saṅkuka's theory of imitation by perception: the actor imitates the hero. This imitation is a *sthāyin* inferred--with the *vibhāva* as the cause, *anubhāva* as the effect, and the *vyabhicārī*s as the auxiliaries-- by the audience which in turn obtains *rasa*, which is an imitation of a *sthāyin*. (See *Abh*, Nagar ed., vol. 1, p. 271-2) " *tasmād hetubhir vibhāvāḥkhyaiḥ kāryaiḥ cānubhāvāitmaḥ sahaścārirūpaiḥ ca vyabhicāribhāv prayatnārjītatayā kṛtrimair api tatānābhimanyamānair anukartṛsthatvena līṅgabalaṭaḥ pratyamānaḥ sthāyī bhāvo mukhyarāmādigatasthāyīyanukaraparūpaḥ. anukaraparūpatvād eva nāmāntareṇa vyapadiṣṭo rasaḥ. " It was Saṅkuka who forwarded the idea that although this inference is based on a false middle term, the spectator nevertheless has the conviction that the hero and the actor are one and the same person by means of *dhī*, a *viruddhabuddhisambhedād avivecitasamplavaḥ*. The specator does not think at all about the actor, whether he is happy, or if he is Rāma, or if he is not happy, or whether he is Rāma or not, or that he is Rāma's look-alike. But rather the audience's perception is that that happy Rāma is this [actor]. Abhinava subsequently destroys this theory of imitation by perception--that there is any kind of imitation at all. But this point of Saṅkuka's argument is well taken by Abhinava, namely that although the logic of perception is false, for the audience, the actor is Rāma.**

mundane situation. To be contrasted with the *vibhāva*s as normal causes of real emotion, however, are the dramatic *vibhāva*s which are, not causes (*kāraṇa*), but stimuli (*uparañjaka*). Only when a spectator is so stimulated and his/her mind given freely to emotive imaginations, a permanent emotion reaches the state of a *rasa* as a savored rather than intensified experience.

In this way, Abhinava is able to pinpoint the difference between emotive causes in mundane emotions and emotive stimuli in aesthetic emotions, and can thus furnish an explanation of an aesthetic perception alternative to Śaṅkuka's theory that an imitative state of mind arises in the audience from direct cognitions and inferences. Abhinava states, on the contrary, that there is no imitation at all. Processes of direct cognition and inference call up trace impressions that are the same in normal and aesthetic responses. In the former, cognitive objects are causes producing direct emotional effects; in the latter, they are stimuli that evoke emotive imaginations.

Ānanda's thoughts on the nature of *rasa* as the soul of poetry has been treated in chapter four. Only relevant points concerning its aesthetic status will be emphasized here. The author of the *Dhvanyāloka* thinks of an aesthetic sentiment in the old-fashioned way of Daṇḍin and Lollāṭa: a *rasa*, an intensified state of the *sthāyin*,²⁹⁴ is the soul of suggestion

²⁹⁴ Ingalls et al, trs., pp. 16-19, 113 n1. Ānanda indeed conceives of an emotional communication from the poet to the audience through poetry. On this matter, Ingalls writes, "Ānanda conceives this *rasa* to abide in the character invented by the poet or in the poet himself, as well as in the audience. As for the first: "The speaker may be the poet or a character invented by the poet. If the latter, he may be devoid of *rasa* and *bhāva*, or he may be possessed of *rasa* and *bhāva*" (3.6gA). As for the poet himself, it is when he is under such a heightened state of emotion as *rasa* that he becomes capable

(*dhvani*). Thus, it is stated in *Dhā* 2.3:

A *rasa*, *bhāva*, *rasābhāsa*, *bhāvābhāsa*, *bhāvaprasānti*, etc., appearing as a predominant element and [so] constituting the soul of *dhvani*, are assigned to the non-sequential type.

and in the *vṛtti*:

For the suggested sense, such as a *rasa*, etc., is apprehended nearly at the same time as we apprehend the literal meaning. When it predominates, that is the soul of suggestion.²⁹⁵

By extension, *rasa*, being the soul of suggestion which is the soul of poetry, is the soul of poetry; and since the suggested meaning is perceived (*pratīyamāna*), by extension, *rasa* which is the soul of suggestion ought to be perceived in the same way. This perception is obviously not a sensory

of writing the suggestive poetry that will transfer this *rasa* to his hearers. The process is illustrated by the story of the first poet, Vālmīki who was so saddened by the wailing of the curlew bird who had lost its mate that Vālmīki's grief (*śoka*, the basic emotion) was transformed into the tragic *rasa* of the *Rāmāyaṇa* (*Dhv.* 1.5 *K* and *A*). The notion of Abhinava that Vālmīki ruminated on the determinants and consequents of the bird's bereavement and so developed his *rasa* in the scriptural way strikes me as an addition quite foreign to the view of Ānanda.

In most cases, of course, Ānanda's *rasa* is indeed produced in the scriptural way by the poetic use of determinants and consequents. The examples of this use, as in the verse of Amaru quoted above, are legion throughout the book. I wish to emphasize, however, that Ānanda's sense of *rasa* has none of the aesthetic removal, the impersonality and generalization, which we shall see Abhinava give to the term." Ingalls et al., trs., intro. p. 18-19. That Abhinava also thinks that this is Ānanda's view is shown in *Ābh. NS* 6.38, "*kavir hi sāmūjikatulya eva. tata evoktam 'śṛṅgārī cet kavir' ity ānandācūryeṇa*" Nagar ed., vol. 1, p. 292. The verse is from *Dhā* 3.42 comparing the poet to Prajāpati. See also chapter 4 of this dissertation.

²⁹⁵ *Dhā* 2.3 *K* and *vṛtti*, Ingalls et al., trs., p. 214.

one, for Ānanda describes it figuratively: in contrast to the perception of the body--sound and sense together--of poetry likened to the faultless limbs, the perception of the soul is like sensing the charm of a woman over and above her physical body and ornaments, which charm is nectar in the eye of the beholder. It is to be thought that a *rasa*, the soul of *dhvani*, is perceived in the same way without another extraordinary mental or linguistic function. In the fourth *uddhyota*, Ānanda, who has prescribed the addition of a ninth *rasa* of peace to Bharata's set of eight, implies that the highest sublimity of poetry suggests *mokṣa*: poetry in its greatest moment leads us to intimations of the eternal and divine. By this, of course, he does not mean that the aesthetic experience itself leads to *mokṣa* or that it is mystical, but that the *rasa*s in themselves are extraordinary experiences, unlike the mundane experiences of ordinary life.²⁹⁶

In the saying that *rasa* is not perceived, produced, or manifested, Nāyaka takes it beyond the realm of ordinary to that of a mystical experience. Abhinava says no: *rasa* is a real experience because it is perceived, produced, and manifested (not as a potential actualized but as a mental phenomenon, *ābhāsa*), but it is far above any normal experience because of the difference in the means and cooperating cause, as well as the goal, of its arousal. The older theories of Lollaṭa and Śaṅkuka, by way of refutation, are cited so as to show Abhinava's formulation of the problems.

Explanations of the *rasa*s in the *Locana* confirm that of the *Abhinavabhāratī*, differing only in the manner in which the texts being commented allow discussions pertinent to the topics. In the *Locana*, *rasa* is

²⁹⁶ See Tubb, "Sāntarasa in the *Mahābhārata*."

discussed mainly from the perspective of language theories, and in the *Abhinavabhāratī* in the context of theatrical psychology. In both, Abhinava states repeatedly that the act of tasting (*rasanā*) is physically produced (*niṣpatti*) by the *vibhāva*s and so on. This act of tasting is not an operation of a valid means of knowledge (*pramāṇavyāpāra*) nor of a grammatical subject (*kāraṇavyāpāra*), but rather of a subjective feeling. An aesthetic sentiment is not an object of cognition. An aesthetic tasting may in the broadest sense be called a kind of cognition, but not an ordinary cognition because its means are different and its object, *rasa*, is also extraordinary. Abhinava explains,

[Objection] Thus *rasa* would be an uncognizable object (*aprameya*). So it ought to be correct because, consisting solely of being tasted, it is not an object of cognition in nature. Then how is it that in the *sūtra*, [it is said] "production (*niṣpatti*)?" This [production] is not of a *rasa*, but rather of the tasting (*rasanā*) of which a *rasa* is the object. But by its 'production,' if it is said, 'production of a *rasa* which has that [tasting] as its basis,' there is no fault in that. And this tasting is not an operation of valid knowledge nor of grammatical case relations. In itself it is not invalid (*apramāṇika*) because it is proven by one's own perception. Tasting is just awareness in form (*bodharūpa*), but only different from other worldly awarenesses because its means, such as the *vibhāva*, and so on, are different from worldly [means]. Therefore, because tasting is produced from the conjunction with the *vibhāva*, and so on, a *rasa* is an object beyond the world whose range [of perception] is this kind of tasting. This is the meaning of the *sūtra*.²⁹⁷

²⁹⁷ *Abh* 6, Nagar ed., p. 283. "nanv evaṃ raso 'prameyaḥ syād evaṃ... rasa itī tūlparyam sūtrasya." In other words, a *rasa* is what Descartes calls a secondary quality, not existing in an empirical object but in a person's sensory experience and subjective judgement of it, like a sweet taste.

The hero: who is Rāma?

A question asked by Abhinava, which Nāyaka neglects as a result of his assumption that poetic language can simply generate *bhāva*s in the audience, is what is the nature of the original character portrayed; and if the actor imitates the hero, what sort of sensory perceptions and emotional experiences occur in a spectator who thereby relishes a *rasa*. First, in the consideration of the original hero, the theory of *rasadhvani* gives scope to greater vividness through its evocative language. It assumes that poetic language does not convey universals, nor does it universalize our emotional attitude. Just the opposite, *rasadhvani* conveys details of personal feelings in peripheral descriptions that suggest the essence of the matter. Take, for example, Rāma in a verse quoted in *Dhā* 2.1, in which the literal meaning is shifted (*arthāntarasaṅkramitavācya*):

White herons circle against dark clouds
that paint the sky with their wet lustre.
Winds carry the small rain.
The peacocks, friends of the clouds, cry out with joy.
Let all this be: my heart his hard;
I am Rāma and can bear it all.
But Vaidehī, how will she live?
Alas, my queen, alas, be brave!²⁹⁸

Ānanda says, "In this verse the [suggestive] word [whose sense is shifted] is "Rāma." By this word we understand Rāma as developed into various

²⁹⁸ *Dhā* 2.1, Ingalls et al., trs., p. 204. VSS 97, p. 177.

"*snigdhasyāmalakāntilīptaviyato velladbalākā ghaṇā/ vātāḥ śikaripāḥ payodasubhṛdām ānandakekāḥ kalāḥ/ kāmam santu dṛḍham kaṭhorabṛdayo rāmo'smi sarvaṁ sahe/ vaidehī tu katham bhaviṣyati haḥā hā devi dhūrā bhava//*"

suggested qualities, not simply as the possessor of the name."²⁹⁹ Abhinava glosses the verse in a wonderfully tender way that shows his thoughts of Rāma as a real person. The hero is overcome by feelings that are in sympathy with his lover who has shared so many experiences of love and separation in exile. Ingalls' translation conveys Abhinava's own vivid and empathetic visualization of the passage. I quote a long passage,

... the sky is covered by clouds of just such a brilliance. "Clouds that are *vellad-balākāḥ*," that is, in which the herons, a species of white bird, are *vellat*: the word means "conspicuous" (*vijṛmbhamāna*), sc., because of the contrast [of their white bodies with the black clouds], and "flying about" (*calat*), sc., because of their joy [at being with their friends, the clouds]. And so the sky is painful to look at [since it reminds one of days of love]. All the directions are also hard to bear. The use of the plural in "winds" shows that they blow from all directions; and by their releasing small drops of water it is suggested that they are blowing very gently [and thus linger over one's body and make one all the more love-sick]. Well then, perhaps Rāma should enter a cave somewhere and stay there for the duration of the rainy season. With this in mind, the poet says that the clouds have their friends (or helpers) among whom are the peacocks who produce out of joy sweet sounds that resemble the *śadja* note and become reminders of that whole unbearable scene of the clouds. On their own as well, these sounds are quite unbearable. This is what is meant. In this way Rāma, whose feeling of love in separation has been aroused by stimulating factors (*uddīpanavibhāva* s), knowing that these determinants of emotion (*vibhāva* s) will be shared [by Sītā], since love is based on mutual feeling, from here on in the poem conjures up his beloved in his heart. First he reports on himself: "Let this be." *Dr̥dham* means "exceedingly." The word "hard-hearted" (*kāṭhora-hṛdaya*) gives scope to the particular suggestion that is achieved through the word Rāma and its literal sense.... Otherwise, how would the word Rāma not suggest other meanings connected with other qualities, e.g., the fact that he was born in the family of Daśaratha, that he was the object of

²⁹⁹ Ingalls et al., trs., p. 204.

Kausalyā's love, the deeds of his childhood, and the acquisition of Sītā? *Asmi* means: "I am the self-same person [who has undergone all these sorrows]." *Bhaviṣyati* expresses action in general, so the meaning is: What will she do? It can also be taken in the sense that "her very being is impossible" [i.e., she will kill herself, or die of a broken heart]. In this way by a succession of memory, name [sc., "Vaidehī"], and speculation [sc., "what will happen to her?"], he has conjured up his beloved from his heart into being present before him. To her, as her heart is about to break, he says with agitation, "Alas, my queen, alas, be brave!" The word "queen" suggests that fortitude will be the proper response.

By this: that is, by the word Rāma, the literal sense of which is not strictly useful here [to the idea intended]. The suggestions of other properties, which suggestions form the purpose [for shifting from the literal to the secondary meaning] are endless; for example, his banishment from the kingdom, etc. And since these suggestions are countless, they cannot be conveyed [simultaneously] by means of the denotative function of words. Even if these innumerable suggested properties were to be conveyed [by denotation] one by one, since they will not be had in single act of cognition, they will not be the source of a wondrous aesthetic experience and hence they will not give rise to great beauty. But if these properties are suggested, they will assume countless forms (*kim kim rūpam na saḥate*) because in the suggestion their separateness will not be clearly perceived. In this way they will become the source of a strikingly beautiful aesthetic pleasure that is analogous to the flavor of a wonderful drink, or cake, or sweet confection [where the individual ingredients cannot be separately tasted but yet add to the flavor of the final product].³⁰⁰

This long passage illustrates the force of suggestive language in poetry on the imagination, of Vālmīki who wrote it, of Ānanda in citing it, of Abhinava in commenting on it, and of Ingalls who translates it. There is no "universalization" of emotion, in the sense that Nāyaka intends, which is to say that one would be pained if he/she perceived compassion in himself;

³⁰⁰ Ingalls et al, trs., p. 205-6.

that Sītā is not a *vibhāva* relative to oneself; that the stories of the gods are not suitable to be universal among humans; that no one has ever perceived Rāma so as to remember what he is like; that when people perceive Rāma through testimonies (i.e. scripture) and inference, and so on, it is not proper to say that they possess *rasa*s, as if [they have gained this experience] through direct perception.³⁰¹ Therefore, the emotional stance taken toward the hero and heroine can only be a generality, but this emotion is nevertheless aesthetically sublime when relished in the soul through the tripartite functions of poetic language.

On the contrary, Abhinava and Ingalls, in commenting and translating, put themselves in the feelings of a real person, Rāma, in spite of the fact that neither has known what Rāma was like as a real person. Abhinava describes Rāma's feelings, as an individual's, through Abhinava's own visualization and imagination. In contrast, he says, no vivid feelings arise about Rāma described by the *mahāvākya*s of scripture which holds him up as a moral exemplar; but in drama and poetry, being is like a direct perception, we know from our own imagination and empathy such emotional accounts that make moral consequences of actions absolutely and brilliantly vivid in our hearts. It is in this way that drama and poetry penetrate the heart of a *sahṛdaya*.³⁰²

³⁰¹ *Abh*, Nagar ed., p. 275. "raso na praiṇyate. nopadyate. nābhivyaṇyate. svagataṛvena hi praiṇau karuṇe duḥkṛtvam syāt. na ca sē praiṇy yuktā. Sītāder avibhāvatvāt svakāntāsmṛtyasamvedanāt. devatāḍau sādharāṇīkaraṇāyogyatvāt. samudralaḍghaṇāder asādharāṇāt. na ca tadvalo rāmasya smṛtiḥ. anupalabdhatvāt. na ca sabdānumānādibhyaḥ tatpraiṇau lokasya sarasatā prayuktā pratyakṣād iva."

³⁰² *Abh* 1, Nagar ed., vol. 1, p. 35, "kāveyeṣv apī hṛdaya eva tāvat sādharāṇībhāvo vibhāvādīnām jātāḥ. tatāpi kathāmātre sādharāṇībhāvāḥ sambhavatī yady api tatāpi 'evam ye kurvantī teṣām etad bhavati' iti

Who is Rāma with whom everyone empathizes without having known him? The topic of the relation between a character and the actor seems to have been well researched by Abhinava, who mentions *nāṭyācārya* (s)³⁰³ concerning this topic. If as Śaṅkuka says, he is the character imitated, Abhinava asks, what does it mean to imitate? If an actor simply follows someone's actions, he is miming or caricaturing. If the actor imitates Rāma 'who weeps as I am weeping,' he himself enters in between. The actor is 're-creating' Rāma through his own emotions and imaginative construction, and that involves *bhāva* s as states of mind, *cittavṛtti*.³⁰⁴

In the passage quoted above, Abhinava treats the poem like a drama: within the scene created by the *uddīpanavibhāva* s of clouds, the darkening

vākyavadraḥjanāṭisayābhāvān na cittavṛttir nirṇayagatā bhavati "Even in poems, to begin with, the *vibhāva*, and so on, acquire a universal state in the heart itself. In the poems as well, even if universalization arises in the telling alone, even so, because such a statement as, "This happens to those who do thus," lacks an excellence of stimulation, the mind does not become convinced."

303 *Abh* 6, Nagar ed., vol. 1, p. 290. "*Śrīśaṅkukas tv āha... loka prakṛtiḥ rasam niṣpādayati. dvitīyapakṣo nāṭyācāryābhīpretasīkṣānusāreṇa...*"

304 *Abh* 6, Nagar ed., vol. 1, p. 274. "*na cāpi natasyetiham pratipattiḥ 'rāmam tacittavṛttim vānukaromi' iti. sadṛśakarapam hi tāvad anukarapam anupalabdhaprakṛtinaḥ na śakyam kartum. aha paścātkarapam anukarapam tal loka py anukarapāṭmatātiprasaktā. aha na niyatasya kasyacid anukārah api tūttamaprakṛteḥ sokaḥ anukaroti tarhi keneti cintyam. na tāvac chokena tasya tadabhāvāt. na cārupālādinaḥ sokasyānukārah tadvañlakṣaṇyād ityuktam. iyaṁ tu syāt-uttamaprakṛter ye sokānubhāvāḥ tēn anukaromīti. tatṛāpi kasyottamaprakṛteḥ yasya kasya cid iti cet so 'pi viśiṣṭatām viṇā katham buddhyāvaropayitum śakyah. ya evaṁ roditūti cet svātmāpi madhye natasyānupraviṣṭa iti galito 'nukāryānukartṛbhāvah. kiñca natāḥ sīkṣāvasāi svavibhāvāsmarapāc cittavṛttisādhārāṇāṇāṁ bhāvaṇa hrdayasamvādāt kevalam anubhāvān pradarsayam. kāvyam upacitakākuprabhṛtyupaskāreṇa paṭhamasceṣṭata ity etāvaṇmātre 'sya pratītiḥ natv anukāram vedayate.*"

light and brilliant clouds of a stormy sky, the birds fluttering about with their shrill cries, Rāma himself is emotionally affected and effected. Such a Rāma, confused and agitated by the sights, conjures up the feelings of Sītā and becomes all the more distraught. In reading the poem, no reader thinks that he/she is Rāma and feels saddened by the separation, although he/she must have personally experienced such a sadness. On the other hand, without a vivid perception that Rāma is really experiencing these pains of separation in this particular way, neither would a reader feel in himself the beauty and mood conveyed by the poem. The reader can get to the *rasa*, the emotional experience, only by feeling what Rāma feels, recreating not his own feelings but Rāma's feelings through his own. Here, again, there is no Rāma, no Sītā, no herons and rainclouds--just the words and the reader.

Determining the nature of a "dramatic character" is an important step leading to Abhinava's statement that drama, and poetry, is a re-telling, or a re-creation, *anukīrtana*, and not an imitation, *anukarāṇa*. This statement implies a categorical distinction between imaginative reconstruction and imitative reproduction, as well as a genre-distinction between scripture, historical narrative, and literature. These implications support what Abhinava seeks to confirm all along regarding *rasadhvani*, namely, that the suggestive function of language is the necessary and particular means to the end of literature, namely *rasa*. Events and personalities in scripture and history may be construed as 'paradigmatic' or 'factual,' and are to be 'acted after,' but not so in literature. It is a mistake in this case to think of Rāma as a historical or scriptural person. The reality of Rāma in literature depends always on being created, either through the *rasa*-filled poet who uses his

own experiences to portray the character,³⁰⁵ or the actor who acts the role through the memory of his own emotional stimuli and making his mental states universal,³⁰⁶ and the spectators who bring their own emotional and memory traces into re-creating the feelings of the characters.

The suggestive function of language alone, with its multivalent power to trigger a flood of images, operating together with the psychological substrata of consciousness, can arouse this sort of imaginative creations in the sympathetic audience. In this sense, indeed, the permanent emotions become *rasa*s (*sthāyino rasatvam āpnuvanti*): a basic emotion colored by those sparkling beads of transient emotions, re-constituted after the words of a poem now come to life in the actors, is the dish with its various spices, whose flavor is enjoyed by the *sahṛdaya*. Abhinava refutes Loīlāta but takes note of the latter's essential idea that a *rasa* arises from the conjunction of the *vibhāva*, etc., with a permanent emotion.³⁰⁷ In establishing his own argument for the *rasadhvani* against Bhaṭṭanāyaka's *bhāvanā*, to the effect that a *rasa* is perceived, produced, and revealed,

305 *Abh* 6, Nagar ed., vol. 1, p. 292. "*kavigatasādhārāṇibhūtasamvinmūlasca kāvyapurassaro naṭavyāpārāḥ*" "The actor's action, preceded by poetry, is rooted in the universalized consciousness (*samvid*) in the poet." See also, p. 300. "*kavir hi laukikarativāsanānuviddhas tathā vibhāvādīm āharati nāṭyam cānubhāvān yathā ratyāsvādāḥ śṛṅgāro bhavati*." "For the poet pierced by the trace impressions of worldly love brings about the *vibhāva*, and so on, the drama, and *anubhāva*s, so that the erotic, which is the relishing of love, comes into being."

306 *Abh* 6, Nagar ed., vol. 1, p. 274. "*kīṭ ca śikṣāvasāi svavibhāvasmarāṇāc cītatvītiśādhārāṇibhāvenā hrdayasamvādāt kevalam anubhāvān praderśayan kāvyam upacitakākuprabhṛtyupaskāreṇa paṭhamś ceṣṭata ity etāvanmātre 'sya pratīūr na tv anukāra vedayate*."

307 *Abh* 6.23, Nagar ed., vol. 1, p. 271. "*vibhāvādibhiḥ samyogo 'rthāt sthāyinas tato rasanispattih*."

Abhinava first demonstrates distinct psychological similarities and differences between real and aesthetic emotions.

Psychology of aesthetic experience

That Abhinava should entertain any part of Lollāṭa's view seems incongruous³⁰⁸ until one reconsiders the psychological structure of the *bhāva*s prescribed by Bharata, with which Lollāṭa explains the *utpatti* of the *rasa*. The *Nāṭyaśāstra* 6.31-33 commence to explain how a *rasa* arises:

In that connection we will explain the *rasa*s now to begin with,
Because but for a *rasa*, there is no purpose whatsoever.
In this regard, *rasa* arises from a conjunction of *vibhāva*,
anubhāva, and *vyabhicāribhāva*.

Just as gourmets, as they eat, savor the food provided with
many spices that are added to (*yuta*) many ingredients,

Just so, wise men mentally savor the permanent emotions which
are connected with the dramatic portrayal of emotions
(*bhāvābhinaya*). Therefore they are taught as "dramatic
*rasa*s."³⁰⁹

In the prose section after verse 31, Bharata makes the well-known comparison between a gracious person's (*sumanā puruṣa*) relishing of food created by a mixture of various spices (*vyādījana*), to a gracious spectator's (*sumanā prekṣaka*) relishing of an aesthetic *rasa* in which the *vibhāva*,

³⁰⁸ Actually, it is not glaringly incongruous since we see that Abhinava cites these views because they are all somehow relevant to his own, and because he has devoted some thought as to how they might have helped to furnish a complete and correct explanation of the psychology of the aesthetic process.

³⁰⁹ AS, Nagar ed., vol. 1, p. 271, pp. 270-271.

anubhāva, and *vyabhicārin*, are combined. When asked what sort of thing is a *rasa*, Bharata is by no means clear. For example, in verse 6.33 he says that connoisseurs mentally savor *sthāyin* s which are connected with acting out the *bhāva* s (or which are tied together in acting out the *bhāva* s), and therefore they are remembered, or taught, as dramatic *rasa* s. A prose passage asks: "Here, does he say the enjoyment of *bhāva* s comes from the *rasa* s, or that of *rasa* s from the *bhāva* s?"³¹⁰ The answer is that only the latter statement is true, and the converse is false, "because it is seen that from the *bhāva* s there is an enjoyment of the *rasa* s, but not from the *rasa* s [is there an enjoyment of the *bhāva* s]"³¹¹

Verses 6.34-37 state in different ways that "in this way the *bhāva* s together with [kinds of] acting cause *rasa* s to come into being."³¹² Verse 37 indicates mutual influences between *rasa* s and *bhāva* s: "In this way, the *bhāva* s and the *rasa* s bring one another into being."³¹³ The introductory passage to the descriptive definitions of the *rasas* says,

Now we will explain the enumeration of the characteristics of those things joined with consequents (*anubhāva*), causes (*vibhāva*), and transient emotions (*vyabhicārin*). And we will lead the permanent emotions up to becoming the *rasa* s,³¹⁴

³¹⁰ *Abh*, Nagar ed., vol. 1, p. 290. "atrāha kim rasebhyo bhāvānām abhinirvṛtīr utāho bhāvebhyo rasānām iti."

³¹¹ *NS* 6 Intro. to 6.34-38, Nagar ed., vol. 1, p. 290, GOS 36, p. 293. "dr̥syate hi bhāvebhyo rasānām abhinirvṛtīr na tu rasebhyo."

³¹² *NS* 6.35, Nagar ed., vol. 1, p. 291. "evam bhāvā bhāvayanti rasān abhinayaish saha."

³¹³ *NS* 37, Nagar ed., vol. 1, p. 291. "evam bhāvā rasāms ca bhāvayanti parasparam."

³¹⁴ *NS*, Nagar ed., vol. 1, p. 297. "idānīm anubhāvavibhāvavyabhicārisam-

which indicates rather that the *sthāyibhāva*s are led to become *rasa*s.

Another passage contains the same idea that *sthāyīn*s reach the state of *rasa*, "*sthāyibhāvāḥ rasatvam āpnuvanti*." ³¹⁵

This is the 'old' theory of intensification, in fact, that Daṇḍin knew and that Lollaṭa used. Abhinava partially accepts that psychologically a main, permanent emotion, is connected with the *bhāva*s, but this connection in itself is not an aesthetic process leading to a *rasa*. An aesthetic sentiment occurs by means of the suggestive language between the poet, actor, and audience. Bhaṭṭanāyaka does not admit the intensification process because, being a ritualist, he recognizes only a direct causal relation between sensory stimuli that are productive of knowledge through a mind-soul contact. Furthermore, Mīmāṃsakas do not admit psychological theories, particularly of the *vāsanā*s that are used by idealist philosophers to explain subjective factors in thought-production. In keeping with the language theory in which *sābdibhāvanā* effects a sentence meaning and *ārthibhāvanā* effects a higher meaning in the form of a desire to perform ritual actions, the poetic language theory says that upon understanding two levels of meaning, the audience is transformed into a higher state of consciousness through a verbal efficacy, the *bhāvakatva* that renders the stimuli--the well-ornamented *abhidhā* and dramatic portrayals--into universal elements of *bhāva*s.

Abhinava not only subscribes to theories of the various *bhāva*s but he makes the *sthāyīn* of the sentiment of peace (*sāntarasa*) the self,

yuktānām lakṣaṇanīrḍarśanāny abhivṛyākhyāsyāmaḥ. sthāyibhāvāḥ ca rasatvam upaneśyāmaḥ,"

³¹⁵ *NS* 7. 7, Nagar ed., vol. I, p. 343.

ātman.³¹⁶ Commenting on the *Nāṭyaśāstra*, he follows closely the mutual influences of *bhāva*s and *rasa*s as described by Bharata and comes to the position that *sādhāraṇīkaraṇa* can be explained only through a theory of suggestion. A communication by means of suggestion, in Abhinava's interpretation, implies a psychological structure of common types of emotions and trace impressions that makes the process of universalization possible. In this sense, when analyzing, after Bhaṭṭatauta, the theory that an actor imitates the *sthāyin* of the character, Abhinava says that it is impossible to imitate a specific emotion but the actor can only retell or re-create a common type from his own experiences and imagination.³¹⁷ In the same way Ānanda has stated in the fourth chapter of the *Dhvanyāloka* that the poet, although constrained by generic types of themes, must strive to create a vividly detailed, individual expressions out of his own imagination.

As mentioned above, Bharata (or, the *NS*, at any rate) seems to say that *bhāva*s are productive of *rasa*s, and not the reverse.³¹⁸ And when he says that *rasa*s arise from the conjunction of the *sthāyin*s with *vibhāva*s, *anubhāva*s, and *vyabhicāribhāva*s,³¹⁹ the first two are well known as

³¹⁶ *Abb* 6, Nagar ed., vol. 1, p. 331. "*kas tarhy atra sthāyī...*" "*tenātmāiva jñānānandādīviśuddhadharmayogī parikalpita viśayoparāgarahito 'tra sthāyī*" "Therefore, in this [*rasa* of peace] the *sthāyin* devoid of tinges of constructed sense-objects, possessing pure qualities of knowledge, bliss, and so on, is just the self."

³¹⁷ *Abb* 1, Nagar ed., vol. 1, p. 35-36. "*na hi naṭo rāmasaḍṛśaṃ svātmanah śokaṃ karoti. sarvaṭhaiva tasya tatrābhāvāt... anubhāvāṃś tu karoti. kin tu sajātīyān eva na tu tatsaḍṛśaṃ.*" "The actor does not effect his own grief, which is like Rāma's, because it [his own grief] is completely absent in him.... But he makes a [dramatic] emotional effect, but they are rather of the same generic type, but not like it [i.e., Rāma's grief]."

³¹⁸ *NS* 6.46, Nagar ed., vol. 1, p. 297. *idānīm anubhāvavibhāvavyabhicāri-samyuktānām lakṣaṇanirdeśanāny abhivyaṅkhyāsyāmaḥ. sthāyibhāvāṃś ca rasatvam unpaśyāmaḥ,*"

ordinary conditions in the world and they follow after the ways of the world.³²⁰ The *sthāyin*, *vyabhicārin*, and *sāttvika*s, altogether forty-nine in number, are mental states (*cittavṛtti*) which are causes of the manifestations of the poetic *rasas*.³²¹ The latter two *bhāva*s, according to Abhinava, are solely inert (*ekāntajaḍasvabhāvāḥ*) and ought not to be designated by the name *bhāva*.³²²

³¹⁹ *NS* 6.32, Nagar, ed., vol. 1, p. 271. "na hi rasād rīte kaś cid arthaḥ pravartate. tatra vibhāvānubhāvavyabhicārisamyogād rasanispattiḥ."

³²⁰ *NS* 7.6, Nagar ed., vol. 1, p. 342, "lokasvabhāvasamsiddhā lokayātrānugāmināḥ/ anubhāvā vibhāvās ca jñeyās tv abhinaye budhaiḥ."

³²¹ *NS* 7.6, vol. 1, p. 342. "tatrāṣṭau bhāvāḥ sthāyinaḥ. trayastrīṃsad-vyabhicāriṇaḥ. aṣṭau sāttvikā itī bhedaḥ. evam ete kāvyarasābhīvyaktīhetava ekonapañcāsadbhāvāḥ pratyavagantavyāḥ. ebhyaś ca sāmānyaguṇayogena rasā nīspadyante." According to this passage, and Abhinava's comment (See n. 70 below), the *bhāva*s which Abhinava calls 'mental states' are the forty-nine included in three main divisions, *sthāyin*, *vyabhicārin*, and *sāttvika*. Abhinava, in the passage cited below (n. 70), following the *NS* in saying that the *vibhāva*s--such as the seasons and garlands--and *anubhāva*s--external [symptoms] such as tears--are known in and follow the ways of the world, says that these two *bhāva*s ought not to be termed *bhāva*s because they are absolutely insentient, i.e. not *cittavṛttis*.

³²² *Abh* 7, introduction, Nagar ed., vol. 1, p. 337. "bhāvasabdēna tāvac cittavṛttiviseṣā eva vivakṣitāḥ. tathā ca ekonapañcāsatā bhāvaiḥ ity ādau tān evopasaṃharisyati. teṣāṃ tu yogyatāvasād yathāyogam sthāyisaṃcārī-vibhāvānubhāvarūpatā sambhavanti. ye tv ete rītumālyādayo vibhāvā bāhyās ca bāṣpaprabhṛtayo 'nubhāvā ekāntajaḍasvabhāvāḥ te na bhāvasabde vyapadesyāḥ." Abhinava most probably bases this opinion on the introductory prose passage of chapter seven, (Nagar ed., p. 341-342). "tatra vibhāvānubhāvau lokaprasiddhau. lokasvabhāvānugatatvāc ca tayor lakṣaṇaṃ nocyate 'tīprasāṅganivṛtyartham. bhavati cātra slokaḥ--lokasvabhāvasamsiddhā lokayātrānugāmināḥ/ anubhāvā vibhāvās ca jñeyās tv abhinaye budhaiḥ/." "Among them, the *vibhāva*s and *anubhāva*s are well known in the world, and because they conform to the nature of the world, their characteristics are not mentioned in order to check prolixity. And in this connection there is the verse, 'But the *anubhāva*s and *vibhāva*s ought to be known by the wise as very well known in [their] nature in the world, conforming to the ways of the world.' In

Among the forty-nine *bhāva* s-- *sthāyin*, *vyabhicārin*, and *sāttvika* which are states of mind (*cittavṛtti*)--the permanent emotion is likened to a king attended by the *vibhāva*, *anubhāva* and *vyabhicāribhāva* s, existing in it as qualities.³²³ Just as men who are like others in having the same limbs become kings because they are noble, moral, learned, and discerning in deeds and the arts, just so, because their substratum (*āśraya*) is great, *sthāyin* s become *rasa* s. And the *vyabhicārin* s are the attendants of the king (*sthāyin*). Bharata speaks of the forty-nine *bhāva* s together as causes that manifest the poetic *rasa* s.³²⁴ In another place, *NS* 6.38, Bharata uses still another metaphor to explain the relations between *rasa* s and *bhāva* s:

Just as from a seed a tree should come into existence, a flower from the tree, and likewise a fruit [from the flower],
Just so all *rasa* s are the root, and on them the *bhāva* s are arranged (*vyavasthitāḥ*).³²⁵

this prose passage, the divisions of the *bhāva* s consist of eight *sthāyins*, thirty-three *vyabhicārin* s, and eight *sāttvikā* s, altogether comprising forty-nine *bhāvās* which are the causes of revealing the poetic *rasa* s. The *rasa* s are originated from these through the use of generic qualities. " *tatrāṣṭau bhāvāḥ sthāyinaḥ trayatrimśadvyabhicāripaḥ aṣṭau sāttvikā itī bhedaḥ. evam ete kāvyarasābhivyaktihetava ekonapañcāśadbhāvāḥ pratyavagantavyāḥ. ebhyaś ca sāmānyaguṇayogena rasā nispadyante.* "

323 *NS* 7, Nagar ed., vol. 1, p. 343, " *yathā hi samānalakṣapās tulyapāpīpādodaraśarīrāḥ samānāṅgaḥ pratyāṅgā api puruṣāḥ kulakūlavidyākarmasūlpa-vicakṣapatvād rājatvam āpnuvanti tatraiva cānye 'lpabuddhayaś teṣāṃ evānucārā bhavanti tathā vibhāvānubhāvavyabhicāripaḥ sthāyibhāvān upāśritā bhavanti. bhāvāśrayatvāt svāmibhūtāḥ sthāyino bhāvāḥ. tadvat sthānīyapuruṣaguṇabhūtā anye bhāvās tān guṇatayāśrayante. sthāyibhāvā rasatvam āpnuvanti. parijanaḥ bhūtā vyabhicāriṇo bhāvāḥ.* "

324 *NS* 7.6, Nagar ed., vol. 1, p. 342. " *evam ete kāvyarasābhivyaktihetava ekonapañcāśadbhāvāḥ pratyavagantavyāḥ. ebhyaś ca sāmānyaguṇayogena rasā nispadyate* " See n. 69 above.

325 *NS* 6.38, Nagar ed., vol. 1, p. 292. " *yathā bījād bhaved vṛkṣo vṛkṣāt puṣpam*

Abhinava's comment is as follows:

Just as a seed stands as the basis of the tree, just so are the *rasa* s; and they ought to be explained as a development (or growth) (*vyutpatti*) preceded by a joy rooted in it [a *rasa*], and so on. An actor's activity, preceded by poetry, is rooted in the universalized *saṃvid* in the poet. This *saṃvid* is in reality (*paramārthato*) *rasa*. And the idea that the audience, overcome by its [*rasa* 's] joy, perceives the *vibhāva*, and so on, through a subsequent analytical knowledge (*pascādapoddhāra-buddhyā*),³²⁶ is for the benefit as regards the theater, poetry, and the insight of the audience. Thus, in this way, a *rasa* in the poet, standing in the place of a seed, is the root. For the poet is exactly equal to the audience. For this very reason, the teacher Ānandavardhana has said, "If a poet has the Erotic (*rasa*)...." (*Dhā* 3.42) In this sense, a flower, etc., stands for the activities of an actor, such as acting, etc., and the fruit stands for the audience's relishing of the *rasa* s. Therefore, everything really consists of *rasa*.³²⁷

Abhinava interprets Ānanda as saying that in composing a literary work, if the poet possesses the aesthetic emotion, that *rasa* is conveyed to the audience who thus also becomes *rasika*. Ānanda views a *rasa* in the old-fashioned way, i.e., that an intensification of a *sthāyin* in bringing about the

phalam yathā/ tathā mūlam rasāḥ sarve tebhyo bhāvā vyavasthitāḥ//

³²⁶ The term '*apoddhārabuddhyā*' seems somewhat out of place and therefore its meaning difficult to determine. I venture that Abhinava is using Bhartrhari's technical term to imply that the joy of *rasa* is, as Abhinava says, a solid, single mass of bliss. It is perceived as a whole in an intuition, like the sentence meaning, *vākyārtha*; and its analytical parts are later separated in a critical analysis, just as a sentence is later parsed in a grammatical analysis.

³²⁷ *Abh* 6, Nagar ed., vol. 1, p. 292. "*bijam yathā vrkṣamūlatvena sthita tathā rasāḥ...tena rasamayam eva viśvam.*"

rasa in the poet and the character .³²⁸ Lollāṭa's theory of intensification of the *sthāyīn* proposes that the stimuli, *vibhāva*, *anubhāva* and *vyabhicāribhāva*, heighten the basic emotion into an aesthetic emotion, and that this condition occurs in the character and in the actor. The difference between a *rasa* and a *sthāyīn* is a matter of degree, and by extension the spectator, in experiencing the *vibhāva*, etc., is emotionally keyed to a higher pitch of the *rasa*. According to the passage above, Abhinava also perceives that Ānanda is of the same opinion, namely that *rasa* is a heightened *sthāyīn* and that it can exist in the poet, character, and the audience.³²⁹ The passage shows that Abhinava interprets Ānanda's *Dhā* 3.42 (that a poet is god in his domain) to mean exactly that a poet's *rasa* is the seed and root that develops into the actor's acting and the audience's aesthetic sentiment: the poet, the actor, and the audience are the same because they are of the same emotive substance. This is also the identity he alludes to in *DhāL* 1.6, "*yad uktam asmadupādhyāyabhaṭṭatautena 'nāyakasya kaveḥ srotuḥ samāno 'nubhavas tataḥ' iti*," as he explicates the meaning of *pratibhā*.

Sādhāraṇīkarapa

In proposing his own version of *sādhāraṇīkarapa* and solving the problem of *svagataparagataiva* in a different way from Bhaṭṭanāyaka's, Abhinava derives a notion of aesthetic psychology from Śaiva philosophical notions of perceptions and knowledge, combined with Bharata's teachings concerning the art of the theater. The *Nāṭyaśāstra* itself does not consider

³²⁸ Ingalls points out that Bhaṭṭalollāṭa has added '*sthāyīnas*' which some critics do not accept since *rasa* can only occur in the audience, but Ānanda did not limit *rasa* in this way. Ingalls et al., *Dhā*, trs., p. 16, n23.

³²⁹ Ingalls et al., *Dhā*, trs., introduction, p. 18.

psychological factors of *vāsanā*, memory, etc.,³³⁰ but Abhinava liberally bases the structure of aesthetic perception on Sāṃkhya psychology. The *Nāṭyaśāstra* uses stock imageries in Sanskrit literature, such as of the king and his retinue or the seed and branches of the tree, Abhinava speaks of impressions deposited in endless lives that condition mental states, memory of one's own experiences, clear crystal or mirror of the mind, chains of effects of emotion; he makes personal observations about human nature in describing transitions of one mental state into another.³³¹

In Abhinava's terms, basic emotions are a permanent part of each person's emotional life which necessarily colors his perceptions. The *Yogasūtra* describes consciousness as a crystal that is highly susceptible to taking up reflections of objects through sensory perceptions, which reflections are conditioned by innate trace-impressions in the psychic life. The yogic meditation is aimed toward a complete reduction of sensory

³³⁰ Although it makes a distinction between *vibhāva* and *anubhāva* which are material things and qualities in the external world, and *sthāyīn*, *vyabhicārin*, and *sāttvika* which are *cittavṛttayah*. See introduction, NS 7, on the *bhāvas*.

³³¹ See, for example, *Abb* 6, Nagar ed., vol. 1, p. 280, where Abhinava makes the observation that when they relish the consciousness which is a single mass of sorrow, women's hearts are reposed. Or, in the paragraph immediately following, noble characters are not given to so much laughter as the lowly types. In the paragraph below that (p. 281) Abhinava describes how one emotion is mixed with and give rise to another. The most pervasive emotion is sexual pleasure. The separation from the desired object gives rise to anger. When a person is angry but powerless, fear arises. As he is fearful but desiring still to win, he becomes amazed upon seeing what he should do and wants to flee. Abhinava sums up, "For there exists no living being in whom the trace impressions of these mental states are completely absent. Only any one person has more or less of any mental state." "*na hy etac cittavṛttivāsanāśūnyah prāpi bhavati kevalam kasya cit kācid adhikā cittavṛttih kācid ūnā*."

experiences in order for the meditator to confront and burn off the 'seed' traces of his inner life.³³² In the *Dhā* 2.4, while describing the nature of *rasa*, Abhinava quotes the *Yogasūtra*, "Latent impressions are endless because desire is eternal." "Though separated by birth, place and time, the latent impressions are uninterrupted because of the correspondence of impressions and memory."³³³

Abhinava thinks of trace impressions as constituents of emotions, and the latter in turn are patterned responses to kinds of causal experiences. These responses are not categorically distinct but overlap with and give rise to other emotions. They have been so divided because human feelings, based on their psychic trace impressions of past experiences, predictably arise in response to external causes. In a real cognitive experience, a creature is

³³² *Pātāñjalayogasūtrāṇi*, with the commentary of Vyāsa and the subcommentary of Vācaspatimīśra, Ānandāśrama Sanskrit Series (ASS) 47 (Poona: Ānandāśrama Press, 1904), 3.55, p. 174. " *sattvapuruṣayoḥ suddhisāmye kaivalyam iti*." "There isolation of the *puruṣa* from *sattva* in an equilibrium of purity." The *bhāṣya* says "For one whose seed of defilements have been burned off has no further any dependence on knowledge. Through the purity of the *sattva*, this power, born from concentration, and knowledge are attained. But ultimately, from knowledge unseeing ceases, and when this ceases there are no defilements further on. From an absence of defilement, there is an absence of the ripening of actions." " *na hi dagdhaklesabhūjasya jñāne punar apekṣā kācid asti. sattvasuddhidvārepaśaitasamādhijam aiśvaryaṁ jñānam copakrāntam. paramārthas tu jñānād adarśanam nīvartate tasmīn nīvṛtte na santy uttare kleśāḥ. kleśābhāvāt karmavipākābhāvaḥ*"

³³³ *Dhā* 2.4L, Ingalls et al., trs., p. 225. See also notes 40, 41, p. 231. Ingalls provides the reference here of the *Yogasūtra* 4.10, 4.9. Ingalls in n41, p. 231, also gives an explanation of a line from Vyāsa's *Yogabhāṣya* (2.4), which Abhinava also uses attributing it to Patañjali, in *Abb*, Nagar ed., Vol 1, p. 281, " *na hi caitra ekasyām striyām rakta ity anyāsu viraktaḥ*, "the fact that Caitra is in love with one woman does not mean that he is out of love with others." This is not meant humorously, but is intended to show that beneath the particular emotions which we manifest there lies a latent capability of many others."

overcome by a variety of feelings³³⁴ and reacts to them through the means of valid of knowledge, direct perception, inference, which means are a part of the normal cognitive processes. Knowledge and experiences in the past have occurred through these means and left behind trace impressions in his/her psyche. In an aesthetic experience, due to its different means and goal, a spectator's *sthāyin*, which normally overcomes him/her and through which he/she thinks and acts without reflection, becomes an object of perception.³³⁵ Abhinava describes how such a *sthāyin* is influenced by flickering transient emotions: it is a string on which the beads of auxiliary feelings impart their colors, a configuration appearing in shifting hues of passing moods.³³⁶

The *sthāyin* becomes a *rasa* (*sthāyino rasatvam āpnuvanti*). In a real-life perception, the *sthāyin* is an individual's conscious mental state. But in an aesthetic situation the permanent emotion is again an object of the aesthetic perception. It becomes the object in the relishing of a *rasa* (*rasacarvapa*) in which many feelings are combined into a unique taste. Abhinava, therefore, speaks of the theater, the overall experience, as "an objectification of a particular, like an apperception," "*tenānuvyavasāyavat viśeṣaviśayīkāryam nāṭyam*." ³³⁷ He repeats the same idea in the next paragraph, "*tasmād anuvyavasāyātmakah kīrtanam rūṣitavikalpa-*

³³⁴ See nn. 292 and 331 above.

³³⁵ *Abh* 6, Nagar ed., vol. 1, p. 282-283. "*tsira lokavyavahāre kāryakārapasahacārītmakalīṅgadarśane... pāṇakarasāsvādo 'pi kim guḍamaricādiṣu dr̥ṣṭa itī samānam eti*."

³³⁶ *Abh* 6, Nagar ed., vol. 1, p. 281. "*tasmāi sthāyirūpacittavṛttisūtrasyūtā evāmi vyabhicārīṇaḥ... pratibhāsanta itī vyabhicārīṇa ucyante*."

³³⁷ *Abh* 1, Nagar ed., vol. 1, p. 36.

saṃvedanam nāṭyam. tadvedanavedyatvāt. na tv anukārapam."³³⁸ This passage expressed in the language of the *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvimarsinī* puts Abhinava's aesthetic theory in the framework of his general theory of knowledge.

The fundamental divergence between Bhaṭṭanāyaka's explanation of *rasāsvādāna* and Abhinava's, despite the similarity of their vocabulary, is clearly shown by structural differences of the perception. In the former, language, with its *bhāvanā/bhāvakatva* power, effects the experiential leap from ordinary perception to an aesthetic perception: the object in consciousness, *rasa*, is a perfected object (*siddharūpa*).³³⁹ This awareness is not perceived through the senses, not physically produced by external causes, and not manifested or revealed. It is, like Brahman, that which has always existed and remains only to be known when illusions created by *avidyā* has been removed. Abhinava reports Bhaṭṭanāyaka's view in the following way,

³³⁸ *Abb* 1, Nagar ed., vol. 1, p. 36.

³³⁹ Ingalls et al, trs., *Dhāt* 2.4, n. 18, p. 229. "*Siddharūpa*: The term and its implications are taken from Vānta philosophy. Saṅkara argues that knowledge of Brahman cannot be learned or produced or manifested or developed in any way, for knowledge of Brahman is Brahman, which is not a *sādhya* (that which is to be produced) but a *siddha*. Brahman and Brahman-knowledge are eternally present, the appearances to the contrary being due to illusion. Just so Bhaṭṭanāyaka would take aesthetic enjoyment to be an eternal mode of being, which is not produced or manifested. In the last analysis he puts the relation between the aesthetic efficacy of the poem and the self-realization of the audience outside the relation of cause-effect which applies to the phenomenal world. It would be the same relation as that between the Upanishads and knowledge of Brahman. Abhinava in what follows will object to this high-flying mysticism."

Bhaṭṭanāyaka, however, says, "I will call the theater that which has been accounted for by Brahma, that which has been made an account in the mentioning of various unsubstantial things wrought by nescience. For, just as [the theater] is mere imagination in essence and therefore has no single, abiding form; it suffers hundreds and thousands of imaginations at every moment; although [the theater] is different from dreams, etc.; all the more so (*susṭutarām*) being an account of the heart's apprehensions, constructed by a Brahman-like actor who does not depart from himself as the substratum, the exploits of Rāma and Rāvaṇa, etc., being unreal appear in any unreal and marvellous way whatsoever. Appearing even in that way, it becomes the means to human goals. Just so, this world is like that exactly. Consisting of an unfolding of unreal names and forms, it causes to arrive at the highest human goal by force of hearing and thinking, and so on." Thus, by hinting at the transcendent, supreme human goal, he must be implying the *rasa* of peace (*sāntarasa*).³⁴⁰

Bhaṭṭanāyaka makes an analogy that the theater, like the world, is an illusion. The theater is by this analogy a thing of the imagination, an illusion that the actor creates out of himself, in the same way that Brahman created the world. Even if they are false, the world and the theater are wonderful with all their ramifications of unreal names and forms; and they lead to the highest goal. This comparison illuminates Bhaṭṭanāyaka's conceptions of the function of *bhāvanā* and *sādhāraṇīkaraṇa*. The real world and drama are cognized in essentially the same way, through a direct perception which is

³⁴⁰ *Abh* 1, Nagar ed., vol. 1, p. 5. "Bhaṭṭanāyakaś cū brahmaṇā paramātmānā yad udāhṛtaṁ avidyāvīracitanissārahedagrahe yad udāharaṇīkṛtaṁ taṁ nāṭyaṁ taḁ vakyāmi. yathā hi kalpanāṁ āśrāsāraṁ taṁ evānavaśīṭaīkarūpaṁ kṣaṇena kalpanāśāśasahasrasaḥaṁ svapnādivilakṣaṇaṁ apī susṭutarāṁ hṛdayagrahaṇidānaṁ atyaktasvālaṁbhaṇabrahmakalpanaṇāṇoparacītaṁ rāmarāveṇādiceṣṭitaṁ asatyam kuto 'py abhūitādbhūtaṁvṛtīyā bhūti, taṁābhāsaṁāṇaṁ apī ca pumarthopāyaīṁ eti. taṁā tādṛg eva vīśvaṁ idam asatyamāmarūpaprāpācāīmakam aīha ca śravaṇamāṇaṇādivāśena paramapumarthaprāpakam itī lokottaraparamapuruṣārthasūcanena sāntarasopākṣepo yam bhaviṣyati."

not erroneous as a perception, but false because of its ontological status as an illusion.

Bhaṭṭanāyaka's use of the Vedānta language (as represented by Abhinava) of Ultimate Brahma and *avidyā* corroborates his sayings in the *Dhā* about a generic similarity between *rasāsvādāna* and *Brahmāsvādāna*. A state of consciousness called "a single mass of bliss" (*ekaghanānanda*) is Śaṅkara's description of the liberating knowledge, *prātibhājñāna*, a monistic realization freed from subjective-objective, differentiated, cognition of the world of multiplicity. The cause of this knowledge is only scripture, as Śaṅkara has argued in the beginning of his *Brahmasūtramahābhāṣyam* : Brahman is the source of scripture, and scripture is the cause of [our knowledge of] Brahman. Scriptural language enjoins rituals which bear results in the world, and the same scripture enjoins the seeking of Brahman who is without a second, *advitīya*, the pure mass of bliss which is to be attained through means other than rituals. Brahman is known by scripture and intuition, i.e. *sākṣātkāra* or one's own immediate experience, not as an object but as one's self, *ātman*.³⁴¹

We consider Nāyaka's analogy of the *rasa* experience to Brahman-knowledge in the light of Śaṅkara's theology: the illusory world is likened to a drama performed by an actor, and the audience which realizes *rasa*, the intuitive and liberating knowledge, to *jīvātman* or individual souls. We further perceive in Nāyaka's poetics a parallel between scriptural and poetic language. Scriptural language has the power, *bhāvanā*, to enjoin ritual and

³⁴¹ See Śaṅkara on knowing Brahman, *The Vedānta Sūtras with the Commentary of Śaṅkarācārya*, part 1, George Thibaut, tr., in *Sacred Books of the East* 34, Max Müller, ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press), 1890, 1.1.1-4, pp. 4-47.

spiritual actions for those who seek *dharma* and *mokṣa* respectively; likewise, Nāyaka's poetic *bhāvanā* has the power to sublimate a literal expression (*abhidhā*) to a higher goal, i.e., a *rasa*. The inherent power of *sābdī-* and *ārthībhāvanā* in poetic as in scriptural language prompts the realizer to bring about what will come about.³⁴² The aesthetic *bhāvanā* prompts the effectuation of what will come about, namely, the *rasa*, through the theatrical *sādhya*, *sādhana*, and *itikartavyatā*. It universalizes the content of a poem/play with respect to the audience so that it is emotionally stirred while remaining distant. Removing this egoistic frame of mind is the sublimation instrumental to bringing about of what will come about, namely, the *rasa*.

In Mīmāṃsā terminology, the soul is the *bhoktr*, the experiencer or enjoyer of the fruits of ritual actions. A similar process is seen in Nāyaka's formulation of *bhoga*, which is not produced, perceived, or revealed by a cause-effected action. Just as Śaṅkara's scriptural language enjoins a knowledge transcending graduated stages effected by ritual actions and their results, Nāyaka's poetic language takes the audience beyond graduated stages of ordinary verbal cognitions that describe things in the world and actions to be accomplished. Sanderson describes the medieval Kashmiri Brāhmans as follows: because scripture and ritualization "determined them from without," Tantrism began to flourish among the orthodoxy, as a way of restoring a psychic life that had been severely constrained by cast and ritual

³⁴² The *Arthasaṃgraha* puts it " *bhāvanā nāma bhavītur bhavanānukūlo bhāvayītur vyāpāra viśeṣaḥ*." Gajendragadkar, A. B. and R. D. karmarkar, eds. and trs., *The Arthasaṃgraha of Laukākṣī Bhāṣkara*, (Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass: repr. 1984, 1st ed. 1934), p. 4.

rules of purity and pollution.³⁴³ In Nāyaka's theory, an aesthetic perception is determined by the power of language, context, intonations, dramatic paraphernalia, but nothing is said about the individual's agency. As it were, after such external instruments of perception have removed all obscurations and obstructions of the self-existing (*siddharūpa*) *rasa*, the *sahṛdaya*, who is an *adhikārin*, is overtaken by the inevitable relish which is about to come into being, a *bhavitṛ*.

Abhinava's version of *sādhāranīkaraṇa*. A student of Abhinava's philosophy wonders why he habitually expresses his ideas in other systems' vocabulary and as antitheses to their theses. Without any cogent answer, this thought moves one to observe that his notion of the perceptual structure of an aesthetic experience is marked by a uniqueness which perhaps could never have been conceived in another medieval Indian philosophical system. Kashmir Śaivas' theory of knowledge, beginning with Somānanda, grounds the notion of validity and its criteria in a psychological basis of a 'precognitive' impulse on the one hand and on the relativity of correctness depending on usage, *vyavahāra*, on the other. It gives a creditable valuation of constructed thought as neither absolutely nor provisionally real, without being an epistemological error and an ontological non-entity. It mediates the Brahmanic creed that what is created and liable to transformations cannot be real, and the Buddhist skepticism that what is constantly changing cannot be a unity describable as a self. The Śaiva notion of the self, i.e., the *ātman* which is *samvid*, challenges existing notions of reality and validity of

³⁴³ Alexis Sanderson, "Purity and Power Among the Brahmins of Kashmir," In *The Category of the Person: Anthropological and Philosophical Perspectives*, Steven Lukes, et al., eds. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), entire.

cognition on both realist and idealist fronts. To the realists for whom the external world is real and existent, correctness consists in the correspondence between a cognitive knowledge and its object. Although Mīmāṃsakas hold that a cognition is valid in itself at the moment of cognition, it is understood that an error, a cognition sublated by a following cognition, is misrepresentation of the object through defects in the senses or circumstances.³⁴⁴ To the idealists, correctness, which is not correspondence to empirical objects, has as criteria the soteriological notion of effectiveness or purposiveness: that which is correct leads to knowing and attaining the ultimate reality.

For Śaivas, knowledge is equally based on sense percepts of external objects as on a subjective and conceptual construction. On the one hand, a person perceives in his cognition a real and stable thing governed by physical laws (*niyati*), and, on the other hand, this cognition is a subjective manifestation. Validity of knowledge depends on the continuity between a cognition and the purpose effected by it in this world, which, according to Abhinava, is real because it is a place where human actions come to pass. Otherwise, he says, we can call nothing else 'real.'³⁴⁵ Valid knowledge,

³⁴⁴ Gaṅgānātha Jha, tr., *Ślokaśrīlīka* 5.207, 208, 211, p. 173. "Sometimes it happens that Cognitions appear in an incorrect form; but this is due to certain discrepancies in the cognitions themselves." 208. "For 'Cognition' too cannot attain to its character, unless it is possessed by an external object." 211. "It is for this reason that the Cognition to the contrary (of any misconceived Cognition) gives rise to such a reasoning as that 'though the object really exists in another form, yet this (false) form is imposed upon it by the mind (or Cognition) (under the influences of a certain delusion.'" 211.

³⁴⁵ Arguing for the reality of verbally constructed, relational concepts which are the glue of thought-constructs, he says, "Thus even unperceived, other manifestations as the forms of universals, relations, and so on, enter into this manifestation itself."

indeed, is predicated by being newly manifested by the knower.³⁴⁶

What Abhinava assails in Saṅkuka's argument of imitation by perception largely destroys the false logic of perception, in which the traditional application of inferential middle term, and so on, seems to work until the experiential components of perception and imitation are closely analyzed. Abhinava's talk of intensification (*upacaya*) and coloration (*uparāñjaka*) of a basic emotional states affirms the notion that an experience, which is subjective, is also a valid and real response to the world. This position pointedly subverts Bhaṭṭanāyaka's denial of a substantive link between a worldly provisional reality and the ultimate *Brahmātman* reality transferred into the theater, so that the progress from seeing a play and relishing a *rasa* is a leap in experience, from illusion to reality.

Abhinava's *sādhārapīkaraṇa* comprises the unique reality of the theater created by a common imagination, and so he can say that its culmination, the *rasa*, is perceived, produced and revealed. Being universal means that an aesthetic perception is a re-creation, and drama an object created (*viṣayikārya*) in which each part uniquely recreates the whole, all being of the same type (*sajātīya*), rather than alike (*sadrśya*). The theater exists

Otherwise no transaction of the ordinary world is possible, and, thus, if this ordinary world which is beneficial to humans in all times, places, and aspects, were unreal, we know of nothing else that is real. So one should not err in of thinking [these concepts] are errors. " *evam ca ābhāsātmani asmin asaṃvedyam api... iti na atra bhṛāntiḥ iti bhramitavyam.* " IPV 2.2.7, vol. 2, p. 63.

³⁴⁶ IPV 2.2.3., vol. 2, p. 138. " *yataḥ pramāṇam nāma navābhāsarūpam pramāṇaṇi pramitīlakṣaṇam viśrāntiṃ vidadhat pramāṇam bhavati, pramāṇaṇi cāvicchinnaābhāsaḥ sarvāḥ ca pramitīḥ svātmani antarmukharūpe bhajate.* " "Because a valid knowledge in the form of a new manifestation becomes valid in creating a repose characterized by valid knowledge (i.e. the content) in the cognizer, and the cognizer who is continuously manifested enjoys all knowledges within himself inwardly."

only in the present: so long as each spectator echoes the poet's imagination, he recreates drama in himself just as the actor recreates the hero through his own psychic and emotional experiences. In this sense Abhinava speaks of a *rasa* as extraordinary, *alaukika*, which does not exist in the ordinary world and which lasts only as long as its stimuli persist. The theater, as a world of the imagination, creates its own reality apart from the ordinary and absolute worlds. Through its proper means and goal, the theater is a unity as constructed by an experience shared by the poet, the actor, and the audience.

Abhinava speaks of *sādhārapīkāraṇa* in two parallel passages in *Abh*, chapters one and six. In chapter one, he begins with the thought that an aesthetic experience depends on a mental conditioning that orients direct cognitions to an aesthetic mode. Conditioning is evinced in the spectator's intention, not to do something real, but to enjoy him/herself in being one with others. Such a consent underlies the cancellation of true-and-false judgements in ordinary propositional cognitions. This cancellation removes the time-space framework from dramatic actions, unbridles the imagination and makes the theater a single timeless and spaceless continuum. Such initial priming turns the spectator into one whose heart is spotless mirror--not preoccupied with worldly matters and not cut off from other minds and hearts. Abhinava says,

The mind, to begin with, becomes submerged in poetry, whose body consists of words and meanings that are delightful because of qualities and ornaments, whose life is an extraordinary *rasa*, by force of the hearts' sympathy. However, for everyone an insight does not arise

toward it (*tatra*) like an immediate experience which is a direct perception. But in the theater, because he has no such intention as, "Today I must do something real," and from an impression of the intention that, "I will join in the lofty, extraordinary sights and sounds whose pervasive relishing (*virasana*) will end in an essence of joy common to the whole assembly (*sarvaparṣatsādhāraṇa*), his heart becomes like a spotless mirror as his worldly being (*sāṃsārikabhāva*) is dazzled in the relish of pleasant songs and dances. He identifies with the joy and grief that burst forth, to be conveyed in watching the dramatic actions. By force of hearing a recitation when another actor enters, the determination of the sense object as Rāma, Rāvana and so on arises; the realm of objectification into knowledge and object of knowledge such as correct, false, doubt, possibility, and so on, is unembraced by an entrance (*āveśa*) of particulars of time and space. [Each spectator in the audience] has the trace impressions from determining that this is the said Rāma, conforming to and indicated by the trace impressions of experiences of love and so on and pleasant things--songs and dances--that accompany [the actor as Rāma], with the unfolding (*anuvṛtti*) of his [the actor as Rāma] trace impressions as the cause. For five or six days, his thought is full of wonder because his own self has been absorbed in the midst of Rāma's exploits...."³⁴⁷

In *Abh*, chapter six, Abhinava expresses the same idea, having prefaced the passage with the remark that a qualified person after hearing scriptural words, and poetic words, perceives subsequently a higher meaning:

A qualified person, in the case of poetry, is a person whose heart is full of spotless intuition (*vimalapratibhāsālin*). To him who understands sentence meanings from such sentences, "gracefully bending his neck...." "Also, Umā of the black curls...." "But, Śiva, somewhat....," now, there arises a perception of the nature of an immediate mental presentation, whose divisions of time designated by respective passages are blocked (*apahastita*). In this perception, the fawn that appears, because it does

³⁴⁷ *Abh* 1, Nagar ed., p. 35. " *kāvye tu guṇāḥ kṛāmanohārasabdārthasārīre... tathā paśyan pratyekam sāmājika*."

not have the form of a particular, is "fearful." Because the fright is unreal, that fear is ultimately just fear, not embraced by time and space. [This fear] is different from such notions as, "I am fearful, he is fearful--is this an enemy, a friend, or a neutral person?" which have many obstructions because other awarenesses of loss, and others, created by joy and sorrow, necessarily arise. The Fearful *rasa* is apprehended as an unobstructed (*nirvighna*) perception, entering into the heart as if it were a direct perception, turning about as if it were happening before the eyes. In this kind of fear, the self is not absolutely suppressed [i.e. hidden], nor is it described by particular [images]. And so for another (*rasa*).

For this very reason, universality (*sādhārāṇya*) is not at all limited, but, rather, it spreads out as in the perception of pervasion of smoke by fire, or, for that matter (*eva*) of trembling by fear. In this case, when they are acting out [the scene in] immediate perception, the nourishing collocation, the actors, etc., when from the force of mutual opposition, causes of restriction (*niyamahetu*) such as time, space, cognizers, and so on--factual realities cast in poems--have disappeared, in that [collocation of actors, etc.] this very universal condition (*sādhārāṇibhāva*) thrives exceedingly. For this reason, as the perception of the whole audience is a single compact mass, *rasa* thrives all the more, from sympathetic communication among all [spectators] whose minds have been made varied (*citrikṛta*) by beginningless trace impressions. And that unobstructed full consciousness (*avighnā samvit*) is *camatkāra*.³⁴⁸

The world of the theater is unencumbered by causes of restriction such as time, space, cognizers, and so on; it is pervaded by the "universal condition" thriving from the force of a common imagination which, through each person's own trace impressions, is focused on recreating the drama. Such a reality, the construct of a collective imagination, is possible because consciousness is a free and independent manifestor. In fact, the thrust of Abhinava's refutation of Nāyaka's concept of the *rasa*-- that it is not

³⁴⁸ *Abh* 6, Nagar ed., p. 278. " *adhikārī cātra vimalapratibhāṇasālihrdayaḥ... sāvighnā samvit*."

perceived, produced, and revealed -- is aimed toward establishing that an aesthetic experience is a real perception. The *vāsanā*s, basic components of mental states, underly emotive and imaginative responses to sensory perceptions in real life as in the theater. In real life, perceptions of a garden, an amorous man or woman, sidelong glances, and so on, combined with an inference based on past experiences of having been in love, engender an emotion of love, *rati*, which is just the person's state of mind. The goal of a person in this situation is to obtain the desired object of love.

In the theater, as we have seen above, Bhaṭṭanāyaka and Abhinava each has a different explanation for the process of detaching oneself from one's own emotions. Abhinava's version of the *sādhārāṇībhāva* creates a special unity in the theatrical space as described above. The goal which is present in the spectator's intention as he/she enters this space, which enchants the audience with its music, dancing, costumes, and so on, is to enjoy oneself and to relish the *rasa* in common with others. This particular intention removes the ordinary time-space framework from the imaginative constructs and erases the egoistic boundaries of the self and others, as the spectators are commonly focused on sharing an imaginative experience of the same kind. After ordinary emotions are thus universalized, they can culminate in a *rasa* only in being an object of relishing. It is the relishing and savoring of one's own varied, emotive colorings that Abhinava calls apperception, which is the theater: "*anuvyavasāyātmakam kīrtanam rūṣīlavikalpasamvedanam nāṭyam*" "The theater is a [re]creation in the nature of an apperception, namely, the perception of colored mental constructs."³⁴⁹

³⁴⁹ *Abh* 1, Nagar ed., p. 36. " *tenānuvyavasāyavai viśeṣaviśayikāryam nāṭyam...tasmiād anuvyavasāyātmakam kīrtanam rūṣīlavikalpasamvedanam nāṭyam.*

Anuvyavasāya

Abhinava describes the process by which a spectator becomes emotionally identified as follows. The spectator's state of mind conforms to that of the character, through the acting, dancing, singing, and so on, of the actor. The spectator does not believe the actor is Rāma but suspends the belief that he is not Rāma. Thus, even if the hero Rāma is not the real person on stage, Rāma's mental states are re-told through the trace impressions and mental states of the actor. For this reason, the actor is not a direct cause of emotions, but a dramatic cause of emotion, i.e., a *vibhāva*, which is a stimulus, *uparāñjaka*. The dramatic, inner states of mind are communicated through the external characteristics of *anubhāva*. These *vibhāva* and *anubhāva* cause the trace-impressions of the spectator to conform to those of the heroes. Abhinava describes further,

For five or six days, his thought is full of wonder because his own self has been absorbed in the midst of Rāma's exploits, seeing the world in that way [*tathā* as Rāma would see it] through himself without a reflection on temporal and spatial particulars, [only with the awareness] that this happens to those who do such. This world is delivered up in the manner of something devoured, being of the same type as a full consciousness (*samvijjātīyam eva*). By force of experiencing a *rasa* through impressions of songs and dances accompanying the relishing of a *rasa*, which is like a lover who is the life-breath of the stimuli of a particular consciousness. From this alone, he experiences this world which, even as it is pierced deep in the heart by hundreds of arrows, is not enjoyed as something stale. Exactly because of the way that the desire to attain various good things and to abandon evil things are always strung

taś vedanavedyātvāt na tv anukaraparūpam. "

together, he practices the good and forsakes evil. Now, because a perception of the means has been acquired, this re-creation (*anukīrtana*), a particular [kind of] apperception (*anuvyavasāya*), is another synonym of the theater.³⁵⁰

The point of the theater being a re-telling, not an imitation, which is an *anuvyavasāya* is so important that Abhinava repeats it several times, with a specific references to his teacher Tauta's objections to Śaṅkuka's theory of imitation. The term 'apperception' indicates an underlying perception of a direct perception. As he has described previously, the emotional conditions of Rāma-actor stimulates the audience into like emotions. The stimuli do not directly cause, but evoke the trace impressions in sympathetic, receptive audience to conform and form the emotions of each spectator. In this case, the audience is like the actor, who does not imitate but allows his own *saṃskāra* to shape a mental state of the same generic type as the character's as described by the poet in the poem. The fact that the audience is able to savor and enjoy this emotional experience with an aesthetic distance implies an apperceiver who enjoys the pure flavors of feelings. In a long passage, Abhinava explains why the theater is an *anuvyavasāya*,

Therefore, the theater, like an apperception, is that in which a particular is to be made an object. Accordingly, [at first] there is a belief (*abhimāna*) of directly perceiving a particular actor, Caitra or Maitra, at that time and place, wearing particular costumes, and so on; and without using any particular thing, this belief proceeds contrary to a direct perception: from the use of the word Rāma, which literally expresses the noble deeds because its meaning is well known, and which is an

³⁵⁰ *Abb* 1., Nagar ed., p. 35. " *pañcaśair divasair
sacamatkūratadīyacaritamadhyā... tad idam anumūrtanam anuvyavasāyaviśeṣo
nāṭyāparaparyāyah.* "

apperception (*anuvyavasāya*) because it denies that the [name Rāma] is a mere supposition, drama, being like a direct perception, is fit for entering into the heart because it is a place of wonderment, being strung together by pleasant songs. In drama, there is a concealment of one's own [i.e., actor's] form through four kinds of acting; which concealment is accompanied by trace impressions born from an actor's knowledge, by means of the prologue (*prastāvanādinā*), and so on. The apperception (*anuvyavasāya*) produced by the performer, who is in the midst of the collocation of stimuli, accompanied by trace impressions [of the actor], assisted by trace impressions of the sensitive audience, with sympathetic communication of the hearts as the cooperating cause for [emotional] identification, consists of the light of an innate bliss of consciousness, colored by various forms of mental states whose shapes are joy, sorrow, and so on. Thus, its various synonyms are tasting, savoring, wonderment relishing, etc. The real thing (*vastu*) that is manifest among these [names] is drama.³⁵¹

Abhinava says in fact that *anuvyavasāya*, apperception, is *rasa* and *camatkāra*. The mode in which the actor effects feelings in the audience is that which suggestions operate on the sensitive readers. In the same way that suggestion suppresses or subordinates its literal meanings to the revealed meaning, the actor suppresses his literal identity in order to reveal that of Rāma. Abhinava's superb comment on the verse, " *snigdhasyāmala...* " (*Dhā* 2.1), and Ānanda's *vṛtti*, that the word 'Rāma' is suggestive because the literal meaning is suppressed to reveal the emotional content of what Rāma enjoys and suffers, show that the actor is the suggestor, stimulating full emotional revelations in the audience who lives out the feelings of Rāma in his own psyche. Only in this way can there be an identification with another's feelings, obviating the problem of one's mind and another's mind

³⁵¹ *Abh* 1, Nagar ed., p. 36. " *tenānuyavasāyavat viśeṣaviśayikāryam nāṭyam.* " *Rāmādīśabdasyatatra yad avabhāṣate vastu tan nāṭyam.* "

without removing the process of sympathetic identification from the realm sensory and psychic perceptions.

To say that the theater is an *anvyavasāya*, Abhinava also commits himself to the position that there is an apperceiver, who looks on and enjoys the inner spectacle of emotions and savors its *rasa*s. In this sense, Abhinava speaks of the aesthetic feeling that is an *ātmaviśrānti*. Mental movements that chase after effects in the external world, lacking repose in the self, are not a solid mass of consciousness. They cannot be aesthetic, because the mind is pained by agitation. Even a woman in grief, when abandoned to its overwhelming mass, finds solace in that repose. Repose in the self is a self-absorbed relishing of the drama of the mind. To this effect Abhinava writes the benedictory verse of chapter seven of the *Abhinavabhāratī*:

The basic emotion in the heart of the enlightened
is transient emotion in the love-agitated masses.
The great emotional effect, the object of the emotional cause within
is the shape of pure *rasa*.
Let the three-eyed god be my clear and serene heart.³⁵²

The word 'apperception' naturally brings up the problem of another and more basic perception.³⁵³ The concept of *samvid* in Śaiva philosophy accommodates itself extremely to Abhinava's aesthetic theory. Because a *samvid* by nature consists of levels in which percepts arranged into coherent thoughts, it is possible for the Śaiva philosopher to postulate that

³⁵² *Abh* 7., Nagar ed., vol. 1, p. 337. " *sthāyī prabuddhaḥṛdaye
vyabhicāribhūtaḥ/kāmaḥkulāsu janatāsu mahānubhāvaḥ/antarvibhāvaviśayo
rasamāuramūrtiḥ/śrīmaṇprasanna ḥṛdayo 'stu mama trineuraḥ.*"

³⁵³ See discussions of perception and apperception in chapter 4.

although sensory percepts are the same in ordinary and aesthetic experiences, thought contents in these situations are quite different. The difference lies in the goals that govern the arrangement; percepts as arranged come to the conscious mind in particular modes of experience.

In fact, as we have seen previously, an apperception is inherent in all cognitions; it is responsible for modal differences in the creative functions of the mind. While other Indian philosophical systems have a rudimentary notion of apperception as, "*ayam ghaṭaḥ. ghaṭam aham jānāmi*," which explains in part a self-awareness and a representation of an object in "my consciousness," Śaiva philosophers suppose that every object-awareness must be combined with an underlying subject-awareness. The consciousness of the "I," as the light of consciousness (*aham prakāśātma prakāśe*), is ever present. According to Śomānanda and his followers, self-awareness is the innate joy of *camatkāra* which is the power behind all conscious awarenesses. Sentience consists precisely in the spirit and will to image an object as desired. Just so, in the aesthetic context a spectator has the same joy of being the cause and experiencer of his feelings. Furthermore, as far as it can be said that in a mental construct, *vikalpa*, pure sensory percepts are combined with mentally and conventionally constructed concepts to create a determinate cognition, the Śaiva theory of knowledge shows that a process from an incipient thought to its full development in different modes of experience is a complex one. Since there is continuity between the initial *vimarśa* up to its complete development into an effective action *arthakriyā*, as one might say that continuity exists in a potter's initial awareness of a pot (as a desire to make a pot) up to completing the making

of a pot, a purpose is inherent in the first moment of an object-awareness and tends to the completion of the initial impulse, i.e., the desire to create. A *saṃvid* is the full consciousness comprehending levels of objectification and providing such a continuity. An apperception is the mind's (*manas*) function of stringing together various percepts as events, so that they cohere in a purpose through which an action culminates in attaining its object.

In this sense, one may say that an aesthetic experience is a kind of knowledge which is an action. The action is the relishing of the bliss of one's own delicate consciousness.³⁵⁴ The theater is the place where *saṃvid*'s imaginative capacity has no boundary or obstruction (*sā cāvighnā saṃvic camatkārah*). In the theater, the psyche is so disposed that trace impressions deposited deep in it are stimulated and heightened, into hue-shifting configurations to be enjoyed with wonderment (*camatkāra*). Abhinava describes the stringing of the beads of transient emotions on the filament of a basic emotion in a way that recalls his description of apperception. Of apperception, he says:

In our philosophy it has already been established that the cognizer, a living being, being the self of his own experiences (*saṃvedana*) is like the inward string of a garland of cognitions (*jñānamālāyā*).³⁵⁵

Of the permanent emotion in an aesthetic experience, he says,

³⁵⁴ *Dhāt* 1.4, VSS 97, p. 50. "kim tu śabdasaṃarpyamāṇahrdaya-saṃvādasundaravibhāvānubhāvāsamucīta-prāgviniṣṭaratyādīvāsannūnūrāgasukumārasvasaṃvidānandacarvaṇāvyaṇṭararasaṇīyarūpo rasah."

³⁵⁵ *JPV* 2.2.3, vol. 2, p. 42. "iha jñānamālāyā antaḥsūtrakalpah svasaṃvedanātmā pramāṇa jīvitaḥhūtaḥ iti upapāditam prak." The word *jñāna* tends to indicate sensory percepts or indeterminate cognitions.

Therefore, these are transient emotions precisely in being threaded on the string of mental states that are the *sthāyin*, permanent emotions; receiving back to itself a hundred and a thousand qualities of rising and falling colors. Like beads of crystal, glass, iron, topaz, emerald and sapphires threaded on red and blue strings showing through the gaps in their midst, although these beads do not permanently give their own colorful traces to the string, they take up the configuration of a decoration made by that string. Being themselves multicolored and coloring the filament of a *sthāyin* they lead the string of a permanent emotion to a state of brilliance at different intervals, although it is pure. They are called transient emotions because they make shine as they inevitably induce [in a permanent emotion] mottled colors of the gems of preceding and following transient emotions.³⁵⁶

Of the self which is the great *sthāyin* of the *sāntarasa*, he says,

What is the savoring of the truth of the *rasa* like? It is said: the self itself is colored by zeal, love, and so on, that bestow colorings. That very self appears as a bright, white string that shows through in the intervals between gems that cover it, shining even as the truth among all the colorings such as love, and so on, in such a way that the perception "this is the self" flash out suddenly.³⁵⁷

In sum, it may be said that Abhinava, in describing the structure of the aesthetic experience, supposes that the theater is an extraordinary place because it is the expanse of the universal condition, *sādhārapībhāva*. An aesthetic experience begins with a sympathetic susceptibility to the

³⁵⁶ *Abh* 6., Nagar ed, p. 281-282. "Tasmāt sthāyirūpacittavṛttisūtrasyūtā evāmi vyabhicāriṇaḥ... pratibhāsanta itī vyabhicāriṇa ucyante."

³⁵⁷ *Abh* 6, Nagar ed., p. 335. "Tattvāsvādo 'sya kīdrśaḥ. ucyate--uparāgadāyibhū utsāharatyādibhū uparaktam... ayaṁ ātmeti nyāyena bhāsanam...."

suggestive mode of poetic language and dramatic stimuli. In both cases the mind is prone to imagining because it teems with beginningless trace impressions. It is in the nature of consciousness to become aware and of the mind to make images, drawing from the psyche's store of trace impressions.

Intuition is the source of the imaginative power. As the Śaiva philosophers explain it: the cognizer, who is the Lord, is that intuition which is colored by various things. Each thought is a new creation by the cognizer, as traces of past experiences rush in to form new ones.

In an aesthetic experience, the imagination is particularly tantalized by stimuli in the mode of conveyance that reveals by concealment. The private, inner feelings of a sympathetic and sensitive audience are intensified because they balance on a duplicity of the suggestive language as on the concealed identity of the actor disguised as hero under paints, headgears and costumes. This mode of conveyance which thrives on an opposition--or, rather, collision--of truth and untruth removes constraints of the straitly ordinary world; and in the world of the theater, strange and wonderful colorings of the inner life come into view.

Intuition in aesthetic experience

The statement

*lasmād anuvyavasāyātmakam kīrtanam rūṣitavikalpasamvedanam
nāṭyam. tad vedanavedyatvāt. na tu anukaraparūpam*

Therefore, the theater is a [re]telling of the nature of an apperception which is a perception of tinged mental constructs. But, because it is to be perceived by a perception, it is not in the form of an imitation.

furnishes a direct link between Abhinava's literary criticism and his theory of knowledge. The *Īśvarapratyabhijñā* and the *Vimarsinī* describe conscious thoughts as mental constructs colored by various sensuously perceived things. Such constructs are synthetic. The intuitive mind draws on trace impressions and combines them with sense-percepts into a single, coherent, verbalized thought. Intuition, *pratibhā*, is taken as the intuitive faculty and the content of the intuitive mind. In the *rasasūtra*, as he says that the boundless *saṃvid* is *camatkāra*, Abhinava elaborates this state of wonderment with a verse from Act V of Kālidāsa's *Abhijñānaśākuntalam* :

And, whether it is of the nature of an immediate experience, a mental perception, an imagination, or a memory, it flashes out as the truth. Let it be as [Kālidāsa] says,

"Having seen lovely sights and having heard sweet sounds,
Although a person is delighted, he becomes anxiously longing.
Perhaps he recalls in his mind something he did not realize before
--loves in previous life that are fixed in his feelings."

In this situation, indeed, the memory which is shown in the statement, "he remembers," is not well-known to logicians because its object has not been experienced before. But, rather, it is of the nature of an immediate experience whose other synonym is intuition.³⁵⁸

Abhinava uses this episode to describe an intuition as the mind's capacity to call upon trace-impressions of which a person is not self-consciously aware. They have been somehow fixed in past experiences and subliminally

358 *Abh* 6, Nagar ed., vol. 1, p. 278. "sa ca sākṣātkārasvabhāvo mēneso
'dhyavasāyo vā saṃkalpo vā smṛtīr vā tatkhātvena sphuraty. astu yad āha" ramaṇīyaṇi
vikṣya madhurāṃś ca nīsamya śabdān/ paryuṣṣuko bhavati yat sukhito 'pi jantuh//
taccetasā smaraty nūnam abodhapūrvam/ bhāvasāhiraṇi janmaṇīrasaauhrādāni."// *ātra*
hi smarātūti yā smṛtīr upadarśitā sā na tārīkēprastidhā pūrvam etasyārthasānanu-
bhūtatvāt. api tu pratibhānāparaparyāyasākṣātkārasvabhāveyam iti."

color one's state of mind in an inexplicable way. It is a process which logicians cannot explain and therefore do not admit as a valid means of knowledge. Intuition, nevertheless, is vivid and unerring because it gives vent to a part of the psychic life that is real and urges itself upon one's conscious level of awareness. As Indians see it, subliminally each human is connected through his/her beginningless trace impressions with all times, places and events that have been experienced in past lives. Knowledge of the past lies buried in consciousness and, when somehow recalled, brings with it an inexplicable authoritativeness to bear on a present situation.

Duṣyanta's mental event in this case cannot be called an imaginative or poetic thought. An anxiety comes into mind uncontrollably, without its perceiver's knowing the cause or means. The king hears music made by his beautiful queen, yet he finds no delight and longs for something unknown. Kālidāsa suggests perhaps he recalls some love from another life. Naturally, the audience knows that the king is troubled because, his memory of having married Śakuntalā having been suppressed, he has cruelly banished her and shamed her before his court. His subconscious memories are plaguing him. Puṇyārāja, in order to illustrate Bhartṛhari's notion of intuition, also cites Act I, 19, of the same play as an example: the king trusts in his intuitive feeling that Śakuntalā is a woman befitting him in birth because he, being a man of good conscience, could not have been in love with her otherwise.³⁵⁹

³⁵⁹ Cited in Iyer, *Bh*, p. 87. "*Pratibhā* includes intelligence of a high order, intuitive knowledge, the instinct of animals and birds and the spontaneous activities of newly-born babies. This kind of knowledge is far more reliable. It comes from within. While speaking about it, Puṇyārāja reminds us of Kālidāsa's statement that, when in doubt, cultured people rely on the voice of their own conscience. It was an inner

While king Duṣyanta grapples with the emergence and submergence of his trace-impressions, memories lost and regained, the audience is well aware that this marriage has been ordained and divinely sanctioned so that the offspring of the union will found a great dynasty. The king knows only through his subconscious mind, but he cannot consciously pinpoint the knowledge. Abhinava uses the above verse to exemplify an intuitive thought, or some mental content intuited. As the Śaivas say that *vikalpa* is *naisargika* and *svairacārīnī*, the intuitive mind is innate and free, acting at will, in its synthesis. Thought constructs are conditioned by the beginningless variety of trace impressions in store in one's subconsciousness, combined in unaccountable ways, and emerge in self-consciousness as a perceptible mental event. But it is because the subjective agency of consciousness is free and sovereign in combining the immediate sense reports and trace-impressions, that there can be variations to thought and originality of the imaginative mind. The outcome of mental-event formation is not determined only extrinsically, through objects of sense and the senses, but also through the intuitive subjectivity that brings together flows of percepts and predispositions into a coherent and unified thought-object.³⁶⁰

In his disagreement with Bhaṭṭanāyaka, it is evident that Abhinava's arguments for the *rasa* as an object perceived, produced, and revealed rest on the fact that the process of universalization pervades the whole theater. A *rasa* is produced by a conjunction of *vibhāva*, *anubhāva*, and *vyabhicāribhāva* with the *sthāyin*s; and intuition is a necessary

pratibhā that told Duṣyanta that Śākuntalā was fit to be married by a *Kṣatriya*." And n. 20, "See Puṇyārāja on Vāk. II. 147 and Kālidāsa, *Śākuntalam*, Act 1, 19."

³⁶⁰ *JPK*, 1.62-66, KSTS 34, 26-7. IPVV 1.6.10-1.7-3, vol. 1. pp. 338-359.

cooperating cause in both the poet and the sympathetic reader. Abhinava concisely states a definite if not well-defined structure of a *rasa* perception in a passage directly following the one quoted above,

To begin with, this is entirely a perception consisting of savoring in which just love shines out. Precisely because it is not conditioned (*anupahīta*) by another sense-object, being something to be savored, it is not a worldly, not false, not inexpressible, not like a worldly experience, and not imposed on that [worldly experience]... By all means, a *rasa* is just a *bhāva* which is to be perceived by an unobstructed perception consisting of relishing. In it, the obstructions to *vibhāva*, and so on, has been dispelled.³⁶¹

The theater is a continuum consisting of the universalized state, *sādhārāṇibhāva*, in which obstructions to experiencing the *vibhāva*s, and so on, purely as aesthetic stimuli have been completely removed. Under this condition, the permanent emotions (*sthāyīn*) become aesthetic sentiments (*rasa*) which are objects of relishing. The theater is a continuum of an unobstructed consciousness (*avighnā samvid*) in that it provides room for freely exercising the imaginative capacity. In one passage describing the mental activity called *anuvyavasāya*,³⁶² Abhinava mentions *saṃskāra* three times, and it is evident that a freedom of the imagination consists in allowing the trace impressions to emerge in profusion in their coloration of mental constructs.

³⁶¹ Abh 6, Nagar ed., vol. 1, p. 273. " *servathā tēvad eṣāsti pralīlīr āsvādātma yasyām ratīr eva bhātī. tatra eva vīṣeṣānterānupahītatvāt sā rasaniyā satī na laukikī na mithyā nānirvācya na laukikatulyā na tadāropādīrūpā... servathā rasanātmakavīlavighnāpralīligrāhyo bhāva eva rasah. tatra vighnāpasārakā vibhāva-prabhṛtayah.* "

³⁶² Abh 1., Nagar ed., vol. 1, p. 36.

Thus, according to Abhinava, mental operations are basically the same in a dramatic as in an ordinary situation. In both instances the active consciousness, whose function of synthetic thought is intuition, manifests constructs by means of logical and emotive paraphernalia. In real life where a thought or a feeling is conditioned by a purposeful activity toward a goal, the thought is just the state of mind impelling one toward an action. In the theater, the aesthetic distance consists in a process of 'apperception' in which thoughts and feelings are objects to be viewed and relished.

In Śaiva terms, a thought in an ordinary context is colored by *samskāra*s and governed by rules of rational thinking. It becomes coherent through a *samanvaya*, logical connection, between the elements in that stream of thought; the *samanvaya* is supplied by conventions and *vyavahāra*, a community of common usage, comprising criteria of validity. In a freely imaginative thought, whose presentation is immediate without the impression of having been perceived before, the mind is innate and willful in its construction. Abhinava says in *IPV* 1.6.10 that no one has seen an elephant with a thousand tusks and a hundred trunks, but that the mind is capable of imagining it.³⁶³ Even if the elephant does not exist, the mental image, at least, is real. Intuition, as the synthetic function of consciousness, is instrumental in the subjective autonomy and sovereignty of the imagination. In this way, the *Pratyabhijñā* philosophy attributes to the intuitive and constructive consciousness the power to create anew, *apūrvanirmāṇasāmarthya*. The subject, in the act of knowing, creates.

³⁶³ *IPV* 1.6.10, vol. 1, pp. 338-339. "tathā hi aparīdrśtapūrvam api... bhāsayati."

Chapter 6

Discussion and conclusion: the creative intuition

Abhinavagupta makes a claim that drama and poetry, considered as one mode of experience and instruction, are a very excellent means to achieve human goals. Poetry is a mode of instruction that imparts knowledge delightfully, in the manner of a wife; drama is vivid, being immediately present before the eyes like a direct perception, and goes directly to the heart.³⁶⁴ The structure of an aesthetic perception, as described in the previous chapter, is complex: although it arises from a basis of direct cognition and inference, an aesthetic perception is an act of imagination that is colored by external stimuli but consists in the main in an emotional and psychic construction of memory and trace impressions. Direct perceptions of dramatic actions and inferences of emotions arouse the spectators' feelings to emerge in their imagination. These, not being caused by external objects do not end in an outward-oriented action, culminate rather as an object of an inward-directed action of relishing.

Abhinava deems the *śāntarasa* the one great *rasa* that is the origin of all others,³⁶⁵ and maintains that in its savoring the soul itself shines forth

³⁶⁴ *Abh* 1.1, Nagar, ed., vol. 1, p. 6 " *lathā hi--dhīrodhātadhīralalitadhīrodhātad-
dhīraprasāntānām... sāṁśayacamatkāragocarībhūtair hrdayānupravesam vidadhad
dharmaḍicatuṣkopāyopādeyadhiyam adharādibhyas ca nivr̥tīm nirviśāṅkam vidhātā
ity asmākam adhigatastruṭāitvānām apī pratyakṣasiddham evaitat. prasiddhā cāsyā
nāryavedasamjñā viditā* "

³⁶⁵ " *ityādinā rasāntaraprakṛitvam upasamhṛtam* " *Abh* ch. 6, GOS 36, p. 341;
Nagar ed., vol. 1, p. 335.

with a sudden clarity: "This is the soul."³⁶⁶ In accordance with the teleological structure of Indian philosophies, a means of valid knowledge is that by which one judges and gains an intermediate correct knowledge in the world for the sake of reaching the higher and highest knowledge that justifies all strivings in the interim. An aesthetic experience is productive of valid knowledge in the ordinary world (*vyavahāra*) and of higher goals.

In contrast to other critics who judge the reality of the theater as true or false in comparison with the reality of everyday life, Abhinava sees an inherent validity in the structure of aesthetic experience itself. This validity is implied in the valuation of life in the world and its ordinary transactions as a real even relative to *mokṣa*, in the same way that an indeterminate cognition (*nirvikalpa jñāna*) is inherent in and continuous with a mentally constructed and verbally articulated determinate cognition (*vikalpajñāna*).³⁶⁷

The primary goal of poetry and drama is an exquisite enjoyment. Beyond the pleasures of literature, the aesthetic wonderment of *camatkāra* implies the self's awareness of its own power of imagination. Ānandavardhana suggests that at its great moments, literature has intimations of the divine. In a different way for Abhinava, the enjoyment of literature nourishes the spirit. When he speaks of the self, shining out in the midst of imaginings as

³⁶⁶ *Abh* 6, Nagar ed., vol. 1, p. 335 " *taṭtvāsvādo 'sya kīḍṛśaḥ. ucyaie-- uparāgādāyibhīr utsāharatyādhībhir uparaktam yad ātmasvarūpaṃ tad eva vīralombihītaratnāntarālanīrbhāsamānasītataraśūtravadābhātasvarūpaṃ sakalesu ratyādiśūparaṃjakeṣu tathābhāvenāpi sakṛdvibhāto 'yamātmēti nyāyena bhāsamānam paromukhaīātmakasakaladuḥkhajālāhīnam paramānandaśābhasamvid ekatvena kāvyaprayogaprabandhābhyaṃ sādharāṇatayā nīrbhāsamānam antarmukhāvasthābhedena lokottarānandānayanam tathāvidbahṛdayam vidhātā iti.*"

³⁶⁷ *JPV* 1.11-14, 19. See translation, vol. 3, pp. 70-76, 81-83.

a colorless thread that strings together shimmering beads of feelings, Abhinava seems to be describing his understanding of an ever present reality in human nature. The changing images and moods of drama are made anew with every moment, but its maker, the self that is the cognizer, is quiescent. Intuitions, tinged by various external sense-objects and internal trace impressions, are creative of an aesthetic world that each viewer relishes. Consciousness and its intuitive faculty, like Śiva and the goddess, are two aspects of an individual world-creation that reflects the universe of all imaginings. Aesthetic enjoyment reposes in the self because, there, the spectator sees the deepest and permanent basis of all feelings that otherwise overcome and drive him to actions in the world.

***Samvid* in the aesthetic context**

Having previously argued that intuition is a cooperating cause in perceiving a *rasa* on the part of the audience³⁶⁸ as well as of the poet, in commenting on verse 1.6 of the *Dhā*, Abhinava brings in several opinions from external sources, namely, of Bhaṭṭanāyaka and Bhaṭṭatauta to support his attempt to establish that intuition, *pratibhā*, is not inferrable on the part of the audience, and for that reason the experience of the poet, hero/actor, and the audience is the same.

For the sake of structural uniformity, Abhinava at first makes the poet's

³⁶⁸ *Dhā* 1.4, VSS 97, p. 60-61. On the audience's intuition: " *tas cchaktiṭrayopajamitārthānvagamamūlajāitātpratiḥhāsapavitrītapratīpatīfopratībhāśahāyārthadyotanāsaktīr dhvananavyāpārah; sa ca prāgvṛttam vyāpārātrayam nyakkurvan pradbhābhūtaḥ kāvyaīmetī*" On the poet's intuition: " *etadebbhidhāsyamānapratīyamānānopprāṇitakāvyānīrmāṇa-nipunapratibhābhājanatvenaiva mahākaṇṭhavyapadesō bhavati bhāvah.* "

creative process one in which a permanent emotion, *sthāyin*, is turned into a *rasa* as a result of the propriety of its stimuli, *vibhāva* and *anubhāva*. This creative process is exemplified by Vālmīki, the first poet. The same process now occurs in the audience as they listen to a poem or watch a play.

Pratibhā exists and functions in the poet and the sympathetic audience.

Through sympathy (*hrdayasamvāda*) and identification (*tanmayibhāva*) on the part of the audience with the author by means of literature and drama, a spectator's emotions, stimulated and colored by appropriate *vibhāva* and *anubhāva*, become an object of his/her own relishing. Thus, as he closes his comment on *Dhā* 1.4, Abhinava says,

For grief: is the permanent emotion of compassion which is itself the experience of relishing [a permanent emotion]. For although grief is a permanent emotion, the *vibhāva* and *anubhāva* appropriate to it are a mental state which in being an object of relishing is a *rasa*. Thus it is said that from propriety (*aucitya*) a permanent emotion becomes a *rasa*; because a multitude of mental states, previously perceived in oneself and inferred in others, as they create (*ādadhāna*) a sympathy between the hearts by means of a sequence of trace-impressions, are appropriated for relishing.³⁶⁹

Commenting on *Dhā* 1.6, Abhinava represents Bhaṭṭanāyaka's view of the sensitive audience as a calf that effortlessly savors the *rasa* from the Cow of Speech, the mother goddess who freely gives her essence out of love

³⁶⁹ *Dhā* 1.5, VSS 97, p. 91. "Soko hīti karuṇasya taccaṇṇāgocarātmānaḥ sthāyibhāvaḥ. soke hi sthāyibhāve ye vibhāvānubhāvāḥ tatsamucitā cītavṛttis carvyamāṇāḥ mā rasa ity aucityāi sthāyīno rasatāpatūr ity ucyate. prākṣvasamviditam paratrānumitam ca cītavṛttijātam saṃskāraḥkramena hrdayasamvādam ādadhānam carvaṇāyām upayujyate yataḥ."

for her young. In contrast, Abhinava's views the aesthetic process as requiring work on the part of everyone involved. The goddess Speech must be gently urged into yielding her shining gems, these gems being the 'sweet substance of [suggestive] meanings' (*svādu tad arthavastu*) spoken of in *Dhā* 1.6. The poet's intuition, in the sense of creative imagination, is not something inferrable by the audience, but it is rather that which the audience must identify with through his own imaginative power. For this reason, Bhaṭṭatauta says that the experience of the hero (as recreated by the actor), the poet and the audience is the same.³⁷⁰ Exercising the imaginative, intuitive power is precisely the process of recreating another's experience out of one's own trace impressions, i.e., the *anukīrtana* as described in the *Abhinavabhāratī* which has been discussed in chapter five.

In *DhāL* 3.43, when he glosses Ānanda's use of the word ' *dr̥ṣṭi* ' as *pratibhāna*, Abhinava again speaks of *pratibhā* as a 'sight' (or an insight, ' *prajñā* , ' of *DhāL* 1.6) associated with the operation, or action, which causes the relishing of the *sthāyibhāva*. This is to say that [the poet's] intuition--his imagination--makes a permanent emotion, which is in essence something to be relished, fit for being relished. The commentator explains that 'intuition' is to be understood as a transferred meaning from the literal meaning of ' *dr̥ṣṭi* , ' which signifies an ocular and sensory perception. The poet who has imagination can string together a new and variegated world at every moment because even as he is practiced in observing the real world, his 'sight' of such a world increases imagination. Perceptions of the empirical world as expressible in the literal use of language are subordinated to the

³⁷⁰ *Dhā* and *L* 1.6, VSS 97, pp. 92-94; Ingalls et al., trs., pp. 119-121.

suggestive function in poetic language. The poet's intuition is a special sight which sees literally and suggestively and whose creation always supposes a mutual cooperation between reality and imagination.³⁷¹

Viewed in the light the Śaiva theory of cognition, poetic intuition belonging to the poet and the audience, is the same as that which functions an ordinary, determinate cognition. A determinate cognition (*vikalpa*), is consciousness's reflection (*vimarśa*) that blooms forth with all its ramifications in accordance with the goal in which that cognition achieves its purposeful activity. As we have seen previously, cognition is an active and fundamentally imaginative process: because the mind constructs concepts at will out of trace impressions, cognitive contents depend as much on the arrangements of their conceptual and psychic constituents as on the pure sensory percepts of cognized objects.

Pramāṇa

Not surprisingly, Abhinava postulates that the success of a purposeful action is the criterion of valid knowledge, *pramāṇa*. A person does not strive toward a purposeful action out of correct knowledge alone; he/she strives toward a goal out of a variety of reasons, the most important of which is the desire to experience something that has been satisfying in the past, even when he/she knows that the means in the present is doubtful. By analogy, a play-goer does not aim to produce any real thing but rather to

³⁷¹ *Dhāt* 3.43, VSS 97, p. 541. "*rasān itī : rasyamānatāsārān sthāyibhāvān rasyatūm rasyamānatāpattiyogyān kurvan... apī tvārtthāntare āndriyakavijñānābhyāsollasite pratibhānalaksणे 'rthe samkrāntam*." See Ingalls et al. trs., p. 654.

enjoy himself/herself in being one with others in the audience. The goal is real, and the experience is real; the theater is neither a false cognition of the real world nor an absolute entity beyond the range of perception ordinarily existing in the world. Abhinava is able to state in a logically rigorous way that an aesthetic experience, consisting in the relishing of feelings and being brought about by the suggestive function of language in poetry as in the theater, is a real and valid experience. The subject of validity is fully expounded in *JPV* 2.3. It cannot be treated fully here and is therefore described briefly as follows.

Since they say that all changes occurring in succession are activities of the subject who is independent and sovereign in the power to synthesize and represent inner manifestations at will, the Śaivas are averse to saying that there are errors of cognition. All manifestations, as an individual's cognitions or Maheśvara's manifestations, are created ever anew. Since all are the synthetic products of the unity of the self, they are existent and valid for the moment. The fact that some cognitions are proved false at a later time does not prevent them from being valid when they are perceived. When they are sublated, this is not an error of cognition. Rather, the continuity of the cognition has been interrupted because the development of a *vimarsa* does not reach its completion in a purposeful action.³⁷²

³⁷² *JPV* 2.3.13, vol. 3, tr., p. 157-159. Vol. 2, p. 125. "apareyam bhrāntīr ucyate, anuvṛtityucīasyāpi vimarsasyāsthaīryāt. atas ca prthak idantādyābhāseṣu na kācana bhrāntīḥ, melanāṁse tu vimarsānuvṛttinirmūlanam vimarsodayakālād eva ārabhya bādhakena kriyate, itī tatraiva bhrāntībhāvaḥ, itī siddham." "The mistake is said to be this other thing, because of the instability of a presentation (*vimarsa*) even though it is piled up in an unfolding (i.e., even though the incipient presentation has begun to be developed into a full cognitive object). Therefore, in regard to each of the appearances as an object, a 'this,' there is no error whatsoever, but in regard to the part of mixing

This theory of relative knowledge stems from Somānanda's doctrine which has been set down in chapter 4 of the *Śivadr̥ṣṭi*. The earlier Śaiva philosopher is anxious to state that since Śiva exists as manifestations in all things, therefore, nothing that consists of the Lord can be an error.³⁷³ Somānanda tries to show that validity is relative according to points of view and usage, as, for example, monetary currencies are different with each locality according to the king's command.³⁷⁴ In the *IPV*, just as Śiva is autonomous in manifesting all things at will, so each individual subject is autonomous in the creation of their determinate knowledge, inasmuch as each cognition is a unity, and because a unity of related diverse things can effect a purpose.³⁷⁵ A purpose is achieved not because of correct knowledge alone but for many reasons, the most important of which is an intense desire,³⁷⁶ and it is preceded by our former experiences which are united in a single determinate perception that relates our past feelings of satisfaction with a future goal.³⁷⁷

together (i.e., the presentation of one thing is mixed up with that of another thing), there is an uprooting of a *vimarsa*'s development which is made by a subiator beginning from the very time that a *vimarsa* arises."

³⁷³ *SD* 4.6-7, p. 128. "Tathā yatra sad ity evaṃ pratītiś tad asaī katham/ yai sat tat paramārtho hi paramārthas tataḥ Śiva/ sarvabhāveṣu cidvyaktiḥ sthitaiva paramārthatā/ mīlhyā/jñānavikalpyānām sattvaṃ cidvyaktisaktatā/" "Just so wherever there is the perception of existence, how can there be non-existence. Whatever exists, that is absolute reality; for, from that [existence] Śiva is absolutely real. It has been established that the manifestation of consciousness is absolutely real in respect to all existents. The existence of imaginable false knowledges is the state of being manifested by consciousness."

³⁷⁴ *SD* 4.8-11, pp. 129-130.

³⁷⁵ *IPV*, 2.3.9, vol. 2, p. 113; translation, vol. 3, p. 153.

³⁷⁶ *IPV* 2.3.1-2, vol. 3, p. 143-4.

³⁷⁷ *IPV* 2.2.7, vol. 3, pp. 137-38

A purposeful action is the goal to be achieved in the purview of a presentation (*vimarsā*) whose development (*anuvṛtti*) is not interrupted, which is to say that a person has an incipient idea in mind. This idea unfolds into the fulfillment of its purpose. A means of valid knowledge consists in the continuity of this incipient cognition throughout until the completion of the purpose. If the goal is achieved in accordance with the aim of a cognition, then the latter is valid. Otherwise, if the goal is not achieved, the cognition is not valid: it is interrupted and replaced by a new cognition. Abhinava defines it in this way,

Whatever creates the result of a *vimarsā*, whose stability (*sthairya*) is not sublated and therefore whose unfolding (*anuvṛtti*) is not obstructed, that is a valid means of knowledge in the form of awareness (*bodha*), based on the object of awareness and resting in the cognizer himself.³⁷⁸

It is to be noted that the cognition relevant to a purposeful action is an indeterminate cognition (*vimarsā*). According to Abhinava, even the first presentiment of an idea is accompanied by a subtle verbalization. The indeterminate, rather than a determinate, cognition is developed in an 'after-function' (*anuvṛtti*) into an action-effective idea, and finally into action itself. A continuity between an initial awareness, its fully verbalized thought, and its completed action underlies Abhinava's notion of a valid means of knowledge. The author says,

The result of a valid means of knowledge is an operation; and an operation is established as not different in form, because it is carried out

³⁷⁸ *JPV* 2.3.1-2, vol. 3, p. 144.

or because it is caused to be carried out, because the cause and the result of the means of valid knowledge are not different. And because a means of valid knowledge is *vimarsā* which depends on words, and a word proceeds in respect of only one manifestation unmixed with other manifestations in the form of time and space, and so on.³⁷⁹

The process of cognition, from indeterminate to determinate, involves an incipient presentation which, when determined by intuition as what it is and what it is not, becomes a determinate cognition. Intuitions bring forth trace-impressions in consciousness which are associable with percepts in immediate presentation. Abhinava describes in a similar way the unfolding of an aesthetic imagination. Upon seeing an actor, there is a determination (*adhyavasāya*) that the sense-object is Rāma. It is the unfolding or development (*anuvṛtti*) of Rāma/actor's trace impressions in the dramatic portrayals that stimulates the spectator's own trace impressions to develop after Rāma's. The result is that the spectator thus becomes identified with Rāma; for a duration of time he lives in the midst of Rāma's exploits and sees the world through Rāma's eyes.³⁸⁰

This unfolding of an initial sensory-perception into a fully detailed experience can be directly linked with intuition. Inasmuch as various intuitions afford possibilities for determining a purely sensory perception, when a determination is made, the intuition of what it is contains within it the seeds of development provided with all qualifications which can effect

³⁷⁹ *IPV* 2.3.2, vol. 2, p. 75. " *kīṃ ca iha vyāpārarūpam eva phalam vyāpāras ca vyāpṛīyamāṇāi vyāpāryamāṇāi vā ananyākāra eva siddhaḥ itī--abhedaḥ pramāṇaphalayoḥ vimarsabaleṇ ca yatāḥ pramāṇam. vimarsas ca śabdajīvitāḥ. śabdas ca ābhāsāntaraḥ deśakālādīrūpāir anāmṛṣṭe ekairālvābhāsamātre parvartate.* "

³⁸⁰ *Abh* 1., Nagar ed., p. 35. See also n. 347 and text, ch. 5, p. 203.

an action. Abhinava expresses the idea that an intuition, as the incipient thing-concept determination (*so 'yam*), contains in itself the unfolding of all later stages of expression. And this intuition, as the initial, noumenous Speech, is active in the first moment of an indeterminate presentation. He says,

That which possesses the three limbs, namely, the *pāsyantī*, *madhyamā*, and *vaikhari*, in the form of a triad of objectifications, is the supreme goddess who embraces the multitude of all differentiated things to be objectified. Speech bespeaks itself; it is called Speech because, 'it reflects' (*vakti svarūpam vimṛśatī vāk*).³⁸¹

Considered in this way, the validity of a presentation that develops continuously into an action consists in a non-interruption of a original awareness. The universalized time-space continuum of the theater, assisted by the pleasures of songs and dances, provides an atmosphere in which the imaginative re-creation of drama proceeds with no obstruction. Universalization thus clears the path for the unfolding (*anuvṛtti*) of an original perception, i.e., that this is Rāma. An aesthetic imagination then thrives on the suggestive nature of stimuli. The spectator's own mental states are shaped after the mental states of Rāma. This unfolding of the first perception, "this is Rāma," follows the vicissitudes of Rāma's pleasures and pains; it culminates in the act of savoring a *rasa* and thus fulfills the purpose which the original cognition serves.³⁸² Of the action of savoring,

³⁸¹ JPVV 1.1, vol. 1, p. 15. " *trayo 'vayavāḥ pāsyantīmadhyamāvaikhariḥ yasyāḥ sa trayī parāmarśarūpā krodhīkṛtābhinnasamasāparāmarśanīyarāśīḥ parā bhagavatī vakti svarūpam vimṛśatī vāk* "

³⁸² Cf. the aesthetic unfolding in *Abh*, in the paragraph beginning with " *kāvyo tu*

Abhinava has this to say,

By means of these things composed by the poet and made to be like a direct perception by the actor, a thorough enjoyment in the nature of an unobstructed experience which is a *rasa* is produced instantly. For the action of savoring is not achieved in the termination, like the action of going, but rather in the very first moment. And it precisely consists in an immediate perception of the *vibhāva*. A *rasa* is led to the presence of relishing and so on through skills in leading [i.e., acting] (*nayanacāturya*) of him who is taken as the range (i.e., object) of relishing in the first place....³⁸³

The above passage shows that Abhinava thinks of relishing as an action, with a *rasa* as its object, following from the first moment of determining that the actor, as a sense-object, is Rāma in content. The act of relishing arises immediately upon the audience's perceiving drama as if it were a real event and the actor as if he were Rāma, but knowing from its original intention that all this is a play. The success of relishing depends on a true-

*guṇālahkṛamanoharasabdhūrtāśarīre lokottararasaprāṇake hrdayasamvādavasāi
nimagnākārikā tēvad bhavati ciltavṛtīḥ. kintu sarvasya pratyakṣasākṣātkāralpā na
dhīr udeṭi. nāṭye tu pāramāṛthikam kiñcid adya me kṛtyam bhaviṣyatyū... idānim
anukīrtanam anuvyavasāyaviśeṣo nāṭyāparapryāyaḥ. nānukāra iti bhramītevyam."*
Abh 1, Nagar ed., vol. 1, p. 35. In the middle Abhinava says, "*samyagmīthyāsamsāya-
sambhāvanādijñānavijñeyatvaparamārsānāspade, rāmarāvanādīvisayādhyavasāye,
tatsamskārānuvṛttikāraṇabhūtatatsahacarahrdayavasīturūpagīḥlodyapramadānubhavas
amskārāsūcitasamanugatataduktarūparāmādhyaavasāyasamskāra eva bhavan....*" See
also nn. 347, 350 and translations, pp. 203, 207.

³⁸³ Abh 6, Nagar ed., p. 303. "*etaiḥ kavīnopanibadhair natena ca
sākṣātkāralpatām ānītaiḥ samyag ity avighnabhogātmakasambhogo rasa utpadyate
jhaṭ ity eva. na hi gamanakriyāvat paryante rasānākriyā nispadyate. api tu prathamā
evāvasare. sa ca vibhāvasākṣātkārātmaka eva. tasya tu prathamakakṣāyām eva
rasanāgocaravābhimatasya nayanacāturyaādhībhiraso rasānādyābhimukhyam niyate."*

false dialectic of dramatic reality culminating in savoring.

In this situation, the awareness of an awareness is the apperception, *anuvyavasāya*, of which Abhinava speaks. And when he says,

*anuvyavasāyavad viśeṣaviśayikāryam nāṭyam... tasmād
anuvyavasāyātmakam kīrtanam rūṣitavikalpasamvedanam nāṭyam. tad
vedanavedyatvāt. na tv anukaraṇarūpam* ³⁸⁴

The theater is that of which particulars are to made its objects, like an apperception.... Therefore, the theater is a [re]telling of the nature of an apperception which is a perception of tinged mental constructs. But, because it is to be perceived by a perception, it is not in the form of an imitation,

the statement means in full that the mind produces and represents --from direct cognitions of actors and dramatic actions and from the spectator's own trace impressions forming memories and inferential judgements coloring emotional attitudes in his conscious mind--a series of mental events which are again objects in a more encompassing level of consciousness that arranges the whole set of representations into a coherent whole. The unity of that "apperceiving" consciousness, occurring after determinate cognitions, is conditioned by a coherence which tends toward accomplishing the goal, namely the savoring of *rasa*. It is this end, namely, the bliss of aesthetic enjoyment that governs the coherence in synthesizing the series of determinate mental events of the play into a whole and meaningful episode.

It is in this sense as well that Abhinava speaks of *pramāṇa* as the means

³⁸⁴ *Abb*, Nagar ed, p. 36; GOS 37, p. 38.

of valid knowledge, which is continuous, i.e., which comprises the continuity of a single knowledge up to accomplishing its effect. In this context, the word "*ekaghanasamvid*" also gains another meaning-dimension: *samvid* is a compact mass because of its uninterruptedness, which is to say that our experience of a drama makes sense as an episode or a whole event because no other thought comes in between to interrupt the continuity. It is this continuity that fosters the experience of *rasa*, and because we experience a *rasa* that we say an aesthetic experience is a unity. In a more commonplace illustration, we see that a Walter Mitty-like experience also depends on non-intrusion of any other reality into a fanciful stretch of the imagination.

The validity of the aesthetic experience, accordingly, can be reconsidered in the light of the validity of a cognition. If a determinate cognition is valid, which is a unity persisting without contradiction or sublation throughout and culminating in a successful action, then the validity of the theater is precisely this: consciousness becomes an unobstructed, compact and gapless mass singularly focused on recreating images in drama. This solid mass of images, tinged with variegated feelings, culminate in a successful action, namely the bliss of savoring the *rasa*. The essence of the theater, according to Abhinavagupta, is a unity of one uninterrupted cognition, a continuum of *samvid*, ending in the fulfillment of relishing a *rasa*.

Other means of knowledge, such as inference, and so on, are effective for purposes of everyday life; and they are also valid. Reason in *vyavahāra*, the rational order, is based on invariability of *niyati*, the physical laws which Śiva ordains to regulate the universe. An inquirer asks: but it is known that some yogis supersede this law, who make at will an object produced in the

world by natural causes. Can one still trust the validity of inference, knowing that some things are created through the natural properties of empirical things and some are created by a yogi's will?

Abhinava says that in each case *vyavahāra* is a standard of a right judgement: in the event that *niyati* prevails, it forms a criterion for valid inferences. And in the case of yogic creation, it forms a criterion of common usage from which supernatural powers may deviate.³⁸⁵ The validity of reason, inasmuch as it serves certain purposes, is not destroyed because another set of rules prevails. Abhinava calls his theory of error *apūrṇakhyāti*, or an incomplete knowledge, which can become more adequate with a subsequent and fuller combination, like a jeweller's knowledge that is sharpened by experience.³⁸⁶ He is at pains to emphasize the reality of this world, which follows from the sovereignty and reality of individual subjects. If the criterion of validity of a cognition lies in being a unity of diverse things related in one awareness that leads to a successful action, the world in which successful actions occur is the domain of valid cognitions. From the standpoint of utility which is a criterion of validity, the world is valid.

The ultimate means of valid knowledge is Śiva who cannot be measured by any limits or criteria. Śiva is the unity that continuously manifests the universe; Śiva's own being is the screen on which all phenomena are projected. Śomānanda says the Lord exists in all beings from the world of moving and unmoving creatures down to the lowest hell; the Lord is like a

³⁸⁵ *JPV* 2.4.10-11. See translation, vol. 3, 173-178.

³⁸⁶ See Navjivan Rastogi, "Theory of Error According to Abhinavagupta." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 14 (1986) 1-33.

great king, full of joy and caprice in his creations.³⁸⁷ To say, as Abhinava does, that the self shines out in an aesthetic experience means in part that one recognizes oneself in this context as Śiva--the poet and the dancer who creates the three worlds with Himself as the screen. Abhinava says, in connection with permanent emotion of the peaceful *rasa* (*sāntarasa*), "*tattvajñānam ātmajñānam*." "What, then, is a permanent emotion in this connection? Since it is said that the knowledge of the truth alone, to begin with, is the means of liberation, just its permanence is proper in respect of liberation. And the knowledge of the self alone is the knowledge of the truth"³⁸⁸ The liberating knowledge, for Abhinava, is the recognition: "I am Śiva."

Intuition and self-knowledge

The problem of self-recognition arises through the fact that, in Abhinava's philosophy, the subject who manifests cannot be manifested, which is to say that the self cannot be represented or viewed. The subject whose nature is full consciousness (*saṃvid*) is an ever-expanding, active source that assimilates, combines, arranges and projects images. The term *saṃvid*, signifying the basic components of light and its reflection capable of originating complex mental functions, appears frequently and particularly in connection with the tasting of the *rasa*. Abhinava's speaks of a *saṃvid* as a solid mass of consciousness in which the aesthetic experience is enjoyed.

³⁸⁷ *SD*, 1.36-38, p. 25. See n. 6, ch. 2, p. 13.

³⁸⁸ *Abh.*, 7, Nagar ed., p. 331: "*kas tarhy atra sthāyī. ucyate iha tattvajñānam eva tāvan mokṣasādhanaṃ iti tasyaiva mokṣe sthāyīṭā yuktiḥ. tattvajñānam ca nāmātmajñānam eva.*"

The usage of the term connotes not only a subject who unifies and manifests all mental images, but also the maker (*nirmāṭr*) who carries out actions in accordance with his inner designs.

In a curious way, although Abhinava affirms the reality of the world and imagination, he considers such a reality a reflection rather than the substance. While everything that exists is a real reflection in the mirror of the mind, there is no original, inasmuch as the subject who manifests is not perceptible.³⁸⁹ Śiva, when in the pure and withdrawn form, is just a mass of transcendent and blissful consciousness. If it is said that the mind reflects the external world, there, again, the world is a reflection of Śiva's consciousness. In the *Paramārthasāra*, Abhinava says,

There, the whole world, whose expanse is multifarious bodies,
senses, and realms, is within.
And in it, the enjoyer, the embodied one, is just Śiva who has
taken to becoming a beast (*paśu*).

Just as pure crystal takes the form of colors of various kinds,
Just so, too, the Lord takes the form of gods, humans, beasts,
and vegetations.

Just as the moon moves over moving water and is still over still
water,
Just so is the soul in the assemblage of bodies, actions, and
worlds.

Just as Rāhu, although unseen, comes to light in the orb of the
moon, just so
the pervading soul shines in the mirror of the mind with the

³⁸⁹ *JPV* 2.1.5, vol. 2, p. 19. " *anābhāsas ca pramāṇa, sa hi na kasya cit ābhāsate, tasya sarvam ābhāti yataḥ* " "The subject has no manifestation, for he is manifested to no one because everything appears from him."

senses as its support (*indriyāśrayeṇa* i.e., by means of).

Just as in a clear mirror, [one's] face shines out; just so, this light shines in the substance of the mind, purified by Śiva's power (*śivasaktinirmale dhātave*).

Because it rests in itself, the perfect, great joy in the form of light,
it is full of will, consciousness, and the senses; it is full of endless powers.

Pure and quiescent, devoid of all mental constructs, without rise and fall,
in Him who is the ultimate substance the world of thirty-six states shines.

Just as variegated towns and villages are continuous in a mirror-reflection, and yet appear distinct from each other and from the mirror as well,

Just so, although not separated from an awakening in the purest and supreme Bhairava, this world appears divided within itself and from Him.³⁹⁰

There are several images of the reflections: the soul shines in the mirror of the mind, the world shines in the mirror which is Bhairava. Abhinava suggests through the imagery of mirror that an individual does not see the self or the Lord directly, because neither is evident to the senses; and the world perceived as separate appearances is in fact a continuity as reflected through the senses in the homogeneous substance of the mind. The manner of seeing is like a reflection, and just as the universe is a reflection in the

³⁹⁰ Liliane Silburn ed. and tr., *Le Paramāthasāra*, (Paris: E. De Boccard, 1957), p. 57 (text). My translation.

mirror of Bhairava, so Bhairava as the self is reflected in the mirror of the mind. The mirror, the substratum, is clear but holds and unifies images in itself; it is the conscious substance. Reflections in the mirror are cognitions, continuous because they are of the same substance and discontinuous because they appear to consist of disparate and external objects. And yet, consciousness, which is the agent of the manifesting mind, has no form apart from its reflection, namely, Speech.

The imagery is an expression of idealism. An existent is that of which mind is aware, and even the mind does not have direct access to the world, but perceives it through the medium of the senses. In chapter three of the *Tantrasāra*, Abhinava speaks of human perceptions of the world through the senses as a reflection, *pratibimba*: what I experience as taste is a mental event consisting of what the sense-organ of taste conveys by being in contact with an object appropriate to the sense. Experiences of the empirical world are "reflected" in "my" mind.³⁹¹

Abhinava's idealism is qualified: external objects exist without being perceived by me, but their existence depends on some consciousness. If one accepts that there are other consciousnesses besides one's own and that there is a real, empirical world, then one must admit a unity of Consciousness by which all things and consciousnesses exist at all times.

All this multitude of existents (*bhāvajāta*) are merely reflections in the sky of awareness, because they possess characteristics of reflections. For this is the characteristic of a reflection: that which is manifested as divided, which has no power, and which appears to be mixed with others,

³⁹¹ Abhinavagupta, *Tantrasāra of Abhinavagupta* (TS), edited with notes by Mukunda Ram Sastri (Repr. Delhi: Bani Prakasham, 1982), ch. 3, entire.

that is a reflection, like a face in the mirror, a taste in the saliva, scent in smelling.... Thus, just as this [world] appears as something reflected, just so the universe [appears as reflected] in the light of the Supreme Lord.

[Objection] In this connection, what would the original be? [Answer] Let it be nothing. [Objection] Then does it have no cause? So, then, it is a question of the cause--What use is the logic of talking about an original? The cause will be just the power of the Supreme Lord, which is synonymous with independence. Because the Lord bears the reflection of the universe, he is the universe. For the universe, consisting of [full] consciousness (*saṁvinmaya*), is the place of the manifestation of [limited] consciousness (*caitanya*). It is for that reason that the universe is in this case a reflection (*pratīpa*). Thus he bears the reflections. And thus, to begin with, the nature of the lord, the self of the universe, is not unreflected (*anāmrṣṭa*).³⁹²

Therefore, to see the universe of diversity as a unity is to perceive that diversity is held together in the Consciousness of which my consciousness is a reflection. The mirror imagery suggests that the individual minds, when they perceive the world, reflect Śiva who unites all minds and all events, manifesting them in Himself. This is an interpretation of Abhinava's imagery of "reflection."

The passage above proceeds to say that this reflection (*āmarśa*), in the form of the Supreme Sound (*paranāda*), is innate to consciousness. The collection of powers of Śiva is the arranger of the world, and the powers (*śakti*) are the syllables. Arranged in various ways, they are the levels of awareness (*parāmarśa*) which, in the lower stages, are realms of elements (*tattva*), and worlds (*bhuvana*).

³⁹² JS 3, repr. of KSTS 17, p. 10-12. " *sarvam idam bhāvajātaṁ bodhaḥagane... paramesvarasya svarūpam na anāmrṣṭam bhavati.*

The whole world shines within the self here,
 just as various arrangements shine in the mirror.
 An awareness (*bodha*), furthermore, through an unfolding of [one's]
 essence in innate (*nija*) *vimarśa*,
 reflects the universe, in the same way that a mirror [reflects]
 us.³⁹³

Abhinava also speaks of rituals as the mirror of the self:

There, on a pleasant ground, he meditates on his very own form, like a spotless mirror. Having seen [his very own form], as if a reflected by an image (*mūrtibimbītam iva*), not different from the circle of deities to whom one ought to perform sacrifice, he should worship with lovely flowers, scents, drinks, libations, eatables, incense, lights (*dīpa*), oblations, songs, music, and dance, and so on; he should recite, and he should praise--to receive certain identity with Śiva (*tanmayībhāva*). For, one who looks at his own face in the mirror constantly should soon know it with certainty. In this case, no particular sequence is important, except for the identity with [Bhairava].³⁹⁴

Masson cites an instance where Abhinava compares the actor to the *Paramātmān*.³⁹⁵ The passage states that just as the Supreme Soul, even without leaving the light of his consciousness, mirrors (*ādarśayati*) his

³⁹³ *TS* 3, p. 19. " *antarvibhātī sakalam jagadātmamāha/ yadvad vicītraracanaṁ mukurāntarāle// bodhaḥ param nījavimarśasānuvṛtīyā/ visvam parāmrśati no mukuras tatthā tu.* "

³⁹⁴ *TS* ch. 20, (Delhi: Baniprakashan) 1982, p. 180 " *laura hrdaye sthaṇḍile vimalamakuravad dhyāte svam eva rūpaṁ yājyadevatācakrābhinnam mūrtibimbītam iva dṛṣṭvā hrdayapuspagaṇḍhāsavatarapañavedyadhūpadīpopahāra-stuṭigītavādyanṛtādinā pūjayeṭ, japeṭ, stuvīta--tanmayībhāvēśaṅkītam labdhum. ādarśe hi svamukham avīratam avalokayataḥ tatsvarūpanīscīṭh acireṇaiva bhavet-- na cātra kaścit kramah pradhānam--rte tanmayībhāvē.* "

³⁹⁵ Jeffrey Masson, *AR*, vol. 1, p. 36, vol. 2, n. 299, p. 50. Passage cited, *Abh.*, vol. 3, p. 124 (Baroda ed., 1954).

nature which seems to be tinged by mental states appropriate to the bodies and their sheaths, so, too, the actor, without leaving himself as the support, appropriately through the use of the dances and songs, and so on, shows himself to the spectator in such a way that he seems to be embraced (*ālīṅgita*) by the nature appropriate to him, through his movements, costumes, and so on.

The actor is likened to Brahman because both conceal their identities under disguises as they generate seemingly real events that sway and beguile spectators. But again, to Abhinava, the actor is a vessel, a *pātra*, the vehicle or vessel for the audience's enjoyment of a *rasa*.³⁹⁶ Abhinava does not mean that a cognition that penetrates theatrics and lays bare the true identity of the actor would lead us to the knowledge of the truth. He does not say that one comes face to face with the reality of the self. But the self is perceived in the midst of phenomena of one's own imagination, never directly. As the spectator savors the feeling of feelings in imagination, he retreats from external goals of objectification, drawing the world of Rāma and Sītā into his heart. This experience, enveloped by and contained in a purely subjective realm, whose aim and activity rest within oneself alone, is a repose in the self (*ātmaviśrānti*).

The term *samvid* describes consciousness that is aware of its object and itself through functions of illuminating and representing things as mental images. In the context of aesthetics, *samvid* is regularly used in connection with the production and enjoyment of a *rasa*. Abhinava says the spectator,

³⁹⁶ *Abh.* 6, vol. 1, Nagar ed., p. 289. " *ata eva ca naṭe na rasah kutra tarhi... āsvādenopāyah. ata eva ca pātram ity ucyate. na hi pātre madyāsvādah. api tu tadupāyaksh.* "

as he puts himself in the exploits and feelings of Rāma, experiences a world delivered up in the manner of something devoured, a world of a generic type of *saṃvid*.³⁹⁷ Speaking of theatrical universality which is not limited but extended, Abhinava tells us that a *rasa* thrives especially when the perception of the whole audience is as a single mass because trace impressions of all minds, made varied by beginningless impressions, are in sympathy; and this unobstructed consciousness (i.e. the imaginative expanse), *avighnā saṃvid*, is aesthetic wonderment.³⁹⁸ The chief thing in this regard is the fact that some consciousnesses, *kāś cit saṃvidat*, are the bases of human goal.³⁹⁹ Or, Abhinava asks, whose consciousness rests in an unimportant object since an unimportant idea does not rest in itself as it runs after something else more important? Therefore, the insentient categories of *vibhāva* and *anubhāva* and the passing *vyabhicāribhāva*, although included in *saṃvid* by nature, are not important. The *sthāyin* is different from these. Therefore it is a vessel of relishing.⁴⁰⁰ Abhinava

³⁹⁷ *Abh.* 1, vol. 1, Nagar ed., vol. 1, p. 35. *evamkārinām idam itī līdhātma-kavidhī samarpitam saṃvijñānam imam saṃvidviśeṣarañjakaprāṇavallabhāpratīma-rasāsāsvādasahacararamyagilālodyādīsamskārarasāvasena... Subham ācaraty asubham samujjhatī.*

³⁹⁸ *Abh.* 6, vol. 1, Nagar ed., p. 278. "evam paro 'pi. tata eva na parimitam eva sādharāṇyam. api tu vitatam... ata eva sarvasāmājikanām ekaghanatayaiva pratipatteḥ sūtarām rasaparipoṣāya. sarveṣām anādivāsanaśīrīkṛtacetasām vāsanaśaṃvādāt. sā cāvighnā saṃvic camatkārah."

³⁹⁹ *Abh.* 6, Nagar ed., vol. 1, p. 280. "tatra puruṣārthanisṭhāḥ kāścit saṃvida itī pradhānam."

⁴⁰⁰ *Ibid.* "apradhāne vastuni kasya saṃvid vīśrāmyatī. tasyaiva pratīyasya pradhānāntaram pratyānubhāvataḥ svātmāny avīśrāntatvāt. ato 'pradhānatvam jñāte vibhāvānubhāvavarge vyabhicārinicaye ca saṃvid ātmake 'pi nīyamenānyamukha-

speaks of savoring one's own *saṃvid* in the way that some women finds a repose in their heart by immersing herself in single mass of grief.⁴⁰¹ In another place, he calls *saṃvid* the permanent emotions that overpower creatures.⁴⁰²

If one interprets the act of savoring *rasa* merely as an apperception (*anuvyavasāya*) which is a mental operation (*mānasapratyakṣa* or *mānasavyāpāra*), and the *rasa* as an object to be realized in one's own consciousness (*svasaṃvedanasamvedya*), the term *saṃvid* may be understood simply as a passive consciousness, like Sāṃkhya's crystal (*sphaṭikamaṇi*) or Vedānta's Brahman. Examples above show that *saṃvid* actively governs objects and activities of theatrical elements, i.e., the *vibhāva* and *anubhāva*; sometimes it denotes particular states of consciousness. It is, therefore, proper to attribute to the term *saṃvid* that we find in Abhinava's literary criticism the same meanings as in his theory of cognition. In this sense, consciousness in which the *rasa* is realized is active. It possesses projecting and reflecting aspects; it is free and sovereign in its power to represent mental images. Consciousness illuminates its objects. In the process of representation, it combines sense percepts with elements of memory in the subconscious. The determinate representation that follows occurs in consciousness's reflective function (*vimarśa*) in the form of Speech, through intuition--the power to create anew--excluding what the object is not and determining what it is.

saṃprekṣiṇi sambhavaṭī. tadatirīkṭaḥ sthāyy eva tathācarvanāpātram."

⁴⁰¹ Ibid. "tatra sarve 'mī sukhaḥpradhānāḥ. svasaṃviccarvanarūpasyaalkaghanasya prakāśasyānandarasaṭvāl."

⁴⁰² Abh 6, Nagar ed., p. 281. "sthāyītvam caṭāvatām eva. jāta eva hi janitū iyaṭībhīḥ saṃvidbhīḥ parīto bhavati."

Of the ultimate *rasa*, the *sthāyin* is so permanent and enduring that all other permanent emotions are transient.⁴⁰³ Abhinava says that the self shines through. The *sthāyin* of *sāntarasa* is the soul; and the knowledge of this *sthāyin* is the knowledge of the truth, which is the knowledge of the self. All emotions dissolve in and issue from the self, which is the screen on which all other emotional states are projected.⁴⁰⁴ He describes in the following way how one may have an experience of the soul:

What is the savoring of its truth like? It is said: the self itself is colored by zeal, love, and so on, that bestow colorings. That very self appears as a bright, white string that shows through in the intervals between gems that cover it, shining even as the truth among all the colorings such as love, and so on, in such a way that the perception "this is the self" flashes out suddenly. It lacks the web of all miseries in being dependent on others. Shining forth universally as the result of a composition and performance of poetry, as the unity of *saṃvid* which is the attainment of the supreme bliss, [the self] turns the heart to look toward a supra-mundane bliss without rupture with an inward-looking state.⁴⁰⁵

An experiencer of any *rasa* s tastes the flavors of feelings and sees colorings of his inner world. But there is no color for the peaceful. T. E.

⁴⁰³ *Abb* 6, Nagar ed., vol. 1, p. 331. : "*tattvajñānam tu sakalabhāvāntarabhūtisthānīyaṃ sarvasthāyibhyaḥ sthāyitam..*"

⁴⁰⁴ *Abb* 6, Nagar ed., vol. 1, p. 331. "*tenātmāiva jñānānandādivisuddhadharmayogī parikalpitaṣṭayoparāgarahito'tra sthāyī.*"
"Therefore, that self, provided with pure qualities of knowledge and bliss, and so on, and lacking in colorations of mentally constructed objects, is the permanent emotion."
"*tattvajñānam tu sakalabhāvāntarabhūtisthānīyaṃ sarvasthāyibhyaḥ sthāyitamam.*"
"But the knowledge of the truth (i.e., the self) standing for the screen of all other emotions, is the most permanent of all permanent emotions."

⁴⁰⁵ *Abb* 6, Nagar ed., vol. 1, p. 335.

Lawrence once says of the desert: it has no taste.

Imagination seeks to act on no goal beyond itself: in viewing the workings of one's own heart and mind, the seer is a creator who takes pleasure in the independence and sovereignty of his creations. If the Śaivas say that Śiva is the dancer who dances out creation on the screen of his own being, the spectator in his limited way weaves the world of illusions out of the senses and traces impressions of beginningless experiences. The Lord dances according to his will, and in the real world humans act in conformity with Śiva's imaginations that create new images of the world with every moment. In the theater, the spectators dance to the stimuli in a world created by the poet and the actor; and for the duration of the drama the audience are bound together as one mind, or as one universe analogous to that created by Śiva. The world of the theater in its way is like the universe in which all creatures dance with the dance of Śiva.

The self that reflects Śiva, i.e., acts as creator of images, is Śiva. So the Śaivas mean when they say, "I am Śiva." The self is not an object, and is not manifested in experience. The repose in the self (*ātmavisrānti*) is the ultimate substratum. To experience the *ātman* is just to be in the *ātman*. Indeed the Śaivas seek the *ātman* as if to catch the fleeting wind. Thinking that it is, as Abhinava describes, in the interstices of experience, they enjoy heightened experiences in order to catch the bright white consciousness in between. The origin of this metaphor can be seen, for example, in the *Spandakārikā*, exhorting followers to find and hold on to the *nirvikalpa* consciousness, riding on the waves (*spanda*) of one's own volitions and seeking to be delivered to waves of universal volition, moving the world in

pulses of consciousness.⁴⁰⁶ Words are a bondage: ordinary language is the fetter that ties cattle to *samsāra*; but pure and subtle language in its original power, is the link to pure consciousness.⁴⁰⁷

In the context of the theater, we see that Abhinava's linking of the poetic language, embodied by the actor's dramatic presentation, to the soul, is constructed equally on traditions of poetics and dramatics as on Śaiva philosophy.

The situation seems to have been that at the height of the power of Kashmirian kings and the most culturally and intellectually productive

⁴⁰⁶ Kallata, *Spanda-Kārikās: The Divine Creative Pulsation (SK)*, with the *Spandanirpaya* Commentary of Kṣemarāja, Jaideva Singh, tr. (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1980). See verses 1.8, p. 57. "*na hi cchānodanasyāyam prerakatvena vartate/ api tv ātmabalasparsāt puruṣas tat samo bhavet*." "For a person does not impel the urgings of desire, but rather he may be equal to that [activity] from a touch of the power of the self." The following verses in chapter one teaches that when an individual, frustrated by a desire and an inability to do things, abandons himself to his innate nature and becomes one with the *spanda*, he will naturally know and do what is desired. (pp. 61-71) Language can bind and makes a person a beast (*pasu*) 3.,13, p.153, 3.15-16, pp. 162-164, because it gives rise to constructed thoughts. But when joined with the *spanda*, he is the master of the *śaktis*, i.e. the phonemes: 3.19, p. 170.

⁴⁰⁷ Vasugupta. *Śiva Sūtras: The Yoga of Supreme Identity (Śs)*. With the *Vimarsinī* Commentary of Kṣemarāja, translated with introduction, notes, exposition, glossary and index by Jaideva Singh (Repr. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1982 [1st edition 1979]). See 1.2, p. 16. "*jñānam bandhaḥ*" "Knowledge is bondage." 1.4, p. 25. "*jñānādhiṣṭhāna mātṛkā*" "The Mother (i.e., the set of phonemes that are the alphabet) is the basis of knowledge." But from the grace of a teacher, there is an awakening to the circle of phonemes, 2.7, p. 104 "*mātṛkācakrasambodhaḥ*." The seeker gains mastery over his worldly condition. 2.9, p. 120. "*jñānam annam*." "Knowledge is food." In the *SK*, and *Śs*, *śakti* is regularly taken to be the set of phonemes by which ideas are formed. The *Śs* also says that the self is the dancer, the mind the theater, and the senses are the spectators. 3.9-11, pp. 152-156. "*nartaka ātmā*" "*raṅgo nītarātmā*" "*prekṣakāṇḍriyāṇi*."

period of the kingdom, there were within a period of a few hundred years flourishing activities among poets and poeticians. Drama and poetry, which were allied arts and had always treated emotional topics and exploited the suggestive functions of language, at that time became subjected to schools of literary criticism that sought after a wider explanations for the causes of beauty in poetry. This intellectual expansion can be accounted for, perhaps, by the prevailing scholarly and philosophical interests, especially in grammar at the court of the kings of Kashmir.⁴⁰⁸ In society, sectarian groups seemed to be active in propagating and furthering the beliefs of their sects.⁴⁰⁹ The question of the soul which had been kept outside the realm of poetic criticism was brought into it; and from that introduction, various metaphysical and religious views were annexed in providing a broad, logical and psychological basis for investigating the causes of poetic beauty.

Bhaṭṭanāyaka, as quoted by Abhinavagupta, seems to have been intent on elevating the aesthetic experience to a transcendent level, and Abhinavagupta, while bringing Nāyaka back into the world, asserts that the soul is manifest in the *sāntarasa*. An analysis of perceptions would naturally

⁴⁰⁸ See *RT*, fourth book and fifth books. Account of scholars at Jayāpīḍa's court, 4.488-499.

⁴⁰⁹ See Alexis Sanderson, "Saivism and the Tantric Traditions," in *The World's Religions*, Stewart Sutherland, et al, eds (London: Routledge, 1988). Kalhana's in reporting the loyalty of minister Śūra to king Avantivarman seems to account for their rapport in part by the fact that they minimized their religious differences. *RT* 5.43, p. 191. "The king, who conformed to the pleasures of his minister as [if it were that] of a deity, bore himself [outwardly] as a worshipper of Śiva, though he was [in reality] from childhood a worshipper of Viṣṇu." *RT* 5.124, p. 202 "Having there become certain of his [near] death, he disclosed to Śūra, at the end of his life and with folded hands, his attachment to the worship of Viṣṇu, which he had long hidden." This episode seems to indicate that sectarianism was a significant social and political factor.

lead to questions of their ultimate basis. It seems inevitable that aestheticians, in bringing literary criticism under a general discussion of metaphysics, would describe an aesthetic experience as sublime because it is enjoyed above and beyond sensory pleasures. Sublimation implies a moral hierarchy--the placement of values in a vertical order of goodness. This hierarchy readily exists in the four goals of human life, and a value relative to liberation is conceived for an aesthetic experience as for other kinds of knowledge leading to higher moral purposes.

Both Nāyaka and Abhinava are fully aware of differences between the experiences of yogis and those of an aesthetically sensitive audience. Although an enjoyment of a *rasa* is blissful, unlike anything in the world and comparable only to the bliss of a mystical experience, there is obviously much less at stake in going to the theater than becoming an ascetic or a renunciant (*sannyāsin*). The ease of an enjoyment of a *rasa* is matched by its short-lived existence: it is created in the theater only, and although it may leave trace impressions (*saṃskāra*), the experience itself does not last beyond the duration of the theater. The approach toward a larger metaphysical picture attests to a desire to provide a theoretical continuity between one kind of elevated, extraordinary perception and another. In the case of Abhinavagupta, for whom continuity between the most minimal to the most exalted experiences exists in the unity of *saṃvid*, there is no interruption between an ordinary and a transcendent experience. Each experience is a dialectic of the one and the many, a relation between an image-forming unity of consciousness and its innate Speech (*vāc*) that gives consciousness its form of diversity.

Seeing language as extrinsic as do Mīmāṃsakas, or as intrinsic as do Bhartṛhari and the Tantrikas, effects the ordering of authoritativeness and hierarchy of objects in experience.⁴¹⁰ Thus, Sanderson perceives the phenomenon of the expansion of Tantrism among householder Brahmins as a conflict of values. This tension occurs between the Mīmāṃsaka ritualism, rendering a person an object of scriptural injunctions, and Tantric ritualism, seeking to restore a sense of individual identity and power. Sanderson writes,

First, the Mīmāṃsaka ritualists, specialists in the interpretation of the Vedic texts as the sole authority for the duties of the twice-born, required the orthodox person to recognize as his a world in which all form is external to consciousness. He was not to view ideas and language as a field of internal construction, an inner depth coming between him and the world in itself. For such a formulation would have undermined his realism, causing him to doubt whether he was in fact in contact with an external world at all.⁴¹¹

Of a Tantrika's objective in meditating on sensual images, Sanderson writes,

His idealism in the Tantric domain was the evocation of an omnipotent, all-containing identity immune to this self-imposed tyranny of extrinsicist inhibition.⁴¹²

⁴¹⁰ On language and authoritativeness, see in general, Madeleine Biardeau, *Théorie de la connaissance et philosophie de la parole dans le brahmanisme classique*, Le Monde d'outre-mer passé et Présent, première série, 23 (Paris: Mouton & co., 1964).

⁴¹¹ Alexis Sanderson, "Purity and power among the Brahmins of Kashmir," in *The Category of the Persons: Philosophical and Anthropological Perspectives* (Steve Lukes et al., eds., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 193.

⁴¹² Alexis Sanderson, "Purity and Power," p. 200.

Tantric initiation and meditation, completely guided by the teacher's instructions, are processes of intense imaginative activity by which, according to Sanderson, the individual reasserts his absolute agency over his mental projections. We see a structural similarity between an aesthetic imagination and a Tantric ritual imagination as described by the same author:

Daily recreating the maṇḍala in mental worship he summons from within his consciousness the deities it enthrones, projecting them on to a smooth mirror-like surface to contemplate them there as the reflection of his internal, Āgamic identity.⁴¹³

Sanderson shows, in fact, that

Possession (*samāveśa*) is the absence of this subordination of one's essence to these projections. It is, says Utpaladeva, the state in which the pure agency of consciousness reasserts itself within them, revealing their dependence upon it.⁴¹⁴

In poetics, the term *āveśa* is used by Abhinavagupta in a way that recalls the idea and process of possession. A *rasāveśa*, for example, is a state of mind overwhelmed by a *rasa*, and the entrance of *rasa* is an intense absorption experienced as a gapless unity of consciousness by the

⁴¹³ Alexis Sanderson, "Maṇḍala and Āgamic Identity in the Trika of Kashmir," ("Maṇḍala") in *Mantras et Diagrammes Rituels dans l'Hindouïsme* (Paris: Éditions du CNRS, 1986), pp. 169-70.

⁴¹⁴ Alexis Sanderson, "Maṇḍala," p. 176.

subject. Possession is an imagination of certain fixed images, serving the purpose of seeing the self reflected in the conscious mind.⁴¹⁵ The single-pointed experience of *rasa* is an apperception in the sense that imagination, colored by dramatic stimuli, is enjoyed by and as an innermost awareness. Resting on this sustratum of *samvid*, aesthetic imagination is untouched by time and space parameters orienting it to any other purpose except bliss, *camatkāra* or *ānanda*.

Abhinava conceives of such a bliss essentially as the wonder and amazement of self-consciousness (*camatkāra*), which he represents by the phrase, "I am the light in that light," " *aham evaṃ prakāśātma prakāśe* " ⁴¹⁶ In *IPVV* 1.5.11, he alludes to different kinds of perceptual wonderment, (*camatkāra*) :

But in relishing the taste of honey, and so on, there is an intervention of the object's influence. Therefore, even in poetry and drama, and so on, there is an absence of that [an object's influence], but there is a piercing through (*anuvēdha*) of trace impressions. But even there [in poetry and drama], those whose hearts are intent on dispelling every bit of intervention arising in that way truly receive the highest bliss.⁴¹⁷

The realization of one's own absolute agency, i.e. that "I am Śiva," is founded on the supposition that language is the constant accompaniment of consciousness, of Śiva as of everyman; and that the individual mind which reflects the seething soul is the reflection of the universe that reflects Śiva's irrepressibly energetic playfulness. If one agrees with Sanderson⁴¹⁸ that

⁴¹⁵ Cf. above, n. 394.

⁴¹⁶ *IPV* 1.51.11, vol. 1, p. 243. Or, "Being light, I illuminate."

⁴¹⁷ *IPVV* 1.5, vol. 2, p. 179. " *madhurādīrasāsvāde tu... labhanta eva paramānandam*."

⁴¹⁸ Alexis Sanderson, "Purity and power among the Brahmins of Kashmir," p. 191:

Saiva Tantrikas, such as Utpaladeva and Abhinava, were responsible for domesticating radical asceticism and routinizing it among Kashmirian Brāhmanic householders, it will not be an overstatement to say that the process of making *śākta* practices meaningful in the Brāhmanic worldview relies in many ways on Bhartṛhari's theory of language and metaphysics. Although the linkage between Bhartṛhari to the esoteric and sectarian traditions remains ambiguous,⁴¹⁹ the notion that *vāc* as the consort of Prajāpati is the connecting link between humans to the cosmos through *mantra*, is a well-known phenomenon of the Hindu and Vedic world-views.⁴²⁰ Possibilities for feminizing the verbal aspect of consciousness, making it powerful independently of Brahman, can be seen in Bhartṛhari's statements describing Speech (*vāc*) as the form and the binder of consciousness whose essence is Brahman. Such possibilities are especially marked in passages that institute *pratibhā* as an ontological real: by following Speech to its source, one comes upon the ultimate origin (*parāprakṛti*);⁴²¹ those who know Speech, by purifying it and cutting the

"Nowhere else at any time did this fundamental element in Indian society find so articulate a voice, and as it grows in strength we witness the strategies by which certain groups within these radical sects were brought in from the visionary fringe to accommodate areas of orthodox self-representation." And "Śaivism and the Tantric Tradition," pp. 661-662.

⁴¹⁹ See D. Seyfort Ruegg, *Contributions*, entire. It seems, however, that *śāktism* predates Bhartṛhari, and Ruegg points out possible connections between them.

⁴²⁰ An exposition of the heart as the seat of *mantra* in Abhinavagupta's work, the *Parāṭmāsikalaghuvṛtī*, is found in Paul Muller-Ortega, *The Triadic Heart of Śiva: Kaula Tantricism of Abhinavagupta in the Non-dual Śaivism of Kashmir* (New York: State University of New York Press, 1989).

⁴²¹ *VP* 1.14, *vṛtī*, DCMS 32, p. 48.

knots of multiplicity, go to its original source and become one with the self, the great soul, who is the Bull of the Word (*śabdavṛṣabha*).⁴²² These passages treat *śabdabrahman* and *pratibhā* effectively as two entities that are ultimate sources of language. And we see in āgamic Tantric texts, viewing the world as composed of the god and his consort, depictions of the latter as the power (*śakti*) which is Speech (*vāc*).

Grammar is the means of purifying defects of Speech, leading to the original and undivided state of Speech in which thought and words are inseparable. In *VP* 1.131, Bhartṛhari describes the process of coming up to the origin of changes of states as ascending to intuition, whose cause is reality (*tattvaprabhava*): a person who understands this Being (i.e., intuition) which is provided with the power to achieve an end (*sattām sādhyasādhanaśaktiyuktām*)⁴²³ attains felicity. In the accompanying verse, Bhartṛhari says that in order to reach the inner light of unity, the knot of egoity has to be cut. The knot, we recall from *VP* 1.4, is the knot of perception in the subjective/objective mode by which the idea of the "I" arises. Reaching Brahman is simply the cutting of the knots of egoity.⁴²⁴ Bhartṛhari associates, if not equates, the knots of subjective-objective experience with differentiation of the unity into diversity, which is Speech. He restates the knot-cutting idea, which is an attainment of the original unity of consciousness, in a supporting verse,

vācaḥ saṃskāram ādhāya vācam jñāne niveśya ca

⁴²² *VP* 1.130-131, DCMS 32, pp. 191-203.

⁴²³ *VP* 1.130-131, DCMS 32, p. 202.

⁴²⁴ *VP* 1.5, DCMS 32, p. 22, "mamāham ityahaṃkāragraṇthiśamatikramamātram brahmaṇaḥprāptiḥ."

*vibhajya bandhanāny asyāḥ kṛtvā tām chinnabandhanām
jyotir āntaram āsādyā chinnagranthiparigrahaḥ
pareṇa jyotiṣaikatvaṃ chitvā granthīm prapadyate.* 425

Having purified Speech, and having placed Speech in knowledge,
Having separated its bindings, and having made its bondage severed,
Having come near the inner light, he who has severed the hold of
knots,
Having cut the knots, becomes one with the highest light.

Passages such as this express ambivalent values of Speech as the form of diversity, which is the basis of worldly life and communication on the one hand, and as the binder to that life and to one's egoity which must be cut off in order to regain unity. In Abhinavagupta, we find the same sentiment realized in differentiating *vāc* into the conventional, artificial language and the real or Tantric language. The first, used in the world, binds humans to the world of *samsāra*; the subtle language creates the world and leads back to the all-powerful subject.

Conclusion: *Pratibhā* and its scope

Abhinava's concept of *pratibhā*, in various contexts, possesses shades of meanings blending philosophy, aesthetics and religion into one another. When he speaks of intuition in poetry and the theater, it is understood that the depths of poetic meanings can be realized and savored because humans, as poets and audience, have a god-like creative capacity. Creative power, furthermore, is full of desires, feelings and caprice that are characteristically Śiva's way of being. When Abhinava speaks purely of cognition in an

425 *VP* 1.131, DCMS 32, p. 203.

epistemological context, he calls the cognitive process an original creation (i.e., making what has not existed before, *apūrvanirmāṇa*) and describes cognitions as tinged and colored by various empirical (*padārtha*) and psychic (*saṃskāra*) things. Bringing these ideas into literary criticism, he sees that the imagination as projected intuitively onto the mirror of the mind is not different from the imagination by which a seeker looks for the absolute in the mirror of his ritual experiences. The self that one comes to see is the same in all cases because the substance, and the matrix, of experiences is one only: there can be none but one creator who spins the yarn of realities as of illusions. Everything is illusion, and everything is reality. One can see, not directly but in reflections of one's thoughts and feelings, the self that ordains experiences and which is the source and criterion of all relative conditions of reality.

In several major works of Abhinavagupta, *pratibhā* is prominently mentioned in the beginning. We find it in the *Tantrāloka* 1.2, 3.66, 10.78-79, and expounded in a detailed hierarchical classification in chapter thirteen. In the *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvimarsinī* and the *Vivṛtivismarsinī*, it appears in verse 1.1.⁴²⁶ His works on poetics contain references to intuition early on: it appears in the *Locana* at 1.1, although Ānanda does not mention it until verse 1.6, and in the concluding verse of the first *uddiyota*. In the *Abhinavabhāratī* Abhinava alludes to it in chapter 1. In the *Parāṭṛṃśikāvivaraṇa*, *pratibhā* appears in the commentary of verses 5-9 as *nirvikalpasamvid*.

⁴²⁶ *DbāL* 1.1., VSS 97, p. 28. "vāgvikalpāḥ vāgpravṛttihetupratibhāvyāpāra-prakāṣa itī vā"

The thread running through the concept of intuition in all these works is, first, a glorification of the creative power of Maheśvara, which power is the goddess, God's constant companion: she encompasses all creations that are the Lord's imaginations.⁴²⁷ She is *parā vāk devī*, who herself radiates into potent sounds; she is the real and uncreated Speech, independent of convention. In the multivalent senses of the word, the fecund Mother (*kaulikī*) is not separable from the ordinary intuitions: every insight seems imbued with this original empowering.

In Abhinava's conception, *pratibhā* is valid knowledge, or the means of valid knowledge, because it is unerring, and creative. Harold Coward likens the authoritativeness in Bhartṛhari's notion of intuition to Kālidāsa's exemplification of the same concept in the *Śakuntalā*: King Duṣyanta has certain intuition that the young ascetic (*tapasvinī*) is a fitting wife for him.⁴²⁸ Abhinava takes *pratibhā* in its highest degree of soteriological efficacy to be the great knowledge that the self is bondage and liberation; this intuition occurs to one without scholarly or preceptorial instruction. It is said in chapter thirteen of the *Tantrāloka*:

⁴²⁷ Ahinavagupta, *Tantrāloka*, vols 1-8, with the commentary of Jayaratha, edited by R. C. Dwived and Navjivan Rastogi (Enlarged ed., Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1987 [1st ed., KSTS, 1918-1938]). Jayaratha in the commentary of *TA* 1.2, vol. 2, p. 17, calls her "desireness of [the Lord] who desires to create."

⁴²⁸ Coward, Harold G. *Sphoṭa Theory of Language (Sphoṭa)*. Repr. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1986 [1st edition, 1980], p. 124. "Not only is it the source of all popular word usage, but, according to Kālidāsa, *pratibhā* is all that function of the mind that provides the strong guiding principle when one finds oneself in the midst of doubts as to the right course of action to follow." After an explanation of *pratibhā* by P. K. Chakravati, *The Linguistic Speculations of the Hindus*. (Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 1933), pp. 113-115.

Because, just in and by himself, he knows that the self is bondage and liberation,
that is the great, intuitive knowledge, which does not depend on book-learning (*sāstra*) and teachers.⁴²⁹

Unlike Śaṅkara's sudden and undifferentiated *prātibhāsikajñānam*, Abhinava allows that there are gradations of intuition and that it can be taught:

That light of gradation consists of the intense, medium, and slow states.

These very states of grace each abide in three ways. The very intense fall of grace from the force of the fall of one's own body (i.e. death). Or, that which bestows liberation at that time or at another time by degree. Because it is middling intense, still, it checks ignorance. The moon of a teacher, whose rays of intuition calms the night, destroys ignorance and pain, causing to shine forth a sight full of joy.⁴³⁰

Its strength can increase with attention and practice, and it is useful for life in the world:

The more the [phoneme's] uncreated form is discerned,
the higher gradations of self-wonderment are brought forth.

⁴²⁹ *TA* 13.132, vol. 5, p. 2287. " *svayam eva yato vetli/ bandhamokṣatayāmatām/ tatprātibhāṁ mahājñānam/ sāstrācāryābapekṣi yat.* "

⁴³⁰ *TA* 13. 120-249, vol. 5, pp. 2283-2354. These verses contain a discussion of kinds of liberating intuition, which Abhinava also calls *śaktipāta*, and the teachers. 13.129 *tārātamya prakāśo yas tīvrāmadyamamandatāh//* 13.130 *tā eva śaktipātasya pratyekam traidham āsthitāh//* 13.131 *mokṣapradas tadaivānya/ kāle vā tārātamya taḥ/ madhyatīvrāt punaḥ sarvaṁ ajñānam vinivartate.* 13.133. *pratibhācandrikāśāntadhvāntas cācāryacandramāḥ/ tamastāpau hanī drśam visphāryānandanirbharām.*

Conventional language being inwardly [i.e. psychically] submerged further and further back in the first, non-dual phonemes, those who have a variety of intuitions in the conventional language, steeped in its more and more primordial portions, who rest on intuition itself, abounding in its original power, quickly become skilled as poets and speakers in every way.⁴³¹

This trust in the intuitive is founded on Bhartṛhari's thought that intuition supersedes other kinds of knowledge as a means of valid knowledge. It has been shown previously that for the grammarian, intuition is an apprehension of the sentence-meaning, going beyond the grammatical relations of expressor and expressed to link a linguistic meaning with reality. And because the use of language in the world has arisen in two ways, from the Veda on the one hand and with the linguistic principle inherent in consciousness on the other, all knowledge woven on the fabric of language as used to communicate ideas in an individual's mind, is intertwined with the Veda as its origin.

If language structures thought, it does so not only through its main grammatical efficiencies (*śakti*) of form (*mūrti*) and action (*kriyā*) that order time, space and relations in thought; but also through the way that scripture, and the arts and sciences that have developed around and in consequence of it, has conditioned the content of thought. Every form of

⁴³¹ *JĀ* 11.76-79, vol. 5, pp. 2152-2154. "yathā yathā cākṛtakam/ tadrūpam atiricyate// tathā tathā camatkāra-/tāratamyam vibhāvyaṭe// ādyāmāyīyavarṇānārnimagne collarottare// samkete pūrvapūrvāṃśa-/majjane pratibhābhidaḥ/ ādyodrekamahatve 'pi pratibhāitmani niṣṭhitāḥ// dhruvam kavītvavakṛtva-/śālīlām yānti sarvataḥ." These verses are found in almost exactly repeated in the *Mālinīvijayottaravārtika* 1.1031-1032, Madhusudan Kaul Shastri, ed., KSTS 32 (Srinagar: Jamu and Kashmir State), p.94.

conduct and way of thinking, even seemingly immediate and fresh, is inevitably colored by traces of tradition. Tradition [*āgama* i.e., scripture and its major and minor limbs] is continuous as consciousness itself.⁴³²

The value of an intuition that appears original and new is rooted in and co-extensive with the value of tradition that is beginningless. The intuitive, in the narrowest sense of an apprehension of a *vāk्यārtha*, apprehends a meaning which is an idea of an external object (*pratyaya*)⁴³³ as well as an object (*vastu*).⁴³⁴ Although the primary Brahman-world may be homogeneous, the use and apprehension of a linguistic expression in ordinary reality --precisely the fact that language is the form of knowledge⁴³⁵--entail a complex of factors: the material world on which word-meanings are imposed, the fact that it is perceptible to the senses with which they are in a relation of fitness, the nature of determinate and indeterminate cognitions, psychic factors such as trace impressions, memory

⁴³² VP 1.42, DCMS 32, p. 98.

⁴³³ VP 1.23 *vṛttī*: "indriyaviśayaavad vā prakāśyaprakāśakabhāvena samayopādhir yogyatā śabdārthayoḥ sambandhaḥ. arthasarūpapratyavabhāśānām pratyayānām bāhyeṣv arthesu pratyastānām akṣaranimittāksarakāśpanāvad arthavad evaika viśayaive bhūyupagamyamāne nityam avicchinna pāramparyaḥ kāryakāraṇabhāvaḥ śabdārthayoḥ sambandhaḥ." "Or, like a sense and its object, the relation of a word and its meaning is a fitness by being a light and the illuminated, on which [fitness] time is superimposed. It being accepted that ideas, manifesting together with the forms of things cast upon external things, have one object, like a meaning (*artha*) which is caused by the letters and mentally composed through letters, the relation between a word and its meaning is eternal, being a cause and effect relation having an uninterrupted continuity."

⁴³⁴ VP 1.123 "vastvātmā jñānānugato vyaktarūpapratyavabhāso jñāyata ity abhidhīyate." "It is said that the thing itself, conforming to knowledge and appearing in a clear form, is known."

⁴³⁵ VP 1.124, DCMS p. 190.

and feelings, the body of knowledge based communication (*vyavahāra*) which is bounded and increased by language, and, finally, conventions which are made of language and based on language.

Bhartr̥hari says that a sentence-meaning is an intuition: the efficiencies residing in words and binding the whole [expressor-expressed relationship]⁴³⁶ are eyes through which an intuition arises. The sentence meaning in this case is not a derivation of a series of word meanings, which may be gained in a translation (*anuvāda*) or a paraphrase (*samākhyeya*), by substituting synonyms for terms in the original sentence.⁴³⁷ In fact, Bhartr̥hari says that a meaning cannot be repeated, which is to say that it cannot be restated in another way without the use of another, similar sentence. An intuition of the meaning encompasses a complex of factors mentioned above, entailed by the use of language of which a sentence is a complete unit of communication.

To reconsider *VP* 1.118, "*śabdesv evāśritā śaktir viśvasyāsyā nibandhanī/ yannetraḥ pratibhātmāyam bhedarūpaḥ pratiyate*," the efficiencies, eyes of intuition, are the binders, therefore, not of word meanings alone but of the whole, *viśva*-- the complex of accountable and unaccountable elements in the active consciousness and its activities, a unity that becomes diverse in the form of language through the binding

⁴³⁶ See Raghunath Sarma's commentary of *VP* 118. Raghunath Sarma, *Vākyaśāstram*, with the *Ambākarī* commentary, Sarasvatī Bhavan Sanskrit Series 91, (Varanasi: Sampurnanand Sanskrit Vishvavidyalaya, 1976), p. 170-72)

⁴³⁷ See John Brough, "Some Indian Theories of Meaning," p. 420. "If on this analogy we proceed to explain the sentence on the basis of an analysis into words, we are in fact merely giving the commentary on it in what are ultimately other words, not words of the sentence itself."

efficiencies of words. The unity of intuition is perceived, whose appearance consists of differences, precisely through the binding efficiencies of words. Efficiencies combined are a complex, a whole that is understood at once. And an intuition coming to mind in a moment branches out in different images in awareness, through the efficiencies of words that communicate and expand it in a sequential linguistic form.

Intuition, although a flash of understanding, is not empty. Just as the seers' insight into unity is divided into many and proliferates into all learnings, and just as *prakṛti* evolves into the world, a flash of insight becomes diverse in form. Every insight is based on every other insight before it, of which scripture is the most continuous, original and basic. The superiority of scripture as the means of knowledge of *dharma* rests on the spiritual excellence of their teachers who have direct intuitions of reality. Bhartṛhari describes intuition in *kāṇḍa* 2 of the *VP*:

Just as in ordinary discourse people cannot repeat meanings,
so a wise person should not think to repeat them.

Another intuition of meanings arises in grasping a discrete thing.
They call it a sentence-meaning created by word-meanings.

[The intuition,] "It is this," can in no way be paraphrased by others.
Functioning in each soul, it occurs to the knower and even he
cannot describe it.

It is not thought out and seems to associate meanings.
Becoming as if the whole, it exists as the object.

Produced by a direct word or by following an instinct,
no one gainsays it as the way to act.

The whole world agrees that it is a valid means of knowledge.
It is known that even animals behave under its power.

Just as qualities of matter arise effortlessly when they ripen, just
so intuitions of those who have it are seen to be slow and so on.

For, who makes the male cuckoo warble in spring?
Who taught creatures to build their nests?

Who urges wild animals to take joy in food, to fight or swim--
behaviors known at birth by their offsprings?

This arises from tradition, accompanied by a natural disposition,
but tradition is distinguished by proximity or remoteness.

They know that by applying practice in one's natural walk of life,
intuition is visibly perfected and brought to excellence.⁴³⁸

The larger sense of intuition is founded on revelation,⁴³⁹ which is an
imitation, *anukāra*, of Brahman. The Veda ramified in remote and
proximate relations to various humans propels them to right actions in
varying degrees, as opposed to natural disposition such as Speech and the
instinct of animals that impel them to behave instinctively. The Veda is the
intuition of sages who perceived *sattā*. Each individual's insight
approximates this reality, and other, lesser seers increase learning through
their insights.⁴⁴⁰

⁴³⁸ VP 2.142-152, Abhyankar and Limaye, eds., p. 28

⁴³⁹ There is the revelation of Brahman in the intuition of the *ṛṣi*s, and the
rendition of intuition by them into sequential Speech for the sake of revelation,
abhivṛyaktinimittāi, to other humans who do not see dharmas directly. See VP 1.5,
DCMS 32, p. 25 "sa maharṣibhir bhedenābhedasya pratipādayitum asakyaivād
abhivṛyaktinimittāi labdhakrame vāgātmarūpe prāpita...."

In this sense, Bhartṛhari intimates that knowledge is cumulative, and similarly one's perception becomes more acute with experience and practice.⁴⁴¹ The fruition of one's insights may seem slow at first, but it is certain, like instincts. Perhaps Bhartṛhari equates innateness with inevitability, in the manifestation of Brahman, or transformations in *prakṛti*, and ripening of substances: all proceeds from an original nature and takes its course. Like instinctive behavior, or scripture with the traditions based on it, intuition is a natural outcome that proceeds from accountable and unaccountable factors of things that are intertwined with and underlaid by the Word. Its sources are pervasive but invisible. Intuition, with world-binding efficiencies of words as its eyes is perceived in an appearance of differences: founded on the most traditional but fundamental substrata of the mind and society, it produces anew.

Abhinava likes to introduce *pratibhā* early in his works, perhaps in an act of devotion to *devī*, who holds the birth of creations within herself. In *TA*, 1.2 he honors the goddess,

I bow to the Supreme Goddess, the intuition which is consciousness,
the companion of Bhairava,
making her abode on the lotus-trident whose parts are the
cognizer, cognizing and cognition.⁴⁴²

⁴⁴⁰ *VP* 1.137, DCMS 32, pp. 226-227.

⁴⁴¹ *VP* 1.35, DCMS 35, p. 93. "*pareṣām asaṁākhyeyam abhyāsād eva jāyate/ manirūpyādivijñānam tadvidām nānumānikam.*" "Not explainable to others, it arises from practice; the knowledge of gems and gold coins, and so on, of those who know them, is not inferential."

⁴⁴² *TA* 1.2, vol. 1, p. 16.

In *TA* 3.66 he describes her:

She who is his independence from others (*ananyāpekṣitā*),
the Lord's immanence (*viśvātmava*),
they call her Goddess, the supreme intuition
The Unsurpassable.⁴⁴³

Abhinavagupta provides a psychological explanation for the Tantric quest:

Indeterminate consciousness (*nirvikalpa samvid*) is that which by its efficacy (*sāmarthya*) brings something within comprehension which by its subsequent suitability for a particular purpose (*arthakriyā-yogyatādivāsa*) finally acquires confirmation as a state of the Self and thus receives firm concurrence which precedes all successive determinate perceptions like blue etc., which are considered to be mutually incompatible (*virodhāvabhāsisammatamakramikavikalpyamānanīlādiniṣṭa-vikalpa-purva-bhāvi*) and pervades undivided all those blue, yellow perceptions etc. which are admitted incompatible (*tattadvikalpanīyaviruddhābhimata-nīlapītādyābhāsavibhāgi bhavati*), as for example in the integral perception of a picture (in which the difference of the various parts is not marked), or in the integral perception of one standing on top of a hill (*sikharastha*) or the integral perception of a peacock's tail.⁴⁴⁴

Determinate perceptions, however, rise and fall in the continuous substratum of indeterminate consciousness which has the power, the freedom to engender thoughts, and possess the store of conventional signs that compose conscious awarenesses. Abhinava continues:

⁴⁴³ *TA* 3.66, vol. 2, p. 423.

⁴⁴⁴ Jaideva Singh, tr., *Abhinavagupta: Parāṭmīkāvīvaraṇa: The Secret of Tantric Mysticism* (Benares: Motilal Banarsidass, 1988), pp. 92-93

Thus the one divine indeterminate consciousness (*pratibhā*) defined by my weighty statement is of this kind i.e. of unlimited nature, the very Self of all. Not only in the beginning and the end but in the intervening state also, she is the origin of the emergence of the other present, past and future determinate apprehensions. Those who are adept in discrimination have experienced *ālaya-vijñāna* i.e. unified or integral knowledge in this very way (i.e. in the way of indeterminate consciousness.).⁴⁴⁵

In the introductory verse of the *IPV*, Abhinava explains *pratibhā* as follows:

Reflection by means of one's own words is reasonable because it benefits all people; for it goes instantly into the heart of everyone. But an implied meaning [goes to the heart] of some people only, because [others] lack the reflection of the essence of Speech rising up from his intuition, and because light, being empty of the reflection of the essence of Speech, does not illuminate.⁴⁴⁶

In the *IPVV*, approximately at the same place among the introductory passages, Abhinava praises *pratibhā* as the *Gāyatrī*:

And in [Speech], **this**: just as the observable universe consisting of Speech, whose single body is verbalization in virtue of being pierced by experiences (*saṃvedana*) in the form of object-awareness (*parāmarśa*) characterized by a cognitive content (*pramiti*), blooms forth in stages, namely, an expectancy to opening up in the *paśyanti* state, the blossoming forth in the *madhyamā* state, the expansion (i.e., full bloom) in the *vaikhari* state as that which is being distinctively (*prathaktayā*)

⁴⁴⁵ Ibid, p. 94.

⁴⁴⁶ *IPV*, vol. 1., 1.1., p. 23.

objectified; just so, the *Gāyatrī* which is set above as the impeller in the form of intuition is the sunlight of knowledge ever arising in one's own heart, skilled in creations....

Therefore, at the time of performing a ritual action, the triad, characterized by the *Rg*, *Yajur*, and *Sāma*, and their ensemble, bloom forth in a state in which the priestliness of the Hotṛ, Adhvaryu, Udgātṛ and Brāhman is to be made vivid. Thus, its cause--a variety of things that are ordinary and fruitful, and scriptural--is stated as the substantiating example. Or, indeed, the *Gāyatrī* shines forth in the triad consisting of internal things and so on, and beyond in the triad consisting of *pasyantī* and so on. Or, the inward *Om* which consists in an injunction of the syllable *Om* in our mind is the triad, the *Rg* and so on. By this sight, which is the same as the syllable *Om*,

"Unaccompanied by *Om*, it proceeds at first and wastes away afterward," (*Manusmṛti* 2.74).

and this,

"All the Veda....," (*Kāśikāvṛtti* 2.15)

in [these passages], [it is said stated] that the *Gāyatrī* in the form of intuition at the beginning of an undertaking is the blooming forth in stages. For, this intuition becoming the sound itself in the *Sāma* s, whose form is music; becoming the string in the form of purpose, namely, the praising of the actions, the *gupa*, and the gods; it becomes vividly manifested in the *Yajur*, as the duty. The Veda is an instruction because it causes one to know what should be known, whose means are *dharma* and so on, with certainty. In the same way, the *Recognition of the Lord*, which is the heart made manifest (*sphuritaḥṛdaya*) will be revealed in this *Vivṛti*

This has been stated: Just as the world exists without differentiation in the ultimate Speech substance, differentiation being strung together in *pasyantī*; differentiation being revealed in *madhyamā*; and an appearance of differentiation becoming vivid as different objectified forms in *Vaikhari*, just so, it ordains different purposeful activities for different qualified people. Just so, in the place of the ultimate Speech substance, the perception of the author who is one with Śiva is the ultimate substance, being self-same with [Śiva]; it is expressed by the word "heart" because it is the substance (*sāratvāt*). It exists in the *sūtra* by the stringing together of different parts whose vibrant

manifestation is characterized by a fitness to become the highest object to be achieved by people....

But those of erroneous views arising from frequenting other shores, their delusions of such sort dispelled, their hearts at rest in the meaning of the verses and their commentary through the subcommentary in the form of a *vivṛti*. Gradually, through a repose in a constant meditation of the meanings of the verses, just as they succeed in being of an essence not different from the supreme heart in the form of the author's perceptions (*śāstrakārasamvedanarūpaparahṛdayāvibhaktatattvatayā*), just so, in intuition itself the bundle of duties realized in the commencement and termination of an action in stages, is the cause of success of all worldly activities. Thus, the awakening to the self, which rests in the heart of the teacher and becomes manifest gradually in the verses, and so on, comes into manifestation by accomplishing without a doubt or an argument what ought to be accomplished."⁴⁴⁷

Abhinava puts this sentiment to words with respect to his own commentarial work, the *Locana* which he must have conceived as an unfolding of an intuition that proceeds to its culmination in a clearly and vividly manifested form. Each *uddyota* ends with a concluding verse dedicated to *pratibhā*, *paśyantī*, *madhyamā*, and *vaikharī* respectively.⁴⁴⁸ He praises *pratibhā* with the following verse:

I praise the goddess Śivā,
God's blessed *śakti* of understanding,
who resides within her own self and who,
by the power which awakens within her
wakes instantly the universe.⁴⁴⁹

⁴⁴⁷ *IPVV* 1.1, p. 15-16. " *tasyām ca 'etat' itī paridr̥ṣyamānam vāñmayam... tat parapratiṣṭhādyajanavīṣayatāpatīyogyatālakṣaṇasphuraṇātmaśabdāśūtrāṇyā sthītam sūtre.* "

⁴⁴⁸ See translation in Ingalls, et al., trs., *DhāL*, pp. 199, 366, 674, 725.

⁴⁴⁹ *DhāL*, Ingalls, et al., trs., p. 199. These four benedictory verses are found in

When we look again to his works in poetics, it seems to have been an especially fortuitous coincidence that Ānandavardhana began speaking of poetry as a communication of hearts, and that the poet's intuition and imagination are fulfilled in the heart of the sensitive audience. There is little doubt that many of Abhinava's reflections on an aesthetic experience and the unity of the audience's imagination colored his perceptions of ritual and philosophy: we see that Abhinava's conceptions in poetics and religious philosophy, of the *kavi-sahṛdaya* bond linked by their creative imagination (*pratibhā*) and of *Śiva-jīva* (*pati-paśu*) bond linked by the goddess (*pratibhā devī*), are mutually and equally influencing. A unique turn of mind into the philosophy of reflection, *bimbapratibimba*, and the ubiquitous use of the mirror imagery, may well have developed from the reciprocity between the poet and actor as the creator, who is re-created in turn by the members of the audience.⁴⁵⁰ The devotional fervor which in Śaivism, and

VSS 97. pp. 172, 310, 603, 556. "I praise intuition, the goddess *Śivā*, reposing on the basis of herself; by whose power of awakening alone, instantly the world awakens." "I, Abhinavagupta, praise her who beholds this world, by whom abundant reality is strung differentiatedly as it blossoms forth." "I praise the supreme goddess, the Middle One, beloved of the Three-eyed, who grants that the divisions strung become vividly clear." "I praise the fourth power who sees objects of direct perception, granting that the flowing outwardly into a marvellous variety of things is made vivid." (my translations) Cf. n. 448 and text. Abhinava's descriptions and schema of the four goddesses, representing levels of speech (Speech), is the same in the *Locana* and *IPVV*.

⁴⁵⁰ The commingling of philosophy and poetics in the notion of *pratibhā* is clearly seen in the first pages of the *Abh*, as Abhinavagupta glosses the first verse of the *NS*, "*kaver apī svahṛdayāyatanaśatātadītapratibhābhīdhānaparavāgdevatānugrahoṣṭha-vicitrāpūrvanirmāṇasaktiśālīnaḥ prajāpater iva kāmajanitajagataḥ*" *Abh I*, Nagar ed., p. 4. "even of the poet whose great power to create original and wonderful things arises from the grace of the supreme deity of speech called intuition (*pratibhā*) ever arising from the basis of his own heart, as of Prajāpati by whom the world is created at will."

Tantrism in general, is expressible as an identity (*tādātmya, samāvesa*) with the Lord, in Abhinava extols human agency and purpose equally. Whatever the world may be, it is seen in a reflection and through the reflection of the individuals' soul. Whatever has been taught comes to fruition in the vividness of the individuals' contemplation of the foundations of one's thoughts and feelings.

In Bhartṛhari's thought, intuition is placed above polemical and logical reasoning as the means of knowledge because of its connections with language which reaches deeply into individual's conscious and sub-conscious mind, widely into the roots that are tradition, and transcendently into an underlying reality of Brahman. On this foundation, Abhinava richly adds ideas of creativity and mastery that arise out of the intuitive. *Pratibhā* is luminous as the becoming that unfolds in varied and marvellous stages to its completion. The endless universe is born from *devī pratibhā*, who is the fulfillment of the Lord's desires, " *icchātvam asya sā hi sisṛkṣoḥ prapadyate*. "⁴⁵¹ And endless universes are born from the intuition of the poet who is god in his world, and from the sympathetic spectators and readers who are also creators in their own right. Each human, being the illuminator like Śiva, is the author of his/her world of thought and imagination.

The theater is a universe in itself, and conversely the universe is a theater of countless spectators enacting it each from his/her own perspective. And from that perspective, as the lord and master of his own thought and imagination, an individual's surest counsel is the heart's

⁴⁵¹ *JA* 1.2 commentary, Dwivedi and Rastogi, eds., vol. 2., p. 16.

prescience that guides him in thought, speech, and action, as the *Gāyatrī* unfolds in the ensemble and performance of the *Ṛg, Sāma*, and *Yajur*, and the poet's intuition is carried out in the mental, vocal, and bodily performance of the actor, ending in the audience's empathetic reception. Abhinava's concept of this noumenon, which makes an aesthetic experience intense, sublime, joyful and finally purifying, also makes the theater the proper means of right and purposeful action. His persistent concern that it should be a place of delightful instruction is heard in the *Abhinavabhāratī*, "Does it teach in the manner of a teacher? No, he says. But, rather, it increases the intellect. It bestows one's own intuition of this kind. This is the meaning. And intuition is not wrong, he says. **The good:** because it begets intuitions of the good. He states the cause in this regard: because it does not depart from *dharma*."⁴⁵²

⁴⁵² *Abh* 1, Nagar ed., vol. 1, p. 39. "nanu kim guruvad upadesam karoṭi. nety āha. kintu buddhim vivardhayati. svapratibhām eva lādṛśīm vitaratīty arthah. na ca sā duṣṭā pratibhety āha--hitam-- hitapratibhājanakatvāt. atra hetum āha--yato dharmād anapeyam."

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